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FOREWORD 
While serving as an aviator in the US Navy—and just after submitting my life to 
Jesus Christ—I began to sense a call to academic work. In the decade following military 
service, I pursued master degrees in divinity and theology while continuing to fly as an 
airline pilot. Believing that I should continue studying at the doctoral level, I wondered 
how this would be done while still flying. The answer was given when I suddenly 
developed eye problems, lost my job as a result, but was provided a disability pension 
that would provide for my needs going forward. The next step was to learn some 
theological German and then begin applying to doctoral programs in the US. But while in 
Vienna for a short German course, providential circumstances put me in contact with 
Professor J. A. Loader, and this eventually resulted in the decision to pursue a Doctor of 
Theology at the University of Vienna. I could not have known then that studying in the 
German-speaking world would force an improvement in my German language ability 
sufficient to critically interact with several key fear-of-God works—especially Joachim 
Becker’s Gottesfurcht im Alten Testament. Now at the end of the program, it seems that 
the Lord allowed me to have contact with the science-based theological world so as to 
best understand the fear-of-God views that have their source in that world. I extend my 
heartfelt appreciation to Dr. Loader—my advisor—who was always gracious and 
available throughout the program. It should be said that the views expressed in this 
dissertation do not necessarily reflect his views or those of the University of Vienna; the 
general direction of the following work is largely driven by a worldview that is 
fundamentally different than the worldview of the secular academy. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Loader was extremely patient with me and was very flexible when I requested an abrupt 
mid-stream change of direction. He also cared enough to insist that I write with 
gentleness and respect. This last lesson—very much bound up with the greatest 
commandment—is probably the most valuable benefit obtained during my time in 
Vienna. I also thank Professors Heine and Pratscher who were always kind and 
accommodating, and thank as well the always-helpful and friendly library staff—
especially Mr. Hrabe and Mr. Szczypiorkovski—who did their best to make my research 
experience a pleasure. Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my fellow 
students Siegfried Kröpfel and Patrick Todjeras who shared the love of Christ and whose 
families extended wonderful hospitality on many occasions. Now, I praise God who 
supplied all my needs during several challenging and rewarding years in Austria  
 
Vienna, June 2009        Eric Engleman 
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ABSTRACT 
Scholars have many different views about what OT fear-of-God means, and these 
different views are reflected in the various translations of the expression in the many 
Bible versions. The variety of opinions is to a large extent a product of the understanding 
that the concept evolved as Israel’s religion evolved. The present work takes the position 
that the OT fear-of-God idea remains closer to the fear emotion/feeling than many 
critical-era scholars have allowed. While the expression may be used from time to time to 
signify the more refined elements of faith (e.g., reverence, awe, honor, worship), it is 
likely that the semantic center remains on the fear emotion/feeling. To build a case for 
this, several works that assume a critical reconstruction of Israel’s history are 
challenged—especially the influential form-critical work of Joachim Becker (Gottesfurcht 
im Alten Testament); the evidence that Becker musters to make the case that the fear-of-
God concept evolved is argued to be insufficient. The OT fear-of-God texts in their 
biblical contexts (opposed to critically-reconstructed contexts) are then analyzed from a 
conservative hermeneutical starting point, and the case is made that the semantic range of 
fear-of-God remains quite stable throughout the OT (and throughout the NT as well): 
“event” fear-of-God cases (i.e., narrative events that depict people fearing before a fear-
evoking object) demonstrate that “fear” (usually ) is semantically centered on the 
emotion/feeling of fear; “virtue” fear-of-God cases (i.e., cases in which fear-of-God is 
understood as a virtue [e.g., “For as the heavens are high above the earth, so great is his 
steadfast love toward those who fear him” Ps 103:11]) appear at times to connote the 
more abstract phenomena associated with Israel’s worship, yet never fail to denote the 
phenomenon of being afraid. An especially close look at the fear-of-God texts of 
Ecclesiastes will help to demonstrate this.  
 VIII 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Es gibt unter Gelehrten viele verschiedene Ansichten über die Bedeutung von 
Gottesfurcht im AT, und diese verschiedenen Ansichten finden ihren Ausdruck in den 
verschiedenen Übersetzungen des Begriffs in den vielen Bibelversionen. Viele meinen, 
das Wesen der Gottesfurcht verändere sich in dem Grad, in dem sich die Religion Israels 
veränderte. Diese vorliegende Arbeit geht davon aus, dass die Gottesfurcht, wie sie im 
Alten Testament verwendet wird, näher mit der Emotion (der Furcht) verbunden ist, als 
viele Vertreter der historisch-kritischen Schule glauben möchten. Während der Begriff 
zeitweise zur Beschreibung des Phänomens Religion (z.B. Ehrfurcht, Ehre, Anbetung, 
usw.) herangezogen wird, liegt die Hauptbedeutung des besprochenen Phänomens darin, 
dass man sich fürchtet. Um diese Theorie zu untermauern, müssen einige Werke, die die 
Geschichte Israels zu rekonstruieren versuchen, hinterfragt werden – allen voran die 
einflussreiche formkritische Studie Gottesfurcht im Alten Testament von Joachim Becker. 
Die Arbeit geht davon aus, dass die Argumente Beckers für seine These, der Begriff 
Gottesfurcht habe sich in seiner Bedeutung geändert, keine befriedigende Antwort geben. 
Die Texte, die für die Betrachtung der Gottesfurcht in Frage kommen, sind in ihrem 
biblischen Kontext zu sehen (was historisch-kritische Betrachtungen nicht immer 
gemacht haben) und von einem konservativen hermeneutischen Blickwinkel zu deuten. 
Der semantische Befund zur Gottesfurcht ist ziemlich konstant im gesamten AT (und 
ebenso im NT) und ist von zwei Kategorien gekennzeichnet: Die „Ereignis“- („Event“-) 
Gottesfurcht (d.h. Narrative, in denen Akteure sich vor einem Furcht einflößendem 
Objekt ängstigen) zeigt, dass „Furcht“ (normalerweise ) mit der Emotion Furcht 
verbunden ist, während die „Tugend“- („Virtue“-) Gottesfurcht (wo die Gottesfurcht als 
Tugend begriffen wird, z.B. in Ps 103:11 [„Denn so hoch der Himmel über der Erde ist, 
läßt er seine Gnade walten über die, so ihn fürchten“]) mehr abstrakte Bedeutungen haben 
kann, aber nie auf die Emotion Furcht verzichtet. Ein genauer Blick auf die Texte im 
Buch Prediger soll helfen, diese These zu untermauern. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his 1926 lecture “Religion in the Making” Alfred North Whitehead said: “If the 
modern world is to find God, it must find him through love and not through fear, with the 
help of John and not of Paul.”1 While this message was given to a unitarian congregation, 
it echoed a growing opinion in Europe and American that the uses of threats which 
engender fear were no longer an appropriate way to present the Gospel of Jesus Christ. 
This opinion was likely to some extent a reaction against Catholic and Protestant 
preaching that for centuries had concentrated heavily on judgment and hell. There was 
also the growing influence of higher criticism which tended to degrade the veracity of the 
biblical testimony of God—and, as a result, the threat of God. In recent years, post-
modern views—which are more or less rooted in the epistemological assumptions of 
modernity—have continued to put a veil between the testimony of Scripture and its 
readers. The recent emergent church movement, for example, which claims to be taking 
Evangelicalism in an entirely new and fresh direction, in general tries very hard to 
downplay the disturbing elements of the Bible that address the subjects of God’s wrath, 
judgment, and the place that God has prepared for those who reject his Son. Because of 
these movements in the last century or more, there is in the minds of many less to fear 
from God.  
Many who are in agreement with this trend have made their case from Scripture; 
they have generally understood that if God is love, then he cannot be the God of wrath 
and judgment that the Bible often depicts. Therefore, the many texts that speak of the 
judging God of wrath must be interpreted in light of the overriding truth that God is love 
and that God would not bring harm to anyone. A by-product of this is to perceive in the 
many fear-of-God texts that depict fear as a virtue more of the refined phenomena that 
worshippers manifest in response to God’s love, and not the actual emotion/feeling of fear 
that men and women feel when threatened.2 But in my view, the Bible greatly resists this 
kind of interpretation—for in both the OT and the NT, there is a continuous tone of 
warning against disbelief and disobedience. And this tone is always heard in the 
atmosphere of God’s love and his unwillingness that anyone should perish. In other 
words, the warning tone (which consists of many individual threats) is meant to serve as 
                                                 
1
 Whitehead, 1926. The lecture was given at Boston’s King’s Chapel. (Part two “Religion 
and dogma,” sec. “The quest for God.”) 
2
 Throughout the dissertation I will distinguish between “event” fear-of-God and “virtue” 
fear-of-God. The former is simply a narrative event of someone fearing before some kind of 
epiphany of God or a display of his power (e.g., Exod 20:18); the latter simply signifies a god-
pleasing virtue of a man or a woman or a group (e.g., “a woman who fears the LORD is to be 
praised” [Prov 31:30b]), or indicates a positive value in general (e.g., “The fear of the LORD is 
the beginning of knowledge” [Prov 1:7a]).  
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an effective tool—among many other effective tools—of evangelism. Whitehead 
mentioned that the world would best find God’s love through John and not Paul; but the 
difference between them that Whitehead suggests is misleading—for John, just like Paul, 
wrote of the blessings of God as well as his curses. The allegory, for example, of the vine 
and the branches is terrifying in its implications for those who do not bear fruit (John 
15:1-17); in John’s first epistle, he makes it clear that the one who hates his brother or 
sister will by no means have eternal life in God (3:15); and the book of Revelation is full 
of warnings against disbelief and disobedience: Christ will one day judge all human 
beings and condemn to the “lake of fire” anyone whose name is not found in the “book of 
life” (20:15). But despite this evidence plus much else in the NT, many today claim that 
there is nothing to fear from God. 
The question that the current work attempts to answer is this: is there any 
significant evidence in the OT that the fear-of-God idea evolved from the emotion/feeling 
of fear to something more refined and abstract such that one would be justified in 
believing that the NT no longer signified any of the fear emotion/feeling in the virtue 
fear-of-God cases there? My answer (my thesis) is this: in all OT cases, in which a clear 
Hebrew word for “fear” is used to signify a virtue, the primary intended meaning (which 
does not exclude other meanings) is the fear emotion/feeling—and this feature holds true 
from the earliest parts of the OT to the latest. While virtue fear-of-God may to a 
significant degree signify various states of the heart/mind/soul as well as god-pleasing 
actions that are manifested in a right relationship with God, the fear emotion/feeling is 
always assumed to undergird them all and to be the primary virtue that is understood by 
the use of the expression. Whatever other relational or behavioral phenomena that virtue 
fear-of-God might connote, it never fails to denote the phenomenon of being afraid.3  
In order to justify the validity of this thesis, the following procedures are now 
undertaken: first, the opinions of others who have thought about the subject will be 
considered; views from the pre-critical era will be examined followed by views from the 
critical era. There will be an especially rigorous interaction with the critical-era work of J. 
Becker. This is necessary because of the great influence of his Gottesfurcht im Alten 
Testament. Second, I will consider all of the OT fear-of-God texts that use  (and many 
that use other words as well) and present—especially with the virtue fear-of-God cases—
what their linguistic and contextual features reveal about a possible evolution in the 
concept. In order to more graphically highlight some of the reasons that indicate that fear 
remains in OT fear-of-God, I will present a closer examination of the fear-of-God 
passages in the book of Ecclesiastes. Finally, there will be a brief consideration of the NT 
                                                 
3
 The use here of “connote” and “denote” are borrowed from Clines, 2003, who used them 
in his own fear-of-God study of Job 28:28. 
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to see if the virtue of the fear emotion/feeling expressed before God is really weakened or 
altogether absent. If fear remains there, then this will lend some credibility to the notion 
that fear-of-God did not significantly evolve in meaning in the OT. But before getting 
started, a few words are in order about my method and general assumptions.  
METHOD 
Assumptions 
My method for investigating fear-of-God in the OT is conservative and trusting. 
When I say “conservative,” I mean that my method reflects a very high regard for the 
Bible and a belief that God has provided words that speak truthfully—both historically 
and theologically. When I say “trusting,” I mean that I have committed this work to God 
and trust that his Word is fully able to deliver through the written form of verbal 
communication his will for human beings—including his will regarding the emotions and 
feelings that men and women ought to exhibit when in relationship with him. I trust that 
God has lovingly spoken to his earthly children and has not left them alone and allowed 
them to only have their hopes set upon the schemes of human beings. With this as a 
methodological foundation, I cannot agree with many of the basic tenets of higher 
criticism. I believe that all methods built upon this epistemologically skeptical foundation 
are extremely limited in their ability to discern the deepest Scriptural truths—if just for 
the reason that they are disallowed by that foundation to state any propositions about the 
“invisible God” (Col 1:15) or about his will for human beings. J. Barton—very much a 
higher critic himself—feels this stricture, and, in view of the massive amount of higher 
critical study that has raised far more questions than it answered, confesses that the search 
for the right method of studying the Bible will never end.4 But a mission that begins with 
                                                 
4
 Barton, 1996, 5, writes, “The primary thesis is that much harm has been done in biblical 
studies by insisting that there is, somewhere, a ‘correct’ method which, if only we could find it, 
would unlock the mysteries of the text. From the quest for this method flow many evils: for 
example, the tendency of each newly-discovered method to excommunicate its predecessors 
(never clearer than with the latest, canon criticism), and the tendency to denigrate the ‘ordinary’ 
reader as ‘non-critical’. I try to argue—not in any one place, but wherever the issue arises—that 
all of the methods being examined have something in them, but none of them is the ‘correct’ 
method which scholars are seeking. This can be done at a simple level, by showing how each in 
turn falls short of perfection; but my argument goes further than this. I believe that the quest for a 
correct method is, not just in practice but inherently, incapable of succeeding. The pursuit of 
method assimilates reading a text to the procedures of technology: it tries to process the text, 
rather than to read it. Instead, I propose that we should see each of our ‘methods’ as a codification 
of intuitions about the text which may occur to intelligent readers. Such intuitions can well arrive 
at truth; but it will not be the kind of truth familiar in the natural sciences. Reading the Old 
Testament, with whatever aim in view, belongs to the humanities and cannot operate with an idea 
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the belief that the mission will never be fulfilled is surely “meaningless” and a “chasing 
after the wind” (Eccl 2:11); this is invariably the outcome when one uses Bible study 
methods that build upon higher criticism and its assumptions.5 In fact, the employment of 
them as tools to find ultimate meaning about God, life, and the world was just what 
Qoheleth warned against: for he concentrated his pursuit of understanding and happiness 
on things “under the sun,” but found it all lbh. His suggested solution—which seemed to 
be almost a concession when all else had failed—was one that “goads” our eyes off the 
things that are “fading away” (i.e., away from the visible things of the world) and toward 
the (invisible) eternal God who alone provides meaning and purpose to the lives of human 
beings. For Qoheleth, it all came down to faith. His way of saying this was: “Fear God 
and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man” (NIV). Qoheleth had 
faith that God is (“fear God!”) and that God had spoken clearly enough for men and 
women to know his will for their lives (“keep his commandments!”). A conservative and 
                                                                                                                                                  
of watertight, correct method.” I believe Barton is right in that he has seen the methods that have 
been created and used to study the Bible fall “short of perfection”; but even though he suggests 
that OT studies should be undertaken more with a humanities mindset, the foundation that he 
assumes to be the starting point remains at heart scientific (i.e., empiricist)—so a conservative 
method like my own is not seriously considered. (In Barton, 1998, 17, he insists that—given the 
current state of biblical studies—“the cure is more criticism, not less.”) In reality, Barton is way 
off the mark when he suggests that the critical methods approach “perfection”; I will concede that 
conservative methods approach perfection asymptotically (i.e., [mathematically speaking] always 
approaches, but never arrives), but critical methods cannot be said to do the same because the 
more they are applied, the more they lead the exegete who employs them from the truth. In other 
words, critical methods cause one to diverge from a right understanding of God’s message in the 
Bible. Young expresses a similar thought in his introduction to Calvin’s commentary on Isaiah 
(Calvin, 1948, ix): “One who can look upon the prophecy of Isaiah as nothing more than a 
product of the religious genius of the ancient Hebrews has thereby excluded any possibility of 
ever arriving at a correct interpretation. For the prophet claims that his message has come from 
God, and the earnest interpreter must take into account this psychological conviction upon the 
prophet’s part. To ignore this conviction—as is done in so much modern literature upon the 
subject—and to place the prophecy on a parallelism with other religious literature of antiquity; to 
regard it, in other words, as nothing more than the fruit of the reflection of a deeply religious 
mind, is to shut oneself out entirely from obtaining a proper understanding.” On the other hand, 
conservative “pre-critical” methods that assume the Bible to be reliable and understandable cause 
one to approach the truth. When I say that conservative methods “approach” the truth, this is not 
at all a confession of relativism based upon epistemological skepticism, but a simple taking into 
account the fallen-ness and imperfection of spirit-filled conservative exegetes; as Paul admitted 
about those of us who believe, we “see in a mirror, dimly” (1 Cor 13:12). Regarding the fear-of-
God topic, a conservative reading of the pertinent passages brings the strong sense that God’s 
holiness vis-à-vis man’s un-holiness gives men and women good reason to experience the 
emotion/feeling of fear before God; but the critical opinion (most exhaustively expressed by 
Becker—see below) moves the meaning of fear-of-God steadily away from the emotion/feeling of 
fear because of incorrect epistemology that then forces an incorrect theology and anthropology. 
5
 See FN 157 concerning Rylaarsdam’s remarks about higher criticism’s assumptions. 
 5 
trusting approach to the Scripture can get one past the impasse that critical methods create 
because it comes from a position of faith and trust: faith that God is and trust that God has 
lovingly revealed his will for human beings. Biblical hermeneutics might be considered a 
combination of science (in the sense of careful and methodical inquiry) and art, but it is 
above all, as Osborne points out, a spiritual endeavor.6  
True understanding—as far as God allows it—of God and his Word only comes to 
those who “tremble” at his Word; that is, those who think highly enough of God to trust 
that he has provided a reliable and readable Word for his children on earth. Those who 
come before him humbly and reverently—indeed, with even some fear—will be blessed 
by God and given special insight.7 The Bible student who from the outset admits his or 
her own contingency before the eternal and omnipotent God is one who will understand 
his or her perilous situation: “[we] are not [our] own” (1 Cor 6:19); we did not choose to 
come into this world and our destination after this world is not ultimately up to us. 
Therefore, God is to be feared.   
To study the Bible one must come from some starting point. Many who employ the 
modern methods and the post-modern methods that flow out of higher criticism’s 
epistemological base, however, usually do not plainly set out their assumptions at the 
outset.8 As a result, a certain circularity in reasoning can often be perceived.9 The form-
                                                 
6
 Osborne, 1991, 5, calls biblical hermeneutics, first, a science in that “it provides a logical, 
orderly classification of the laws of interpretation” (I do not think that Osborne here accepts the 
rigid empiricist epistemology that of often assumed to undergird “science”). Second, 
hermeneutics is an art, “for it is an acquired skill demanding both imagination and an ability to 
apply the ‘laws’ to selected passages or books.” Finally—and most important for Osborn—
“hermeneutics when utilized to interpret Scripture is a spiritual act, depending upon the leading of 
the Holy Spirit. Modern scholars too often ignore the sacred dimension and approach the Bible 
purely as literature, considering the sacral aspect to be almost a genre. Yet human efforts can 
never properly divine the true message of the Word of God.” 
7
 This “insight” is sometimes called “illumination.” Klein writes, “For his part, God 
provides the resource for such obedient understanding of his truth: the illumination of the Holy 
Spirit. A corollary of the requirement of faith is the regeneration of the Holy Spirit. That is, once 
people have committed their lives in faith to Jesus as Lord, the Bible speaks of a work that God 
performs in them. This internal operation enable believers to perceive spiritual truth, an ability 
unavailable to unbelievers (cf. 1 Cor 2:6-16; 2 Cor 3:15-18). This illuminating work of the Spirit 
does not circumvent nor allow us to dispense with the principles of hermeneutics and the 
techniques of exegesis. It does mean that a dynamic comprehension of the significance of 
Scripture and its application to life belongs uniquely to those indwelt by the Holy Spirit. Though 
scholars possess an arsenal of methods and techniques with which to decipher the meaning of the 
biblical texts, interpretation falls short of its true potential without the illumination of the Spirit. 
Neither methodology nor the Spirit operates in isolation from the other.” 
8
 Barr, 1982, 9, Barr accuses the conservative scholar “when talking outside [his or her] 
fundamentalist constituency” of the same: “I do not say that he shares the same presuppositions 
[of the critical scholar], for he very likely does not: but as a rule he conceals his presuppositions, 
 6 
critical work of J. Becker (which will be reviewed at length below) is no exception: for 
him, a literary form (for example, the Deuteronomistic form) contains fear-of-God 
instances that have certain meanings. These meanings are justified to some extent by the 
fact that these fear-of-God cases occur in certain linguistic forms (verb, noun, adjective, 
etc.). But because these linguistic forms are mainly run-of-the-mill forms that—at least at 
first glance—would not seem to justify any significant semantic difference, the reader is 
left with the sense that the only reason that the linguistic form justifies any change in 
meaning is simply because it is found in a certain OT literary form. In other words, a 
certain fear-of-God case in a certain literary form will have a certain meaning; why? 
Answer: because it occurs in a certain linguistic form. But why should an unremarkable 
linguistic form make any difference? Answer: because it occurs in the literary form. The 
reader who is unfamiliar with basic higher-critical assumptions will sense the circularity 
that comes about when the most influential factor in the writer’s reasoning process is not 
made plain. Unspoken—yet operating in the background—is the form-critical assumption 
(that is shared by all higher criticisms) that Israelite religion evolved from primitive fear 
                                                                                                                                                  
for he knows very well that, if he sets them in the forefront, he will only depreciate the value of 
his own scholarly work.” Barr has a valid point here: there are not a few conservative scholars 
who think of themselves as being evangelical and, at the same time, as being a fully-legitimate 
part of the “academy” (that is, the wider [and much bigger—although it represents a much smaller 
percentage of the worldwide church] academic world that generally disregards scholarly work that 
assumes supernatural causation). It is my understanding that the biblical scholar cannot 
legitimately operate in both worlds at the same time: from the ground up these worlds are too 
different. There is, so to speak, no “middle ground.” When an evangelical undertakes biblical 
study with one of the methods of higher criticism, he or she tacitly admits the validity of the 
underlying assumptions of the method and therefore accidentally admits the non-validity of his or 
her own evangelical position. An evangelical can certainly have something to say “when talking 
outside his own fundamentalist constituency,” but he ought to do so honestly—and let the cards 
fall where they may. 
9
 This point is admitted by Barton, 1996, 5: “I try to show how each method, however 
modestly it is applied, always brings in its wake some kind of circularity in argument.” Because 
of this subjectivity, Barton says that biblical criticism should be understood as “non-scientific and 
needs to be evaluated with the tools proper to the humanities, not the sciences” (6). This last point 
is a step in the right direction, but to leave theology under the humanities tacitly still puts man on 
top. There needs to be an additional step, and that is to once again make theology a general field 
of study in its own right—not subjected to the limitations of science and humanities. But this call 
by Barton toward the “non-scientific” is not at all like he is suggesting that the “scientific” (i.e., 
epistemologically empirical) foundation of higher criticism should be scrapped; that remains 
firmly in place. What he does mean is that we should be “non-scientific” enough to live with the 
reasoning circularity that is inherent in higher-critical methods. In other words, we should not be 
critical of circular reasoning. Therefore, higher criticism’s permanence is assured, because—
according to Barton’s suggested criteria—it can only be judged according to taste and not 
according to truth. 
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of the natural elements to refined worship of their “posited” God.10 The literary form that 
is used by Becker is not just a simple literary genre (poetry, wisdom, etc.); in reality his 
idea of genre includes significant changes to the history and to the works and words of 
God that the OT testifies about. Basic to form criticism is the assumption that the religion 
evolved—and this assumption is really what provides the main interpretational force in 
Becker’s monograph; if the religion evolved, then the concept of fear-of-God must have 
also evolved.11  
This evolutionary theory—as understood by the form critics—is clearly built upon 
philosophies that contain, as Bartholomew points out, an “ethos of suspicion towards 
Christianity.”12 Modern science—of which higher criticism is a part—is not only 
epistemologically blind to God, but consciously seeks to exclude God: as Dietrich and 
Link confess, “Die Wissenschaft braucht [Gott] nicht mehr.”13 Crenshaw confirms this 
when he admits that higher biblical criticism is one of the factors (along with Darwinian 
biology, Freudian metapsychology, Marxist ideology, etc.) that has resulted in an 
“emptying of the universe” of the existence of God.14 This desire of higher criticism to 
empty the supernatural out of religion is clearly understood—and supported—by the 
Committee for the Scientific Examination of Religion:  
The methods developed for the study of religion in the nineteenth century were 
“scientific” in the strict sense. They were based on the modern understanding of 
genesis and change, reproducible cause and effect, and inductive and empirical 
standards of proof. There was a search for scientific explanations that would 
interpret both biological and moral life in terms of evolution. In a nutshell, 
scientific explanations began to replace religious explanations. Belief in the 
miraculous was seriously weakened by the revolution in historical criticism, a term 
that would later come to be applied to any canon of literature, religious or secular. 
The historical school of criticism, which began in Germany in the early 
nineteenth century (but with strong eighteenth-century antecedents), regarded the 
Bible as a “human” work—a work of the religious imagination. It showed, 
                                                 
10
 Rudolf Otto—whose ideas about “God” are appropriated by Becker—used “posited” to 
indicate that the reality of God is not objective but subjective (see my p. 45 and Otto, 1958, 113.)  
11
 I do not criticize here the idea of the evolution of the Israelite religion per se, but the kind 
of evolution that is purported to have occurred by the form critics. The religion of YHWH of 
course evolved, for example, from a foundational covenant with Abraham to the religion of an 
entire nation based upon the complex laws and the covenants given by God through Moses. The 
biblical text depicts God developing his covenant people as he saw fit; on the other hand, form 
criticism in the main understands that the evolution of the Israelite religion (and all other 
religions) occurred through human reactions to natural phenomena and through human agency. 
God as a supernatural agent of causation is epistemologically off-limits. Therefore, any evolution 
in the cult must be explained in terms of the psychological and sociological phenomena of human 
beings and not in terms of the will of God. 
12
 Bartholomew, 1998, 86. 
13
 Dietrich and Link, 2000, 9. 
14
 Crenshaw, 2005, 25. 
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laboriously, that most of the books of the Bible—from Moses to John—were not 
written by the persons whose names they bear. The critics demonstrated with 
incredible deftness that the books of the Bible had been modified from earlier 
sources and that many of these sources lay outside the Jewish and Christian 
traditions. 
Perhaps most challenging of all, historical criticism called into question not 
only the words and teachings of biblical personalities, but even their historical 
identity. Much of the Bible, on this view, was regarded as mythology, not history—
valuable for what it reveals about the culture of a period of human history but not as 
a guide for ethics, science, and society.15  
The higher-critics’ skepticism regarding the miracles and the words of God that the 
biblical text records is normally not confessed up-front; perhaps they assume readers will 
already know about it. On the other hand, the omission may be a way to avoid legitimate 
debate over the appropriateness of their limitations on what is reasonable and what is fit 
to be classified as knowledge. Becker accomplished his OT fear-of-God study using the 
form-critical method and all the philosophical assumptions that undergird it. He, 
therefore, could not consider the fear-of-God emotion/feeling as one that was really 
exhibited by men and women before the true God who really did reveal himself in 
history. With the Bible being a “human” work (a “work of the religious imagination” as 
the Committee for the Scientific Examination of Religion understands it—see block quote 
just above), all Becker can do is theorize what fear-of-God might have meant to those 
who imagined God—whether primitive homo sapiens who trembled before thunderstorms 
and volcanoes, or the later devotees of YHWH who worshiped at the cultic center of 
Jerusalem. So there is no way with this method to get to a right evaluation of the fear 
emotion/feeling that one might have before God if God—as the Bible describes him—
really does exist. 
My starting point is the Bible.16 I assume that it is a reliable testimony to how the 
creation came to be, God’s actions in the creation, and his will for the creation.17 The 
                                                 
15
 CSER colloquium. Threat to enlightenment: The challenges to the historical-critical 
method, 2006, 17. 
16
 In the name of truth and fairness to others, one should in study of the Bible admit one’s 
presuppositions. Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, 1993, 100, write at length about the importance 
of being open about presuppositions and about what can be contained within those 
presuppositions. Drawing upon D. S. Ferguson’s views on the subject (Biblical Hermeneutics—
pg. 12), they present the four following categories: “(1) informational: the information one 
already possesses about a subject prior to approaching it; (2) attitudinal: the disposition one brings 
in approaching a topic, also termed prejudice, bias, or predisposition; (3) ideological: both 
generally, the way we view the total complex of reality (world view, frame of reference); and (4) 
methodological: the actual approach one takes in explaining a given subject. Possible approaches 
include scientific, historical, and inductive.” 
17
 In this dissertation I will not intentionally use any ambiguity that could be had in words 
or sentences. In other words, I will not play “language games” with my readers. When I say, for 
example, that the Bible is a “reliable testimony,” I do not mean “reliable” to be taken in some 
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Bible, being God’s special revelation for humankind, is God’s Word. The Bible is not 
God, but it has the authority of God in that it came from God—and, therefore, men and 
women are obligated to know what the Bible says and to apply what it says to their 
lives.18 With this belief that the Bible is God’s Word, and with a willingness to come 
under its authority, then one can have confidence that God will provide the insight 
necessary to understand what it says. This starting point, however, is not at all arbitrary—
for the Bible provides the answers to the greatest questions of men and women, far 
surpasses all the literary creations of human beings, gives God’s Word that there is indeed 
life after death, and is the best seller—by far—of all time. As Peter well said when many 
were leaving Jesus, “Lord, to whom can we go? You have the words of eternal life” (John 
6:68). What Peter saw in Christ was his majesty, his truth, his self-sacrifice, his words of 
unsurpassed wisdom and authority, his miracles, and his love. If Jesus is not the way, then 
we have no hope, for all other gods of other religions (if they indeed profess a god or 
gods) are practically dust by comparison.  
To make the truths in the Bible one’s foundation for studying the Bible is to 
acknowledge that one cannot stand outside the universe to peer in and judge the universe 
and its creator. I am always, in reality, in the universe and always a part of its 
contingency. Even if I am the wisest man in the world, no matter how much of the world I 
put in my crucible for observation, there is always more that is behind me—unseen and 
unknown. This means that I cannot create a foundation that explains all reality; the 
foundation upon which I rest my ultimate ideas and hopes and fears must be, by 
definition, a reality that is not of myself, but of the creator-God. Therefore, it is simply a 
matter of looking for this reality, identifying this reality, and laying this reality in as a 
foundation to one’s life. The God of the Bible must be this reality, for no one or nothing 
else compares. But for “theologians” and others to hold to philosophical assumptions that 
                                                                                                                                                  
post-modern sense of “reliable for me” or “reliable for the church”; instead, I mean that it is 
“reliable” because it is truthful in its representation of testimony and historical events—including 
events of God and prophets speaking words that foretell the future. I might also define how I am 
using the word “truthful,” but I do not think that is necessary; for normal people (who speak, in 
this case, English), the meaning of the term is self evident. 
18
 The first article of the Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics (produced by 
conservative/evangelical scholars—see Explaining hermeneutics: A commentary on the Chicago 
Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, 1983) says: “We affirm that the normative authority of Holy 
Scripture is the authority of God Himself, and is attested by Jesus Christ, the Lord of the Church. 
We deny the legitimacy of separating the authority of Christ from the authority of Scripture, or of 
opposing the one to the other.” This Evangelical statement stands in stark contrast with Hermann 
Gunkel (upon whom Becker builds his fear-of-God work): “Thus the opinion that the Old 
Testament is a safe guide to true religion and morality cannot any longer be maintained.” In 
Gunkel’s opinion, this is so because the OT is simply a “roguish piece of [Hebrew] folk-lore” 
(Gunkel, 1928, 16, 17).  
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necessarily exclude God (and his right to intervene in the occurrences of nature that he 
himself ordained) is the greatest folly; in this case, the only ultimate reality that can ever 
be had will be something necessarily created by humans; but this gives no hope at all. So 
much of the willingness to search for the true ultimate foundation is based upon the 
understanding that God is good and that he will provide a true and understandable guide 
for his children. When a person so inclined finds the Bible, he or she accepts it with joy, 
and considers the words to be faithful and true. In other words, that person considers the 
Bible to be innocent, holy, and pure—that is, a reflection of God’s holy perfection and of 
God’s ability to provide and preserve information that is free from untruth and anything 
evil.19 His Word “will stand forever” (Isa 40:8) and “Heaven and earth will pass away, 
but my words will not pass away” (Matt 24:35). So there are good reasons to expect a 
faithful Word from God and to find that Word in the book that we call the Bible. As for 
me, I will assume the innocence of the Bible—until proven otherwise—and continue to 
use it as the foundation by which I understand all of reality, including fear-of-God.20  
                                                 
19
 Not only the Bible is considered to be good, but God—as described in the Bible—is 
considered to be perfect, holy, and always just. The tendency for some to call the goodness of 
God into question is not something I will do. When, for example, Crenshaw writes, “a cruel streak 
exists in the biblical depiction of God,” and goes on to call God’s actions as depicted in the OT 
“fiendish,” “bestial,” “monstrous,” “harsh,” “savage,” “immoral,” and “evil,” (see Crenshaw, 
2005, 178, 179), I understand this opinion to be a great mischaracterization of God as well as a 
misunderstanding of the basic biblically-based doctrines of God and man that show that God has 
the full right to judge humans, humans are guilty of sin and ought to be judged, and God has the 
best interest of humans always in mind—for he takes “no pleasure in the death of the wicked” 
(Ezek 33:11). This is not to say that I do not find myself perplexed and distressed occasionally by 
the actions of God as described in the Bible or by what God allows in everyday life; but I give 
him the benefit of the doubt, knowing that—even though I cannot understand his ways in my very 
limited view—he is always working everything out for the good. If the Lord gives, he is not evil if 
he decides to take away; either way, one should say—as did Job—“blessed be the name of the 
LORD” (Job 1:21).  
20
 Walter Kaiser, 1980, 7, has the same view regarding the presumption of innocence of the 
Bible: “For our part we believe all texts should be innocent of all charges of artificiality until they 
are proven guilty by clear external witnesses. The text should first be dealt with on its own terms. 
All editorial impositions designated by modernity (derived not from real sources—to which 
evangelicals have no objection—but rather deduced from broad philosophical and sociological 
impositions over the text) which can be credited with atomizing the text and deleting the 
connectors allegedly assigned to pious or misguided redactors must be excluded from the 
discipline until validated by evidence. Biblical theology will always remain an endangered species 
until the heavy-handed methodology of imaginary source criticism, history of tradition, and 
certain types of form criticism are arrested.” Whether one is coming from a critical perspective or 
a perspective of faith, Kaiser goes on to say that one should be careful to not read into the biblical 
text one’s particular “axe to grind”; instead, “all criteria should approach the issue in a similar 
fashion to the American system of jurisprudence: a text is innocent until proven guilty by known 
data provided by sources whose truthfulness on those points can be demonstrated or which share 
the same general area of contemporaneity as the texts under investigation and whose performance 
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General Hermeneutical Issues 
Hermeneutical issues will only be discussed briefly here and in general. One can 
consult the numerous conservative sources that are available on the subject.21 In view of 
what has been said just above, I believe God has made the Bible highly readable. Once 
again, this is a reflection of his love and his willingness to transmit an understandable 
Word to the human beings whom he created. The Bible can be understood because it has 
clarity and because God has given common sense to men and women. “Clarity” and 
“common sense” are important concepts, so a few words should be said regarding both. 
First, the doctrine of “clarity” (or “perspicuity”) which was strongly emphasized by the 
reformers simply claims that the Bible is understandable—especially in regards to its 
main message of salvation (see, e.g., Deut 6:6-7 [teachable to children]; Ps 19:7 [makes 
wise the simple]; 119:130 [gives light to the simple]; Matt 12:3-5; 19:14; 22:31 [Jesus 
assumed people should have known the Scriptures]; John 3:10 [Nicodemus should have 
known the Scriptures]; and Heb 2:3-4 [the Gospel was clearly announced]). There are, of 
course, many parts of Scripture that are challenging: God communicates through 
“riddles” (e.g., Judg 14:14; Ezek 17:2-24; John 3:3-9; see Num 12:8; Prov 1:6) and 
dreams (e.g., Gen 28:12; 31:10-12; 37:5-11; 1 Kings 3:5-15; Dan 7; Matt 1:20-21; 2:19; 
see Num 12:6; Joel 2:28; Acts 2:17); his ways are, as Qoheleth says, “deep, very deep” 
                                                                                                                                                  
record of producing reliable data has been good” (28). It might be noted here that both critics and 
conservatives appeal to “evidence”—so evidence per se is not the issue; rather, the epistemology 
that determines what is allowable for evidence is the issue. In the conservative view, the 
epistemological base (and, in many cases, the worldview) of higher-critical scholars precludes an 
honest validation of the evidence; on the other hand, the consideration and the handling of the 
evidence which accords most accurately to the way things really are is best enabled by an 
epistemology that allows God to be known through the evidences of reason, subjective states of 
the heart/soul, and the order (i.e., the design) that characterizes the physical universe. In a word, 
the epistemology of the higher critic is simply too skeptical, and it prompts views towards the 
biblical text that are very different than that of a conservative. To illustrate this, one can contrast 
what Otto Kaiser, 1977, says below (the subject being the reliability of the biblical ascription of 
certain words to certain OT prophets) with what Walter Kaiser has already said above. O. Kaiser 
writes: “Establishing which individual sayings are to be ascribed to each particular prophet 
depends on a careful delimitation of the units with application of strict criteria about literary 
types, a comparative investigation of vocabulary, style and ideas, and not least of the general 
historical picture of the period. In view of the situation just sketched, it is methodologically 
justified to work with the postulate that it is not the inauthenticity but the authenticity of the 
sayings ascribed to the prophets that needs to be proved” (pp. 208, 209, emphasis mine). For O. 
Kaiser, the biblical historical testimony is false unless proven true; for W. Kaiser, it is true unless 
proven false. I will side with W. Kaiser because it is the fair thing to do.  
21
 For example, Fee and Stuart, 2003, Goldsworthy, 2007, Hartill, 1960, Hendricks and 
Hendricks, 2007, Kaiser and Silva, 1994, Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, 1993, Maier, 1994, 
Osborne, 1991, Ramm, 1998, Zuck, 1991. 
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(Eccl 7:24); how/when prophecies are fulfilled is sometimes difficult to know (that is why 
the Ethiopian Eunuch [Acts 8:26-39] needed help); Jesus often spoke figuratively (and 
even the apostles needed him to interpret—see Matt 13:33-36; John 16:25-30); Paul’s 
letters were, according to Peter, “hard to understand” (2 Pet 3:16); and Paul exclaimed, 
“who has known the mind of the Lord” (Rom 11:33-35). In addition to challenging issues 
within the Bible, there also have been the challenges of language and culture: translation 
from source language to target language is imperfect and the understanding of how a 
biblical teaching to one culture applies to another culture is imperfect as well.22 But the 
phenomenon of fear-of-God flows in the main out of the big-picture categories of the 
Bible that are literarily and theologically easy to apprehend—and these categories 
confirm what is already known by human beings through the general revelation: God’s 
“eternal power” and “divine nature” are made “plain” to them (Rom 1:19-20); they know 
who they are in comparison—that is, weak and temporal creatures (implicit in Rom 1:18-
20); they know that they are sinful and are therefore guilty before God (Rom 1:32); they 
know that there is a problem and that God (who they know to be good) has a solution to 
this problem—but most, nevertheless, reject this solution (Rom 2:8) and incur God’s 
“wrath and fury” as a result. Jesus Christ is the solution and he is only known through the 
clear presentation of the gospel in the NT. The “knowability of the literal sense” of the 
gospel is achievable because God has presented the gospel in an easy to read and 
understandable way:23 Jesus is the son of God, Jesus died for sinners, and faith in Jesus 
brings rescue from God’s condemnation; this is the perspicuous gospel message. When 
one knows that the “solution” came at such a high cost to God, then one ought to be 
aware at the deepest level of the “fearful prospect of judgment” and the “fire of fury that 
will consume [God’s] adversaries” (Heb 10:27). That is, in view of the clear message that 
God is, that God sent his Son to redeem, and that God will judge finally those who reject 
his Son, one is a fool to not fear God—for the consequences of disbelief are so horrible. 
The question of perspicuity must be considered in view of God’s love and God’s purpose 
of providing the Bible in the first place: God’s Word is a “lamp unto [our] feet”; God sent 
his “only Son” into the world not to confuse or to condemn the world, but “in order that 
the world might be saved through him” (John 3:16, 17). The purpose of Scripture is to 
provide information so that men and women can know God and know his will for their 
                                                 
22
 So, as Berkouwer, 1975, 267-268, points out, the Reformation/Catholic distinction is 
somewhat inaccurate; interpretation and exegesis are clearly understood from both sides to be 
necessary. The need to explain—even in Reformation theology—is “deeply felt” (270). 
23
 Vanhoozer, 1998, 314. 
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lives. Because it illumines the correct path—and not darkens it—inherent in the Bible is a 
clarity which reflects the love that the creator has for his children.24  
While the Bible text in the main has the quality of “clarity,” it still could not be 
understood unless its readers had Spirit-led “common sense.” This is a God-given 
characteristic that gives people the ability to know the way things really are—both in the 
physical and the metaphysical realms. That people can predictably interact with other 
entities in the world because they have sufficient knowledge about those entities seems 
obvious to me; but I also draw here upon the thoughts of T. Reid who wrote at length 
about the knowability of many phenomena that had been decreed during the 
Enlightenment to be unknowable. Reid argued that one must factor into one’s 
epistemology not only what logically/rationally appears to be the case, but also what 
appears to be the case in the experiences of everyday life. If the former is in conflict with 
the latter, then the latter should take precedence; but those thinkers who put reason over 
common sense “shew the acuteness of the sophist at the expense of disgracing reason and 
human nature ….”25 Restraint should be exercised in making grand assertions of the 
limits of what can be known if they run counter to the grain of what we take to be 
knowable in day-to-day experience. The world might not be the same as one’s sense 
impression of it, but that does not preclude one from having cause/effect interactions with 
things in the world or from really knowing things in the world. If we give up on this, then, 
according to Reid, we are hopelessly alone: “upon this [skeptical] hypothesis, the whole 
universe about me, bodies and spirits, sun, moon, stars, and earth, friends and relations, 
all things without exception, which I imagined to have a permanent existence, whether I 
thought of them or not, vanish at once.”26 If this is the case, says Reid, “we are deceived 
                                                 
24
 In the foregoing I have considered the clarity question from the human perspective of 
choice and accountability. There is, of course, the reality of God’s sovereignty and the necessity 
of the quickening of the Holy Spirit (who gives “internal clarity” as Luther called it—see Ibid., 
316) to draw people to God in the first place (see 1 Cor 2:14; 2 Cor 3:14-16; 4:3-4, 6; Heb 5:14; 
James 1:5-6). The Bible’s words, as Calvin, 1972, said, “will not obtain full credit in the hearts of 
men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit” (first book, chap. 7, sec. 4). And 
even then, as Luther points out, plumbing the depths of Scripture is a lifelong process: “(W)e 
must ever remain scholars here; we cannot sound the depth of one single verse in Scripture; we 
get hold but of the A, B, C, and that imperfectly” (Luther, 1868, sec. viii). God’s sovereign 
election of men and women mysteriously occurs according to his sovereignty; but this in no way 
diminishes human responsibility nor diminishes the appropriateness of fearing before the One 
who is infinitely more powerful and who will judge human beings in the end (see Grudem, 1994, 
107). 
25
 Reid, 1999, 102. 
26
 Ibid., 96. Reid is here offering what would be the case if Hume’s empiricism were taken 
to its logical limit. This empiricism, according to Reid, leaned its “whole weight” upon the very 
ancient hypothesis that “nothing is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it: That we 
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by Him that made us, and there is no remedy”27 But this cannot be the case, for God is 
love and has graciously provided the senses in order that men and women know how 
things really are about them. The senses have a telos—and that is to accurately describe 
what is sensed. The final telos of the senses and the human mind is to allow one to know 
God. The awareness of God is innate in all human beings; therefore, says Reid, “the 
unjust live by faith as well as the just” (i.e., both believe that God is).28  
This is not to say that a man or woman with plenty of common sense but with very 
little Bible education will be able to fully understand fine points of theological doctrine or 
know, for example, much about near eastern history during Bible times; but most sincere 
students of the Bible—quite apart from their education level—can easily understand 
many of the larger-scale realities that the Bible teaches. This is mainly because the 
Bible’s words are—in the main—predictable in their meaning. Of course, words are 
arbitrary signs that somehow come to be in groups by which members of the group can 
communicate. Words can and usually do evolve in meaning over time, and their forms 
change too. There is also the phenomenon of a word’s meaning being to some extent 
dependent upon many other components within the structure of the language. But this 
does not make language—written or oral—unintelligible; in fact, once a language is 
learned, real communication becomes easy, and great and complicated missions can be 
undertaken by a group and success achieved because group members are able to 
communicate effectively despite the imperfection of that communication. This applies 
also to communication that is accomplished at one time and recorded for another group at 
a later time. If communication across the expanse of time was mainly unreliable, then 
biographies, histories, land deeds, law codes, and state constitutions would have little or 
no usefulness—and civilization as it is known would not exist. But reliable 
communication through many mediums which carry information across small and great 
expanses of space and time does occur; accurate communication of very detailed 
information from one language to another occurs in mass every minute of every day. And 
even if one group tries to encrypt their information so that it cannot be understood by 
others, the code for that encryption can be broken by another group and the meaning fully 
apprehended.29 If the full meaning of an encrypted text can be understood, how much 
more readily will an unencrypted text—even if in a foreign language—be understood. 
                                                                                                                                                  
do not really perceive things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them 
imprinted upon the mind, which are called impressions and ideas.”  
27
 Reid, 1997, xxi (taken from Brookes’s quote of Reid in the book’s introduction). 
28
 Reid, 1999, 1. 
29
 For example, in World War Two the extremely complex encryption of Axis military 
communications was decrypted by the Allies and the information then gathered and used to their 
advantage.  
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While it is true that the Bible does have parts that are in one way or another “encrypted” 
(e.g., OT typology that looks forward to Christ, irony and humor in OT narratives, views 
about the monarchy and/or Jerusalem cult that might be read “between the lines,” 
prophecies, parables, etc.), and the task of decryption is a challenging task (“he has ears, 
let him hear” [Matt 13:9 NIV]), the main lines of theology and anthropology are, 
nevertheless, easy to discern by a man or women who takes the time to read and the effort 
to understand: God is the omnipotent creator-God who made men and women out of the 
dust of the earth, men and women are contingent beings who are absolutely dependent 
upon God, and they are accountable to him to live their lives according to his will; 
therefore, “men should fear before him” (Eccl 3:14 NKJV).30 
Biblical hermeneutics—and hermeneutics undertaken in the search for meaning of 
all types of information systems—should be accomplished with the acknowledgment that 
language is, in the main, reliable and predictable. God has given language as a gift to his 
earthly creatures so that they can effectively communicate and survive. Words—at least 
for humans—are central to this effective communication; a given word has a meaning or 
meanings that can be discerned and recorded, and although contextual factors can perhaps 
suggest various semantic peculiarities, a word will tend to be semantically anchored at 
usually one, but often two or three points. If this were not so, it would be practically 
impossible to produce lexicons and dictionaries. This understanding is vital to effective 
biblical hermeneutics; the consideration of the normal meaning(s) of words is taken very 
seriously, and those words are assumed to clearly communicate unless solid evidence to 
the contrary is found. Concerning this, Krause, et al, write, “The centrality of words in 
language communication underscores the importance of the lexical principle of 
hermeneutics: The correct interpretation of Scripture is the meaning required by the 
normal meaning of the words in the context in which they occur.”31 With this 
predictability of words understood, Goldingay with good justification believes that the 
interpretation of Scripture “is in one sense a quite straightforward enterprise, one that 
                                                 
30
 The 23rd article of the Chicago Statement of Biblical Hermeneutics says: “We affirm the 
clarity of Scripture and specifically of its message about salvation from sin. We deny that all 
passages of Scripture are equally clear or have equal bearing on the message of redemption.” 
Norman Geisler comments: “Traditionally this teaching is called the ‘perspicuity’ of Scripture. By 
this is meant that the central message of Scripture is clear, especially what the Bible says about 
salvation from sin. The Denial disassociates this claim from the belief that everything in Scripture 
is clear or that all teachings are equally clear or equally relevant to the Bible's central saving 
message. It is obvious to any honest interpreter that the meaning of some passages of Scripture is 
obscure. It is equally evident that the truth of some passages is not directly relevant to the overall 
plan of salvation” (Explaining hermeneutics: A commentary on the Chicago Statement on Biblical 
Hermeneutics, 1983). 
31
 Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, 1993, 183 (emphasis theirs). 
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ordinary people accomplish (courtesy of the labor of translators) as effortlessly as they 
understand newspapers, television, or each other.”32 This is a good point which makes 
sense in view of God’s love: God provides his will for human lives through a medium 
that can be understood through common hermeneutical principles so that common men 
and women can know his will and come into the kind of relationship that God desires. In 
other words, the linguistic relativism that has been asserted to exist does not much affect 
the men and women “on the street”; the words they send and receive enable them to get 
on just fine (usually) with their day’s activities. Likewise, they can sit down and read 
their Bibles and pick up quite easily much of what God intends to teach there.33  
One of the assertions of the higher critics is that specific genres require highly 
specialized treatment. To properly handle a certain genre, one must first master a vast 
                                                 
32
 Goldingay, 1995, 3. 
33
 Barton, 1996, 24, sees the Pentateuch as “ambiguous and incoherent” and says that a 
single writer of the Pentateuch—if single authorship were really the case—would have been 
“mentally incoherent or disturbed.” He focuses on the occasional peculiarity of the text (e.g., the 
irregularity in how God is addressed, double and differing narratives, etc.) at the expense of the 
grand and clearly understandable narrative. Because the Pentateuch (and much of the rest of the 
Bible) is “ambiguous and incoherent,” an “army of specialists” is needed for its proper 
interpretation. Welker, 2003, 376, points out this phenomenon: “Finally, suppose one points out 
that in reading the biblical traditions we must take note of the fact that they have developed over a 
period of more than a thousand years? In view of this fact, to speak of the external and internal 
clarity of Scripture, or to say that Scripture interprets itself, can appear to be mockery. Readers 
find themselves referred to an army of specialists—in theology, biblical exegesis, and historical 
and cultural disciplines—whose help they will need if they are to deal appropriately with sacred 
Scripture. It seems that the self-interpretation of Scripture and the principle ‘Scripture alone’ are 
now out of the question.” In my view, this “army of specialists” has become a new priesthood that 
stands between God and the common man/woman—much to the latter’s loss. Many schools of 
theology and churches force their students and parishioners to be subject to the opinions of this 
army (most of them very critical of the Bible) before they can study the Word of God as-it-is. 
According to Childs, 1972, 710, this results in an “unparalleled ignorance of the Bible”: “Again, 
historical criticism was to free the Word of God from the tyranny of tradition, but could it be that 
a new form of tyranny has emerged? We have turned out generations of students whom we have 
fully convinced regarding the necessity of the critical method. Yet we often leave them paralyzed 
before our massive learning, warriors of the Gospel cramped in Saul’s armor who have been 
robbed of their freedom. One often reads in the textbooks that the medieval church deprived the 
people of the Bible by claiming the sole right of proper interpretation. One now wonders whether 
the Bible has become the private bailiwick of technical scholars who make a similar claim. 
Finally, has it ever struck you as strange that ours is an age of the most beautifully illustrated 
maps of Palestine ever, of a whole range of brilliant new visual aids, of commentaries without 
end, and yet at the same time of almost unparalleled ignorance of the Bible? Far from 
automatically bringing the Bible closer to the average man, the critical method flounders 
helplessly in our secularized churches before a growing sense of alienation. Indeed, our well-
educated modern congregations can tell you that the Bible is filled with myth, but they have 
ceased to understand its language of faith.” 
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amount of form-critical scholarly output—only then can one have a hope to be 
“competent” in the genre’s interpretation.34 I question if switching gears from one genre 
to the next is really such a complicated process; discernment of literary forms usually 
happens quite naturally; that is, a man or woman who is reading the Bible typically 
recognizes, for example, narrative and automatically adjusts to the literary laws in play in 
narrative literature. When that same person suddenly comes to a song within the narrative 
(especially if it is introduced as a song) then the reader naturally knows that the emphasis 
has shifted from telling a story to praising God. Even with its various literary genres, the 
Bible is still generally understandable; but this is especially the case when the reader 
understands first the genre of the Bible as a whole: when the reader comes to the Bible 
knowing from the start that it is authoritative Scripture, then he or she is able to most 
excellently understand the parts within the whole. It is not much different, for example, 
with an aircraft operations manual: when a 747 pilot reads his or her manual, he or she 
reads it not in any way he or she likes—but as a certain “genre” of information; in this 
case the genre of authoritative operating guide for the 747. The pilot will read the various 
subgenres within the manual (e.g., emergency procedures, normal checklists, flight 
system descriptions, etc.) in light of the overarching genre understanding. If the pilot 
mistakenly identifies the aircraft flight manual, for example, as “comics” or “poetry,” 
then the pilot—not considering it authoritative for the operation of the aircraft—will 
misinterpret and misapply the information in the manual, and hundreds of people will 
perish in the predictable conflagration that follows. The main point to be taken from this 
analogy is this: one can read any piece of literature (including an aircraft flight manual or 
the Bible) anyway one wants; but one should read a piece of literature in accordance with 
what it was designed to be read as—for this is the only way to get at the deepest and 
truest meaning of the text (i.e., the meaning intended by the authority who wrote it), and 
is the only way to avoid disaster if people’s health and happiness are somehow dependent 
upon the right understanding of the literature (which I think is the case with both an 
aircraft flight manual as well as the Bible). Scholars of aviation do not profess multiple 
ways to read an aircraft flight manual, nor do they say that the one right method for 
reading it will never be found; instead, they would acknowledge that the manual has 
binding authority upon the pilot to fly the aircraft according to the literal and common-
sense meaning of the words, sentences, and paragraphs in the manual—so that the 
transportation of passengers occurs in a safe and efficient manner. To do otherwise would 
guarantee disaster. The effects of reading the Bible incorrectly, however, come slower, 
and the effects in the afterlife—while clearly warned about in the Bible—are 
unobservable outside of the Bible. So, many scholars treat the book as if it had no 
                                                 
34
 See Barton’s comments regarding “literary competence” (Barton, 1996, 19).  
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authority behind it and as if there really were no consequences that flow out of how one 
reads the book and how one applies it to his or her life. But both an aircraft operating 
manual as well as the Bible has many warnings within telling the reader that there is an 
approved and authoritative way of reading it—and one disregards this authoritative way 
at one’s peril.  
Not only are the words of the biblical text generally understandable, but the general 
contexts of most biblical texts are also understandable and critically important for 
effective interpretation. One should read the individual texts in light of the largest biblical 
context of God’s salvation plan for humankind: while the Bible certainly has several 
large-scale themes that run through it (e.g., the coming of the kingdom, promise, etc.), the 
salvation question (at least from an evangelical perspective) is the topic that weighs most 
heavily upon men and women and that the Bible from the beginning to the end 
progressively answers. This main theme is intimately bound up with how the Bible should 
be read—that is, the Bible ought to be read as an authoritative, God-given rule book for 
human conduct because the eternal destinies of human beings are at stake. To understand 
first that the Bible is this genre is at the same time to see one’s dire need and to know that 
the Bible has the solution—especially, the solution to the universal problem of death. The 
Bible must be read in this light in order for any hope to be had for its proper 
understanding. 
In light of God’s love and order, it is to be expected that his Word fits together; the 
parts fit in with the whole in an orderly and wonderful way that only God could arrange. 
The individual texts can be read in light of God’s overall redemption plan as well as the 
reestablishment of his reign over the universe in which all people will one day bow and 
cry out, “blessed is he who comes in the name of the LORD” (Matt 23:39 NIV). The parts 
of the Bible are read in view of the whole and the whole in view of the parts because the 
whole and the parts are all ordered to the same ultimate end—the salvation of human 
souls. This ordering towards a grand end is no surprise in view of the order within the 
creation—something that Hodge notices as he asserts that, as science is bound by the 
order of nature, theology is bound by the order of God’s Word:  
The parts of any organic whole have a natural relation which cannot with impunity 
be ignored or changed. The parts of a watch, or of any other piece of mechanism, 
must be normally arranged, or it will be in confusion and worthless. All the parts of 
a plant or animal are disposed to answer a given end, and are mutually dependent. 
We cannot put the roots of a tree in the place of the branches, or the teeth of an 
animal in the place of its feet. So the facts of science arrange themselves. They are 
not arranged by the naturalist. His business is simply to ascertain what the 
arrangement given in the nature of the facts is.… The same is obviously true with 
regard to the facts or truths of the Bible. They cannot be held in isolation, nor will 
they admit of any and every arrangement the theologian may choose to assign them. 
They bear a natural relation to each other, which cannot be overlooked or perverted 
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without the facts themselves being perverted.… It is important that the theologian 
should know his place. He is not master of the situation. He can no more construct a 
system of theology to suit his fancy than the astronomer can adjust the mechanism 
of the heavens according to his own good pleasure. As the facts of astronomy 
arrange themselves in a certain order, and will admit of no other, so it is with the 
facts of theology. Theology, therefore, is the exhibition of the facts of Scripture in 
their proper order and relation, with the principles or general truths involved in the 
facts themselves and which pervade and harmonize the whole.35 
An important aspect of this unity and irreducibility is the fact that God progressively 
revealed his salvation plan and will for mankind through time. God brought the Savior 
into the world (NT) through the Israelite nation (OT); one led to the other, so they are not 
equal halves. Christ is the fulfillment of the law and the law is unfulfilled without Christ. 
Therefore, the OT cannot be read as if it were a complete presentation of God’s salvation 
plan. This is why Sailhamer believes OT biblical theology is not “complete in itself”: 
The first implication is that the study of OT theology is not complete in itself. By 
acknowledging its place alongside a New Testament, OT theology confesses that its 
scope is not narrowly circumscribed around its own canonical borders. Its line of 
sight extends beyond itself to something more—the New Testament. OT theology 
anticipates the study of NT theology and there is no possibility of working without 
this anticipation. To fail to see this is to run the risk of being blind to our most basic 
assumptions. OT theology can only be complete as the first part of a biblical 
theology, one that includes both an Old and a New Testament theology in a final 
integrated whole.36 
When the reader reads the OT with the NT in mind, he or she knows the “rest of the 
story” and, therefore, the telos toward which God drove the Israelites: Christ and eternal 
life—both ideas that were yet incomplete in the OT. And fear-of-God has something to 
do with how the eternal life will go; in other words, considering OT fear-of-God in light 
of the NT makes the reader extremely aware that what was perhaps only suspected in the 
OT is really true: the stakes are frightfully high.  
                                                 
35
 Hodge, 1940, intro., chap. two, part one (pp. 18, 19). Goldingay, 1995, 61, writes 
concerning the biblical unity: “The nature of the Bible as a witnessing tradition suggests that the 
various individual stories it tells need to be understood as part of one macro-story. Episodes 
within one long narrative have to be interpreted in the light of the narrative as a whole: accounts 
of creation in the light of accounts of deliverance and vice versa, accounts of cross in the light of 
accounts of resurrection and vice versa. Luke’s story of Jesus has to be read in the context of 
Luke’s story of the spread of the gospel from Jerusalem to Rome, and vice versa. That much 
would be true of any narrative. But something further emerges from the awareness that one story 
runs through the Bible as a whole. Different witnesses tell us of the exodus from Egypt and the 
occupation of Canaan, of the triumphs under David and Solomon, of the exile and the restoration, 
of the oppression by Seleucids and again by the Romans, of the Christ event and the beginning of 
the work of the Spirit in the church. Their witness is set in the context of an account of the 
unwitnessed Beginning of this history at creation and its not yet witnessed End in the new 
Jerusalem. The story accumulates throughout biblical times.” 
36
 Sailhamer, 1995, 23. 
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Biblical context necessarily includes the context of history—for the events of the 
Bible are, in the main, real events that happened in history.37 There has been much debate 
about whether history should have any place in the practice of biblical theology; but one 
cannot escape history: we live in history at this moment in time, and the events in the 
Bible had their moment in time. If they did not, then “we are to be pitied more that all 
men” (1 Cor 15:19 NIV) and we had better look for something different. This history that 
Bible students cannot escape from considering, however, is not the history as postulated 
along higher critical lines; in fact, the main lines of this critical history in many ways 
looks much different than the history that is attested to in the Bible. The Bible student 
should instead concern himself or herself with the historical context inasmuch as it is 
supplied within the biblical text. The question is not if history should be taken seriously; 
what is important is how history is taken seriously.38 If the “history” to be considered to a 
significant extent turns the biblical narratives into “stories” and “myths” and “sagas” that 
were created in order to justify the location of the cult or to provide an explanation for the 
exile, then it should be forgone in deference to the idea that God is graciously able to 
provide accurate history.  
The consideration of history is very important to this dissertation because the 
biblical idea of fear-of-God flows out of one of two very distinct historical accounts (that 
cannot both be true at the same time): the account that is generally foundational to the 
various higher criticisms postulates that the Israelites (and, later, “Jews”) to a significant 
extent created their religion; the account generally assumed to be valid by conservatives 
maintains that the writers of the Bible recorded events in which God really did speak to 
his people in order to move them towards certain ends. These are radically different 
starting points and will yield radically different results when they are assumed in the task 
of interpreting the Bible.39 Because I assume the conservative account, I understand 
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 I tend to see as historical any narrative account that occurs within a context that gives no 
indication that it should be taken otherwise. If a parable of Jesus is read in isolation, one might 
think it to be historical; but the context clearly shows that most of the parables were told as non-
historical stories to teach some kind of moral or spiritual lesson.   
38
 Bartholomew, 1998, 89. 
39
 A significant part of this work will be devoted to pointing out the weaknesses of the form 
criticism-based fear-of-God study of J. Becker. This criticism will mainly stem from my 
perception that Becker cannot come to a right understanding of what it means for real people—
really created in God’s image—to fear before the real God who created human beings and (as 
recorded in the Bible) really revealed himself to them; this is because Becker’s work builds upon 
the form-critical ideas of H. Gunkel, and Gunkel believed that “science” had conclusively shown 
the world that the OT was simply a work of men and not a work of God. “For a century and a half 
scholars have been busy,” writes Gunkel, “first groping uncertainly, then progressing with 
increasing confidence, till they have now worked out a clear conception of what the Old 
Testament is. Among the scholars who have helped to achieve this result Julius Wellhausen will 
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that—while God’s revelation and God’s cult community did in a sense evolve over 
time—the general big-picture reality between God and humans did not evolve; 
throughout the OT and NT histories, God is still God, humans are still sinful and under 
condemnation, and the only way to escape God’s judgment is to “[call] on the name of 
the LORD” (Joel 2:32)/“[call] on the name of the Lord” (Acts 2:21). Those who do not do 
this or do it without their whole heart have reason to fear the “consuming-fire” God (Isa 
30:27). But if many of the critics are right and the religion of the Jews and the religion of 
the Christians had their origins in the minds of humans and not in the will of God, then 
fear-of-God will tend to be interpreted apart from the notion that there really is a living 
God out there who can “destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matt 10:28)—and the fear 
emotion/feeling will tend to be reduced as a result. 
FEAR TERMINOLOGY 
Before proceeding, the English word “fear” and related words should be considered 
and perhaps even a bit artificially defined in order that we have a semantic anchor for the 
investigation to follow. In addition, a brief look at the lexical meaning of  	 (yor ) will 
be presented.  
Use of English Fear Words  
The English terms that will be mainly dealt with are:  
Fear: “An unpleasant emotional state characterized by anticipation of pain or great 
distress and accompanied by heightened autonomic activity especially involving the 
nervous system; agitated foreboding often of some real or specific peril …. A 
condition between anxiety and terror either natural and well-grounded or 
unreasoned and blind …. Profound reverence and awe.”40.  
Terror: “Intense fright or apprehension: stark fear.”  
Dread: “great fear especially in the face of impending evil: fearful apprehension of 
danger: anticipatory terror …. Translation of Danish and German angst.”  
                                                                                                                                                  
always be named with honour. Old Testament scholarship, by means of great acumen, patient 
detailed investigation, and a power of intuition amounting to genius, has sketched a splendid 
picture of the history of the people of Israel, its religion and its literature. In so doing it has 
definitively given up the old conception of Inspiration. To Old Testament Science the Bible is in 
the first instance a book produced by human means in human ways. Science has brought it down 
from heaven and set it up in the midst of the earth” (Gunkel, 1928, 18, 19). Gunkel puts this idea 
most succinctly when he writes: “Ultimately naïve religion was invaded by a rational reflection 
which finally destroyed it” (Gunkel, 1928, 113). 
40
 All these English definitions are from Merriam-Webster’s unabridged dictionary, 2003. 
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Anxiety: “A state of being anxious or of experiencing a strong or dominating blend 
of uncertainty, agitation or dread, and brooding fear about some contingency … A 
strong concern about some imminent development or a strong desire, mixed with 
doubt and fear, for some event or issue.”  
Awe: “fear mixed with dread, veneration, reverence, or wonder: as … profound and 
reverent fear inspired by deity … abashed reverence and fear inspired by authority 
or power … veneration and latent fear inspired by something sacred, mysterious, or 
morally impressive.”  
Reverence: “honor or respect felt or manifested: deference duly paid or expressed 
…. Profound respect mingled with love and awe (as for a holy or exalted being or 
place or thing).”  
One can immediately see a problem here: the words are defined in terms of each other. 
That is, fear, for example, is described as “apprehension or dread” while dread is 
described as “great fear.” In order to have a set of clear working terms for the purposes of 
what follows and avoid the confusion of circularity, I will—somewhat artificially—define 
each word and also give its approximate German equivalent. Thus defined, I think the 
words will actually be quite close to current common use in English:41 
Fear (German: Furcht): When this term is used, I am speaking of the 
emotion/feeling of being fearful in general. Fear is—as described by Webster’s 
above—“an unpleasant emotional state characterized by anticipation of pain or 
great distress and accompanied by heightened autonomic activity especially 
involving the nervous system.” It is that “unpleasant” emotion/feeling that rises in a 
person in proportion to the awareness of some threat, whether real or imagined.  
Anxiety (German: Besorgnis): A low to medium level of the emotion/feeling of fear 
that does not have an object. Anxiety can be experienced over a short, medium, or 
long period of time. 
Dread (German: Angst): A medium to high level of the emotion/feeling of fear that 
may or may not have an object.42 The emotion/feeling is experienced over an 
extended period of time and can include a general sense of doom, hopelessness, and 
despair. 
Terror (German: Terror): An extremely high level of the emotion/feeling of fear 
before a real and imminent threat for a short period of time. 
                                                 
41
 I realize that these words only crudely denote actual psychological states—which are in 
reality unique from person to person and always a mix of many thoughts, emotions, and feelings.  
42
 According to Drosdowski, 1976, Angst does not have an object. On the other hand, 
according to Ringel, 1993, Psychology does allow for Angst to have a real object. 
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Awe (German: Ehrfurcht): Emotion/feeling of wonder and amazement before some 
awesome object. Awe may have a component of low-level to high-level fear.  
Reverence (German: Verehrung): Emotion/feeling of adoration, honor, respect, 
and/or submission before one who is adorable, honorable, and respectable. 
Reverence may have a component of low-level to medium-level fear.  
Important to notice here is that fear is a term that signifies the fear emotion/feeling itself. 
Terror, dread, and anxiety indicate certain levels of fear. On the other hand, awe and 
reverence are at base stand-alone emotions/feelings that might or might not have an 
element of fear within them. This depends on the circumstances. If a person is awed by a 
beautiful painting, there is no fear because there is nothing to fear. But if a person is awed 
by a powerful supernatural being, then a feeling of fear might arise because of a perceived 
threat to safety. While these definitions admittedly oversimplify all the shades of meaning 
in these words, this somewhat artificial rendering will probably help more than hinder the 
investigation to follow.  
In English use, when a person uses the word “fear,” he or she could be referring to 
terror, dread, or anxiety (as defined just above). If a man says that his wife fears her 
neighbor’s pet parrot, one can reasonably assume that the intensity of fear is most likely 
low. She is somewhat “anxious” around parrots because they are noisy and sometimes 
peck. But if a woman mentioned that her husband feared the mountain lion just before it 
attacked, she would most likely be referring to a very high fear level—perhaps even 
“terror.” Only knowledge of the context give us a good idea in each case what 
emotion/feeling the person was experiencing.  (LXX φοβέω) in the OT is also, like 
“fear,” used in a very general way. Other than the basic meaning of the word (the fear 
emotion/feeling) and occasional intensifiers that accompany it (e.g., lwdg, dam [when 
combined with  mean “great fear]), only the context can indicate what  means. In 
addition to indicating terror and dread and anxiety, , however, can also indicate other 
mind/heart states such as awe and reverence. In common English use, “fear” is only rarely 
used to refer to awe and/or reverence (probably more so in the past); but in the Bible, 
many translators continue to use “fear” occasionally where  appears to connote some 
kind of awe and/or reverence. So in general, we are fortunate to have an English word 
(“fear”) that corresponds quite closely to how  is used in the Bible.  
Initial Lexical Definitions for ארי 
By far, the most common root for fear in the OT is . Its various forms are, 
according to Stähli, as follows:43  
                                                 
43
 Stähli, 1971, uses Becker’s fear-of-God ideas as the basis of his article—and that is 
problematic: the history-of-religions assumption that religion evolved strongly appears to be taken 
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 	 (Qal): 1. Fear before men, events, or things: basic meaning of “one is afraid.” 
 may have no object (absolute use—e.g., Gen 31:31), take an accusative object (Gen 
32:12), or use the prepositions !m (Deut 1:29) ynpm (Josh 11:6) or "#$% (1 Sam 18:12) 
plus an object to denote fear before something/someone that/who evokes fear. 2. Fear 
before God: indicates “numinous”44 fear (erschauern—shiver, shudder]), is used 
absolutely (Gen 28:17), with an accusative object (Exod 14:31), or with !m (Lev 19:14) 
ynpm (Exod 9:30) or "#$% (Eccl 3:14) plus God as the fear object in order to denote fear 
and/or awe before God. The numinous fear “ground-tone” remains in all fear-of-God 
uses.45 “Do not fear!” appears mostly in theological contexts (approx. 60x), but 
occasionally in “profane” ones (approx. 15x). Deuteronomy and Deuteronomistic 
Historian (Dtr.) sections of the OT have a very tight connection between fear and keeping 
God’s commandments (covenant formula—e.g., Deut 4:10). In the wisdom books, fear 
usually has the object “God” (Job 1:9; Eccl 5:6; 12:13) and when depicted as a virtue, can 
mean “righteous” or “honest”—although in Ecclesiastes, the distance between humans 
and God indicates a more “numinous” fear.46  
 	וֹ" (Niphal participle used mostly as an adjective): 1. Fearful quality of men, 
events, or things: basic meaning—“dreadful,” “terrible” (Furchtbar). It can characterize 
the desert (Isa 21:1), ice (Ezek 1:22), and the war deeds of kings (Ps 45:5). 2. Fearful 
quality of God: over thirty uses denote the awful, dreadful, terrible (Furchtbar) attributes 
of God (Exod 15:11), his deeds (Exod 34:10), his name (Deut 28:58), and his judgment 
day (Mal 3:23). The primitive numinous fear is present in all of these. Even though  	וֹ" 
has hardly any pre-exilic uses, it would be inappropriate to consider its form a late 
development.  
 	 (Verbal adjective): a typical form used for fear-of-God in the Psalms—quite 
often in the plural and in construct relation with YHWH ( ) where it takes on a 
                                                                                                                                                  
for granted by Becker—and that in turn precipitates an evolutionary view of biblical fear-of-God 
as well. Stähli takes up Becker’s results without question. 
44
 “Numinous” is a term created by Rudolf Otto (Otto, 1958). Many articles and 
monographs employ it as another designation for God. But, after reviewing Otto’s book, I will 
argue below that the term only designates the emotion/feeling of the subject. For the purposes of 
this brief lexical study on , however, I will assume that Stähli has God in mind when he uses 
“numinous.”  
45
 This idea that the fear-emotion “Grundton” is never completely out of the picture in the 
various fear-of-God uses is originally from J. Becker (Becker, 1965, 80). Stähli’s/Becker’s 
opinion here supports my thesis that the fear emotion is a component of all OT event and virtue 
fear-of-God cases.  
46
 That God is far away to Qoheleth is a widely held view. But Qoheleth’s several uses of 
"#$% in the fear-of-God context would seem to bring God closer—especially if he thinks of 
himself and of God throughout his work as royalty before whom humans stand and are judged 
(compare Gen 4:16 with Gen 47:10).  
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substantive meaning (Jahwefürchtigen—God-fearers).47 In earlier Psalms,   tends 
to identify those in the cult who honor God (Ps 22:24, 26). Later Psalms designate those 
who are faithful to JHWH and are pious (Ps 25:14). Going along with Becker, Stähli 
understands that these construct plural uses in the Psalms are “genitivus possessives.”48 
On the other hand, the singular construct uses of  	 + YHWH or “God” found in the 
wisdom books (Job 1:1, 8; 2:3; Prov 14:2; Eccl 7:18) are “genitivus objectivus.”49 
אַ () (Feminine noun): occurs primarily in wisdom books, especially in Proverbs 1-
9 where the noun occurs in construct with YHWH. It is synonymous with  *+ *גּ, 
“knowledge” (+- .  , “the fear of YHWH is the beginning of 
knowledge”—Prov 1:7; see also, 1:29; 2:5; 9:10; 15:33).  
 	וֹ% (Masculine noun): l. When used non-theologically, the term without exception 
has full force of the numinous fear (Schrecken—fright). It characterizes the fear that 
animals experience before humans (Gen 9:2) as well as the fear before Israel that the 
Canaanites would experience when the Israelites entered the land (Deut 11:25). 2.  	וֹ% is 
used theologically in Deuteronomy to designate the fear-instilling deeds of God that 
occurred as part of the exodus (Deut 4:34; 26:8; 34:12).  
As can be seen, Stähli understands that  and its derivatives can denote a wide 
range of emotions and feelings. This semantic elasticity will be questioned, however, later 
on in this work. I now turn to consider several pre-critical era commentators who in 
general kept fear-of-God much more centered on the emotion/feeling of fear than did later 
commentators.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
FEAR OF GOD ACCORDING TO COMMENTATORS 
In this section, I will describe and comment upon the views of a number of fear-of-
God commentators from both the pre-critical and critical periods. The lengthiest works 
accomplished to date on the subject are from the critical period; nothing comes close to 
the length and the influence of J. Becker’s Gottesfurcht im Alten Testament—so his work 
will be considered in some detail. Nevertheless, others from an earlier age had their own 
insights and, as will be seen, had the ability to probe deeper into the biblical meaning of 
fear-of-God than those who came later.  
PRE-CRITICAL ERA 
Of course, when considering those who commented upon the fear-of-God theme 
one should go first to the NT—which turns out to be very fertile ground for the subject 
(although, even here as in the OT, there is no exposition on the theme per se; that comes 
only later in the church age).50 Because the NT fear-of-God concept will be considered 
later (in chapter three), I will instead begin after the apostolic era and highlight a number 
of those who saw fit to remark upon the subject.  
The Shepherd of Hermas 
Not only does Hermas in this second century work quote from Ecclesiastes 12:13a, 
but also comments briefly about what it means to “fear the Lord.”51 In the 
apocalyptic/didactic vision, the angelic visitor (“the shepherd”) tells Hermas: 
“Fear,” said he, “the Lord, and keep His commandments. For if you keep the 
commandments of God, you will be powerful in every action, and every one of your 
actions will be incomparable. For, fearing the Lord, you will do all things well. This 
is the fear which you ought to have, that you may be saved. But fear not the devil; 
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for, fearing the Lord, you will have dominion over the devil, for there is no power 
in him. But he in whom there is no power ought on no account to be an object of 
fear; but He in whom there is glorious power is truly to be feared. For every one 
that has power ought to be feared; but he who has not power is despised by all. 
Fear, therefore, the deeds of the devil, since they are wicked. For, fearing the Lord, 
you will not do these deeds, but will refrain from them. For fears are of two kinds: 
for if you do not wish to do that which is evil, fear the Lord, and you will not do it; 
but, again, if you wish to do that which is good, the fear of the Lord is strong, and 
great, and glorious. Fear, then, the Lord, and you will live to Him, and as many as 
fear Him and keep His commandments will live to God.” “Why,” said I, “sir, did 
you say in regard to those that keep His commandments, that they will live to 
God?” “Because,” says he, “all creation fears the Lord, but all creation does not 
keep His commandments. They only who fear the Lord and keep His 
commandments have life with God; but as to those who keep not His 
commandments, there is no life in them.”52 
A number of features of this text are meaningful to the fear-of-God topic: first, the angel 
appears to understand that there is some mix between real fear and reverence/respect. The 
latter could be indicated if one were to take fear before someone who is powerful to be 
the opposite of the feeling generated before one who is not powerful and therefore 
“despised” (i.e., the opposite of “despised” is not fear, but “honored” or “revered”). On 
the other hand, more of the fear emotion is indicated when the angel says “all creation 
fears the Lord, but all creation does not keep His commandments.” Certainly, all creation 
does not honor or reverence the Lord, but one could make a case that there is a low-grade 
fear that resides in the hearts of all men and women that has God as its object. Because 
the subject matter here is tied to salvation and to the “glorious power” of God, then real 
fearfulness (because eternal destiny is at stake) is warranted. But the angel appears 
inconsistent, for towards the top of the quote above, he says that one may be saved by 
fearing God, but later says that fear by itself is insufficient for salvation: “They only who 
fear the Lord and keep His commandments have life with God” (emphases mine). More 
than likely, the writer had in mind this requirement to keep God’s law in both cases 
(unless he uses fear in different ways—but that is unlikely). Second, the angel says that 
God has “glorious power,” and that alone warrants fear before him. When fear is 
displayed toward God, then that fear becomes “strong and great and glorious.” The angel 
seems to imply that one’s fear of God allows one to partake in God’s “glorious power.” 
Whatever the case, fear is justified before a “great and glorious” power like God.53 Third, 
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the subjects of judgment, salvation, and fear-of-God are closely related.54 The angel 
makes explicit what I think Qoheleth implies: fear of God and obedience are prerequisites 
for entrance into his kingdom. Fear-of-God, therefore, is intimately related to the subject 
of eternal destination: either one goes to heaven or one goes to hell, and the consideration 
of these possibilities should evoke some element of fearfulness.  
One other subject that the angel mentions prefigures what Augustine and Thomas 
will say later as well as alerts one to the reality of common fear and saving fear: “For 
fears are of two kinds: for if you do not wish to do that which is evil, fear the Lord, and 
you will not do it; but, again, if you wish to do that which is good, the fear of the Lord is 
strong, and great, and glorious.” It could be that the angel’s first kind of fear is the less 
excellent fear of retribution that makes a person afraid to do evil. This fear has an 
advantage—as Augustine and Thomas will argue later—and is a necessary component of 
the relationship between sinful humans and the holy God. But the second kind of fear 
builds on the first and is more “great, and glorious.” This fear prompts men and women to 
avoid sin because they do not want to disappoint their Lord. The first kind is motivated by 
threat of punishment; the second kind is generated by love.  
Tertullian 
In The Soul’s Testimony Tertullian (c. 155-c. 220)55 wrote about the fundamental 
emotional characteristics of the soul and how they indicate that God exists. The emotion 
of fear—especially the fear of death—is central to Tertullian’s thesis in that it gives 
evidence that there is something in death to fear. If death is the annihilation of the soul, 
then there is nothing to fear. Yet, the soul does fear (and this is universally true) because 
every soul is endowed by its creator with the knowledge of the creator and the knowledge 
of judgment. The knowledge humans have is reason to fear; but this fear is also proof that 
there really is something to fear after death—that is, God’s anger. Tertullian writes that 
the soul 
doubtless knows its giver; and if it knows Him, it undoubtedly fears Him too, and 
especially as having been by Him endowed so amply. Has it no fear of Him whose 
favour it is so desirous to possess, and whose anger it is so anxious to avoid? 
Whence, then, the soul's natural fear of God, if God cannot be angry? How is there 
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any dread of Him whom nothing offends? What is feared but anger? Whence comes 
anger, but from observing what is done? What leads to watchful oversight, but 
judgment in prospect? Whence is judgment, but from power? To whom does 
supreme authority and power belong, but to God alone?56 
Several elements of this are worthy of note: first, the knowledge of God is universal. 
Second, the fear of God’s punishment, according to Tertullian, is also universal (at least 
indirectly through the fear of death). Third, the knowledge of the threat of judgment and 
God’s anger is based somewhat upon the soul’s understanding of God’s power and 
authority. Fourth, the two aspects of fear-of-God spoken of by the angel to Hermas just 
above are also indicated when Tertullian says: “Has [the soul] no fear of Him whose 
favour it is so desirous to possess, and whose anger it is so anxious to avoid?” Tertullian 
most likely saw these two fears (the fear of losing God’s favour and the fear of being 
punished) as being two sides of the same coin, and therefore inseparable. Augustine will 
argue in the next section that the deepest desire of humans should be to make the basis of 
their relationship with God to be the fear of losing God’s favour, not the fear of 
punishment. But because humans are hopelessly sinful in this life, there will always be 
some component of the latter.  
Augustine 
In his “Homily Nine on the First Epistle of John,” Augustine makes a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of fear-of-God.57 In this sermon, the text of main 
concern is 1 John 4:16-18:  
4:16 So we have known and believe the love that God has for us. God is love, and 
those who abide in love abide in God, and God abides in them. 4:17 Love has been 
perfected among us in this: that we may have boldness on the day of judgment, 
because as he is, so are we in this world. 4:18 There is no fear in love, but perfect 
love casts out fear; for fear has to do with punishment, and whoever fears has not 
reached perfection in love. 
While the main thrust of his sermon is to highlight and encourage his flock to exercise 
love that “casts out fear,” he spends the better part of it justifying the idea that fear will, in 
one form or another, nevertheless remain a part of the earthly Christian life. To account 
for this, Augustine first points out that not all men or women believe in a final judgment 
and, therefore, do not fear God (in contrast with Tertullian above). But people who do 
think about God and his judgment will inevitably begin to think about their sin, and fear 
of God’s anger will come as a result. A person with this kind of fear does “not yet have 
boldness in the day of judgment.”58 But one should not despair about this, because this 
                                                 
56
 Tertullian, 1989, chapter 2. 
57
 Schaff, 1956, “Homily Nine on the First Epistle of John.” 
58
 Ibid., sec. 2.  
 30 
fear is “the beginning of wisdom” (Prov 9:10a). This person has the motivation to begin 
the process of learning to obey Christ—that is, to love. A man at this point must “correct 
himself” and “mortify his members which are upon the earth” (Col 3:5).59  
Once a person through this initial fear of punishment begins to submit to the will of 
God, he or she now begins to understand the goodness and mercy of God. As a result, a 
desire for God and a desire to please him (by loving his or her neighbors) begins to 
grow—and love, says Augustine, begins to drive out the fear of punishment: 
Fear, so to say, prepares a place for charity. But when once charity has begun to 
inhabit, the fear which prepared the place for it is cast out. For in proportion as this 
increases, that decreases: and the more this comes to be within, is the fear cast out. 
Greater charity, less fear; less charity, greater fear. But if no fear, there is no way 
for charity to come in.60 
So the fear of punishment is a prerequisite for love (“charity”). I will argue from time to 
time throughout the dissertation that this kind of fear is based upon knowledge (i.e., true 
information) and is an honest (i.e., humble and authentic) response to the realities and 
potentialities of the human condition. It forces out competing beliefs that do not account 
for and have no reasonable way to solve the fear. The soul is then prepared to feel the 
need for and to accept the only solution to the fear, which is God’s grace. This fear will 
continue to “goad” as long as a person has not reached “perfection in love.”61 Augustine 
believes this is a lifelong process. He likens the fear of punishment to a painful surgical 
process to remove “rottenness” from the body.62 To avoid the surgery is to avoid pain in 
the short term; but to make death a certainty. He does not say that perfect love is 
achievable for the believer in this life. Therefore, the surgery must continue throughout 
life in order that love of God and love of neighbor might come in and a person might be 
saved: 
For if you be without fear, you can not be justified. It is a sentence pronounced by 
the Scriptures; "For he that is without fear, cannot be justified" (Sirach 1:28). Needs 
then must fear first enter in, that by it charity may come. Fear is the healing 
operation: charity, the sound condition. "But he that fears is not made perfect in 
love." Why? "Because fear has torment;" just as the cutting of the surgeon's knife 
has torment.63  
Augustine believes that the way to perfection is to love God and to love other people like 
God first loved us—i.e., to love them when they are still enemies. This was the painful 
experience of Christ who loved mankind when they were yet evil and unlovable: 
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If this then be the perfection unto which God invites us, that we love our enemies as 
He loved His; this is our boldness in the day of judgment, that "as He is, so are we 
also in this world:" because, as He loves His enemies in making His sun to rise 
upon good and bad, and in sending rain upon the just and unjust, so we, since we 
cannot bestow upon them sun and rain, bestow upon them our tears when we pray 
for them.64 
By doing this, believers are conformed into Christ’s image with the result that fear is 
driven out.  
This fear that is driven out by love (i.e., fear-of-punishment) is valuable and a 
necessary step on the way to justification. But Augustine speaks at length about a more 
excellent fear. One is forced into perceiving two types of fear-of-God when one is faced 
with the fact that 1 John 4:17 teaches that fear-of-God should be done away with, yet Ps 
19:9a teaches just the opposite: “the fear of the LORD is pure, enduring forever.” To 
account for this Augustine distinguishes between fear of God’s punishment and the fear 
of falling out of fellowship with God (which is by far the more excellent). The former is 
more predominant early in the Christian life; the latter, however, begins to grow as the 
believer’s love grows for his or her Lord. The man or woman increasingly understands 
God’s goodness and grace and friendship, and therefore becomes increasingly anxious 
about losing them. Augustine calls this anxiousness “chaste fear”: 
When once you have begun to desire the good, there shall be in you the chaste fear. 
What is the chaste fear? The fear lest you lose the good things themselves. Mark! It 
is one thing to fear God lest He cast you into hell with the devil, and another thing 
to fear God lest He forsake you. The fear by which you fear lest you be cast into 
hell with the devil, is not yet chaste; for it comes not from the love of God, but from 
the fear of punishment: but when you fear God lest His presence forsake you, you 
embrace Him, you long to enjoy God Himself. 
The difference between these fears, says Augustine, is analogous to the fears experienced 
by two very different women—one who is unfaithful to her husband and fears only his 
punishment, and one who is faithful to her husband and loves him and only fears lest she 
lose him.  
The one says, I fear my husband, lest he should come: the other says, I fear my 
husband, lest he depart from me. The one says, I fear to be condemned: the other, I 
fear to be forsaken. Let the like have place in the mind of Christians, and you find a 
fear which love casts out, and another fear, chaste, enduring for ever.65 
It should be noted that, up till now, all mentions of the fear-of-God have involved 
the fear emotion itself and not reverence, worship, or even awe. It has also not denoted a 
situational state—either righteousness, obedience to God’s law, or active participation in 
the “cult” of YHWH and/or Christ (meanings that critical commentators will attempt to 
assign to fear-of-God). With the three works covered so far, fear-of-God is linked with 
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judgment and the legitimate fear of punishment which acts, says Augustine, as a “goad” 
away from sin and toward righteousness and fellowship with God.66 But there is a still 
more excellent fear (also, I think, based on knowledge: the knowledge of the human 
propensity to sin and potential of losing faith) that dreads losing God’s favor and the 
fellowship and gifts that come with that favor.  
Thomas Aquinas 
Thomas’s Summa Theologica contains a lengthy treatise on the fear-of-God theme 
called “The Gift of Fear.”67 Even though he goes into far more detail in this work than 
Augustine (building upon certain philosophical and logical constructs that he culls from 
Aristotle and others), his conclusions are nevertheless quite similar. The first question to 
settle for Thomas is whether God can be feared at all. The answer is yes: humans can and 
should fear both God and his punishment.68 But some might argue that it is wrong to fear 
God on the basis of punishment, because punishment—being a deprivation of good—is 
evil. But Thomas says that while in a relative sense this is true, in an absolute sense God’s 
punishment is not evil because it is ordered to an ultimate end—God’s telos—and is 
therefore good.69 The fears that Thomas discusses that concern the fear-of-God subject 
are “servile,” “filial,” and “initial.”  
“Servile” fear is based upon God’s punishment and—as the name implies—denotes 
a fear that involuntarily drives a person away from the feared punishment and towards 
God. It is therefore not based upon freedom—and one could argue that it is evil (for 
servility is not of love). In response, Thomas points out that this fear-gift is from the Holy 
Spirit and is given in order to fulfill God’s purpose for humans. This makes it good, for 
there is an ultimate good to which it is ordered.70 One could also argue that a person who 
has servile fear is only looking out for him/herself and will respond selfishly and not on 
behalf of God. But self-love, says Thomas, is not necessarily evil. To be concerned about 
one’s self and to take steps to avoid privation (e.g., the privation brought about through 
God’s punishment) is not evil per se. Love can be shown to others as well as to the self. 
Nevertheless, servile (fear-of-punishment) fear that has only its own end in mind—despite 
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originating with the Spirit of God—cannot in the long run remain with charity. The fear 
of punishment is admissible into charity (as will be discussed in a moment); but the 
servility component (i.e., all being a matter of coercion and not freedom in the process of 
becoming closer to God) of servile fear will diminish as charity increases.71 In this 
respect, servile fear is the same as Augustine’s “fear of punishment.” It is used by God, 
but it is a poor kind of fear compared to the “chaste” fear that should replace it. But 
Thomas understands that servile fear has the possibility of having not man as its end, but 
God. Someone can fear God’s punishment not because it deprives them of, for example, 
physical property, food, or comfort, but because that person knows and is distressed by 
the fact that God is grieved and disappointed. If this is the case, then servile fear can exist 
with charity, but is not charity itself.72 This dividing of servile fear into two species is a 
distinction that Augustine does not make. The servile fear species that has God as its 
ultimate end seems to lie somewhere in between Augustine’s fear-of-punishment and 
chaste fear (and in between Thomas’s first species of servile fear [i.e., man, not God, as 
end] and his filial fear).  
Thomas goes on to speak about the more excellent “filial” fear which he says is all 
but the same as Augustine’s chaste fear.73 This fear—one of the seven gifts of the Holy 
Spirit according to Isa 11:2, 3a—has punishment no longer as its focus, but the fear of 
losing fellowship with God. This fear wants to please God (it therefore has God’s purpose 
[or “end” or “telos”] first in mind) and is only fearful of the loss of the close relationship 
should the person do what is always the possibility, i.e., to sin.74 But it should 
nevertheless be noted that even filial fear cannot be completely detached from God’s 
punishment; loss of fellowship is part of the punishment that God gives as a result of sin. 
To fear and grieve because one has sinned and grown apart from God is very close to 
fearing and grieving over the punishment.75 This is a far cry from the species of servile 
fear that cares not about God, but is only fearful of the punishment-caused loss of its own 
comfort and wealth. Even so, Thomas sees both servile fear (of both species) and filial 
fear as being a part of the “beginning of wisdom”: 
For servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so 
far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the 
effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus 1:27, The fear of the Lord driveth out sin. On 
the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first 
effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law 
belongs in wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of all fear God and 
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submit himself to Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by 
God.76 
Thomas’s “initial fear” is the fear experienced by “beginners”—i.e., new Christians. 
“Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear.”77 In this way, Thomas appears to be 
talking about the same thing as his second species of servile fear (that has its focus on 
God’s telos). This species of servile fear, however, retains its servility component and is 
not, therefore, the substance of filial fear. But initial fear, although having a component of 
fear-of-punishment (servile fear), is of the substance of filial fear—albeit imperfectly. So 
“initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the 
same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being 
….”
78
 The “perfect being” which Thomas refers to is filial fear (which is based upon 
love); conversely, the “non being” is servile fear (which is not based upon love). Initial 
fear is experienced by a new Christian who has true affection for Christ (and the filial fear 
of losing fellowship) as well as true fear of punishment (servile fear) because his or her 
understanding of God’s love and justice is yet underdeveloped.79  
Several items come to mind in consideration of Thomas’s thoughts: first, 
throughout his article, Thomas is referring (in his three types of fear-of-God) to the 
unpleasant emotion of fear. Second, if he is right that servile, filial, and initial fears come 
from the Holy Spirit, then they are good in that they come from God and are used to do 
his will. Third, the three fears relate to justification in the following way: servile fear is 
based upon knowledge of God’s power, authority, and judgment, as well as based upon 
the love-of-self; it goads a person to face reality and to make a decision to follow or not 
follow God. Filial fear is based upon love-of-God; because it fears losing the love 
relationship with God, it also acts as motivation to stay close to him. Initial fear is a 
combination of these two: it goads away from punishment (involuntarily) and presses 
(voluntarily) a believer into God. Initial fear (the part that fears losing God’s love) and 
filial fear are both the effects of love—they are not the love itself.80 In view of all this, it 
appears that none of these three fears can save. Saving faith (love) builds upon servile 
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fear and both actuates and is supported by filial fear. Initial fear is a combination of both. 
They are not of the same virtue substance as love/faith (see FN 40 just above) and, in my 
opinion, can not of themselves save. Finally, Thomas, like Augustine, believes that 
servile fear diminishes and filial fear increases as charity grows (is “perfected”). In the 
process of conversion and then sanctification, servile fear does not immediately disappear 
to be completely replaced by filial fear; God will use both in the life of the Christian 
depending on the circumstances and the state of the heart. But if the believer is maturing 
and growing in love, then the fear of punishment (servile) will decrease, and fear of 
losing God’s fellowship (filial) will increase until the believer is “made perfect in love.”81  
Martin Luther 
Even thought Luther was the greatest reformer, he remained true to the orthodox 
views about God and human beings: God is the creator of all things, infinite, perfectly 
holy, and absolutely sovereign. Humans are creatures, finite, corrupt, and under God’s 
authority; and without Christ, they are subject to God’s wrath. Therefore, Luther 
understood that there was much to fear from God and that to have no fear of God and of 
his punishment was utter foolishness and folly. Perhaps more than others before him, 
however, he often perceived more than just fear in many of the OT virtue fear-of-God 
cases. While a number of characteristics are indicated, Luther often understood that 
“worship” was in view.82 For example, in Luther’s comments on Gen 22:12 he writes:  
[O]ne should … note in this passage that when Abraham is praised as one who fears 
and reveres God, the statement refers not only to his faith but also to his entire 
worship, to the tree with its fruits, inasmuch as for the Hebrews to fear God is the 
same as to worship God or to serve God, to love and honor God.83 
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Luther comments likewise about Moses’s admonishment of the Israelites to “fear the 
LORD”: “It seems to be characteristic of this language to apply the term ‘fear of God’ to 
what we call worship of God or piety, or, in Greek, qeosevbeia. Thus Moses here 
combines those two concepts: fear and keeping the Commandments.”84 The fear of the 
LORD that Jonah professed (Jonah 1:12) to the terrified sailors is said to be a “Hebraism” 
for “worship,” and that this worship (in commenting on Eccl 3:14) is to “have God in 
view, to know that He looks at all our works, and to acknowledge Him as the Author of 
all things, both good and evil.”85 In other words, God is to be feared (i.e., worshipped) 
because he is sovereign and the lives of human beings are completely at his mercy.   
In these instances of defining what fear-of-God (as used as a virtue) is, it almost 
sounds like Luther leaves the emotion/feeling of fear completely out; but how he in 
general describes the relationship between God and humanity clearly shows that he 
believes that real fear has its place in the lives of non-believers as well as believers. 
Sometimes his uplifting of fear as an entirely appropriate emotion/feeling toward God is 
seen in texts in which he defines fear-of-God differently. His discussion of the Gen 22 
fear-of-God text just mentioned is an example. Just after claiming that fear-of-God is 
worship, he writes the following: “Where God is revealed in his Word, there worship 
Him, there exercise your reverence; then you are fearing where you should fear and 
tremble.”86 Luther also points out that when the angel said to Abraham “you fear God,” 
Abraham, “thoroughly frightened, fell on his face, or at least listened on bended knees 
….”
87
 This indicates that Luther understood that fearfulness before God was a good thing: 
to “fear and tremble” surely signifies the state of being afraid; and for the angel to say 
“you fear God” while Abraham exhibited the fear emotion/feeling demonstrates that 
being “frightened” has something very much to do with virtue fear-of-God.  
In another Genesis passage (that does not mention fear-of-God directly), Luther 
discerns virtue fear-of-God in Joseph’s response to the sexual advance of Potiphar’s 
wife—and, conversely, fear-of-God is something the woman tragically lacks:  
Accordingly, the very saintly young man preaches to the raging woman …: “Far be 
it from me to sin against God! Woman, consider how great a sin it is to cast off 
reverence for and fear of God, and to offend Him for the sake of a trifling and 
momentary pleasure.” But here no god avails. She gives no thought whatever to 
promises or threats of God; nor does she recall any rewards or punishments.88  
It should be noticed here that “reverence for and fear of God” is a response of the heart 
and mind that should arise in consideration of God’s “rewards and punishments.” In other 
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words, it is the heighth of folly to disregard (i.e., to have no emotional awareness of) the 
pain and suffering that can come when God is angered and inflicts his punishment. The 
“threats” of God do not touch her emotions/feelings at all. That Luther has fearfulness in 
view here is confirmed by what he says next (once again, speaking hypothetical words of 
Joseph to Potiphar’s wife):  
“You are the wife of my master. Have regard for him as you have regard for 
yourself. If you do not fear the wrath of God and do not think that you should pay 
attention to your salvation, at least search your conscience, and give thought to 
what the name and position of a wife require.”89 
It would seem—reading between Luther’s lines—that Potiphar’s wife would have had the 
“beginning of wisdom” and “the beginning of knowledge” if she had been afraid of the 
“wrath of God.” But she had no fear and she therefore conducted herself like a fool. 
This fear of God’s “wrath” that would seem to be basic for all humans is, according 
to Luther, also the fear that is in view in Ps 76: 7, 8 (8, 9). It is a terrifying fear that God 
employs to force people away from sin:  
“For the fear of he Lord is the beginning of wisdom” (Prov 1:7). For from then His 
wrath is in the heart of the penitent, because He causes His judgment to be 
preached, because of which they tremble and cease to do evil, and also because of 
the rumbling of an accusing conscience.90 
This fear—such that people “tremble”—is also the fear-of-God  that one should exhibit if 
one witnesses abominations in civil or church governance, and tolerates them; if this is 
the case, one should “rightly fear the wrath of God.”91 And the sum of Luther’s teaching 
on the Ten Commandments is that one had better fear God lest that person find himself 
taking the brunt of God’s anger and punishment: 
Thus He demands that all our works proceed from a heart which fears and regards 
God alone, and from such fear avoids everything that is contrary to His will, lest it 
should move Him to wrath; and, on the other hand, also trusts in Him alone, and 
from love to Him does all He wishes, because he speaks to us as friendly as a 
father, and offers us all grace and every good.92  
Once again, fear-of-God is understood as dissuading one from sin, and the heart-attitude 
signified here is not worship, but fear—for fear is the most primal emotional safety 
mechanism (“the beginning of wisdom”) that forces one away from what is dangerous. In 
the following quote, the emphasis upon young people’s correction and discipline as well 
as Luther’s earnest desire that they come to know the fear of the Lord strongly indicates 
that fear-of-God is to a significant extent this fear that dissuades one from doing evil: 
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This (I say) it is profitable and necessary always to teach to the young people, to 
admonish them and to remind them of it, that they may be brought up not only with 
blows and compulsion, like cattle, but in the fear and reverence of God. For where 
this is considered and laid to heart that these things are not human trifles, but the 
commandments of the Divine Majesty, who insists upon them with such 
earnestness, is angry with, and punishes those who despise them, and, on the other 
hand, abundantly rewards those who keep them, there will be a spontaneous 
impulse and a desire gladly to do the will of God.93 
Like cattle fear the “blows and compulsion” of the farmer, Luther here believes that 
children should likewise fear the “blows and compulsion” of God when they “despise” 
his commandments. 
Is Luther inconsistent in his portrayal of fear-of-God? This would certainly be so if 
Luther’s understanding of what it means to “worship” was identical with the general 
understanding today. If “worship” is only fear-less adoration and praise, then Luther uses 
the fear-of-God idea in two radically different ways: sometimes fear-of-God means being 
afraid of God, and sometimes it means being in a posture of fear-less worship of God. If 
this is how it is with Luther, and his discussions accurately reflect the state of fear-of-God 
in the OT, then the interpretation of the many OT virtue fear-of-God passages would be 
especially difficult; there would be no way to tell if “fear” or “worship” is meant because 
most virtue fear-of-God texts do not include local contextual or linguistic/semantic 
features that point one way or the other. And, to make matters worse, the word “fear” 
(and Furcht and h and foboς) would lose its semantic specificity (if fear-of-God in 
the OT can signify such widely divergent meanings), and there would then be no general 
OT word remaining to signify the state of being generally afraid before God. But I do not 
think that the meaning of “fear” in fear-of-God—as intended by the Hebrews and as 
interpreted by Luther—is semantically so unpredictable; the brief survey of Luther texts 
above as well as the general flow of Luther’s thought clearly shows that the fear 
emotion/feeling before God—especially in view of the universal human propensity 
(believers included) to sin—was considered by him to be foundational for fruit-bearing 
Christian faith; and this faith includes the worship that Christians manifest before Christ. 
So, for Luther, fear-of-God is not either the fear emotion/feeling before God or fear-free 
worship; rather, it signifies the fear emotion/feeling alone or the fear emotion/feeling plus 
elements of what we would commonly consider today as “worship” (and possibly other 
elements such as “reverence,” “awe,” “honor,” “obedience,” etc.). In Luther’s day, the 
high view of God, the acute awareness of the depravity of humans, the general poverty of 
life, and the proximity of death, all made for a general understanding in the church that 
some element of fearfulness before God was an entirely legitimate anchor for the 
Christian faith—indeed, it was the “beginning of wisdom” for it informs the experient of 
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danger and “goads” him or her away from danger and towards safety. At the same time, 
Luther more than many in his day perceived that virtue fear-of-God was used to stand for 
other heart, soul, and mind elements of the Israelite’s religious experience.  
John Calvin 
Fear-of-God, according to Calvin, is a human emotion that must come in order for 
there to be any hope of conversion. He sees it as negative motivation—that is, fear-of-
God is dread of punishment that motivates one to avoid that punishment. Calvin couches 
his fear-of-God discussion in the context of the saving process of repentance—repentance 
being defined as a turning away from one’s self (one’s own worldly desires—what he 
calls “concupiscence”) to God.94 The sword of the Holy Spirit—through whom faith 
comes—must, however, pierce a person first. Once the spirit begins to stir in a man’s or 
woman’s soul, there occurs a great distress in which the fear of God’s judgment and 
sorrow over one’s sins are mingled. This is the phenomenon that the prophets and 
apostles sought to provoke when they declared the people’s sinfulness as well as the 
judgment that would occur because of it.95 The repentance that God seeks must go down 
to the deepest part of the soul, such that a person becomes willing to mortify the entire 
flesh—i.e., to put off the old man and to put on the new.96 But humans, says Calvin, are 
so steeped in their original corrupted state that it takes the jarring awareness and fear of 
judgment to even begin to move them towards repentance:   
Before the mind of the sinner can be inclined to repentance, he must be aroused by 
the thought of divine judgment; but when once the thought that God will one day 
ascend his tribunal to take an account of all words and actions has taken possession 
of his mind, it will not allow him to rest, or have one moment's peace, but will 
perpetually urge him to adopt a different plan of life, that he may be able to stand 
securely at that judgment-seat. Hence the Scripture, when exhorting to repentance, 
often introduces the subject of judgment, as in Jeremiah, "Lest my fury come forth 
like fire, and burn that none can quench it, because of the evil of your doings," (Jer. 
4: 4.) Paul, in his discourse to the Athenians says, "The times of this ignorance God 
winked at; but now commandeth all men every where to repent: because he has 
appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness" (Acts 17: 30, 
31.).… The stern threatening which God employs are extorted from him by our 
depraved dispositions. For while we are asleep it were in vain to allure us by 
soothing measures.97 
This “stern threatening” results in distressing dread. But this dread should not be so 
intense that people are driven to utter despair, unable to look up. This would slip over into 
the Devil’s domain in which, once he notices that a person is so distressed, he would 
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plunge them “deeper and deeper into the abyss of sorrow, that they may never again 
rise.”98 But this is certainly not the goal of God. 
Calvin understands that repentance (regeneration through putting off the old man 
and putting on the new) is a process. While it is true that a person is “born again” at a 
point in time, the phenomenon of repentance (turning away from sin [mortification of the 
flesh] and turning to God) lasts a lifetime. “This renewal,” writes Calvin,   
is not accomplished in a moment, a day, or a year, but by uninterrupted, sometimes 
even by slow progress God abolishes the remains of carnal corruption in his elect, 
cleanses them from pollution, and consecrates them as his temples, restoring all 
their inclinations to real purity, so that during their whole lives they may practice 
repentance, and know that death is the only termination to this warfare.99  
This is because humans are plagued with concupiscence. This lust after evil is not just an 
“infirmity” (as Augustine describes it), but is itself evil in every case because it causes 
people to love God imperfectly (i.e., with less than their whole heart, soul, mind, and 
strength).100 Because perfection is unattainable in this life—either in avoiding sin or in 
loving God—“God assigns repentance as the goal towards which they must keep running 
during the whole course of their lives.”101 
In summary, Calvin puts high value on the fear-of-God that works negatively to 
pressure a person to commence the repentance process. Because men and women are so 
stiff-necked and heard-hearted, the fear of God’s wrath must be used like hammer blows 
until pride is broken up and sufficient humility is instilled such that openness to God’s 
free gift of grace is manifested. But because “sin is lurking at [the] door” and men and 
women must learn to “master it” (Gen 4:7b), the repentance process—spurred on by the 
fear of God’s punishment—must be exercised throughout their lives until the Lord one 
day says “well done, good and faithful servant[s]!” (Matt 25:21, 23) 
THE CRITICAL PERIOD (WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON JOACHIM BECKER) 
The pre-critical fear-of-God thinkers just spoken of all assumed—based upon a 
high view of Scripture—that God created men and women, God brought about his 
salvation plan through Christ, and there would be a final judgment based upon the 
acceptance or rejection of Christ. God’s commands in Scripture were taken to be the 
highest law and it made perfect sense that one should fear God and his judgment if one 
did not follow his commands. This clarity of the fear-of-God theme, however, did not 
remain; the theme lost its simplicity and innocence in the critical era. This was a 
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consequence of the philosophical and theological paradigm shifts that occurred during 
and after the Enlightenment. Epistemological skepticism (mainly empiricism and 
idealism) forced theological study into more of a history-of-religions mindset. As a result, 
the emphasis shifted from the inspired Word of God to the uninspired creation of the 
Bible by men.102 With this, fear-of-God went from being a subject of theological 
reflection to one of scientific study. A most noticeable by-product is this: the writers of 
the critical age—unlike those from the earlier age—do not present themselves as being 
within the world that necessarily must wrestle with the fear-of-God phenomenon; instead, 
the modern writers seem to stand outside of the world, as if peering in through a 
microscope, cataloguing all the discernable historical details, but leaving out the invisible 
factors of the heart. The critical era studies concentrate on how fear-of-God “evolved” 
from primitive cultures to refined monotheism in Israel; but how it applies to the readers 
(or the writers), and how it can help us move toward a saving relationship with God and 
Christ is practically of no concern. These characteristics of the critical period’s fear-of-
God studies will be seen as several of that period’s main works are considered in this 
section.  
Rudolf Otto 
We begin with Rudolf Otto—the German thinker who wrote the highly influential 
Das Heilige—because, first, his term “numinous” is so widely used, and, second, because 
his idealism is reflected in a number of later important works that deal directly with the 
fear-of-God theme.103 Otto does not in Das Heilige address fear-of-God per se, but tries 
to argue for and describe the irreducible a priori emotional religious phenomenon (what 
he calls the “numinous”). To be more precise, Otto argues for the numinous, but he 
confesses that he really cannot describe it—for it is at the absolute bottom (i.e. 
base/foundation) of the human psyche. It can only be described with imperfect analogies. 
Here, Otto borrows from Kant the idea of irreducible categories of the mind that make 
intelligible the sense impressions received from the exterior world.104 Kant was willing to 
admit God into the fold of what could be known; but he based this upon the a priori moral 
imperatives that he believed to be in all persons, and not on historical observation or 
emotional experience. But Otto believed that religious emotion/feeling was sufficiently 
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powerful and compelling to also qualify as an a priori category (and, therefore, as 
knowledge). In this way, Otto makes more room for knowing God than Kant. But at the 
same time, Otto held on to most of Kant’s (epistemological) skepticism about the thing in 
itself, and, more specifically, about the ability to know the truth of the Bible’s historical 
claims to supernatural revelation.105 Otto also did not put much stock into the Bible’s 
historical credibility—far more important and reliable were what people felt about God. 
The written things of religion that were outside were not appropriate gauges of the truth 
of religion. The subjective experience was practically all that mattered. It followed, then, 
that the core feelings/emotions of each religion (i.e., the numinous) are true because they 
flow from the a priori category of divine awareness. In this deduction from 
epistemological skepticism to theological truths—as will be seen in the next few 
paragraphs—the God of the Bible fades away as an objective reality. The idea of the holy, 
however, is still there; but it is no longer applied to YHWH (as object of holiness), but to 
the numinous (the religious emotion/feeling) of the subject. Every religion’s core 
numinous feeling, therefore, must be counted as valid. It follows, then, that Christianity 
cannot claim exclusive rights to the truth. It also follows that, with this level of 
subjectivity, the idea that God broke into human history and revealed himself from the 
outside cannot be maintained. God must come from the inside. God begins with men and 
women as they first fear their dangerous environment, imagine demons or gods within 
that environment, then—according to their cult and political and emotional needs—wind 
up with some kind of monotheism that best sooths their fears about earthly life as well as 
the afterlife. In other words, God is a human concept that develops as humans evolve. 
These results of Otto’s thought are thoroughly revealed in his Das Heilige. I turn to this 
work now in order to argue that his numinous concept—of which fear is a significant 
component—is ultimately unsuitable for describing the feelings that one has before the 
God of the Bible.  
The holy = the numinous = a feeling  
In the fear-of-God literature after Otto, the term “numinous” is often used as 
another term for God.106 But this does not accurately reflect what Otto really meant when 
he coined then employed this “special term” in Das Heilige.107 The numinous was created 
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to stand for the idea of “the holy” minus any moral or rational aspects; but “the holy” of 
which he speaks is not God, but a subjective feeling that may or may not have God as an 
object. The numinous is “a state of mind” that is “irreducible to any other; and therefore, 
like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it 
cannot be strictly defined.”108 Of primary importance is to note that Otto is using the term 
as equal to “the holy”—a term normally reserved (biblically speaking) for God or people 
and liturgical items that God pronounces as holy. But when one considers the ways that 
he attempts to fine tune what he means by “numinous,” one wonders if the biblical God is 
altogether out of view: the numinous is at the “innermost core” of every religion; it is a 
“feeling-response,” an “element,” a “category of value,” and “a state of mind”; the 
numinous is something that “stirs” in humans, yet “cannot be strictly defined”; it “cannot, 
strictly speaking, be taught” but only “evoked, awakened in the mind.”109 On first glance 
these properties do not appear to have anything to do with God, but everything to do with 
the human consciousness.  
While it is true that Otto bases his term “numinous” on the Latin “numen” (“deity”), 
and he also speaks occasionally about the God of Israel or the God of Christianity, the 
best estimate of how he really thinks about “numinous” is to notice that he always 
describes the word in terms of human emotion/feeling, not of God. Furthermore, if there 
were any intention on Otto’s part to have his readers understand that the object of the 
religious person’s affections is God, then he would—if given the opportunity—designate 
the object as God or at least (in keeping with his numinous coming from numen idea), 
“numen.” He does have this opportunity and does offer an object to the “feeling 
element”—but this “object” is surprising and baffling. In Otto’s following quote, he is 
trying to argue that Schleiermacher’s “feeling of dependence” (what Otto prefers to call 
“creature-feeling”) is not the primary religious feeling, but is the 
effect of another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself 
indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self. 
Now this object is just what we have already spoken of as ‘the numinous’. 
For the ‘creature-feeling’ and the sense of dependence to arise in the mind the 
‘numen’ must be experienced as present, a numen praesens, as is in the case of 
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Abraham. There must be felt a something ‘numinous’, something bearing the 
character of a ‘numen’, to which the mind turns spontaneously; or (which is the 
same thing in other words) these feelings can only arise in the mind as 
accompanying emotions when the category of ‘the numinous’ is called into play. 
The numinous is thus felt as objective and outside the self.110 
Note here that the numen is not said to be the object of the mind, but the numinous is the 
object. The numen might be “experienced as present,” but the operative word here is 
“experienced”; something might be experienced as an object of the mind, but it may or 
may not be an object that is objectively real. After thoroughly defining the numinous as 
the religious feeling, he goes on here to say that it is also the object of the feeling. Put 
another way, the numinous has as its object the numinous (in German [using Otto’s 
spelling for “numinous”]: das Numinose vor dem Numinosen). But this borders on 
nonsense.  
That the numinous is a subjective feeling is made clear by the parallel upon which 
he clarifies the term: as “ominous” comes from the word “omen,” so he coins the word 
“numinous” to signify a feeling when one is aware of a numen.111 “Ominous” and 
“numinous” are both (not completely different) feeling-reactions to—one would think—
their respective “omen” and “numen” objects. But the above block-quote of Otto—which 
is his best opportunity in the whole book to make crystal clear the object of the numinous 
a priori feeling—says that the object is the numinous. One might attempt to defend him at 
this point by saying that, despite this first definition, he really intends for the numinous 
object to be God; but based upon what he has said here, his clear reliance upon the 
“feeling of dependence” idea of Schleiermacher, and his otherwise very tight reasoning, it 
can hardly be an accident that “numinous” is used here as both subject and object.112  
That the object is confused with the subject is even more evident in the German of 
Otto’s 1936 edition. There, the same block-quote (the text of the 1958 English edition 
differs substantially) from just above reads (skipping the first part that mentions the 
“feeling-element” that casts the dependence feeling “like a shadow” and perceives an 
object that is “outside the self”):  
Das aber ist eben das numinose Objekt. Nur wo numen als praesens erlebt wird, wie 
im Falle Abrahams, oder wo ein Etwas numinosen Charakters gefühlte wird, also 
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erst infolge [as a result of; owing to] einer Anwendung [use] der Kategorie des 
Numinosen auf ein wirkliches oder vermeintliches [presumed] Objekt kann als 
deren Reflex das Kreatur-gefühl im Gemüt entstehen [to arise].113  
Several items in this German text are noteworthy (I will use only his German terms and 
their spelling for clarity): first, Otto clearly uses „numinose“ in the first sentence as an 
adjective—it is not capitalized and not in the genitive case, or he would have written, 
„Das aber ist eben das Objekt des Numinosens.“ The use of the adjective appears to 
mean that the „Objekt“ has the property of „numinose.“ But one would think that the 
object would be the „Numen“—especially if he were staying true to his parallel with (in 
the German) „Omen“ (noun) and „ominös“ (adjective). For as „ominös “ gives the 
property of the feeling that has an „Omen“ as its object, so should the „numinose“ 
provide the property of the particular feeling that has the „Numen“ as its object. Where 
Otto is going with the question of the religious feeling’s object is perhaps indicated by the 
following fact: even though he cites the parallel just mentioned, he does not stick to the 
parallel. He adds something that he does not inform the reader of; that is, he uses 
“numinous” (I continue with the spelling in the English versions [as used later by most 
English commentators]) not only as an adjective, but also as a noun. This is easier seen in 
the German where the first letter of the noun is capitalized. By also giving “numinous” 
noun status (which he has the right to do, because the word is of his own creation), he is 
then able to employ it as an object (which he would not be able to do if he stuck purely to 
the “omen”/“ominous” parallel and used “numinous” as a pure adjective).  
That there is no object—as one normally thinks of an object—in Otto’s notion of 
the numinous is also implied through his declaration that the numinous can be added to 
one of the Kantian pure-reason (a priori) categories which do not rely on what comes 
through the senses to exist. But Otto does not stop there; he says that the numinous goes 
“back to something still deeper than the ‘pure reason.’” He claims this is the “bottom or 
ground of the soul.”114 The numinous is so basic that, while it may be stirred to life by 
something taken in through the senses, the highest reality will only be realized when an 
object supervenes that the numinous alone creates. In the numinous experience are found 
beliefs and feelings qualitatively different from anything that ‘natural’ sense-
perception is capable of giving us. They are themselves not perceptions at all, but 
peculiar interpretations and valuations, at first of perceptual data, and then—at a 
higher level—of posited objects and entities, which themselves no longer belong to 
the perceptual world, but are thought of as supplementing and transcending it. 
[italics mine]115 
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The key word here is “posited.” When Otto gave his numinous ontological status by 
making it a noun, he now had something that could posit or be posited. But one wonders 
if any pure-reason Kantian category of the mind can posit or be posited as an object. Be 
that as it may, there can be no doubt that reality and religion are mainly apprehended by 
Otto from an idealist standpoint: the numinous experience is the object, is not 
“supernatural,”116 but is nevertheless “holy.” Consequently, worship is possible without 
any real divine power. In speaking of Jacob’s first gut reaction of the awesomeness of the 
place where he had his heavenly-ladder dream (Gen 28:17), Otto writes, “There is no 
need … for the experient to pass on to resolve his mere impression of the eerie and 
aweful into the idea of a ‘numen’, a divine power, dwelling in the ‘aweful’ place …. 
Worship is possible without this further explicative process.”117 In fact, it matters not if 
the objects that supervene on the numinous are demons or Elohim—the Mysterium 
Tremendum numinous feeling can be the same. If the objects of religious feelings came 
about as projections of evolving minds, then it follows that those feelings could be the 
same regardless of their objects; for if the “posited” objects are only perceived and not 
real, then they do not have any ontological status that could cause feelings to change in 
humans.118   
The holy evolved from primitive peoples 
A significant assumption in Otto’s Das Heilige is that religion evolved. Otto draws 
much of his thought from idealism which originally was a reaction against empirical 
epistemology.119 Idealist philosophers like Hegel and Schleiermacher preserved a place 
for religion by saying that the mind sensations/experiences are really all we can know 
with certainty. Religion could be preserved through the minds perception of it. But this, 
like radical empiricism, left things of the outside world (like biblical events that happened 
in history) as unknowable (we did not experience them ourselves) and off limits for 
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reasonable study. When combined with the rising status of empirical science as well as 
the theory of natural selection by Darwin, biblical studies in most universities in Europe 
were undertaken with the assumption that the Israelite idea of God had evolved.120  
Otto, who mainly concentrates on the experience of religious feelings, nevertheless 
takes a very scientific view of how these feelings arose and how they invoked the 
consciousness of deity. In accordance with the scientific requirements to keep theological 
explanations as close to nature and nature’s evolution as possible, Otto understands that 
the primordial human religious “predisposition” was something that evolved and 
flourished over a long period, could be stimulated by outside influences, but always 
developed ontologically from within: 
The predispositions which the human reason brought with it when the species Man 
entered history became long ago, not merely for individuals but for the species as a 
whole, a religious impulsion, to which incitements from without and pressure from 
within the mind both contributed. It begins in undirected, groping emotion, a 
seeking and shaping of representations, and goes on, by a continual onward 
striving, to generate ideas, till its nature is self-illumined and made clear by an 
explication of the obscure a priori foundation of thought itself, out of which it 
originated. And this emotion, this searching, this generation and explication of 
ideas, gives the warp of the fabric of religious evolution, whose woof we are to 
discuss later.121 
The religious feeling, which begins as a kernel of “religious impulsion,” is latent in every 
person and gives the “warp” and “woof” of “religious evolution.” Here, Otto is keeping 
fully with the subjective feelings; but these feelings find their highest manifestation only 
through being “self-illumined” by the a priori numinous. Whatever “incitements from 
without” may be take a back seat to this self-illumination.  
The above quote from Otto is admittedly ambiguous. Any idea, however, that a 
supernatural God is one of the “incitements from without” in the development of the 
numinous is quickly eliminated when one considers his suggested steps in religion’s 
evolution: first in the process of religious evolution arise “curious phenomena,” like the 
notions of  
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‘clean’ and ‘unclean’, belief in and worship of the dead, belief in and worship of 
‘souls’ or ‘spirits’, magic, fairy tale, and myth, homage to natural objects, whether 
frightful or extraordinary, noxious or advantageous, the strange idea of ‘power’ 
(orenda or mana), fetishism and totemism, worship of animal and plant, daemonism 
and poly daemonism.122 
These all come out of—if indirectly—a numinous element and form “the vestibule of 
religion.”123 The numinous awareness that finds its focus on demons is especially 
appropriate as proto-religion because the religious feeling is not “diverted … to earthly 
things” (like stars, volcanoes, sun, moon, etc.). The numinous in this case “remains a pure 
feeling, as in ‘panic’ terror … or itself invents, or, better, discovers, the numinous object 
by rendering explicit the obscure germinal ideas latent in itself.” (Italics mine)124 Once 
again, as Otto has said before, there is a “positing of the numinous object” (i.e., the 
numinous “invents” its object). And this can occur, writes Otto, with only the tiniest 
amount of environmental stimulus:  
This experience of eerie shuddering and awe breaks out rather from depths of the 
souls which the circumstantial, external impression cannot sound, and the force 
with which it breaks out is so disproportionate to the mere external stimulation that 
the eruption may be termed, if not entirely, at least very nearly, spontaneous.125  
As the numinous feeling grows, it is not evolving from one species to another; rather, it is 
more precisely growing. In primordial humans it was there, but latent. As the human 
species develops, the numinous began to grow and to take on (“posit”) objects, both real 
(e.g., volcanoes, stars, etc.) and imagined (e.g., demons).126  
If the early stirring of the numinous does not get “diverted” to things-in-the-world, 
then, as the subject has his or her feelings of “‘How uncanny!’ or ‘How eerie this place 
is!’” there may be a chance for this pure feeling-awareness to slip over into perceiving 
some unseen-but-felt object:  
‘It is not quite right here’; ‘It is uncanny.’ The English ‘This place is haunted’ 
shows a transition to a positive form of expression. Here we have the obscure basis 
of meaning and idea rising into greater clarity and beginning to make itself explicit 
as the notion, however vague and fleeing, of a transcendent Something, a real 
operative entity of a numinous kind, which later, as the development proceeds, 
assumes concrete form as a ‘numen loci’, a daemon, an ‘El’, a Baal, or the like.127  
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The notion, of course, that Israelite religion arose from inner feelings of uncanny-ness 
and haunted-ness in which its patriarchs “invent[ed], or better, discover[ed]” “a daemon” 
just as easily as “a Baal” or “an ‘El’”, inverts the biblical testimony that God made 
humans first and then revealed himself to them. When Otto uses “invents, or, better, 
discovers” (in paragraph just above), he is clearly using—given the context—“discovers” 
ironically (for he can only be using it straightforwardly if he believes that a real “Baal” 
can really be met and worshipped); actually, the whole phrase is ironically meant for 
“discovers, or, better, invents”—but that would too explicitly say what he is trying to say 
implicitly throughout his book. If Otto really meant for “discovers” to be understood in 
the usual sense, then there would have been no reason to mention “invents.” In any case, 
this phrase well displays the (what I sense to be intentional) ambiguity that Otto employs 
to keep the real meaning of the numinous (that only he can define) perpetually a mystery 
and just beyond the reader’s grasp. But this is not to be unexpected considering his 
contacts with Buddhism and Hinduism with their emphases on the unfathomable and 
esoteric.128 
If this evolutionary scenario is how God came to be, then, says Otto, there can be 
no such thing as “primitive monotheism” (which is only a “missionary apologetic … 
eager to save the second chapter of Genesis”).129 While he insists that the “naturalistic 
psychologists” do not fully appreciate the “self-attestation” of religious ideas, his main 
gripe is against “the upholders of the theory of ‘primitive monotheism’” who 
show no less serious disregard of this central fact than the naturalistic 
psychologists. For if the phenomena we have been considering were based simply 
and solely on historical traditions and dim memories of a ‘primeval revelation’, as 
on such a theory they must be, this self-attestation from within would be just as 
much excluded as before.130 
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In view of this quote, and of what he has professed up to this point, his big picture seems 
to be this: in all ages each human being has had a religious awareness (the numinous) that 
is only slightly or more highly developed. Otto clearly assumes that this feeling (the 
characteristics of which will be discussed in the next section) is the right and true and 
“holy” religious feeling. He is therefore, of course, describing something that is at the 
heart of the orthodox Christian (and Jewish and Muslim) question of how one can be right 
with God. (i.e., he is in fact stating his opinion of how immortality can be achieved [Otto, 
being a member of the Protestant church in Germany, would have been fully aware of the 
salvation and immortality questions]) It comes down to two choices (as made clear in the 
quote just above): either his idea that all people have the true religious feeling is true, or 
the opposing idea that some people who received a “primeval revelation” have the true 
religious feeling is true. The latter (biblical) possibility is immediately brushed off by 
Otto because, if it were true, the “self-attestation” (i.e., his “numinous”) would be 
“excluded”; in other words, his numinous would be shown to not be the true experience 
of true religion because it lacks a true revelation. By mentioning this distinction (that both 
cannot be true at the same time), Otto illumines the reader to a great truth. If the God of 
Genesis—that is, the holy and eternal God—really gave a “primeval revelation” to 
ancient men and women, then the true and truly holy religious experience can only occur 
if one has as his or her object of religious feeling the true God who is not just felt to be 
external, but is external to the subject. To put it more bluntly, if the God of the Bible 
really is, then Otto’s theory of “the holy” residing in the hearts of all humans is false. He 
understands this point correctly; but he uses it (that any “primal revelation” would 
exclude any “self-revelation from within”) as grounds to dismiss the possibility of any 
“primeval revelation.” But this is only begging the question of which religious experience 
is the right one. To assert that all peoples have religious feelings may be evidence for 
human psychology (and maybe give evidence for a “general revelation”), but it does not 
say anything about the question of whether or not those feelings are appropriate feelings 
based upon the true ultimate reality. By dismissing revelation, Otto is in fact violating the 
right of revelation to take the legal position of higher priority—for the general feeling 
cannot exclude the revelation, but the revelation can exclude the general feeling. But Otto 
turns this on its head with no argument or evidence.  
The usefulness of Otto’s numinous feelings 
One cannot take seriously Otto’s belief that true and “holy” religious feelings can 
be experienced the same, no matter who or what the object is (whether God or a demon or 
even Satan). The experience cannot be the same because objects of worship can be so 
vastly different. Plus, the soul-state of the person who worships God will obviously be 
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radically different from that of one who worships, for example, Satan. Consequently, the 
feelings involved will be radically different. And again, one must be extremely wary in 
using Otto’s term “numinous” if just for the reason that it denotes both the worship 
feeling as well as a feeling that is worshipped. The numinous is both subject and object, 
and therefore cannot qualify as a true depiction of the feeling that a child of God would 
have for his or her loving Lord. For this reason, Otto’s “mysterium tremendum” (one of 
his ways to describe the numinous) should not be used as a term for God because it is 
ultimately subjective and indescribable, as Otto himself says: “Conceptually mysterium 
denotes merely that which is hidden and esoteric, that which is beyond conception or 
understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar.”131 The God of the Bible is indeed 
mysterious; but for the Christian, he is not completely mysterious but reveals much to his 
children through his Word and his Holy Spirit who indwells them. 
On the other hand, some of the feelings that Otto has catalogued are quite likely 
those that really do arise in response to God’s general revelation. Through (as the apostle 
Paul puts it) “the things he has made,” humans are brought to feelings of wonder and awe 
and thoughts about God—so that “they are without excuse” (Rom 1:20b). This only 
makes sense because human beings are made in the image of God. They can at least 
sense him—but they are not forced to choose him as Lord. Some characteristics of the 
numinous (as Otto describes them) are characteristics of the feelings that arise in response 
to the general revelation. On the other hand, where the numinous appears to have 
inappropriate objects “posited”—like volcanoes, demons, pantheons of gods—the 
feelings that Otto says occurs are not an accurate description of the feelings that one has 
before the general revelation that is evidence of not an evil being, but a good one. This 
evidence is the creation which the creator made. The general revelation that points to the 
God who is love provokes (as a function of the “eternity” in people’s hearts [Eccl 3:11]) 
the sensing of one who is all-powerful and immortal.  
This general revelation-provoked feeling is similar to Otto’s “creature feeling”: “It 
is the emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in 
contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.”132 This “supreme” reality he goes 
on to describe as an “overpowering, absolute might of some kind” or “absolute 
overpoweringness.”133 It should be mentioned once again that Otto’s “supreme” reality is 
a reality that is not “posited” by itself, but a reality that is “posited” by the numinous 
experience of the subject. Even though his “mysterium tremendum” is essentially all in 
the mind, it nevertheless has components that echo the feelings when one responds to the 
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general revelation. When one, for example, is alone deep in a dark forest or high on a 
rugged mountain ridge or is beholding the “milky way” on a moonless, crystal-clear 
night, one begins to sense the mystery and the tremendousness of the one who made it all. 
Some degree of that sense might have as its object the forest, mountains, or stars —and 
worship of these physical phenomena might result. But, if the general revelation is true, 
God plants the understanding in humans that this focus and worship of these created 
things is a wrong—and evil—diversion from the soul’s proper object. The general 
revelation feeling will have an “awefulness” about it that perceives the hallowedness of 
the creator and feels, in response to the creator’s mystery and omnipotence, some level of 
real fear.134 But Otto’s idea that the numinous contains elements of “terror,” and 
“shuddering,” and perceives its object of fear as being „grässlich“ (“grisly”), makes one 
doubt if the numinous really has as its object the God who is love.135 Otto based much of 
what he wrote in Das Heilige upon his observations of people groups who were not 
monotheistic. These groups focused their natural religious awareness upon ancestor 
spirits, demons, and idols that provoked very weird and fearful reactions. It appears that 
Otto, as he observed these reactions, assumed that they too comprised legitimate religious 
feelings and included them in his description of the numinous. But feelings of “creeping 
flesh” and blood that runs “icy cold” as well as the “grisly” (which Otto says “very 
clearly designate[s] the numinous element”) do not accurately describe the feelings one 
has when he or she is prompted to think about God in witness of the beauty and grandeur 
of his creation.136 
There is also a reflection of the reality of moral law and judgment in Otto’s 
numinous where he writes about the feeling of numinous “wrath.” This wrath is “the 
‘ideogram’ of a unique emotional moment in religious experience” that is “nothing but 
the tremendum itself.”137 In his opinion, however, the biblical “wrath of Yahweh” 
possesses “no concern whatever with moral qualities,” but  
is more like “stored-up electricity, discharging itself upon anyone who comes too 
near. It is ‘incalculable’ and ‘arbitrary’. Anyone who is accustomed to think of 
deity only by its rational attributes must see in this ‘wrath’ mere caprice and willful 
passion.138 
This “arbitrary” attribute of the biblical God (which he understands as being a property of 
the wrath component of the numinous in general) is simply a miss-characterization of 
YHWH. While there are indeed a few examples of what seem to be “arbitrary” justice 
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(see, e.g., 2 Sam 6: 6, 7, where Uzzah is killed by God for taking hold of the ark), his 
moral law—especially that contained in the Mosaic Law—is quite clearly understood to 
be the basis upon which YHWH judges human beings. In that Otto does observe this 
element of wrath in the numinous, however, does somewhat accurately reflect the natural 
tendency for people to have a moral law in their hearts that prompts a feeling of 
accountability. This awareness of accountability as well as their awareness that they fall 
short of the moral law results in fear. But when Otto describes the anger perceived in the 
numinous as “something supra-rational [that] throbs and gleams, palpable and visible, in 
the ‘wrath of God’, prompting to a sense of ‘terror’ that no ‘natural’ anger can arouse,” he 
cannot be describing the righteous anger of the God of the Bible.139 
Finally, Otto’s “fascinosum” aspect of the numinous could have some parallel with 
Thomas’s filial fear that is always in some sort of tension with the fear of punishment 
(servile fear). Otto writes:  
The daemonic-divine object may appear to the mind an object of horror and dread, 
but at the same time it is no less something that allures with a potent charm, and the 
creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has always at the 
same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his own. The 
‘mystery’ is for him not merely something to be wondered at but something that 
entrances him; and beside that in it which bewilders and confounds, he feels a 
something that captivates and transports him with a strange ravishment, rising often 
enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxication; it is the Dionysiac-element in the 
numen.140  
Needless to say, the attracting emotion Otto describes cannot be one-size-fits-all; the feel 
of the “strange ravishment” when one has a demon as object will be very different from 
that when one has the truly Divine as object. In fact, this makes the fascinosum aspect of 
the numinous also unsuitable to describe the more positive feelings of true religion—for 
one cannot love a demon and God in the same way. On the other hand, Otto’s fascinosum 
could have something to do, once again, with the general revelation. When humans 
behold God’s creation, they not only are prompted to think about its creator, but also to 
have a longing for the creator. This longing, however, can be easily misdirected to the 
fascinosum for things or persons within the creation.  
To sum up on Otto, while he does speak from time to time in Das Heilige of the 
biblical God, he never clearly speaks of that God as a supernatural being. If there is any 
doubt how he thinks of God, one can go back to his definition of the numinous at book’s 
beginning; there, his idea of “the holy” is a subjective feeling, and that feeling is the 
“numinous.” This definition as well as Otto’s assertion that the numinous evolved are 
sufficient reasons to avoid using the term altogether in theological writing that seeks to 
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accurately describe the attributes of God and the feelings that people have when they have 
a relationship with God. If the term is used, it should be, as Terrien insists, “seriously 
qualified.”141 That being said, Otto’s idea of the numinous—which comes from his 
investigation of many religions around the globe—does provide some insights that can 
add to and/or illuminate what was learned about fear-of-God in the pre-critical age. First, 
Otto’s study indicates that religious feelings might not fit neatly into two or three or four 
distinctly discernable classes; feelings are very fluid and radically different feelings can 
be experienced at the same time. The numinous feelings tend to “evolve” because they 
are “latent” in all people; but more mature feelings can wash back into the more 
primitive, or the primitive can erupt into the more mature if certain stimuli occur. Second, 
there are elements of the numinous that match certain feelings that arise as a result of the 
perception of the general revelation. The fear of the unknown as well as the fear of a 
“mysterium tremendum” that is “out there” are natural responses to the general revelation. 
One may feel fear and “awe-fulness,” but probably not “creeping flesh” and “horror.” His 
idea—based upon Schleiermacher—of “creature feeling” fits well with this initial 
response to the “things that [are] made” in God’s creation. The “creature feeling” is 
perhaps used by God in that the one who begins to know that (and to feel like) he or she is 
a “creature” will only then begin to search for the creator. This response to the general 
revelation seems to be before the fear-of-judgment (servile fear) that Augustine and 
Thomas describe. But, third, Otto does present the case that the fear of God’s wrath is one 
of his numinous feelings. Otto sees this wrath as “arbitrary” and not based upon any sort 
of righteousness of God. That would be quite opposed to Christian orthodoxy and makes 
this component of the numinous unreliable. Nevertheless, that he counts “wrath” as 
universally perceived and felt does give evidence that God’s moral law and judgment are 
realities that God has placed as knowledge (if, however basic) in the hearts of all humans. 
Fourth, there is the “fascinosum” part of the numinous that is attracted to and enjoys the 
object of one’s religious feeling. But Otto does not speak about fear arising from the loss 
of the relationship with that object (which would make it similar to Thomas’s filial fear). 
Perhaps this is because the “object” is so blended into the subject, they are in essence one 
and the same; and once the object supervenes upon the subject, there is no fear of losing it 
because the subject willed it to exist in the first place, and can continue to will it to 
exist—without fear of losing it—if the subject so desires. But that is, admittedly, over-
speculation about a very esoteric subject.  
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B. Bamberger 
In a lengthy journal article, Bamberger tries to show that most uses of fear-of-God 
in the OT have lost the component of the fear emotion/feeling. He sympathizes with the 
modern “distaste” for religious fear, and this appears to drive his interpretation.142 Fearing 
God, he says, “is repugnant to modern taste, which regards fear as incompatible with 
genuine religious sentiment.”143 Bamberger then proceeds to look into a number of 
biblical texts that demonstrate that fear before God tended to come early while the more 
mature notions of obedience, moral purity, and worship came later. His investigation only 
uses a small sample of texts, but he does establish a general framework that Becker was 
to later follow and work out exhaustively. The methodological strengths and/or 
weaknesses that will be discussed briefly below will also tend to reappear in Becker.  
Bamberger first presents a number of verses that depict fear before God (Becker 
will call these cases of fear before the “numinous”). These “chiefly of pre-exilic origin” 
verses mainly record incidents of men fearing before epiphanies of God and/or 
spectacular displays of his mighty works.144 He then surveys a number of the ninety 
percent (his count) of the total fear cases that stress “the objective side of religion, as 
manifested either in moral conduct or in ritual.”145 With these texts, he makes the 
sweeping statement that all of them—that have any context at all that illumines the fear 
concept—show that fear-of-God means “worship.”146 When the passages, however, are 
considered that Bamberger sets out as proof texts, it is evident that he over-generalizes. 
For example, he says that the fear mentioned in Isa 29:13 “refers plainly to the 
ceremonial, observed in a lifeless and mechanical fashion.”147 This is indeed what God is 
saying; but the point missed is that this is not what God desires. Fear-of-the-LORD 
should be more than just ceremony and ritual. It should be a relationship—as the first part 
of the verse implies—of the heart. The fear emotion could certainly be allowed in this 
case especially in view of God’s anger because of the hypocrisy of the people. Actually, 
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this verse delimits what can be included in legitimate fear-of-God: non-heartfelt worship 
is not allowed.148  
Several other of his texts are worthy of comment: Josh 24:14 can indeed to some 
extent be referring to worship (and this implies, as Bamberger correctly perceives, the 
abandonment of the worship of false gods);149 but the solemn gravity of the occasion—
especially seen in view of the inevitability of sin (see vv. 19-22)—warrants the view that 
fearing and serving the LORD/abandoning false gods (v. 14) are not synonymous 
concepts, but the former is foundational for the latter.150 The stern threats of God’s 
judgment issued by Joshua in this case furthermore warrants the idea that he was trying to 
instill real fear (of punishment and of God who would bring the punishment) in the hearts 
of a rebellious people. Similar dynamics are found in Ps 5:7(8) where David bows down 
in fear (which, according to Bamberger, “refers to worship in the strictly devotional 
sense”) towards God’s holy temple.151 In view of God’s great judgment of the wicked 
(vv. 4-6) and his “great mercy,” David’s worship could very well be best described as 
“fearful worship.” But “fear” here does not have to mean worship: an Israelite could have 
any one of a number of feelings/emotions in the temple; one could certainly bow down in 
fear just as one could bow down in worship. Bamberger seems to base his opinion on the 
assumption that fearing is synonymous with bowing down—the latter often translated as 
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“worship.” But if there is synonymity, the case might be that “bow down” is meant to be 
taken literally—and fearing could mean bowing. But I do not think this is the case. As 
will be seen with Becker later, there is the tendency of these critical commentators to 
overcomplicate the text. In the case of Ps 5:7(8), there is most likely—just like the text 
says—a combination of fear-feeling and worship in view. In Deut 6:2 (as well as other 
“hortatory” sections in Deuteronomy) “fear of Jhwh is not the motive for keeping the 
laws, but is itself the keeping of the laws.”152 While this might be so, one does not have to 
take “fear the LORD” and “keep all his decrees and all his commandments” as 
synonymous. The latter can be taken to build upon the former. And especially in view of 
the reality of God’s jealousy and anger (see vv. 13-15), compliance to God’s decrees 
should build upon a base of fearful recognition that God has every right to judge human 
sin. Bamberger mentions several other fear-of-God passages that indicate some aspect of 
the worship of God (Gen 22:12; Neh 1:11; Job 28:28; 31:30; Ps 22:24; 33:18; 147:11; 
Prov 10:27; 22:4; Jonah 1:9; Mal 3:5); but none explicitly rule out the emotion of fear.  
For passages that do not have any contextual indications of what is meant by fear-
of-God, Bamberger suggests that meaning can be found by the form criticism tactic of 
comparison: “from the more explicit examples, it is usually possible to determine the 
meaning of the term in documents of the same period when the context gives no help.”153 
He does not comment further on this idea and the reader is left to wonder what 
implications this would have.  
In summary, other than alleged synonymous parallels, Bamberger does not really 
give evidence for his claim that most of the OT fear-of-God passages do not depict the 
emotion/feeling of fear.154 Like with Becker, the claim is simply made; but meaningful 
justification for the claim is not given. There is clearly a large body of “authoritative” 
form-critical opinion behind the claims of Bamberger and Becker, but little is said about 
it (Becker does give a nod to Hermann Gunkel in the brief description of his method, as 
will be seen in the next section, but he does not discuss how his exegesis of fear-of-God 
texts is affected by it). 
Joachim Becker  
We now come to the longest fear-of-God work of the critical age—Becker’s 
Gottesfurcht im Alten Testament.155 Unlike pre-critical authors, Becker does not write 
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from the perspective of biblical authority/inspiration. His work, therefore, does not aim to 
discern the appropriate fears that believers and non-believers may be justified in 
experiencing before God. Even though he accomplishes an impressively thorough survey 
of OT fear texts, his goal is to provide evidence that the prevailing views of source and 
(especially) form critics can be upheld and even buttressed by presenting in a systematic 
way the fear linguistic forms and their meanings as found in the various literary layers of 
the OT. In fact, Becker’s work is not an investigation into the fear-of-God phenomenon 
per se, but a presentation of how source and form critical scenarios are not at odds with 
the biblical fear-of-God concepts. A close look at his Vorwort should help in 
understanding this: 
Der Unterscheidung der verschiedenen Begriffsarten dient das Herausstellen 
geprägter sprachlicher Formen, die den einzelnen Begriffsarten eigen sind. Die 
Begriffsarten mit ihren sprachlichen Formen sind hinwiederum an bestimmte 
literarische Formen oder literarische Schichten gebunden. Bei der Erklärung der 
einselnen Stellen wird aus dem jeweiligen Kontext der Nachweis zu erbringen sein, 
dass die Annahme einer bestimmten sprachlichen Form für eine bestimmte 
Begriffsausprägung zu Recht besteht. Die Anwendung dieser Methode zur 
Ermittlung von Begriffsunterschieden soll eine wesentliche Aufgabe der 
vorliegenden Arbeit sein. Sie enspricht einem Anliegen der neueren Exegese, die 
vor allem seit Gunkel den Blick geschärft hat für die eine literarische Form 
bestimmenden sprachlichen Prägungen.  
The beginning makes it clear that he is interested in distinguishing the fear-of-God 
“various idea-types” (i.e., the various categories of meanings for fear-of-God [e.g., 
numinous fear, cultic and moral ideas of fear, etc.]), and he assumes that these types 
correspond to linguistic forms that are found in certain literary forms in the OT. By the 
“explanation” of the contexts of the individual fear-of-God instances, Becker will furnish 
“proof” (Nachweis) that a certain linguistic form will indeed have a certain “idea-shape” 
(Begriffsausprägung). This correspondence between linguistic form and idea shape is 
what most concerns Becker—as well as his belief that this correspondence will occur 
within a certain “literary form.” But the second half of the paragraph is perplexing: he 
says that “an essential task” of his work is to apply “this method” to the determination of 
“idea differences” („Begriffsunterschieden“). What is “this method” that allows him to 
distinguish the meaning of one fear-of-God use from another? It might be that he is 
referring to using “context” in each fear-of-God case to determine the “idea-types”; but 
based upon what he says last about how his work “corresponds to a matter of the new 
exegesis” (i.e., the exegesis in the tradition of H. Gunkel), it seems to me that Becker’s 
method has less to do with context of the local text than with that of the “literary form.” 
In other words, the method, which “corresponds to a matter of the new exegesis,” is to let 
the pre-established characteristics of literary layers (forms) in the OT provide the main 
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authority in how the individual linguistic forms of fear-of-God found in those layers 
should be translated.  
A number of factors indicate that Becker’s primary interpretational force comes 
from the literary form: Becker assumes the general outlines of source and form criticism 
throughout his work. Between this and his general acceptance of Otto’s idea of the 
development of the numinous, it is clear that Becker writes from the start as though the 
fear-of-God phenomenon evolved. In fact, he writes in his Vorwort that a result of his 
work will be “to give an overview of the semantic development of the root jr’” (emphasis 
mine). The notion that fear-of-God developed as the Israelite cult developed is taken as a 
matter of course. The stages of this development are reflected in the OT literary forms 
that were authored/redacted by men who sought to adjust and/or create special works 
according to the needs of their day (e.g., the “Deuteronomist” was a shaper of pre-
existing works as well as an author who constantly emphasized loyalty to the Israelite 
federal Bund). In all this, Becker’s method is circular, in that the form critical theory (of 
Gunkel) he is trying to support is the method that will determine the meanings of the 
individual fear-of-God cases.156 I believe this is the case—based upon how he proceeds in 
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his study—despite his claim to neutrality later in his Vorwort („Die Arbeit stellt sich das 
Thema in seiner ganzen Breite, ohne es auf eine bestimmte Begriffsart, auf bestimmte 
literarische Schichten oder einzelne Bücher zu beschränken.“). 
Becker’s method has three variables: literary form, linguistic form, and idea-type. If 
any two of these are known, then the third can be determined. But this is really not a 
method; rather, this arrangement is a law that has been proposed and defended by form 
critics. That there are really only three components is indicated when Becker says the 
following (already quoted just above): „Die Begriffsarten mit ihren sprachlichen Formen 
sind hinwiederum an bestimmte literarische Formen oder literarische Schichten 
gebunden.” And when he mentions in the next sentence that “prevailing context” will 
illuminate the fear-of-God linguistic form and idea-type relationship, the “prevailing 
context” to which he refers will primarily consist of the context of the literary form, not 
the immediate fear-of-God text context. In other words, local text context will be 
examined in his study, but his interpretation of the local text will be driven by the 
meaning that the text should have according to the literary form in which it is found. Each 
fear-of-God case will be assumed to have a meaning according to the Geist of the literary 
form unless local context is sufficient to indicate otherwise. But any feature of a passage 
that even remotely supports the demands of the literary form will be fully exploited. For 
example, fear-of-God cola in the Psalms that are set in parallel with righteous conduct 
                                                                                                                                                  
the material that they are in: narratives—many of them in the oldest material of the OT—use lots 
of imperfect and perfect verbs; the Psalms often describe what will happen to the group or person 
who does this or that—and the participle is naturally employed; in the wisdom literature, fear-of-
God itself is often the topic—so it is not surprising to see the noun in use. Now if the literary 
characteristics of the various literary forms plainly account for the existence of unique fear-of-
God linguistic forms, then this element of Becker’s argument is effectively removed. If this is so, 
then Becker is left with no reasonable argument. To justify his claim that fear-of-God texts in the 
OT support the validity of form criticism, he can only appeal to the supposed evolution of fear-of-
God; but this evolution is mainly based upon the idea that later literary forms will invariably show 
a development in the cult—which is one of the central tenents of form criticism. So for Becker, 
form criticism is legitimated by form criticism. But one might, in response, say that my reasoning 
is also circular because my reason for holding to a more stable fear-of-God meaning is because 
God is and does not change. This charge is technically true; but it is an appropriate argument just 
the same. Becker’s circular reasoning, on the other hand, is not appropriate because the authority 
to which he appeals is not absolute and final. Essentially, Becker appeals to a theory brought forth 
by men who voluntarily excluded God as an epistemological reality. The most succinct way to 
express Becker’s argument vs. my own is this: he appeals (covertly) to human authority; I appeal 
(openly) to God’s authority. Circularity may be present in both, but only the latter can ultimately 
be called reasonable. This all boils down to choosing between two opinions; either God is or God 
is not. All human beings are forced to ground their decisions in life upon one or the other—for 
God has so arranged the universe such that there is no middle ground. Reasoning that appeals to 
’adam and reasoning that appeals to the true biblical God might both be circular, but they are far 
from being equally so. 
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cola (e.g., the two clauses of Ps 28:1—“Happy is everyone who fears the LORD, [happy 
is everyone] who walks in his ways”) will be assumed to be synonymous because cultic 
obedience to YHWH and his law is generally what fear-of-God means according to the 
Psalm literary form.  
If Becker is in essence trying to add evidence to support this law-like triad 
relationship, then the lawfulness of the triad depends upon there being no exceptions to 
the rule. If there are exceptions clearly shown by the local text context, then the triad is 
proved not to be a law at all—and each case of fear-of-God meaning that the law requires 
could be otherwise. The lawfulness of his method is already in question when Becker 
admits of the “mixing” and “blurring” of the fear-of-God ideas as they occur from one 
literary form to another. Nevertheless, Becker is spring-loaded to interpret them 
according to the demands of the form-critical paradigm. So if a particular case of fear-of-
God could be interpreted by the local context one way as well as another, Becker will 
interpret it according to the demands of the literary form. The main problem is this: the 
forms as well as the interpretational force in those forms are products of a view of 
Israelite history that assumes their religion was simply an evolution of fear of the 
unknown to creation of an advanced cult.157 When the literary form, therefore, drives 
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today because of the theological implications of modern criticism. Criticism set out to tell the 
story of the Bible. It did not intend to deal with theology, let alone launch new movements in 
theology. Nevertheless, however unintentionally, it did both.” Rylaarsdam’s suggestion that 
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interpretation, it will tend to drive it in a direction that is not in keeping with the overall 
biblical view of theology and anthropology. The form critics believe that a certain case of 
fear-of-God denotes whatever the appropriate literary form author/redactor thought it 
should mean; conversely, the biblical view interprets a certain fear-of-God case in view of 
what was really experienced in Israelite history in the midst of the outworking of God’s 
redemption plan. At the most foundational level, I believe that the results of Becker’s 
work are unreliable because his anti-supernatural critical framework (i.e., God as God is 
epistemologically off limits) which provide his assumptions, will not allow him explain 
the emotional reaction that one has before a real and living God. The most he can do (like 
Otto before him) is to explain fear in terms of what one imagines about God.  
As this investigation proceeds, a number of Becker’s practices that relate to his 
triadic law mentioned above will be criticized: first, his literary categories greatly 
oversimplify the reality of what happened in the pre-canonization (or perhaps better, pre-
recognition as Scripture) times. The debate that still goes on today regarding the sources 
of the Bible and who wrote them demonstrates (as Childs has well and repeatedly pointed 
out) the great mistake of declaring—if just for the sake of coming to an artificial 
consensus of the “main lines”—that the writers, their sources, and when they wrote can 
be known. The speculation about authors, redactors, assemblers, and their oral or written 
sources is practically endless because the biblical record itself is almost silent on the 
subject and there is no way to reliably know what was in the writer’s minds or from what 
sources they drew (or, anything about the sources of the sources!). Second, Becker greatly 
over-complicates the implications of the several linguistic forms of . For example, the 
simple and normal occurrences of verb, noun, and adjective will be understood by Becker 
to justify a highly questionable range of meanings. A verb will indicate being 
“terrorized,” the noun will mean “righteousness,” and the adjective will mean “loyal.” 
But this goes hard against the semantic grain that normally manifests a very close 
semantic relationship between the basic forms of the same root word. Third, the number 
of meanings within each of the “idea-types” that are sustained by  is severely over-
inflated—especially in view of the fact (as admitted by Becker) that the “numinous” 
meaning of  is never entirely absent.158 But how elastic can one word be? The 
multiplicity of meanings that Becker suggests is enough to put his results in question; but 
when some renderings (e.g., “love,” “adoration”) become nearly opposite to the persistent 
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root feeling-of-fear meaning, then the reader understands that Becker has gone too far in 
trying to make fear-of-God fit into the form-critical mold.    
I will now undertake a brief perusal of each of Becker’s idea-type categories by 
which he orders his work.  
Fear-of-God as Numinous Fear (Furcht vor dem Numinosen) 
It must be said right away that Becker (like Otto) uses the term „das Numinose“ 
ambiguously. Despite his chapter two and three titles that contain Gottesfurcht als Furcht 
vor dem Numinosen, Becker is most of the time (when using the term “numinous”) either 
explicitly or implicitly referring to a feeling, not God. If he does appear to be referring to 
God, a closer look will reveal that he is referring—in Ottonian fashion—to the perception 
of God. A number of particular details indicate that this is so: first, „das Numinose“ is, 
grammatically speaking, without gender (i.e., it is a neuter noun); second, the term (which 
he acknowledges is from Otto) is not a theological one, but “a recognized history-of-
religion and psychology-of-religion terminus”;159 third, „das Numinose“ is used to 
“designate the difference of the divine,” but only “insofar as it [i.e., the divine] comes 
experientially to the consciousness of the man”;160 fourth, the fear resulting from the 
“encounter with the numinous” has its origin not in supernatural occurrence, but in the 
natural events that humans interpreted as being supernatural (see his discussion of the 
fear that is provoked by the smoking and quaking mountain of Exod 19, 20).161 As the 
analysis on Becker’s work proceeds in this section, additional features will be pointed out 
that further demonstrate Becker’s blending of the subject and the object when speaking 
about the numinous. 
The first major portion of Gottesfurcht in Alten Testament deals with the many 
cases of fear that involve the fear-feeling before the “numinous.”162 This portion is the 
least complex in that it is dealing only with fear-feelings in response to God (or his 
works) and not the more abstract virtue-fear-of-God ideas.163 As rightly pointed out by 
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Becker, „Der Mensch des AT erschrickt, erzittert, erbebt sehr rasch“!164 He does a 
thorough job surveying many of the OT texts that display these various physical 
manifestations of the fear emotion/feeling. The reliance upon Otto’s terminology (and 
ontology in my opinion), however, often make his results questionable; the fear-response 
to some “presence” that finds its main being/existence in the mind of the fear-responder 
cannot be in all respects the same fear-response that one experiences when the living 
“consuming fire” God is known to be present. While his other chapters seek to support the 
developmental scenario by showing that most fear-of-God texts in later parts of the OT 
involve mainly the virtue-fear-of-God category, he nevertheless admits that “numinous” 
fear is never completely absent in any of the main parts of the OT.165  
In his inquiry into the „Eigenart der numinosen Furcht“ Becker writes, 
„Gottesfurcht als Furcht vor dem Numinosen kann alle Stufen der Gefühlsskala 
durchlaufen vom tödlichen Erschrecken bis zur ehrfürchtigen Scheu.“166 This is very 
much the case as Becker shows by many examples. The “linguistic criterion” for his 
numinous fear is mainly the use of the verb plus accusative and the verb plus 
!m/ynpm/ynplm. He writes regarding the former: „Die Konstruktion mit dem Akkusative 
drückt mehr abgeschwächte numinose Furcht im Sinne ehrfürchtiger Scheu aus und findet 
deschalb bei den Stellen des kultischen, sittlichen und nomistischen Begriffs.“ Regarding 
the latter, Becker says: „Die Konstruktion mit [!m/ynpm/ynplm] drückt mehr wirkliche 
Furcht aus (vgl. Das deutsche ‚sich fürchten vor’) und findet deshalb beim kultishen, 
sittlichen und nomistischen Begriff nur selten Anwendung.“167 Becker has some 
justification for this; the construction with the preposition appears to bring out higher fear 
intensity because of the heightened sense of “presence” of the feared thing or person.168 
The prepositions !m/ynpm/ynplm, however, only inform the reader that the feared object is 
                                                                                                                                                  
fears the LORD is to be praised” [Prov 31:30b]), or indicate a positive value in general (e.g., “The 
fear of the LORD is the beginning of knowledge” [Prov 1:7a]). 
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 Becker, 1965, 6. Here, he is quoting L. Köhler, Theologie des Alten Testaments, 1947, 
132.  
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 Even though Becker will argue strongly for a semantic development of the fear-of-God 
concept from “numinous” fear to fear-of-God as virtues, he nevertheless admits the following: 
„Umgekehrt gibt es auch keine Zeit, in der die Furcht vor dem Numinosen nicht mehr anzutreffen 
wäre. Es sind sogar Anzeichen dafür vorhanden, dass eine relative späte Zeit das Numinose mehr 
hervorkehrt als die Frühzeit.“ (Ibid., 77. This quote also demonstrates the ambivalence in 
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emotion/feeling [see my concerns about „das Numinose“ in the chapter one section on R. Otto].) 
Regarding the NT, Becker writes, „ist jedoch zu bedenken, dass auch das NT durchaus die 
numinose Furcht kennt und schätzt“ (58). 
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near (in time, space, threat level, etc.). Strictly speaking, they do not modify the verb and 
therefore indicate the type or level of fear. The fearfulness of the near object is what 
mainly determines the meaning. (In Ecclesiastes, for example, one can fear before heights 
(12:5) and before God (8:12, 13); the two are, of course, not to be feared in exactly the 
same way.)169  
Regarding the verb + accusative (God), its generic nature and its wide employment 
in a multitude of fear contexts provide evidence that it should not be restricted to “weak” 
fear of the “awe” („ehrfürchtiger Scheu“) variety as Becker suggests.  plus an 
accusative object is simply a baseline form that indicates that there is (or should be) fear 
manifested in the subject because of a certain object; but the form does not comment upon 
the level or variety of fear. It should be understood that  + accusative (God or LORD 
[or “me” or “him” as pronoun for God]) is found here and there throughout the OT. But 
Becker (and BDB as well) connects “numinous” fear most evidently with those instances 
in which  + accusative is employed in narrative scenes in which a person or persons 
are recorded to have feared before God. In these cases, the presence of God and the 
reaction of the people are described—and in several cases (see immediately below), 
extreme fear is evident. But these narrative texts are only a few compared to the  + 
accusative (God) texts that are non-narrative and that present fear-of-God as a virtue. 
Even these virtue-fear-of-God cases from time to time contain enough contextual 
information such that one is almost forced to see real fear and a high level of it. This is 
why BDB, for example, puts the virtue-fear-of-God cases found in Job 9:35; 27:24; Isa 
57:11 and Jer 5:22 into the category of “fear, be afraid” and not “fear, reverence, honour.” 
But in most other virtue-fear-of-God instances (in which context does not illumine the 
fear kind or intensity), BDB and Becker (and most other modern commentators) will give 
them non-fear-feeling meanings. In other words, if a run-of-the-mill  + accusative (+ 
God) form is found, it will be assumed to have non-fear meaning (loyalty, honor, 
righteousness, etc.) unless some contextual feature proves it to be fear. But this method is 
the reverse of what it should be; fear should be interpreted as fear—because that is the 
core meaning of —unless the context strongly indicates otherwise. The triad that 
Becker appears to suggest in his monograph’s first major section (about “numinous” fear) 
consists of OT narrative epiphanies (the literary form),  + accusative (God) or  + 
!m/ynpm/ynplm + God (linguistic form), and, respectively, “weakened fear” or “fear” (the 
“idea-type). That the idea-type will change so radically when the literary form is changed 
(e.g., to “loyalty,” and “obedience” in the Deuteronomistic literary form) is a subject that 
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 While fear before heights and fear before God may not be precisely the same, they both 
have the foundational unpleasant fear-feeling that is a warning sign that danger is present. In fact, 
practically all the OT uses of fear plus !m/ynpm/ynplm involve contexts in which danger to life is 
present (see BDB for list of OT uses). 
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will be discussed in the next section. For the remainder of this section, I would only like 
to briefly counter his idea that  + accusative (God) indicates “weakened fear.”  
To do this, two OT texts can be mentioned—from First Samuel and Jonah. In the 
former, the Israelites gathered in Gilgal and celebrated because they finally had—as they 
requested—their first king (1 Sam 11:15). But their king and judge up till that moment—
God (operating through Samuel)—was angered by this because the people had rejected 
his rule (and Samuel’s) in favor of a human king (1 Sam 8:6-8). This decision had far-
reaching and catastrophic consequences. The sin of rejecting God as king was great. So 
Samuel told the people to “take your stand and see this great thing that the LORD will do 
before your eyes” (12:16). That “great thing” was to destroy their crops with rain (vv. 17, 
18)—a terrible punishment because of their “wickedness” (12:17). As the people became 
acutely aware of their evil and watched their year’s efforts get washed away (perhaps 
more accurately, destroyed by mildew), $%.    -% 1+ $D  (“[then] all 
the people greatly feared the LORD and Samuel” [v. 18]). The use of -% (“greatly”) 
reflects the fact that the verb plus accusative does not comment upon the fear level.170 
Only contextual or syntactical factors that give clear semantic input (like in our present 
passage) can inform the reader of the actual fear level/kind in a given fear-of-God text. In 
this case of the Israelites fearing both God and Samuel, the context of a very wicked deed 
(on a nationwide scale!), Samuel’s rebuke, the thunder and rain, and punishment in the 
form of the destruction of the crop certainly indicate a high level of fear. The linguistic 
form of the verb plus accusative allows for a high level of fear, and the addition of -% to 
the form in this case guarantees it. But here, the adverb addition only confirms what is 
already known through the context.171  
In Jonah, after the sailors were already “afraid” of the storm (Jon 1:5), and “more 
afraid” of Jonah’s confession (v. 10), they “feared the LORD even more” (once the seas 
calmed after they had thrown Jonah—at his request—overboard [Jon 1:16]). The MT of 
1:16 reads:   $-E  1."  ([literally] “and the men feared the LORD a 
great fear”). In this case, the context of the sailors’ initial fear in reaction to the storm was 
without a doubt extreme. Anyone who has experienced dangerously stormy seas in a 
vulnerable vessel knows the feeling. By the time the sailors gets to the fear of YHWH, the 
context does not say if the initial fear of the sea is still present; but based upon how the 
syntactical arrangement goes from “they feared” (v. 5) to “they feared greatly” (v. 10) to 
“they feared the LORD greatly” (v. 16), it appears that the writer of Jonah had an 
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 In 2 Kings 10:4 -% is used twice to modify “they feared.” 
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 Becker admits that this Deuteronomistic  + accusative (God) case means “real” fear: 
„in v. 18 jedoch liegt nicht der typisch dt-stische Begriff vor, sondern wirkliche (numinose) 
Furcht ….“ 1 Sam 12:14, 24, on the other hand, are instances of  + accusative (God) in the 
more normal Deuteronomistic sense of „Jahwe verehren“ (Becker, 1965, 33).  
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escalation of fear in mind.172 Like the First Samuel case, the modifiers simply serve to 
point to the level of fear involved; but it is clear from the context that the fear experienced 
by the sailors—when YHWH becomes the object of their fear—is some mixture of great 
fear, awe, and reverence (the latter is indicated by the sacrifice and vows the sailors then 
made [1:16b]). This is certainly not a case of “weakened numinous fear.”  
These two passages are presented mainly to show that  + accusative (God) is a 
linguistic/syntactic form that simply says that fear exists, but does not comment upon 
kind or intensity. In the case of the two above texts, the kind and intensity are discerned 
by the verb modifiers as well as the general context of God’s judgment and punishment. 
Becker perhaps wants to tone down the fear content of this linguistic form (in earlier 
literary layers whose narratives contain frequent event fear-of-God cases) in order to 
more easily accommodate the more abstract meanings of the form that will be found in 
later literary layers. The vast majority of the (later) occurrences of the  + accusative 
(God) form will indicate, according to Becker, one or more of the abstract notions (cultic 
loyalty, commitment to the Mosaic Law, etc.). For the purposes of this section, I will only 
say that Becker’s idea that this particular linguistic/syntactic form indicates “more 
weakened numinous fear” cannot be supported. That this form can allow for more 
abstract interpretations will be discussed in the next section. Much of Becker’s thinking 
on this matter is motivated by his belief that the meaning of  developed over time from 
numinous “primitive” fear, to the more abstract and refined notions of the mature cult—
i.e., reverence, honor, loyalty, righteousness, and the like. To this question of 
“development” we now turn. 
Becker’s View of “Numinous” Fear development 
Becker believes that the idea of fear-of-God developed (evolved) between the times 
of the composing of the oldest and the newest parts of the OT. In this development, 
explains Becker, much of the fear-feeling dried up: „Im Zuge dieser Entwicklung geht das 
Moment eigentlicher furcht fast ganz verloren; Gottesfurcht wird Äquivalent für Religion 
und Frömmigkeit.“173 The fear-of-God phenomenon first arose in “primitive” humans and 
developed into a “designation for religion and piousness.”174 Along with this development 
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 Sasson, 1990, 138, points out this escalation. Becker includes Jon 1:16 among the texts 
that display “numinous” fear in reaction to the deeds of God (Becker, 1965, 37, 284). His 
explanation of the fear kind of Jon 1:16, however, is only made in a brief footnote within chapter 
six (non-Deuteronomistic places of the “cultic idea”). Becker writes there: „In vv. 10 und 16 
hingegen drückt [] eigentliche Furcht aus“ (176). He does not comment on the intensity of the 
fear.  
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 Becker, 1965, 75. 
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 Ibid., 75, 78. 
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was a corresponding development in the concept of God. When fear was more of the 
“numinous” kind, YHWH was perceived to be—as Becker puts it—the “unpredictable” 
and the “demonic.”175 As the concept of God became more “purified,” fear-of-God 
evolved along with it into the more abstract ideas of “religion and piousness.”176 Hebrew 
words for fear (especially ) were retained throughout this development because the 
first Israelite stirrings of their religion came in the form of the emotion of fear as they had 
their initial encounters with the “numinous.” With this in mind, „es ist daher verständlich, 
dass der Terminus Furcht als Ausdruck für das verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott 
überhaupt in Gebrauch kommen kann.“177 This development, which is paralleled by other 
ancient near eastern God and fear concepts, can even be seen on into the NT where 
“numinous” fear is “superceded” by “faith.”178 
I have already offered some criticism against Becker and Otto for their opinions 
that both God and religion evolve. At this point, I would only like to mention a couple of 
points that relate to Becker’s belief that Israel’s ideas of fear and God paralleled those of 
other nations in the Ancient Near East.179 The people who wrote those “parallel” texts are 
not here today—so they cannot be asked what they were really thinking when they wrote. 
The same goes for the OT writers. So the next best thing is to rely upon their testimony. 
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several points (perhaps to the point of contradicting himself) that “numinous” fear remains 
throughout the Bible (see FN 165). “Numinous” fear is actually, according to Becker, a “ground-
tone” that remains in the more highly developed fear-as-virtue forms (cultic, righteous, and legal 
[80]). Even regarding the NT, Becker admits: „Es ist jedoch zu bedenken, dass auch das NT 
durchaus die numinose Furcht kennt und schätzt.“ (58—Becker lists the following NT texts as 
“numinous” fear examples: Matt 9:8 (Luke 5:26); Matt 14:26 (Mark 6:50); Matt 17:6 (Mark 6:9; 
Luke 9:34); Matt 28:4; Mark 4:41 (Luke 8:25); Mark 5:15 (Luke 8:35); Mark 16:8; Luke 1:12, 
65; 2:9; 5:10; 7:16; 8:37; 24:5, 37; Acts 2:43; 5:5; 5:11; 10:4; 19:17; Phil 2:12; Heb 12:28-29.) 
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 Becker (Ibid., 78, 79) introduces a lengthy list of ANE texts with: „In diesem 
Zusammenhang ist es von Nutzen, auf akkadische und ägyptische Parallelen hinzuweisen, die für 
ihre Sprachen eine entsprechende semantische Entwicklung bezeugen ….“ The dating of the 
examples he presents is in most cases not clear, and most of the examples (like many in the Bible) 
are of the “virtue” variety—and contextual clues that would shed light on their meanings are 
generally lacking (e.g., “fear [the deity]!” “It is good to fear God.” “It goes well with the one who 
fears … his God.” “I want to fear Adad.” “The day on which I feared the gods was the joy of my 
heart.” “I am daily attentive to his [Marduk’s] fear.” “My lord the king is a god-fearer.” “I am 
Assurnasirpal, your sad servant, who is humble, who fears [Ishtar’s] divinity, who is prudent, 
your darling.”). The non-Israelite ANE fear-of-God texts are so scattered and fragmentary and of 
such a generic nature that one can only see a developmental tendency in them with great strain. If 
anything, the ANE mentions of fear-of-God give additional evidence for a general revelation in 
which all humans have some innate sense of God—and fear arises because of that sense.  
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The testimonies of each are, of course, very different. There cannot be a one-to-one 
parallel correspondence—if just for the fact that they do not agree upon the identity of the 
deity. Either YHWH is the only true God, as the OT claims, or, for example, Chemosh is 
God as assumed by king Mesha of Moab.180 Either they are both wrong or one is right—
but they both cannot be right. To discern who speaks the truth, one must rely upon the 
quality and trustworthiness of the testimony. It cannot be denied that the OT testimony is 
by far the most compelling, thorough, and powerful. It records not only the testimony of 
men and women, but, most importantly, the testimony of God. This testimony is all set 
within a moral atmosphere in which true witness (as opposed to false witness) is 
obligatory—for both the people who testified in the OT as well as those who recorded 
those testimonies (sometimes one and the same). This holds also for the NT where Christ 
confirmed the obligation to bear true witness by simply saying, “But let your ‘Yes’ be 
‘Yes,’ and your ‘No,’ ‘No’” (Matt 5:37a NKJV). Unlike the majority of the other ANE 
texts, the intention of the OT is to make God known and to preserve for later generations 
how he has worked out his kingdom plan in this world. The ANE gods and their ways are 
normally only mentioned in passing—usually in the context of rulers recording their 
conquests and other achievements. Most important for the present matter is this: the OT is 
far and away the most insistent ANE work in making the case that its God is the only 
God: YHWH is God “and there is no other” (Isa 45:5a). In other words, if the OT writers 
were to look over the shoulders of scholars today and evaluate their methods, they would 
insist that, because YHWH is the only God, the writers of other ANE texts who believed 
in other gods are not to be trusted. They would lament as folly the notion that the 
characteristics of God and fear-of-God as found in the OT can be paralleled to the 
characteristics of false gods and fear of those false gods as found in the other ANE texts. 
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 Pritchard, 1958, 209. Regarding the viability of using ANE parallels, Blocher, 1977, 21, 
insightfully has the following to say: “But should the comparative approach reign supreme? It is 
significant indeed that none can quote a saying “The fear of Marduk (or Baal or Râ) is the 
principle of wisdom”; yet the men of the Bible would not have been embarrassed by such a 
saying, they would have denounced and rejected it because Marduk is not god, Marduk is a 
Nothing! In other words, the uniqueness of truth among human errors and demonic lies is truth—
it may not be obvious in its expression (cf. 2 Cor. 11:13f.). Untruth is not just something else than 
truth: it is truth corrupted, and sometimes so with subtlety. In this light, the existence of scattered 
similarities to Biblical truths in the ancient Near-East could be considered as glimpses of God’s 
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fathers had spoiled these Egyptians’ riches. The weakness of the comparative approach is that it 
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et false! Reverent reference to the LORD first is the principle of wisdom! When one abides by 
this principle, he can appreciate (and there is plentiful evidence for him then to canvass!) how 
darkened and distorted the truth of God has been in nations deprived of special revelation.” 
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And if a scholar today insisted upon making the parallel anyways, the OT writer would 
safely assume that that scholar believed the God of the OT to be just as false as those of 
the nations around Israel. This judgment is not unfair or incorrect—for, as was alluded to 
just above, either there is one God who is the true God (which is the OT claim), or none 
of the gods are true (i.e., exist); but they cannot all be true, for that—in view of the ANE 
vastly differing claims about God—would be a violation of the law of non-contradiction. 
The very testimony of the OT implores the reader to not see any parallels between 
YHWH and other gods. The OT simply says in essence that YHWH is, and the others are 
not.181  
So when attempts are made today to find parallels between ancient Israelite religion 
and the religions of her contemporary neighbors, often assumed to be true is the belief 
that Israel’s God was really no different than the gods of the other nations; and if they are 
all false gods, then they must have originated in the minds of the “primitive” ancestors of 
these nations who first thought of gods when they feared before the unknown. In this 
scenario, Israel’s religion could evolve in a predictable way in parallel with the other 
nations. But this method (and the assumptions that underlie it) dishonors those who wrote 
the biblical testimony. The practitioners of this method must hold as untrue the main 
elements of the OT testimony as recorded by many different people and sanctioned by the 
whole Israelite nation. To put it another way, the practitioners of this method are anti-
Jewish in the sense that they assume the main lines of the Jewish OT writers’ testimonies 
to be untruths; God is not and he did not speak, and Israel, therefore, has no monopoly on 
the truth about God.  
At this point one could reply that Becker (and Otto and many others) is writing 
within an idealist epistemological framework which understands that knowledge is so 
strongly located within the subject that the law of non-contradiction no longer applies. 
The people of Canaan can have their god Molech and make their sacrifices according to 
their understanding of truth, and the Israelites can have their God YHWH and make their 
sacrifices according to their understanding of truth. As long as they are both doing what 
they sincerely know to be true and right, then one cannot judge the other—and scholars 
today can certainly not judge between them. In response to this kind of thinking, I can 
only say that we have nothing if it is true. All hope is lost for true truth—and, frankly, 
men and women have no hope because they have no assurance that their god is really the 
god that can save them out of the pain and suffering and death that are realities in life 
“under the sun.” In fact, the reason for even doing “science” or “theology” is 
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 This knowledge and belief in the exclusive deity of YHWH in the OT is the first 
obligation of the moral law, as evidenced by the first two of the Ten Commandments (Exod 20:1-
6).  
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eliminated—because the truth will never be found. One might reply, “But the search for 
truth is nevertheless worthwhile!” Perhaps so—but the search would in reality be no more 
meaningful than Sisyphus’s mission to forever role the rock up the hill or the commitment 
of Vladamir and Estragon to wait for Godot. If something a priori cannot be found, why 
look for it?182 But the insistence that the search is nevertheless worthwhile is really only 
self-refuting, for it claims that the value of searching for truth which cannot be found is a 
good and true value.  
My position rejects a worldview that is rationally incompatible with life as lived 
normally in the experienced everyday world. If the idealist (in the skeptical vein of Otto 
and Becker) were to apply his or her philosophy to everyday life, the senses which rely 
upon reliable and true informational input from the world would be ignored, and that 
person’s life would as a result be in great danger. But my common sense view holds that 
things in the world (trees, dogs, cats, crossing traffic, etc.) as well as metaphysical 
phenomena (love, beauty, testimony, God, etc.) can be sufficiently known to operate 
safely and predictably in the world.183 With the belief in the reliability of this knowledge, 
I perceive that the testimony contained within the OT is honest and accurate and reliable. 
The testimony itself claims that it is testimony and was meant to serve not only the people 
of that time, but people of all future times as well. In this way, the Bible is a legal 
document admissible as testimony in court for the purpose of deciding the truth of 
matters. Like any other testimony it ought to be considered innocent and accurate 
testimony unless it can be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony is 
otherwise.184 Orderly and just civilization actually rests upon this assumption of 
innocence.  
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 John Barton calls for his fellow higher critics to conduct their work with the 
understanding that the “right” method will never be found: “Indeed, if there is one tendency of 
biblical criticism it has been my aim to call in question,” writes Barton, “it is this tendency to seek 
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introduction, pp. 13-14.  
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text is innocent until proven guilty by known data provided by sources whose truthfulness on 
those points can be demonstrated or which share the same general area of contemporaneity as the 
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When the biblical testimony is heard fairly and impartially, that testimony clearly 
indicates that God is unchanging and that God desires his relationships with human 
beings to be based upon love and not fear (Deut 6:5; Matt 22:37)—for God was first with 
Adam and Eve in a state of peace, and (servile) fear did not come till the fall.185 But once 
fear came—not as fear of the unknown, but fear of punishment from the God whom they 
already knew—then it to some extent defined the relationship from that time onward. 
While the Bible writers may from time to time use “fear” to denote non-fear virtues (as 
Becker well illumines), fear certainly does not evolve wholesale into that; for from start 
to finish the Bible is consistent in recording that righteous men and women usually 
experienced the fear-feeling when God visited them or showed his mighty power: Adam 
“was afraid” of God immediately after the first sin (Gen 3:10); David was “afraid of God” 
when God killed Uzzah for laying a hand on the ark (1 Chron 13:12); Daniel fell down 
with his face to the ground, trembling and overwhelmed when confronted with the 
heavenly vision (Dan 10:12, 19); Peter, James, and John were “overcome by fear” when 
Jesus was transfigured upon the mountain (Matt 17:6); and John fell down “as though 
dead” when visited by Christ (Rev 1:17). The testimony never gives any indication that 
rain, thunder, hail, earthquakes, burning bushes, or fire- and smoke-covered mountains 
were the sources of fear and, then, of God. These natural phenomena are not just in the 
“old” parts of the OT, but can be found throughout the Bible. And despite all of Becker’s 
insistence upon a “development” of the fear-of-God concept, he admits that, „umgekehrt 
gibt es auch keine Zeit, in der die Furcht vor dem Numinosen nicht mehr anzutreffen 
wäre. Es sind sogar Anzeichen dafür vorhanden, dass eine relative spate Zeit das 
Numinose mehr hervorkehrt als die Frühzeit“186 This is a valuable observation, but one 
that is not significantly reflected in the bulk of his study. I think this is because it goes 
against the grain of the form-critical paradigm that he is both using and defending. 
Therefore, there is the tendency—especially in the virtue-fear-of-God cases—to leave 
“numinous” fear out of the discussion altogether and to replace it with something more 
abstract and advanced. Only if the immediate context of a virtue-fear-of-God text 
obviously indicates “numinous” fear will Becker confess that “numinous” fear is—at least 
partly—in view. Virtue-fear-of-God passages that do not contain this context—i.e., they 
simply do not comment—will be assumed to be devoid of “numinous” fear.187  
                                                                                                                                                  
texts under investigation and whose performance record of producing reliable data has been good” 
(28). 
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 It could be that Adam and Eve before the fall had some measure of filial fear. 
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 I put “numinous” in quotation marks to remind the reader that, in my opinion, this term 
does not accurately represent the actual fear-feeling (or any other feeling/emotion for that matter) 
that one has when in a relationship with the true and living God. But this is the term that Becker 
mainly employs to more or less denote the “primitive” feeling—which often included being 
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The developmental view is flawed for many reasons. But the most distressing 
reason is that it has little respect for reasonable and compelling testimony; in this way, it 
is anti-Jewish. It turns the compassionate and loving God of Israel’s testimony into the 
„Dämonische“ of the pagan nations around her. And because of its epistemological 
restrictions, the developmental view shuts itself off from any hope of finding any truth 
about God or about God’s purpose for humankind. Doing theology (or any other 
discipline) this way—if practiced consistently in accordance with the epistemological 
skepticism that underlies the developmental view—is actually purposeless and, as 
Qoheleth would say, “meaningless” and a “chasing after the wind.” 
Becker’s Deuteronomistic Development 
Becker’s chapter four title is: „Gottesfurcht als Gottesverehrung (‚Kultischer 
Begriff’) Der Deuteronomisch-Deuteronomistische Begriff.“ (“Fear-of-God as adoration-
of-God [‘Cultic Idea’]; the Deuteronomic-Deuteronomistic Idea”). Because confusion is 
inherent (especially in translation) in the source/form-critical terms related to 
authorship/redaction/assemblers/etc. of Deuteronomy to Second Kings, a brief 
clarification of these terms (as used in the critical literature—mainly following M. Noth) 
is in order:  
1. Deuteronomy (Becker’s “Dt”): the fifth book of Moses. 
2. Deuteronomic Code: chapters 12-26 of Deuteronomy. 
3. Deuteronomist (Becker’s “Dt-st”): the “author/compiler” of Deuteronomy through 
Second Kings—and perhaps other parts of the OT—who wrote sometime during the 
exile.188 
4. Deuteronomistic History: what the “Deuteronomist” wrote (i.e., Deuteronomy-2 
Kings).189 
5. Deuteronomistic Historian (usually in English abbreviated “Dtr”): the person or 
“school” that redacted the “Deuteronomistic History” that had been previously written by 
the “Deuteronomist.”190 
                                                                                                                                                  
fearful—when one is aware of the “presence” of God. So I continue to use the term; but the 
quotation marks signify that I do so with (in the words of Terrien) “serious qualification.”  
188
 Soulen and Soulen, 2001, 46. 
189
 Ibid. 
190
 Ibid. Based upon the confusing nature of this nomenclature, contradictions among 
scholars are bound to arise. For example, Römer and Pury, 2000, 48, understand that Dtr. is the 
Deuteronomist. Crenshaw thinks Dtr. is the Deuteronomistic history (Crenshaw, 2005). 
 74 
6. Deuteronomistic (Becker’s “Dt-stisch”) is an adjective used to denote the 
characteristics of the “Deuteronomistic History” as imparted by either the 
“Deuteronomist” or the redaction of the “Deuteronomistic Historian” (“Dtr.”).  
While Becker will go into some detail about which fear-of-God texts were 
written/influenced by the Deuteronomist, Dtr, and subsequent redactors who tried to fit 
Deut-2 Kings with the words of the prophets (DtrP) and the Mosaic Law (DtrN), his main 
thrust in chapter four is simply to link the linguistic form and the fear idea-type with 
everything in the OT that “was written in the Deuteronomistic language and the 
Deuteronomistic spirit.”191 This includes all that was authored/redacted by the 
Deuteronomist, the Deuteronomistic Historian, and subsequent redactors. 
Becker here presents his next main triad. The first component is—as already 
alluded to—the Deuteronomistic literary form. This form reflects the culture and religion 
of the authors/compilers/redactors who purposed to write and arrange Israel’s history in 
order to justify the exile and to instill a sense of loyalty in Israel’s YHWH cult.192 The 
second component of this triad is the verb + YHWH linguistic form which is found in all 
but a few fear-of-God cases in the Deuteronomistic literary form. The third part of this 
triad—the idea-type—is in general an attitude of loyalty (Treue) to the Israelite cult and 
to the covenant of its God, YHWH. Becker writes the following regarding this linguistic 
form and the idea-type relationship: 
Der Gebrauch bestimmter Wortformen ist mehr als nur stilistische 
Eigentümlichkeit; die Wortform wird bestimmt von der Eigenart des 
auszudrückenden Begriffes. Die gemässe sprachliche Form der sich in kultischer 
Verrichtung und Beobachtung der Bundessatzung betätigenden Jahwetreue ist das 
Verbum.193 
According to Becker, the meanings of the many fear-of-God cases within the 
Deuteronomistic layer are remarkably consistent:  
Der Begriff der Gottesfurcht, genauer des Jahwe-Fürchtens, ist im Dt und in allen 
anderen nach Geist und Sprache als dt-stisch kenntlichen Partien auffallend 
einheitlich. Er besagt Verehrung Jahwes unter dem besonderen Aspekt der Treue zu 
ihm als dem Bundesgott. Die Treue findet ihren normalen Ausdruck im alleinigen 
Kult Jahwes und der Beobachtung der Bundessatzung.… Die Jahwetreue ist der 
typische aspect der dt-stischen Stellen des kultischen Begriffs, der dazu berechtigt, 
sie als eigene Gruppe zusammenzufassen.194 
Becker then proceeds to support his case by the highlighting of a number of examples.  
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 Becker, 1965, 85 (see his FN 2). Plath, 1962, 42, says the  instances in Deuteronomy 
and Dtr “correspond fully.” 
192
 According to the form-critical theory of how Deut-2 Kings came to be (which Becker 
obviously subscribes to). The theory—in my understanding—is deeply flawed.  
193
 Becker, 1965, 87. 
194
 Ibid., 85. 
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I will now respond to this schema and comment upon a number of texts that Becker 
presents as support for the validity of the triad. But first, a few general observations 
should be made: while there are some insights to be gained from form-critical theories on 
how the OT came to be, the reality of how Deuteronomy and the former prophets were 
recorded can only be very speculatively explained. The people involved and the sources 
they worked from are—with only a few exceptions—not specified in the OT. On the 
other hand, there are the testimonies—not only of those who recorded the biblical history, 
but also of those within that history—that notify the reader that God really did guide the 
Israelites in the founding of a nation which would later bless “all nations.” Readers are 
also notified that the people and events described in that history are not fictional. The 
history is presented as such and not as a creation of an author who had certain political 
and cult motivations in mind.195 Even if the theories about the Deuteronomist/Dtr/et al are 
approximately correct, the myriad of factors involved (authors, redactors, written sources, 
oral sources, sources of sources, etc.) make it highly unlikely that such uniformity in the 
fear-of-God meaning (especially such an abstract meaning as “loyalty”) would be the case 
throughout the entire work. Be that as it may, the main error of Becker’s form-critical 
schema is that it defines the proper relationship between God and Israel (which affects 
how he views fear-of-God) according to what was hypothetically in the mind of the 
“author” and not what is described in the history itself. The testimonies in the biblical 
history itself are of lower order exegetical value because they are deemed to be, 
historically speaking, unreliable. So the key is to try to get into the mind of the author; but 
in my view, this is an extremely speculative enterprise.  
Another problem is the emphasis put upon the linguistic form of the verb plus 
YHWH. The verb, first of all, is just that—a plain verb. If Becker were referring to a rare 
or unusual use of the verb, then perhaps that might indicate a special meaning. But the 
plain indicative Qal use of  is especially unremarkable. The verb is indeed almost 
exclusively employed in Deut-2 Kings; but that is the case throughout all of the OT—
with the exception of the Psalms where a number of “adjectives” and nouns appear (but 
still with the second highest count of verbal forms of  in the OT), and Proverbs which 
is unusual in preferring the noun.196 According to the count of Stähli, Deut-2 Kings (plus 
                                                 
195
 The tendency by those operating generally within the Deuteronomistic form-critical 
framework to understand the Deuteronomist, Dtr, et al more as authors and less as assemblers is 
reflected in the title of one of their more recent colloquia collections: Israel Constructs its 
History: Deuteronomistic Historiography in Recent Research (ed. Pury and Römer [see FN 113 
just above]).  
196
 Stähli, 1971, 766, counts 30 verbs in the Psalms, 16 cases of the Niphal participle  	וֹ", 
27 adjectives, and 10 nouns (if the participle and other verbs were combined, Psalms would have 
the most  verbs in the OT). Proverbs has 5 verbs, 3 adjectives, and 14 nouns. As I will argue in 
the next section, I do not think that the -based “adjectives” found in the Psalms (and a few 
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Ruth) has 72 instances of the verb. The rest of the OT (not including any apocryphal 
books) has 211. So the “Deuteronomistic History” does have a high rate of fear cases (not 
just before God, but humans, natural phenomena, etc.), but this is simply a function of the 
historical subject matter that it records and not the artistic creativity of the writer(s). 
Deuteronomy, for example, is thick with references to fear because the book recapitulates 
the events of the previous forty years in which a “rebellious and stiff-necked” (Deut 31:27 
NIV) people were tested (Deut 8:2) in one fearful situation after another. Somewhat of a 
change in the employment of  is seen in Deuteronomy in that YHWH for the first time 
makes himself and his law known to the entire “nation.” While the earlier Pentateuch 
narrative mainly describes God revealing himself and his will to a few people in a few 
instances (i.e., to the “patriarchs,” and a number of “numinous” cases of fear-of-God 
result), Deuteronomy presents God as now with his people trying to grow them up by 
teaching them to fear him out of love by allowing them first to fear him out of the threat 
of punishment. Josh-2 Kings then records the history of the Israelites who by then had 
their own God and covenant and tabernacle (and later, temple). In this part of the history, 
people still experience fear/dread/terror at times before God, but fear-of-YHWH as a 
virtue becomes common because a whole nation now knows the identity of their God, and 
that nation recognizes (based upon the stories passed down to them about the Exodus 
experience) their susceptibility to sin and the value of fearing YHWH. So, unlike in 
Genesis, there are many more opportunities in Deut-2 Kings for virtue-fear-of-God cases 
to occur. 
The Deuteronomistic theory does not accurately account for this increased use of 
virtue-fear-of-God. The employment of  + YHWH was not driven by some 
hypothetical author’s need to build loyalty into the cult, but arose as a response of the 
people to the presence and the demands of YHWH. With the revelation of God’s name to 
the nation of Israel and the creation of the covenant community of YHWH, the chances 
for people to say “Fear YHWH!” or “He fears YHWH” greatly increased—and that is 
why these so often occur in Deuteronomy and the former prophets. But that is not to say 
that virtue-fear-of-God cases did not exist before; several instances occur very early on 
(the documentarians would say in J and E sources). For example Abraham was told by 
                                                                                                                                                  
elsewhere) are properly designated. Morphologically and semantically, they function as 
participles. If I am correct, this should add even more verbs to the Psalms verb count. If all the 
verbs, Niphal participles, and “adjectives” in the Psalms were then combined, the total verb 
count—according to Stähli—would be 73. This would make Psalms the king of  	 (i.e., the verb) 
use among the OT books with nearly twice as many as that found in the book with the second 
most plentiful count, Deuteronomy (total count there, 39). All this is intended only to show that 
the phenomenon of the verb in Deut-2 Kings tells the exegete absolutely nothing beyond the base 
meaning of “fear” and normal semantic functions of tense, voice, mood, etc. Only contextual 
factors (including syntax) can provide additional semantic information. 
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God (upon passing the test of being willing to offer up his son), “…now I know that you 
fear God ….” (Gen 22:12)197 Virtue-fear-of-God is evident here because God is referring 
to virtues that were indicated by Abraham’s actions—i.e., faith, loyalty, trust, and humble 
obedience. But “the beginning” of Abraham’s virtues, however, was the fear-feeling 
before God (as indicated by the use of   and not !% (faith, loyalty, trust) or [mv 
(obedience)—and to this “virtue” the use of fear-of-God here most immediately applies.  
The triad’s idea-type of loyalty to YHWH and to the YHWH cult appears in some 
measure to be the case when context is considered. But Becker in accordance with the 
law-like nature of the triad over-generalizes; as will be seen in a moment, he is prone to 
classify all virtue-fear-of-God cases in this Deuteronomistic literary level as virtues that 
have to do with commitment to the YHWH cult. In the process of the evolution into this 
idea-type, real fear has all but disappeared. This is the strong impression the reader gets 
as he or she reads Becker’s explanation of this triad in chapter four. But, first, what 
Becker already acknowledged in his “numinous” investigation earlier deserves repeating:  
Die numinose Furcht ist Ausgangspunkt einer semantischen Entwicklung, die zum 
kultischen, sittlichen und nomistischen Begriff der Gottesfurcht führt, aber sie ist 
auch bleibender Grundton einer jeden Begriffsausprägung. Trotz starker 
Abschwächung des numinosen Elementes schwingt numinose Furcht mit, ja, sie 
vermag dann und wann wieder aufzuleben. Dies ist bei den Darlegungen in kap. IV-
IX ergänzend zu berücksichtigen.198 
This raises a practical issue that has to do with Bible translations: if “numinous” 
fear remains in all the idea-types, then it is understandable why the original Hebrew of the 
OT uses  to designate these idea-types.199 On the other hand, if, for example, !% was 
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 The “adjective” is used here; but, as mentioned in the FN just above, it is possible that 
nearly all of these  cases, that several of the lexica and commentaries deem as adjectival, could 
be more reasonably understood as participles—because they function as such (see my fuller 
discussion about this question in the next section).  
198
 Becker, 1965, 80. 
199
 Assumed here is that Becker follows Otto in understanding that the more developed 
feelings of the “numinous”—like fascination, worship, joy, etc.—still retain some element of the 
fear feeling. According to Otto, “Though the numinous emotion in its completest development 
shows a world of difference from the mere ‘daemonic dread’, yet not even at the highest level 
does it belie its pedigree or kindred. Even when the worship of ‘daemons’ has long since reached 
the higher level of worship of ‘gods’, these gods still retain as numina something of the ‘ghost’ in 
the impress they make on the feelings of the worshipper, viz. the peculiar quality of the ‘uncanny’ 
and ‘aweful’, which survives with the quality of exaltedness and sublimity or is symbolized by 
means of it. And this element, softened though it is, does not disappear even on the highest level 
of all, where the worship of God is at its purest. Its disappearance would be indeed an essential 
loss. The ‘shudder’ reappears in a form ennobled beyond measure where the soul, held speechless, 
trembles inwardly to the farthest fibre of its being” (Otto, 1958, 17). At this point, I should once 
again point out that in this dissertation, I try to avoid the use of Otto’s “numinous” term (at least, 
it is put in quotation marks to indicate that it is Otto’s term). As already argued in the section on 
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used to denote the idea-type of “loyalty,” then the “numinous” fear that was actually still 
present and remained as a “ground tone” of the “loyalty” would not be understood to be 
there. To put this succinctly, the use of “fear” in biblical times would denote mainly fear 
as well as imply the virtues that flow from that fear. But a word like “loyalty” could only 
mean something close to that (“stand firm,” “faithful,” etc. [see BDB !%]) but not the 
feeling of fear. So the OT use of  in the many virtue-fear-of-God cases is meant to 
notify the reader that fear and (perhaps) some other virtue(s) are present. The current 
English use of fear is remarkably similar: one can say “she fears the Lord” and mean real 
fear and/or, for example, loyalty. While a person today—based upon the modern aversion 
to fear (especially of God)—might not consider the fear feeling when hearing this 
expression, it must be said that, nevertheless, it is the only formula that gives the hearer 
the opportunity to think of both loyalty and fear. If the biblical writers—as I strongly 
believe—intended real fear and (often) some other virtue to be understood in most or all 
virtue-fear-of-God cases, then the best way to transfer that information to the reader in the 
briefest way was to use “fear.” Likewise, Bible translators today ought to use “fear” to 
transmit the full meaning intended by the Scripture.200  
The virtue-fear-of-God passages in Deut-2 Kings are by and large unclear as to the 
exact virtues that they designate. Because “fear” is used, however, the reader knows that 
some level of fear-feeling is indicated and that some other virtue could also be implied. 
This is analogous not only to how “fear” can be used today, but also, for example, “love”: 
when a man says to his wife in a moment of passion “I love you,” the meaning is that he 
has the warm emotion of attachment at that moment (i.e., the foundational feeling of 
love). If a few minutes later he says to his beloved, “I love my country,” the meaning is 
probably weakly related to the “love” meant in the first mention, but points more to a 
sense of pride about his country and loyalty in serving it (the latter could be considered a 
“virtue”). If these expressions of love were heard without knowing the people involved or 
their circumstances, then the meaning would be hard to discern. So some overarching 
perspective would be helpful. With virtue-fear-of-God, the Deuteronomistic schema 
offers to the exegete a way to gain perspective. If the form critics are right, then it follows 
that the author might use fear-of-God in trying to bring about commitment to the cult. But 
                                                                                                                                                  
Otto, I believe the term—as invented and used by Otto—is used to signify the religious feelings 
of the subject and not God (as a true exterior object). Whatever Otto (or Becker) might intend to 
be the final ontological reality connected with “the numinous,” it is sure (as seen in the quote 
above) that the feeling of fear is somehow a part of it. 
200
 Most Bible versions translate many of the virtue-fear-of-God passages into the perceived 
virtues of, for example, “reverence,” “honor,” and “respect”; but to probably most in western 
society today, these terms no longer signify any fear emotion/feeling. Therefore, these 
translations—if a fear “ground tone” does indeed remain in the original Hebrew—are often 
mistranslations. 
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if Deut-2 Kings is mainly a recording of how God worked historically in the lives of the 
Israelites, then the fear-of-God cases found there can to some extent be interpreted in 
view of the historical fact that the people were then in the process of forming a cult 
community centered in Jerusalem; but they must not be interpreted solely in light of that 
historical reality. Those who recorded the history of the former prophets might have even 
had some desire (or at least a tendency) to employ fear-of-God to designate loyalty and 
commitment to the cult; but even if this were so, there is no way to know today that this 
was the case—for those who wrote Deut-2 Kings simply do not say anything either way 
on this question. Therefore, while the “literary form” might have some interpretational 
force, it is too speculative of a phenomenon to be given preference over local context and 
linguistic characteristics when exegeting a text.  
Before looking at several passages, I will list the Deut-2 Kings fear texts according 
to the source of the fear and the kind/level of fear: 
Fear Before Men—Fear: 1 Sam 12:18. Dread: Deut 2:4; 20:1; 20:8; 28:10; Josh 
9:24; 10:2; 10:25; Judg 7:3; 7:10; 1 Sam 7:7; 17:11; 17:24; 21:12(13); 23:3; 28:5; 
28:20; 1 Kings 1:50; 1:51; 17:13; 2 Kings 6:16; 10:4. Terror: 1 Sam 31:4. Awe: 
Josh 4:14. Unknown: 1 Sam 14:26. 
Fear before God—Fear: Judg 6:23; 1 Sam 12:20; 2 Sam 6:9. Dread: 1 Sam 4:7. 
Terror: Deut 5:5. Virtue: Deut 4:10; 5:29; 6:2, 13, 24; 8:6; 10:12, 20; 13:4(5); 
14:23; 17:19; 25:18; 28:58; 31:12, 13; Josh 4:24; 22:25; 24:14; Judg 6:10; 1 Sam 
12:14, 18, 24; 1 Kings 8:40, 43; 18:3, 12; 2 Kings 4:1; 17:7, 25, 28, 32-39, 41. 
Fear as an Attribute of Things—Terrible: Deut 1:19.  
Fear as an Attribute of God’s Works—Awesome: Deut 10:21; 2 Sam 7:23.  
Fear as an Attribute of God—Awesome: Deut 7:21; 10:17; 28:58; Judg 13:6. 
Terrible: Deut 8:15. 
A glance at the above list shows, first of all, that real fear is a part of Deuteronomy and 
the former prophets—so  does not develop into an abstact virtue of a cult follower and 
leave fear behind. This is an important point. There continues to be (as in the rest of the 
OT) the feeling of fear as an anchor. Other meanings could have developed, but the 
existence of these fear-feeling passages show that the other meanings could—in whole or 
in part—still mean “fear.” Nevertheless, Becker indicates that all the virtue fear-of-God 
texts in this section stand for virtues closely related to loyalty and/or obedience to the 
YHWH cult. To justify this, he claims that many of these fear-of-God instances are in 
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synonymous parallel with adjacent or nearby lines that have to do with covenant 
loyalty.201 Verses in which he finds synonymous parallels are: 
Deut 5:29: Keep the commandments. 
Deut 6:2: Keep the commandments. 
Deut 6:13: Worship and swear by God’s name. 
Deut 6:24: Observe God’s statutes.  
Deut 8:6: Keep the commandments and walk in God’s ways. 
Deut 10:12: Walk in God’s ways and love him and serve him. 
Deut 10:20: Serve God and cling to him and swear by his name. 
Deut 13:4: Follow God and keep the commandments and listen to his voice and 
serve him and cling to him. 
Deut 28:58: Follow God’s laws. 
Deut 31:12: Observe the words of the law. 
Josh 24:14: Serve God in sincerity and truth. 
1 Sam 12:14: Serve God and listen to his voice and do not rebel against his 
commands. 
1 Sam 12:24: Serve God in truth and with all the heart and consider what he has 
done. 
2 Kings 17:34: They do not follow the commandments or the statutes or the laws or 
the ordnances. 
2 Kings 17:35: Do not bow down to other gods and do not serve them and do not 
sacrifice to them. 
2 Kings 17:36: Bow down to God and sacrifice to him.  
These parallels are where Becker finds his main evidence that these passages fit the theme 
of the literary form.202 But it should be kept in mind that this opinion (that the parallelism 
is by and large synonymous) is driven by the literary form. Becker is clear in saying that 
the law commitment thrust that is a part of his Deuteronomistic form is the determining 
factor in how fear-of-God of God is viewed:  
                                                 
201
 Plath, 1962, 33, identifies many of these (in his words) “parallel expressions” (parallele 
Ausdrücke)—and it is from him that I borrow the term “parallel.” Becker, 1965, identifies them as 
“synonymous expressions” (synonyme Wendungen [see pp. 94, 99, 107, 115, 117, 120]). Because 
of Plath’s use of “parallel,” Becker’s de facto designation of these verses as such, and some 
indications that many of these “parallels” really are in poetic relationship with fear-of-God, it 
seems acceptable to employ the term.  
202
 Plath, 1962, 33, also notices and makes use of these parallels. 
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Die Erkenntnis, dass das Gesetz in alter Zeit und auch noch im Deuteronomy—
freilich in literarischer Darstellung—die Funktion der Bundessatzung hatte und sich 
dadurch vom Gesetz als der „absoluten Grösse der Spätzeit“ tiefgreifend 
unterscheidet, verdanken wir vor allem M. Noth. Diese Auffassung darf als bekannt 
vorausgesetzt werden und ist hier nicht im einzelnen darzulegen und zu beweisen. 
Es genügt uns, sie für das Verständnis des Begriffs des Jahwe-Fürchtens im 
Deuteronomy zuverwerten. (emphasis mine)203 
Here, Becker reveals more clearly his method that was ambiguously mentioned in the 
Vorwort. His statement there bears repeating:  
Die Begriffsarten mit ihren sprachlichen Formen sind hinwiederum an bestimmte 
literarische Formen oder literarische Schichten gebunden. Bei der Erklärung der 
einselnen Stellen wird aus dem jeweiligen Kontext der Nachweis zu erbringen sein, 
dass die Annahme einer bestimmten sprachlichen Form für eine bestimmte 
Begriffsausprägung zu Recht besteht. Die Anwendung dieser Methode zur 
Ermittlung von Begriffsunterschieden soll eine wesentliche Aufgabe der 
vorliegenden Arbeit sein.204 
When Becker in this quote mentions using the “prevailing context” that comes out of the 
“individual places,” it is now clear that he means the literary form context and not the 
immediate biblical context. In the case of Deuteronomy, as Becker mentions in the quote 
before last, “prevailing context” has everything to do with the late literary creation of the 
Mosaic Law-based YHWH cult. Therefore, this concentration upon the “federal laws” 
(which everything should be interpreted in light of) should be “presupposed” and there is 
no need “to explain” it or “to prove” it. As has already been said, this method is a great 
over-generalization taken from a highly speculative theory that is ultimately not a study 
into the OT uses of fear-of-God per se (in which an exhaustive biblical [i.e., theological] 
analysis of each text and each context is accomplished), but a forcing of large groups of 
fear-of-God texts into a few “idea-types” preconceived by form-critics. The 
“Deuteronomistic” group of virtue-fear-of-God texts is easy prey for this method because 
most of them do not have any in-verse context to protect them from misinterpretation.205 
But Becker takes one potential in-verse (and sometimes near-verse) context-producer—
i.e., the parallel—and uses this phenomenon as “evidence” that the idea-type fits the 
literary form. He does this by designating many of the parallels as “synonymous,” not 
based upon local context, but because a “synonymous” designation often fits with the 
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 Becker, 1965, 89. 
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 Ibid., v. 
205
 What I mean here is this: if a text says “And David was afraid of the LORD that day” (2 
Sam 6:9), we know from the context (Uzzah was suddenly killed for mishandling the ark) that 
David had the feeling of fear. The “virtue” fear-of-God texts, on the other hand, are not depicting 
(at least in their immediate context) an epiphany or startling work of God. They are often 
imperative (“fear God!”), narrative accounts of a condition (“He did not fear God” Deut 25:18), or 
Psalmic non-narrative poetry that tells about men and women who do or do not fear God (“You 
who fear the LORD, praise him!” Ps 22:23 [24]).  
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demands of the literary form. With this accomplished, he can then say that a general idea-
type exists for the Deuteronomistic literary form, and finally declare how this one idea-
type fits in finely with the one main linguistic form that is mainly found there—that is, 
the verb + YHWH.  
A brief look at several of these virtue-fear-of-God texts should be sufficient to show 
how Becker’s overemphasis on the literary form tends to degrade the plain meaning of the 
text. My first example, Deut 6:13, is also the first one that Becker uses to justify his 
position (v. 12 is included for context): 
6:12 take care that you do not forget the LORD, who brought you out of the land of 
Egypt, out of the house of slavery. 6:13 The LORD your God you shall fear; him you 
shall serve, and by his name alone you shall swear.206 
When this text is read, “fear” can certainly be interpreted to mean just what it says, i.e., 
the feeling of fear. There is the possibility, however, that there exists some element of 
figurative meaning. So when one goes to the surrounding context to gain perspective, one 
reads that Moses is recounting (in chapter five) the giving of the law at Sinai 
approximately forty years previous, and imploring the new generation not to make the 
mistakes of their fathers and mothers and thereby once again fall under the harsh 
judgment of God. When the reader ponders the fearful events at Sinai and the wrath of 
God that repeatedly broke out against the “rebellious and stiff-necked” people (Deut 
31:27), he or she would not be surprised to find among Moses’ admonitions some 
mention of fear. In fact, much of what Moses says in Deuteronomy is quite threatening in 
tone, because evil-doing among the Israelites—despite all the past lessons—is routinely 
made out to be inevitable (which, in turn, inevitably brings on God’s wrath and 
punishment). With this disturbing mood in the readers mind, could he or she then say that 
the imperative “fear the LORD” in this stormy atmosphere has no place? Given the 
circumstances, is it reasonable to fear? It appears obvious that the fear feeling could 
certainly be a part of this context—and would quite reasonably be expected. I mention 
this in order to set a contrast with how Becker interprets the passage. 
The framework of the recounting of the Ten Commandments in chapter five is the 
main local contextual consideration according to Becker. Much of what is said in chapter 
six is meant to focus attention on loyalty and obedience to YHWH—which implies the 
keeping of his commandments. To this end, he takes it that  (“you shall fear”) in v. 
13 is in synonymous parallel (also in v. 13) with -F+ (“you shall serve”) and +F. 
(“you shall swear”), as well as GD. !# (“lest you forget”) in v. 12 and F (“you shall 
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 I designate this a virtue-fear-of-God case because, first, there is no epiphany or awesome 
work of God that the fear is a reaction to; second, the fear is something that is commanded—
therefore it must be a quality (virtue) that is highly desired by God; and, third, it can imply other 
virtues that flow out of the primary fear-feeling virtue.  
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love”) in v. 5.207 Now, even though Becker says, “In 6:13 [yor’] is surrounded by a row 
of synonymous expressions,” it is clear that he does not mean that these expressions are 
synonymous with the feeling of fear; rather, the semantic flow is always away from fear 
and toward the meaning of the parallels.208 But in the case of this text, Becker would have 
a difficult time saying that fear-of-God is synonymous with serving and swearing and not 
forgetting and loving. Fear would semantically be very elastic indeed if it could also 
mean these. In order to get the kind of parallelism that he desires, Becker comes up with 
an interesting twist: he first applies the Deuteronomistic emphasis of loyalty to YHWH 
onto the meaning of the parallels. By saying, for example, that “lest you forget” really is 
designed to say “worship YHWH alone,” then a nice synonymous parallel can be found 
with “fear the LORD” after “fear” here has also been subjected to and interpreted 
according to the literary form. With serving, swearing, not forgetting, and loving now 
gelled into a convenient cult-centered generalization,  in v. 13 can now more easily 
be seen to be in synonymous parallel with them (because the same generalization applies 
to it too). One gets the feeling that much of the contextual detail he goes into on many of 
the passages is simply a formality—for, at best, only one feature of the context (i.e., the 
attempt to get people to be loyal to the cult and to the cult’s God) has any substantial 
relevance.209 This is not to say that Becker—even with his flawed “history of religions” 
foundation—does not perceive important elements of the text that were quite likely to be 
to some degree upon the minds of the writers. But even if a major intention of the text 
was to build loyalty and obedience to YHWH and his Jerusalem cult, it does not follow 
that “loyalty” and “obedience” are the only aspects of cult life to which Moses’ 
imperatives must somehow point.210 
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 Becker, 1965, 94, writes (note: his transliteration symbols are somewhat different than 
those of the SBL system used in this dissertation): „In 6, 13 ist jāre’ von einer Reihe synonymer 
Wendungen umgeben, die ihrerseits erhärten, dass jāre’ nicht formell Gesetzesbeobachtung 
ausdrückt. Sie kreisen sämtlich um Bundestreue und Verehrung Jahwes als des allein zu 
verehrenden Gottes; sie sind ja, wie bereits erwähnt wurde, ein Kommentar zum Hauptgebot des 
Dekalogs. Die synonymen Wendungen sind: šākah ’ät-JHWH (v. 12); ‘ābad (v. 13) (vgl. 5, 9), 
das zweifellos Terminus kultischer Verehrung ist; nišba‘ bišemô (v. 13) (vgl. 5, 11), das 
Anerkennung und Verehrung einer Gottheit voraussetzt, da man bei dem Gott schwört, den man 
verehrt; hālak ’aharê ’älohîm ’aherîm, das antithetisch zur Jahwetreue steht. Wir können 
sodann noch ’āhab in 6, 5 zu den Synonyma des in 6, 13 stehenden jāre’ rechnen ….“  
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 Ibid., 94. One could reasonably question why the parallels to virtue-fear-of-God cases 
are so often semantically in the driver’s seat and not the other way around.  
209
 Deut 10:12 is quite similar to 6:13 (with parallels of “walk in all [God’s] ways,” “to love 
him,” “to serve the LORD,” and [in v. 13] “to keep the commandments of the LORD”). Becker 
(Ibid., 99) applies the same “method” there with similar results.  
210
 If Becker’s form-critical history-of-religions scenario is correct, then perhaps the text 
really does only have the “reality” (i.e., the intention of the author) of generating loyalty and 
obedience to the (artificial) cult; in this case, all imperatives could quite likely be intended to be 
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The same semantic blending is also seen in Becker’s handling of Deut 13:4 (Heb. v. 
5): “The LORD your God you shall follow, him alone you shall fear, his commandments 
you shall keep, his voice you shall obey, him you shall serve, and to him you shall hold 
fast.” In this verse are found, according to Becker, “the longest row of typical 
Deuteronomistic expressions of YHWH-affiliation and law-observation.”211 The same 
Deuteronomistic effect is also seen by Becker once one moves into the books of the 
former prophets. For example, there are many Joshua chapter 24 synonymous parallels to 
 (in v. 14).212 Becker lists the following: “serve” the LORD (vv 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 
24), “put away” other gods (vv. 14, 23), “incline your hearts to the LORD” (v. 23), “hear” 
the voice of the LORD (v. 24), do not “forsake the LORD” (vv. 16, 20), do not “serve 
foreign gods” (vv. 16, 20), and do not deal “falsely” with God (v. 27). Regarding these 
Becker says, “All terms and expressions express loyalty to YHWH or the opposite.”213 
The same goes for many of the parallel expressions in and surrounding 1 Sam 12:14 and 
24. In the former, Becker lists the following synonyms to : do not “forget” the LORD 
(v. 9), do not “forsake” the LORD (v. 10), do not “serve” Baal or Astartes (v. 10), “serve” 
the LORD (v. 10, 14), “heed his voice” (v. 14), do “not rebel against the commandment 
of the LORD” (v. 14), and “follow the LORD” (v. 14).214 The synonymous parallels to 
the virtue-fear-of-God text in 1 Sam 12:24 are: “do not turn aside from following the 
LORD” (v. 20), “serve the LORD with all your heart” (v. 20), “do not turn aside after 
useless things” (v. 21), “serve him faithfully with all your heart” (v. 24), and do not do 
“wickedly” (v. 25).215    
Becker closes his investigation of the Deuteronomistic literary type by commenting 
briefly upon the many virtue-fear-of-God cases in 2 Kings 17. In his estimation, “it stands 
without doubt that [yor’] here means ‘worship’ [„verehren“], and no translator has 
decided differently.” With this confident statement, Becker goes on to say that “it is 
                                                                                                                                                  
taken to denote this reality. On the other hand, if YHWH is real and the Jerusalem cult developed 
in the working out of his redemptive plan upon earth, then the imperatives of Moses can signify 
realities that have to do with that redemptive plan—those realities being, for example, blessings, 
love, joy, sin, wrath, curses, punishment, fear, being in the “book of life” or not being in it, etc., 
etc.  
211
 Becker, 1965, 102. 
212
 A number of his examples are “antithetical.” For ease of understanding, I have presented 
them all as imperatives (e.g., for Josh 24:27—“[this stone] shall be a witness against you, if you 
deal falsely with your God”—I record Becker’s synonymous parallel as “do not deal falsely with 
God”). 
213
 Becker, 1965, 115. 
214
 Ibid., 117. 
215
 Ibid., 117, 118. 
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superfluous, therefore, to quote the synonymous expressions.”216 In 2 Kings 17:7-41, 
there are not a few “expressions”—many of them like those listed in the paragraph 
above—that Becker would no doubt consider to be synonymous parallels to “fear.” Much 
could be said about the fear texts here: it seems at first glance that they could be referring 
to “worship” (which Becker understands as being an aspect of the general 
Deuteronomistic loyalty to YHWH theme). Indeed, many Bible translations do use 
“worship” here (NRSV, NIV, NLT, NCV [also “honor”]); but several stick with “fear” 
(KJV, NKJV, NASB). One could insert “worship,” or even “honor,” or “praise,” and it 
would not go against what sounds natural to the ear. But in view of the disastrous 
downfall-of-Israel context of this pericope, a strong element of real fear is very likely 
indicated. This fearful context is present even if “Deuteronomist”/“Deuteronomistic” 
writers did “construct” much if not all of the history—for even from a literary standpoint, 
there is still enough sin and punishment and pain and death around to justify the feeling of 
fear. The 2 Kings narrative does not give much in the way of details about what went on 
during the 8th century BC Assyrian sieges of the cities in Israel and Judah; but from what 
is now known extra-biblically about Assyrian siege warfare from around that time (8th 
cent. BC), the three year siege of Samaria (2 Kings 17:5) must have been horrible.217 The 
writer of 2 Kings 17 is at pains to show that the Israelites got what they deserved, for the 
LORD had warned them not to worship idols (v. 12), to not turn from his commands (v. 
13), to not worship or bow down to other gods (v. 35), to carefully follow all aspects of 
the law (v. 37), and to not forget the covenant that he had made with them. The Israelites, 
however, “sinned against the LORD their God” (v. 7) by practicing the religions of the 
surrounding nations (v. 8), by setting up high places and sacred stones and Asherah poles 
(vv. 9, 10), by disobeying his commandments (v. 16), by bowing down to the stars and 
worshipping Baal (v. 16), and by practicing human sacrifice, divination, and sorcery (v. 
17).  
That the fear feeling is indicated in chapter 17 in also implied by the several 
contrasts made between fearing God and fearing “other gods” (see vv. 35-39). As Otto’s 
work has to some degree accurately pointed out, people around the world are prone to 
fear whatever ends up being their object of worship. And the more “primitive” and 
“demonic”-oriented this worship is, the more there is of the feeling of fear.218 The point to 
be learned from this is that people are prone to fear false gods who they believe can either 
bless their lives or make their lives miserable. But sometimes blended into the fear of 
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 Ibid., 120. In the German here, Becker writes: „Es steht ausser Zweifel, dass jāre’ hier 
‚verehren’ bedeutet, und kein Übersetzer hat sich anders entschieden. Es erübrigt sich deshalb, die 
synonymen Wendungen anzuführen.“ 
217
 2 Kings 17 should be read in light of the sickening predictions made in Deut 28:49-57.  
218
 See the analysis of Rudolf Otto’s „Das Heilige“ earlier in this chapter.  
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false gods is the fear of real demonic and/or satanic activity. Those depicted in the Bible 
as being in idolatry are often portrayed as being in bondage. For example, the prophets of 
Baal went as far as flagellating and cutting themselves in their effort to move Baal to 
action (1 Kings 18:28), and some in the remnant of the people remaining in the land after 
the Assyrian exile went as far as to sacrifice their children (2 Kings 17:17) in order to 
appease their god (probably Molech—see 2 Kings 23:10). The nations lived in fear of 
their gods, and did strange and appalling things in order to please them. But YHWH calls 
his people to not fear idols because they are powerless to do any harm or good in 
comparison to the harm and good that he can do.219 The same principle is stated by Jesus 
when he said to his disciples, “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the 
soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.” Christ is clearly 
referring in the first clause to anyone other than God, and in the second clause, to God.220 
The fear that is mentioned here must be seen in light of the discussion of the inevitability 
of persecution that takes place just before. The point is that Jesus’ disciples should not 
fear those who might persecute them—for they have no power to harm the soul—but to 
fear God who has the power and authority to harm both body and soul.221 But in this fear 
of God’s punishment is great hope: the God who has the power to make life miserable is 
also the God who has the power to create abundant life for his followers. At the end of the 
2 Kings section recounting the horrible consequences for failing to “fear” YHWH is 
found this principle—but it is spoken positively: “‘And the covenant that I have made 
with you, you shall not forget, nor shall you fear other gods. But the LORD your God you 
shall fear; and He will deliver you from the hand of all your enemies.’” (17:38, 39 
NKJV). Most of the versions translate the two “fear” instances here as “worship.” I 
believe this is a significant loss, for in this text, God is saying that by fearing God alone 
(who, alone, ought to be feared) one can be free from the fear of false gods and also be 
free of the fear of everything else (except God).222  
It would also appear to be an essential loss when the instance of  in v. 35 is 
translated (as most versions do) as “worship.” There, the LORD is quoted as 
commanding: “You shall not fear other gods, nor bow down to them nor serve them nor 
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 This is clearly his message in Jeremiah chapter ten. 
220
 See the discussion of Matt 10:28 in the section on NT uses of fear-of-God below. 
221
 The same principle exists behind the words of YHWH throughout Deut-2 Kings as he 
repeatedly calls his people away from false god worship, and he repeatedly backs up his claim to 
fearsomeness through many warnings. 
222
 This “fear and bondage” can be felt as a „Grundton“ in the annals of the Assyrian kings 
who brought about the downfall of the Northern Kingdom. The accumulation of booty and bodies 
is routinely connected with the satiation of their gods, and the mood is generally dark and 
heartless (see Luckenbill, 1927). See also 1 Chron 16:25, 26 for the justification for fearing God 
alone: “For all the gods of the nations are idols, but the LORD made the heavens” (NIV).  
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sacrifice to them ….” If all is blending into the Deuteronomistic idea of worship, then the 
textual richness that illustrates the details of idolatry is overlooked. In this case, the text 
implies that many of the Israelites had been afraid of “other gods.” This is a call for them 
to not be afraid of them (which would be a great benefit to be freed from this fear [as vv. 
38 and 39 suggest]). The translation “do not worship other gods” completely loses the 
idea that one can be freed from the fear inherent in idolatry. From a syntactical 
standpoint, the next phrase—“nor bow down to them”—is much nearer in lexical 
meaning to “worship.” If the translator felt that one of these should be rendered 
“worship,” 	 	G (DBLSD: “bow down,” “prostrate oneself,” “bow in worship” [only in the 
rare Hishtafel form]) would be the first choice.223 But the best choice would be to follow 
the MT and LXX texts and simply describe the phenomena that are a part of false god 
worship—i.e., fearing and bowing down.224  
The most important contextual factor for determining how  is used in the many 
Deut-2 Kings virtue-fear-of-God passages is (as mentioned above) the fearful context of 
the Mosaic Law. In a key passage (Deut 4:9-13), the admonition to teach the fear-of-God 
is clearly set within the fearful context of the giving of the law at Sinai:  
Only take heed to yourself, and diligently keep yourself, lest you forget the things 
your eyes have seen, and lest they depart from your heart all the days of your life. 
And teach them to your children and your grandchildren, 4:10 especially 
concerning the day you stood before the LORD your God in Horeb, when the 
LORD said to me, ‘Gather the people to Me, and I will let them hear My words, 
that they may learn to fear Me all the days they live on the earth, and that they may 
teach their children.’ 4:11 “Then you came near and stood at the foot of the 
mountain, and the mountain burned with fire to the midst of heaven, with darkness, 
cloud, and thick darkness. 4:12 And the LORD spoke to you out of the midst of the 
fire. You heard the sound of the words, but saw no form; you only heard a voice. 
4:13 So He declared to you His covenant which He commanded you to perform, the 
Ten Commandments; and He wrote them on two tablets of stone. 
Here, Moses is trying to remind the people of the deadly seriousness of the LORD when 
he called them to Sinai about forty years earlier to receive the law. Moses paints a picture 
in the minds of his hearers of the terrifying scene and informs them that the reason for 
having the people endure the Sinai spectacle was to instill in them (“that they may learn” 
v. 10) the fear of the LORD. This was supposed to be a lesson that the Israelites would 
learn and pass on to their children (v. 9). The reason why they should learn this is stated in 
the narrative description itself (in Exod 20:18-20): 
Now all the people witnessed the thunderings, the lightning flashes, the sound of 
the trumpet, and the mountain smoking; and when the people saw it, they trembled 
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 The 1912 version of the Luther Bible goes this way („Fürchtet keine andern Götter und 
betet sie nicht an“).   
224
 Only occasionally does the LXX deviate from translating  (and its derivatives) as 
φοβέω (and its derivatives). One example is Josh 22:25 where LXX uses σέβοµαι (“to worship”). 
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and stood afar off. 20:19 Then they said to Moses, “You speak with us, and we will 
hear; but let not God speak with us, lest we die.” 20:20 And Moses said to the 
people, “Do not fear; for God has come to test you, and that His fear may be before 
you, so that you may not sin.” 
In view of these two passages, it is clear that “fear” was to be “learned” and to be a part 
of the Israelites’ relationship with God “all the days they live on the earth.” The purpose 
for this fear is clearly stated in Exod 20:20b: “so that you may not sin.” Moses’s 
encouragement to the people not to fear (Exod 20:20a) should in no way be taken as 
somehow canceling out this teachable fear. Moses—in his role as mediator—was only 
trying to calm their extreme level of fear that was precipitated by a misunderstanding of 
God and his motives.225 The Israelites still did not yet realize that—despite the smoke, 
thunder, quaking mountain, and threats of punishment—God still had their best interest in 
mind. Considering the fearful circumstances then, what was promised to happen if the 
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 Durham, 1987, implies that no fear at all was warranted when the people beheld the 
terrifying epiphany: “The people must have no fear, [Moses] says, because God had come for the 
purpose of giving them the experience of his Presence” (303) He further believes that the fear that 
would make the Israelites avoid sin is really reverence, which is a “basic emphasis of Israel’s 
teaching tradition”—an idea that he picks up from Becker and Stähli (the latter draws almost 
exclusively from the former; see my p.123). Finally, Durham writes: “What is meant by such 
‘reverence’ or ‘fear’ is a respect for Yahweh/Elohim that will give a constant emphasis to his way 
for living and relationship, and so avoid the missing of the way (afj) that is sin” (304). 
Bamberger throughout his article argues that fear-of-God cases in the OT should in most cases be 
taken in a “derived sense” (i.e., they mean something else other than the fear feeling). His main 
proof text is Exod 20:20 of which he says, “Plainly, Moses either contradicted himself within a 
single sentence, or else used the word fear with two widely different connotations.” On the face of 
it, Bamberger has a point. Several things, however, can be said in response: Moses could have 
easily used one of the normal words for “worship”—G or -F+—if that were the intended 
meaning (note: Deut-2 Kings by far prefers G or -F+ [and not ] in cases in which the context 
strongly suggests worship—see Deut 4:19; 12:2; 17:3; 29:18 (17); 30:17; 31:20; Josh 22:27; 1 
Sam 1:3; 15:24; 2 Sam 12:20; 15:32; 1 Kings 1:47; 2 Kings 18:22; 19:37; 21:3). It does not seem, 
however, that “worship” would “goad” people away from sin. Worship and loyalty and honor do 
not really force a sinful person away from sin; but fear can. In any case, hary (n.f.) is used for 
several good reasons. First, the Israelites’ situation is conditional upon their improvement in 
conduct (Exod 19:3); in other words, fear is not unexpected in view of the big “if” regarding their 
future survival. Second, God obviously made the Sinai experience as dreadful and terrifying as 
possible for a reason (see Deut 4:10; 5:29). As Moses indicates, the experience was a “test,” and 
that test had the ultimate purpose of dissuading the people from sin. The intensity of the people’s 
sin and the intensity of God’s anger (see Deut 9:14—God was so angry that he wanted to kill 
them all) provides justification to the idea that God—at this initial stage of the relationship—
simply used terror as a means to scare the people out of their sin. God had certainly shown love 
and compassion already towards his people as they came out of Egypt; but their conduct at Sinai 
demonstrates that they were still so “stiff-necked” and prone to spiritual adultery that God appears 
fully justified in using the force of fear to make the people behave in a way that would be good 
for them in the long run. Worship eventually came about through the Sinai experience—but it 
appears that fear was a necessary step to get there.  
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people disobeyed, and in view of what did happen later (the horrors under siege 
conditions should be kept in mind here), it seems that some fear-of-God would be a small 
price to pay if it helped the people avoid sin and its disastrous results.226 Going again to 2 
Kings 17, the LORD made it clear that fear of him would bring a good result (i.e., he 
would “deliver [them] from the hand of all [their] enemies” v. 39); conversely, when the 
people would not fear the LORD, then disaster surely followed (in the case of failing to 
fear in v. 25, the LORD responded by sending lions to attack the people). The reason I 
mention these texts is simply to make the point that the Deut-2 Kings virtue-fear-of-God 
cases (and I believe for the rest of the Bible as well) cannot be semantically separated 
from the fearful lessons learned at Sinai: God is supreme in power and moral authority 
and humans are contingent beings who are obligated to live according to God’s law. But 
because humans are universally susceptible to sin, the threat of God’s punishment is ever 
at hand—and fear comes as a result. But fear is not just a result; in view of the fact that it 
is commanded, fear to some extent can be willed. And this can come about through 
knowledge. This was to some extent the purpose of Sinai: to educate the Israelites about 
the true nature of God and of themselves. With this knowledge, they could ponder their 
situation and potentialities, and choose to fear God as a result. The fear-of-God 
phenomenon, therefore, is somewhat paradoxical: it is an unpleasant result to be avoided; 
but each occurrence of fear-of-God that results from sin is (if a person is willing) an 
education in the way things really are in life “under the sun.” As a result, a man or 
woman can walk more circumspectly and fearfully in order to avoid sin, punishment, and 
even more fear that could lead to even more wisdom. This paradox might be reflected in 
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 Plath, 1962, 40, understands that YHWH’s „Furchtbarkeit“ is to a significant extent 
attributable to YHWH’s absolute will and omnipotence. This idea will be critical for the 
understanding of fear-of-God in Qoheleth. I believe that modern theologians have tended to 
minimize the fear-feeling that is justified when one is faced with greater authority and power. It is 
very much the spirit of the age in the west to dismiss fear before authoritative and/or powerful 
people or institutions (this might be an inevitable characteristic of wealthy socialized democracies 
that are relatively insolated from abuses of power [at least, in the minds of the people]). Even 
Becker, 1965 (in his monograph’s forward), admits (and claims he will resist) the efforts of OT 
commentators to “free the Old Testament” from the accusation that it promotes a religion of fear. 
But Becker in his Deuteronomistic section gives very little attention to the fear feeling. Plath goes 
a bit deeper; but in my opinion, they are both only scratching around on the surface of the 
human/God relational phenomenon of fear-of-God. Plath’s opinion (p. 39), however, that fear-of-
God and love-of-God should not be entirely separated because it “splits the heart” is indeed a 
good point. Unfortunately, he does not significantly develop this thought further. The pre-critical 
fear-of-God commentators (and, perhaps, as well as Otto) might very well have expressed the 
opinion that one cannot have love-of-God without fear-of-God; but it seems to me that one can 
have fear-of-God (i.e., total servile fear-of-God) without any love-of-God. Whatever the case, one 
does not have to think too long about the psychology of love and fear to realize that these mental 
phenomena are very complex and related to each other in ways that are beyond understanding.  
 90 
Solomon’s words that fear-of-God is the “end of the matter” (Eccl 12:13) as well as “the 
beginning” of both wisdom and knowledge (Prov 1:7; 9:10). Despite this paradoxical 
nature, one thing is for sure: the Bible repeatedly portrays fear-of-God in a positive light, 
and teaches that it ought to be practiced by all (as Qoheleth says, fear-of-God [and 
keeping his commandments] is the “all” of humankind [Eccl 12:13b]). 
A few remarks should now be made regarding Becker’s suggested synonymous 
parallels. Becker uses literary parallels in the “Deuteronomistic” literary genre as a 
conduit to bring the virtue-fear-of-God cases found there into line with the demands of 
the literary form. That is, fear means “loyalty” (or similar) because fear is synonymous to 
the parallels that are in one way or another indicative of loyalty. This program of 
Becker’s does not work for a variety of reasons. It is extremely unlikely, first of all, that 
so many parallels of such diverse literal meanings could be synonymous with fear and/or 
loyalty. The method of bringing the demands of the Deuteronomistic form to bear on both 
the virtue-fear-of-God cases as well as the parallels, and then professing that they are then 
all synonymous, goes against normal semantics and certainly degrades the exegete’s 
ability to determine the information that the writer intended to transfer to the reader. A 
common sense reading of most of the parallels reveal many specific details about Israelite 
religious life that enrich the narrative. A few of them may figuratively mean “loyalty,” 
but the majority have their own semantic focus and at most are only related to cult loyalty 
in that the action or emotion described is simply what cult-honoring people do or feel. 
The parallels to virtue-fear-of-God in Deut-2 Kings inform the reader that loyal Israelites 
do the following: they— 
Keep the law (Deut 5:29; 6:2; 8:6; 14:4 [5]; 28:58; 31:12; 2 Kings 17:34) 
Swear by God’s name (Deut 6:13; 10:20) 
Walk in God’s ways (Deut 8:6; 10:12) 
Love God (Deut 10:12) 
Serve God (Deut 10:12, 20, 13:4 [5], Josh 24:14; 1 Sam 12:14; 2 Sam 12:24; 2 
Kings 17:35) 
Cling to God (Deut 10:20, 13:4 [5]) 
Follow God (Deut 13:4 [5]) 
Listen to God’s voice (Deut 13:4 [5]; 1 Sam 12:14) 
Bow down to God (2 Kings 17:35, 36) 
Sacrifice to God (2 Kings 17:35, 36) 
This list demonstrates the variety and specificity of the texts in parallel with virtue-fear-
of-God. On the face of it, there does not seem to be much room for synonymous 
parallelism.  
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But Becker seems to be under the impression that most or all of OT parallelism 
must be synonymous.227 But this does not have to be the case. Although parallelism is a 
phenomenon mostly discussed in the context of clearly poetical texts, its use is found 
throughout the OT. Parallelism is “the basic feature of biblical songs—and, for that 
matter, of most of the sayings, proverbs, laws, laments, blessings, curses, prayers, and 
speeches found in the Bible.”228 Whether or not the virtue-fear-of-God texts and their 
alleged parallels in Deut-2 Kings are part of poetical sections is still a debated question. 
Whatever the case, the existence of parallels there—in the sense of one clause which 
follows on and somehow expands upon another—is obviously a reality. For this brief 
discussion about parallelism, a look at Deut 6:13 will be helpful. The NRSV text reads: 
“You shall fear the LORD your God and serve Him, and shall take oaths in His name.” 
This verse could be seen to consist of three cola in parallel:  
The LORD—fear!/  
Him [the LORD]—serve!/  
In his [the LORD’s] name—take oaths!// 
When one initially reads through the verse, it is certainly evident that the three cola are 
intimately related to YHWH worship. And yet each colon has its own particular message: 
the first colon commands fear of God, the second commands submissive service, and the 
third commands that one appeal to YHWH as the highest authority when taking oaths. 
The first and third commands involve—respectively—the heart (feeling/emotion) and 
mind (intellectual assent to YHWH’s authority); but the second command has to do with 
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 Christensen, 1991, 204, suggests the following for Deut 10:12: “Careful prosodic 
analysis suggests that the term is defined here by means of poetic parallelism: “to fear YHWH” is 
“to walk in all his ways.” This phrase is explained by the words that follow: “to fear God” means 
“to love him and to serve YHWH your God with all your heart and with all your being” (v 12).” 
Wright, 1953, 399, writes regarding Deut 10:12: “To fear God means to walk along the paths 
which he has laid out; to love God means to serve him and obey him. Note that it is characteristic 
of Deuteronomy to combine fear and love, and to see the fruit of both in obedient service.” 
Calvin, 1950, 359, on the other hand, appears to keep fear-of-God quite close to the fear 
emotion/feeling when summing up Deut 10: “Lest they should despise this teaching [Moses] 
reminds them of God’s awful power [in Deut 10:17]; for the cause of contempt and negligence is, 
that the majesty of God does not always obtain its due reverence. Wherefore he inspires them with 
fear, to deter them from self-indulgence and indifference.” Plath, 1962, 41, notices that bha has a 
number of the same parallels as , and therefore sees some blending of the former into the latter. 
But he does not press the requirements of the Deuteronomistic literary form into  as hard as 
Becker—and his view, therefore, is more balanced. He points out, for example, that in Deut 1:1, 
„stützt sich das Liebesgebot ebenfalls auf die Erkenntnis der “fruchtbaren” Taten Gottes …. 
Ebenso kann auch nicht unwidersprochen bleiben, dass sich die -Belege lediglich auf die 
Furchtbarkeit und die Strafen Jahves beziehen ….“  
228
 Kugel, 1981, 1. His chapter two is devoted to prose parallelism. 
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the works that flow out from the attitude of the heart and the orientation of the mind. Or, 
it could be that “serve!”—as is commonly done—be translated as “worship!” Whatever 
the case, the second colon could be understood as the center of a small chiastic 
arrangement in which the “works” (either service and/or worship) that are a part of 
YHWH cult loyalty flow from the affective and cognitive wellspring of the believer.  
This sample verse simply illustrates that many factors come into play in parallelism. 
According to Kugel, the parallel cola A and B (and C, etc.) can have a near or distant 
relationship: 
The ways of parallelism are numerous and varied, and the intensity of the semantic 
parallelism established between clauses might be said to range from “zero 
perceivable correspondence” to “near-zero perceivable differentiation” (i.e., just 
short of word-for-word repetition).229 
In his monograph, Kugel presents many kinds of biblical parallelisms (and he does not 
claim to have established an exhaustive list). In general, he sees parallelism as simply 
indicating: “‘A is so, and what’s more, B is so.’ That is, B was connected to A, had 
something in common with it, but was not expected to be (nor regarded as) mere 
restatement.”230 He further explains:  
What this means is simply: B, by being connected to A—carrying it further, 
echoing it, defining it, restating it, contrasting with it, it does not matter which—has 
an emphatic, ‘seconding’ character, and it is this, more than any aesthetic of 
symmetry or paralleling, which is at the heart of biblical parallelism.231  
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 Ibid., 7. Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, 1993, 225, write, “Scholars refer to the 
structure of Hebrew poetry as parallelism of members, a term that has unfortunately spawned a 
common misunderstanding. Many people understand “parallelism” to mean that a second poetic 
line merely restates or contrasts the point of the previous line in different words. They assume that 
an equal sign (=) links the lines together. Actually, parallelism is that phenomenon whereby two 
or more successive poetic lines strengthen, reinforce, and develop each other’s thought. As a kind 
of emphatic additional thought, the follow-up lines further define, specify, expand, intensify, or 
contrast the first.” 
230
 Kugel, 1981, 8.  
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 Ibid., 51. Fokkelman, 2001, uses the metaphor of binoculars and eyes to understand 
parallelism: “The dynamics and surprises of parallelismus membrorum may also be expressed in 
a metaphor. This way of constructing verses is like a pair of binoculars.… We look through two 
cylinders, with both eyes, so that we have the advantage of seeing depth. Our eyes, with or 
without binoculars, see ‘in stereo.’ The effect results from the fact that one eye has a slightly 
different angle of incidence that the other and hence produces a minimally different image; these 
two pictures are easily superimposed and assembled into the one image inside our brain. 
Parallelismus membrorum does something comparable: this shaping device creates two 
subtly different images on one line (the full poetic line). As this is done with the tools of 
language, we have every opportunity to consider both pictures separately and let them sink in. 
This is where the metaphor ceases to be appropriate: the point of the similarity between A and B 
is their very difference! Only those who look closely and have patience will discover and savor 
the role played by dissimilarity, its surprises, and its richness of meaning.” (pp. 78, 79. Kugel [p. 
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Kugel argues strongly against the idea that one can simply define any given case of 
parallelism as either synonymous or antithetical. The details of parallel texts and their 
contexts are way too varied for that. The practice of assuming synonymity in parallel 
texts is especially criticized by Kugel as “a drastic sort of leveling” that does not 
understand that B has something to do with A’s “completion.” And this “completion” can 
occur in just about an “endless” variety of ways.232 I very much agree with Kugel’s 
emphasis on variety. In my view, that is what one sees when one thoughtfully considers 
the virtue-fear-of-God parallels pointed out by Becker. There is too much variety present 
for them all—or even a small portion of them—to be made to be synonymous in the way 
that he suggests.  
To sum up on Becker’s second main section in which he suggests the hermeneutical 
trio of the Deuteronomistic literary form,  plus LORD, and the idea-type of loyalty to 
the YHWH cult, there can be no doubt that many if not all of the virtue-fear-of-God 
instances in Deut-2 Kings do intimately relate to the establishment of the YHWH cult of 
the Israelites. God-honoring loyalty to YHWH appears to flow out of fear-of-God; it 
might even have fear-of-God as a necessary component. Whatever the case, it is not 
loyalty (or worship or obedience). If it were (and I am speaking here in the most direct 
semantic sense of the word) then  would not have been used, but ןma. There is nothing 
in the virtue-fear-of-God texts in Deuteronomy and the former prophets that preclude 
them from meaning just what they say—i.e., “fear.” It is true that there is some 
interpretational leeway afforded here by the fact that—unlike in “numinous” fear cases—
the object of the fear is not immediately present in the context. The same could be said, 
for example, about “love”: the meaning is perfectly clear when a person reads “the man 
loved his wife as he watched her prepare dinner.” But notions of honor and fidelity—with 
perhaps some attenuation of the love emotion—would be discerned when one reads, 
“love your wife all the days of your life,” or “blessed is the man who loves his wife,” or 
“the love of one’s wife is the beginning of marital success” (a pronounced semantic 
shrinking would, of course, be perceived in “he loved his wife’s blueberry pancakes”). 
More abstract notions of faith, loyalty, honor, and reverence may come into the semantic 
mix, but the emotion of love will not fail to be the primary constituent. I believe the same 
thing can be said about the fear feeling in virtue-fear-of-God cases.  
The point to be illustrated by this is simply that one must regard the known 
semantic flexibility of a word (which might have some dependence on linguistic form) 
and the textual context in which it is used. But Becker’s “context” is mainly the 
                                                                                                                                                  
12] says the term “parallelismus membrorum” means “the parallelism of the clauses” and that it 
was coined by Robert Lowth in his 1753 study De sacra poesi Hebraeorum) 
232
 Kugel, 1981, 13, 15.  
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hypothetical historical contexts of the Deuteronomist and Dtr. who were mainly 
concerned with invoking loyalty to the Jerusalem-centered YHWH cult. Even if 
Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History came about more or less as the form-
critics believe, it still does not explain (if Becker is correct) why the writers would use 
such a plethora of words of diverse literal meanings to all mean the same thing. Whoever 
they were who wrote and redacted this large portion of OT narrative, they certainly did 
not lack skill; they could have—and most likely did—carefully use each word to denote 
specific meanings that could be understood both then and today. The simplest explanation 
is most often the best: they wrote what they did because that is what they meant to say. 
To conclude, it should be said that Becker in this section on Deut-2 Kings puts too much 
emphasis on the non-fear “virtues” that fear-of-God can allude to. This is done at the 
(almost) complete expense of the fear feeling—and that is a mistake; for when one 
considers the fearful circumstances in Deut-2 Kings (in which fear is used to dissuade 
people from sin), the fact that  is still used in plenty of real fear-feeling cases (i.e., it 
has not semantically developed in a linear fashion), and, lastly, what Becker mentions 
about the “numinous ground-tone” remaining throughout the OT (even just a little fear is 
still fear!), one should realize that the writers of the MT and the LXX used—
respectively— and φοβέω for a good reason.233  
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 My thesis that the fear emotion/feeling is the primary element in OT virture fear-of-God 
cases could be brought into question by the fact that Jesus in his quote of Deut 6:13 (or perhaps 
the nearly identical Deut 10:20) in Matt 4:10 (parallel Luke 4:8) uses “worship” and not “fear.” 
The LXX Deut 6:13a Greek of nearly all manuscripts says: κύριον τὸν θεόν σου φοβηθήσῃ καὶ 
αὐτῷ λατρεύσεις (lit. “fear the Lord your God and serve him”); but Jesus’ quote of this in Matt 
4:1b reads, κύριον τὸν θεόν σου προσκυνήσεις καὶ αὐτῷ µόνῳ λατρεύσεις (lit. “you shall 
worship the Lord your God and serve him alone”). The Matthew text as displayed here (from 
NA27) is not contested in the manuscripts (they are consistent in using the verb προσκυνέω and 
not φοβέω) and the LXX text shown (from Rahlfs, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1982) is 
consistent in the manuscripts—with one notable exception: Alexandrinus (A) dating from the 5th 
century contains in Deut 6:13 (and in 10:20) the Greek text exactly as quoted by Jesus. The 
Hebrew manuscripts consistently show  in 6:13 (the BHS apparatus does not mention any 
manuscripts that use G [“to bow down,” “to worship”—see TWOT #619] in Deut 6:13 or 10:20). 
To explain the textual difference between Jesus’ quote and the LXX text, Allen, 1951, 32, simply 
suggests that, first, the writer (or the writer’s sources) of Matt 4:10 might have possessed and 
been influenced by a copy of the LXX that used the verb προσκυνέω instead of φοβέω; or, 
second, there is the possibility that the Matt 4:10 writer wanted to antithetically employ the same 
word (προσκυνέω) that had just been used by Satan in the verse before (“and [Satan] said to him, 
“All these I will give you, if you will fall down and worship me.”). Regarding Allen’s first 
suggestion, I would say that—given the LXX manuscript evidence—it is unlikely that 
προσκυνέω was used in Deut 6:13 and 10:20 in any of the LXX texts extant at the beginning of 
the church era. Alexandrinus does indeed use προσκυνέω in Deut 6:13 and 10:20; but these 
appear to be the only deviations (besides Josh 22:25’s σέβοµαι [“worship”]) from φοβέω in 
Deut-2 Kings virtue-fear-of-God texts according to the Rahlfs LXX apparatus. In other words, 
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Becker’s Psalms Literary Form 
Becker’s next main category consists of a number of fear-of-God passages from the 
Psalms.234 Although he understands this category as being still under the general rubric of 
“fear-of-God as worship-of-God (‘Cultic Idea’)”—and therefore closely related to Deut-2 
Kings—it nevertheless has the distinctive emphasis of designating those who belong to 
the cult community. This idea-type, says Becker, is represented linguistically by the plural 
of the verbal-adjective  	 which is often found in construct with “YHWH” or “Elohim” 
(or a pronominal suffix that represents him).235 This linguistic phenomenon means that 
the emphasis is not on the fear feeling, but on the state of belongingness to the 
community: 
Wie dem dt-stischen Begriff eignet dem jir’ê JHWH der Psalmen der Zug der 
Jahwetreue, mit dem Unterschied jedoch, dass es nicht um den Akt des Fürchtens 
geht, sondern um die Fürchtenden. Der Begriffsart eignet so ein komminitärer Zug, 
                                                                                                                                                  
where the Rahlfs LXX uses φοβέω in virtue-fear-of-God cases, the Rahlfs apparatus does not 
show any manuscript deviations, except for Deut 6:13; 10:20 where A uses προσκυνέω (Wevers, 
1977, LXX apparatus of Deuteronomy was also consulted). Therefore, one gets the feeling that 
the Deut 6:13/10:20 copyist of A (or one of the copyists or editors of a source [in time] before 
him) adjusted these Deuteronomy texts to align with the words of Jesus in Matthew. Even if the 
LXX Deuteronomy text before the writer of Matthew did contain προσκυνέω in Deut 6:13 and 
10:20, I still do not think—given my understanding of “inspiration”—that the Matthew writer 
(who I believe was Matthew) would have recorded the words out of Deuteronomy at the expense 
of the words that Jesus spoke (of course, Matthew might not have had Jesus’ exact words, but 
perhaps only a note saying [or a memory recalling] that Jesus had quoted Deut 6:13/10:20). 
Regarding Allen’s second possibility that the Matthew writer wanted to (antithetically) balance 
Satan’s use of προσκυνέω, I think this could have some merit: the stark contrast between the two 
possible worships (between the devil and God) is fine liteary style and brings home the 
theological point; but I would say that this is not a literary or even theological creation of the 
writer, but is actually what Jesus said in response to Satan. If so, then this gives authoratative 
justification to the understanding that enough of the concept of “worship” is contained in Deut 
6:13 and 10:20 to permit “fear” there to be translated into “worship.” This is what the Lord did in 
this circumstance. And it must finally be kept in mind that προσκυνέω is not completely without 
an undercurrent of fear—for it first means “to bow down.” In those days, to “bow down” and to 
“worship” were not at all separate from the phenomena of fearful “reverence” and “awe” before 
God.  
234
 Becker, 1965, 125, notes the existence of other fear-of-God idea-types in the Psalms: 
„Natürlich umfasst diese Gruppe nicht alle Stellen des Psalmenbuches, in dem als einem 
Sammelbecken verschiedenster Strömungen vielmehr fast alle Begriffsausprägungen der 
Gottesfurcht anzutreffen sind.“ 
235
 Ibid., 129. The Psalms m/p construct-state verbal-adjectives of  	 are (all of which 
Becker regards as having adjectival function): 15:4; 22:23 (24), 25 (26); 25:14; 31:19 (20); 33:18; 
34:7 (8), 9 (10); 60:4 (6); 61:5 (6); 66:16; 85:9 (10); 103:11, 13, 17; 111:5; Ps 115:11, 13; 118:4; 
119:74, 79; 135:20; 145:19; 147:11.  
 96 
ein Interesse an der Zugehörigkeit zur Gemeinda Jahwes und dadurch etwas 
Statisches.236 
This belongingness to the community is especially to be perceived when the construct 
state is used. In Ps 22, for example, the MT of verse 24 reads הּהּ$ ($Q * 	(   () (“You 
who fear the LORD, praise him!” [English v. 23]). From the pointing of   () it is evident 
that it is in construct with “YHWH.”237 It is probably not inappropriate to say that most 
would read this text with the same understanding that is reflected in the NRSV text; that 
is, “LORD” clearly appears to be the object of fear. But this interpretation appears at first 
to run against the grain of the construct state that is present here—for the construct often 
indicates the genitive-of-possession relationship. In this case,   () + LORD should mean 
“the fearers of (i.e., who belong to) the LORD.” This is how Becker takes it.238 By going 
with the genitive-possessive, the emphasis is not on fear, but on the ownership of the 
community by God. This ownership is best represented if   () is not viewed as verbal 
(i.e., as a participle)—which would still allow it to take an object—but as adjectival 
which fits quite comfortably in the construct state and has no opportunity to display 
action and therefore claim an object. So, Becker’s hermeneutical triad in this section of 
his book consists of this plural adjective used in construct with LORD (the “linguistic 
form”), the “idea-type” of membership in the cult community, and the “literary form” of 
the Psalms.  
For a number of reasons I do not think that Becker is on the right track. My main 
concern is that he pushes forward a form-critical emphasis on cult loyalty at the expense 
of a literal reading of the text. The consequence is that the original meaning of  is 
pushed aside in favor of something more abstract and in keeping with the notion that fear-
of-God evolved. Once again, it should be recalled that Becker is trying to show that a 
certain literary form will have a certain linguistic form, and that these two will indicate a 
certain idea-type. The identification of these Psalms’ linguistic forms as “adjectival” 
gives Becker something different that he can then use to justify an idea-type that is also 
                                                 
236
 Ibid., 126. 
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 In the construct state plural, tsere-yod replaces hiriq-yod + mem. Regarding the other 
vowels, most Qal active masculine participles, singular or plural, will resist losing the 
characteristic first syllable holem, even in construct (although the second syllable tsere will 
usually reduce to shewa in all forms except the singular non-construct). But because  	 is a 
stative verb—and undergoes vowel changes more like adjectives and nouns—the first syllable 
qamets usually reduces to shewa and the second syllable tsere will tend to persist (including in the 
singular construct). The exception is the plural construct which takes the form   ().  
238
 Becker, 1965, 127, writes, „In der Verbindung jir’ê JHWH regiert jir’ê daher nicht den 
Akkusative wie das Verbaladjektiv in verbaler Funktion (jāre’ ’ät-JHWH), sondern nach unseren 
grammatikalischen Kategorien den Genetiv, und zwar nicht einmal den genetivus objectivus, 
sondern eher den genetivus subjectivus, so dass jir’ê JHWH eher ‚die Fürchtenden Jahwes’ als 
‚die Jahwe Fürchtenden’ bedeutet.“  
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quite different. But a plain reading of these texts shows that  is being used in each 
case as a participle (verbal-adjective); and the participle here is not evidence for some 
semantic shift, but is simply the linguistic form that naturally appears in biblical songs. 
The Israelites at the temple (and elsewhere) sang songs about what happens to those who 
live righteously and about those who do evil. The Psalms are mainly not narrative history 
in which it might be said, “The people feared God” (i.e., narrative tends to use the 
indicative verb), but are to a large extent songs about the general consequences for those 
who do either doing good and evil—and this naturally leads to the use of the participle: 
“Blessed are those who fear God.” It should be noted that the participle does not normally 
indicate some basic semantic change; it indicates voice [active or passive] and the type of 
action corresponding to the type of Hebrew verb [Qal, Piel, etc.]). But only other factors 
can indicate a change in the basic meaning of a given verb.239 The participle is simply one 
of several verbal linguistic forms used within a semantic field. But Becker insists these 
(plural) uses of  function adjectivally—and that gives him enough room to justify a 
shift in meaning (from “fear” to “community”). Becker could have a point if these in fact 
are pure adjectives (i.e., completely non-verbal modifiers of nouns); but this certainly 
does not have to be the case—even though they occur in the construct state. It will be 
necessary to take some time to explain grammatically why this is so.240  
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 Becker (Ibid., 46) makes the case—with some justification—that the Niphal participle 
 	וֹ" is semantically employed as an adjective; for the form is often used as an attribute of God 
(see, e.g., Pss 47:3; 68:35 [36]; 76:7 [8]). BDB makes its meaning quite elastic (“fearful,” 
“dreadful,” “cause astonishment and awe,” “inspire reverence, godly fear, and awe”); but Becker 
understands that  	וֹ" has not developed but remained quite close to its numinous fear roots. I 
agree with Becker that this form has become somewhat of an independent entity that modifies 
nouns (the wilderness [Deut 1:19; 8:15], people [Isa 18:2, 7], the day of YHWH [Joel 2:31 (3:4); 
Mal 4:5 (3:23)], and, frequently, God)—i.e., it operates adjectivally. But Becker keeps this Niphal 
form—unlike the Psalms Qal participles that are being discussed in this section—very close to the 
fear feeling. This is somewhat strange in view of Becker’s insistence that the adjectivally 
functioning instances of  mean something quite developed and abstract, yet the adjectivally 
functioning  	וֹ" stays right close to its semantic roots. The reason why probably relates to the fact 
that context clearly sets some definite limits of how far one can go with the meaning of  	וֹ". 
Because it is often used as an attribute of God, one cannot say about it what one would say 
concerning the virtue-fear-of-God uses that are describing phenomena experienced by men and 
women.  	וֹ" is also constrained by its clear meaning of “fearful” when used as an attribute of fear-
provoking realities other than God. Because of this context, Becker cannot press  	וֹ" into the 
form-critical mold and find in it some development (even though it is employed throughout the 
OT) by which it becomes more abstract and less fearful as time goes on. 
240
 Becker says that   () (as used in the Psalms) is a “verbal-adjective in adjectival 
function.” (and there are instances of the m/s which he designates “verbal-adjective[s] in verbal 
function”). This terminology is ambiguous and needs some explaining: when Becker writes about 
verbal-adjectives that function adjectivally, he means that there is no action in what is said about 
the nouns that they modify. If this is the case, then they—in my opinion—are no longer “verbal-
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This problem of trying to distinguish between participle and adjective is by and 
large only a problem with stative verbs—one of which is .241 Most verbs simply 
describe action (She throws …) and have little if anything to do semantically or 
morphologically with adjectives that describe states (… the red ball). But stative verbs 
denote states of being and a few have corresponding adjectives that are identical in 
appearance to several forms of the verb. For example, consider the stative (qamets/tsere 
pattern) verbs  	 and  $ 	% (“to fill up, be full” DBLSD): the spellings/pointings of the 
Qal perfect 3m/s verbs, Qal m/s participles, and the m/s adjectives are identical ( 	, 
 $ 	%); the Qal m/p active participles and the m/p adjectives are also identical in form 
(1 ) (, 1 ) $ (%). In the biblical cases in which the linguistic form could be an adjective or 
a verb, then one must consider syntax and context to discern which is being used. 
Because most stative verbs only describe states and not action, the exegete may not find 
much semantic difference between the adjective and the verb. 
But  	 and $ 	% are actually part of a small subclass of stative verbs that can 
indicate a state and/or indicate action (and take an object). With these, it is an important 
exegetical task to discern if an adjective is being used or a participle—for if there is 
action present, it might be a critical element in rightly understanding the message of the 
text. There are a number of OT examples of  	 that depict a stative situation (e.g., Gen 
3:10:  !EF +%. R$S  % [“He said, ‘I heard the sound of you in the garden, 
and I was afraid”]); other uses depict action (i.e., they are “fientive”) and—in their own 
unusual way—are transitive (e.g., Num 14:9: T 1+   $ [“Do not fear the 
people of the land”]).242 The verb in many forms—including the participle form—can 
take objects of action. Despite the fact that no real physical action is transferred from 
                                                                                                                                                  
adjectives” but simply “adjectives” (as they are designated by some of the lexica). All this boils 
down to grammatical definitions—which can sometimes be problematic. For the sake of clarity in 
this section, I will limit (somewhat artificially) the use of “adjective” to words that give some 
non-action quality (property) to a noun (or name or pronoun). But if a noun-modifying word 
imparts any kind of action, then I will call that word a “participle.” Also, in describing Becker’s 
opinions in this section, where he designates a word as a “verbal-adjective in adjectival function”, 
I will simply say that he designates the word as an “adjective.” If Becker describes a word as a 
“verbal-adjective in verbal function,” I will interpret that to mean that the word is a “participle.” 
This will avoid the repeated use of the cumbersome “verbal-adjective in adjectival/verbal 
function” formula as well as the ambiguity that is inherent in it (in principle, just as ambiguous as 
the phrase “adjectival-verb in verbal/adjectival function”). I do this in order to try to discern if 
there is any action in   () as used in this group of Psalms. 
241
 “Adjective” and “participle” are being used here in a somewhat restricted sense. See 
footnote immediately above.   
242
 Waltke and O’Connor, 1990, 363, use the term “fientive” instead of “active” (vs. 
“stative”) because “active” is already used in the nomenclature of voice. “A fientive verb,” they 
write, “is one that designates a dynamic situation.… A fientive verb may be either transitive or 
intransitive ….” 
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subject to object when one fears something (one might argue the “action” goes from 
object to subject [“the dog caused the man to fear”]), the fear nevertheless does have an 
object on which it focuses (at the very least, this is the case grammatically). Because of 
this, Waltke and O’Connor think that stative verbs that can have fientive meanings should 
be “construed as quasi-fientive when they occur either implicitly or explicitly with an 
object and as stative when they are free.”243  
The potential for stative and fientive meanings in  	 means that the exegete must 
be careful to distinguish between the verb and the adjective. If one mis-identifies  	 as 
an adjective when studying a fear passage, the stress will be placed on the state; but the 
action of fearing (only possible if 	   is a verb) might be overlooked. As a verb,  	 can 
indicate stative or fientive situations; but as an adjective, it can only indicate stative 
situations.244 Verbs and adjectives can usually be easily distinguished based upon 
morphology. But, as just mentioned, with  	 there is the aggravating feature that several 
of the verb forms are identical to several of the adjectival forms. Because one cannot tell 
the verb from the adjective based upon morphology alone, then one must consider other 
factors in deciding which is being used.  
Becker is aware of all this as well—and knows that he must find some grammatical 
reason to justify his designation of these   () uses as adjectival. He does this by pointing 
to the fact that all of these Psalms cases of ( )   are in the construct state.245 Before 
replying to this, it should be mentioned that Becker does not claim that the 
masculine/singular cases are adjectives (even though they too are in construct with 
YHWH/Elohim)—but admits that they take objects and function as “verbal-adjectives.” 
Pss 25:12; 112:1; 128:1, 4, according to Becker, signify “moral” (Ps 25:12) and “law-
observation” (Pss 112:1; 128:1, 4) idea-types,246 and are not in a genitive-possessive 
relationship with LORD or Elohim (like the plural), but in a genitive-objective 
                                                 
243
 Ibid., 366. 
244
 The reader is once again reminded that “adjective” is being used somewhat artificially to 
denote only modifiers of nouns that give the noun some non-action property or quality.  
245
 Becker, 1965, 126, writes: „Der kommunitäre Zug äussert sich bis in die sprachlichen 
Formen hinein. Während der dt-stische Begriff ausschliesslich das Verbum gebraucht oder das 
Verbaladjektiv in verbaler Funktion, haben wir hier das Verbaladjektiv in adjektivaler Funktion. 
Schon der status constructus ist der Beweis dafür.“ 
246
 Ibid., 127, 285, 286. It is unlikely that  	 in Ps 112:1 is in the construct state. On a 
different note, Becker appears to hold the view that the kultic („kultische“) and moral 
(„sittliche“) idea-types of fear evolved more or less as two streams from the original “numinous” 
fear (184). The law-observation („nomistische“) idea-type was a further development of the 
moral idea-type (262). See the next section for a brief discussion about Becker’s moral and law-
observation idea-types. 
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relationship.247 In other words, in the Psalms (and elsewhere)  ( can take an object but 
  () cannot. Becker does have a point about these singular construct forms; they do 
indeed take God as the object of fear. While I agree that the singular forms are participles 
(“verbal-adjectives” as Becker calls them), I do not think he gives any credible reasons 
for making the distinction. In my view, the only reason he sets the singular cases apart is 
because there is pressure to fit them in with other instances of the singular form that are 
deemed to denote the “moral” idea-type.248 But there is really no good evidence to split 
off the plurals and make them pure adjectives. The syntax and context do not at all 
require that. It is true that—apart from any other semantic factors—the construct state 
does suggest the existence of a genitive-possessive; but this does not have to be the 
case.249  
                                                 
247
 After Becker claims this sing./plur. distinction, he justifies it with the following: „Damit 
hängt zusammen, dass das sittliche jere’ JHWH (’älohîm) nie durch die suffigierten Formen 
vertreten wird, was beim jir’ê JHWH sehr häufig der Fall ist …. Die Suffixe drücken eben im 
allgemeinen leichter unser Possessivpronomen aus als das im Akkusativ stehende 
Personalpronomen. Der tiefste Grund für den formalen Unterschied zwischen jere’ JHWH 
(’älohîm) und dem jir’ê JHWH der Psalmen liegt in ihrer inhaltlichen Verschiedenheit, zu der 
nicht zuletzt das Vorhandensein oder Nichtvorhandensein des kommunitären Aspekts, des 
Interesses an der Zugehörigkeit zur Jahwegemeinde zu rechnen ist.“ This can be responded to 
briefly: first, the phenomenon of the second and third person suffixes on the plural is simply what 
one can expect to exist in the Psalms; for the Psalms speak repeatedly in many lines of poetry—
one after the other—about God and people. Because God is mentioned in successive lines there is 
ample opportunity for the pronominal suffix to be used. Of the total of 30 (LDLS) m/p construct 
state “verbal-adjectives” of , all but five (Exod 18:21; Eccl 8:12; Mal 3:16 x 2; 4:2 [3:20]) are 
in the Psalms—so one should expect a mix of “YHWH,” “Elohim,” “him,” and “you” to follow 
  (). On the other hand, the m/s occurs only eleven (LDLS) times (Gen 22:12; Job 1:1, 8; 2:3; Ps 
25:12; 128:1, 4; Prov 13:13; 14:2; Eccl 7:18; Isa 50:10) in passages that by and large do not lend 
themselves to repeated uses of the pronominal suffix (the Psalms passages could, but 128:1 is the 
first verse—so “him” or “you” following  ( would be nonsensical; 128:4 occurs after a number 
of lines that do not mention God—so the pronominal suffix would not be expected there; and 
25:12 could have gone either way). Regarding Beckers “ deepest reason” for the m/s and m/p 
distinction, all that can be said in response is that the plural will of course occur in the Psalms 
which by nature have a “community aspect”—and this “community aspect” will thereby be 
associated with all that is in the Psalms, including the fear-of-God. The m/p is just a way to talk 
(and sing) about God’s community (and about those who are outside of the community). The use 
of the m/p instead of the m/s signals only number—and that is all. In no way can it signal what 
kind of genitive situation exists when it finds itself in a construct-state relationship; only 
syntactical and contextual factors can do that. 
248
 See Becker, 1965, 285, for a list of moral idea-type texts. According to Becker, the 
moral idea-type texts that employ  ( + YHWH/Elohim (other than in the Psalms) are Gen 22:12; 
Job 1:1, 8; 2:3; Prov 14:2; 31:30 (feminine/singular); Eccl 7:18.  
249
 Despite all that Becker strongly argues for in the main text of his chapter five, he 
confesses the tenuousness of his m/p and m/s distinction (as well as his justification of it based 
upon the use of the pronominal suffix [see FN 247 first]) in the following footnote (Ibid., 127): 
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A clearer understanding of how adjectives and participles operate in the construct 
state might be helpful at this point. This will help the reader see that Becker’s designation 
of this ( )   verbal-adjective group as genitive-possessive (“the fearers of [i.e., owned by] 
God”) based upon number is inappropriate. It should first be said that adjectives (used as 
substantives) are found regularly in the construct state. A number of these denote some 
relationship of possession. Ps 34:9 (10) contains one example:  	﬩0- (S (lit. “the holy ones 
of him” or “his holy ones”).250 Others simply modify the absolute-state noun. For 
example, “upright” modifies “heart” in Ps 32:11: FQ $V  (﬩) (lit. “the upright ones of heart” 
or “the ones having upright hearts”). Adjectives used in the construct state denote some 
non-action attribute. Because there is no action, then it is unlikely that the adjective in the 
construct state (or any other state) can take an object of action. That is not what adjectives 
do. But participles (“verbal-adjectives”)—can and often do in the OT have action objects. 
Participles can also exist in the construct state (inasmuch as they too can operate 
substantivally).251 Being indicative of action, the participle will often take the noun (or 
pronoun, another participle, etc.) in the absolute state as object. Of the more than a 
thousand OT instances of the construct-state participle, not a few take the absolute as an 
(genitive, not accusative case) object.252 These participles that find themselves in the 
construct state will tend to be from verbs that signify not so much direct (even physical) 
                                                                                                                                                  
„So bedeutet also jere’ājw eher ‚seine Fürchtenden’ als ‚die ihn Fürchtenden’. Die 
grammatikalischen Formen lassen die Frage—mit Ausnahme der 1. Person des Singulars—an 
sich offen. Es soll auch nicht behauptet werden, dass z. B. jere’ājw in keiner Weise ‚die ihn 
Fürchtenden’ bedeutet. Eine soch strikte Entscheidung wäre unsachlich, eben weil die hebräische 
Sprache nicht unterscheidet. Es kann sich also nur darum handeln, dass die Suffixe in den 
vorliegenden Fällen eher einem Possessivpronomen gleichkommen. Mit demselben Körnchen 
Salz ist die obige Behauptung zu nehmen, dass JHWH in der Verbindung jir’ê JHWH einem 
genetivus possessivus, im sittlichen jere’ JHWH (’älohîm) hingegen einem genetivus objectivus 
gleichkomme.“ Anson F. Rainey (Professor Emeritus of Ancient Near Eastern Cultures and 
Semitic Linguistics at Tel Aviv University) graciously spent a few minutes with me at the 2008 
SBL meeting (Nov. 23, Boston, MA) discussing this question. In Dr. Rainey’s view, these plural 
forms in the Psalms are substantives (i.e., “the ones fearing” is taken as a unit) but are 
nevertheless employed in genitive-objective relationships with God/LORD. They function much 
the same as  indicative verbs that have God/LORD as object.  
250
 See Van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, 1999, sec. 25.4, “Syntactic-Semantic 
Relationships in Construct Relationships,” and sec. 30.4, “Adjectives used as Substantives.” 
251
 Waltke, 2007, 614. 
252
 LDLS search gives 1177 instances (of all verbs) of the “participle” in the construct state. 
The true count is probably higher, as LDLS designates many participle-looking and functioning 
words as adjectives. This is especially true of ; LDLS designates every one of the 29 construct-
state instances of  as adjectives. (BDB, on the other hand, lists most of them under the verb , 
and assigns them the meaning “fear, reverence, honor.”)  
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action, but more of an abstract quality, emotion, or feeling.253 Object taking participles 
that depict more direct action tend to avoid the construct state and simply add accusative 
objects. But any participle can take the construct if the writer’s intention is to show 
possession.  
The unusual (and rare) subclass of stative verbs that can exhibit both adjectival 
(stative) and participial (fientive) characteristics, however, present the exegete with some 
special challenges—especially in view of he identical spelling in several forms of the 
participle and adjective. A closer look at several of these verbs may be helpful at this 
point. The construct-state stative verbs that are found in the OT that stress more of a truly 
stative quality will occasionally be found to operate adjectivally—and the lexica will 
sometimes designate these cases as adjectives. On the other hand, those that depict action 
will usually take objects of the action. These stative verbs that are “fientive” more than 
likely use the participle. But this over-generalizes what actually occurs with these stative 
verbs. Each is unique—but, as will now be seen, the tendency (as they occur in the 
construct state) is that they take objects. The problem of common spelling between 
participle and adjective actually turns out to be almost a non-factor—except with  
where it is a significant problem. Several of the stative/fientive stative verbs will now be 
briefly analyzed in order to shed some light on our understanding of  (note: the 
searches related to these several stative verbs were for participles and adjectives in the 
construct state). 
- F 	כּ: LDLS search results register only three participles.254 Two of these, 1 Sam 
2:30 and Lam 1:8 take objects and, being in the Piel, cannot be confused with the 
associated adjectives—of which there are only five. These five are clearly used 
adjectivally, so even though Ezek 3:5 and 6 are m/p and look just like participles, 
the syntax/context plainly employs them as adjectives.  
 $ 	%: no results were displayed for participles. Three adjectives were found—all 
three operating adjectivally. Two of these are feminine; one (Jer 6:11) is m/s and 
                                                 
253
 Exod 18:21a is a good example of this: “You should also look for able men among all 
the people, men who fear God, are trustworthy, and hate dishonest gain.” “Fear” and “hate” 
appear to be in parallel in this way: “You should also look (from all the people) [first] for able 
men who fear God, [and second] for trustworthy men who hate dishonest gain.” Both “fear” (  ()) 
and “hate” ( ("0שׁ) are in the construct state. The former obviously takes “God” as its object while 
“hate” takes “dishonest gain” as object. (Note how  ("0שׁ takes the first letter holem characteristic of 
most participles. There is apparently sufficient action in hating to warrant the holem than there is 
in fearing [which remains with the stative spelling])  
254LDLS was used for the several verbs being studied here. Searches were made for 
“participles” and “adjectives” only in the construct state. 
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could be taken as a participle, although it is fairly clear that it operates adjectivally 
(1Q )%	  $ (% “the very aged” or, literally, “full years”).255  
F אַ: There are 29 participles but no adjectives (an adjective corresponding to Fאַ 
does not exist).256 It can be argued that all 29 take objects (this is especially obvious 
in Deut 5:10; 7:9; Prov 8:17, 21; and Dan 9:4)—at least implicitly; but even though 
most lexica deem these to be participles,257 the English translations often translate 
them as nouns in a genitive-possessive relationship. The result is “those who love 
you” becomes “your friends” or “your lovers.” But these do not technically reflect a 
possessive (i.e., ownership) situation—for “friends” and “lovers” are not really 
owned.258 In any case, it is at least implicitly understood that the affection of the 
“friends” and “lovers” has as its object the person(s) in the absolute state. 
" 	שׁ: there are no adjectives that correspond closely with " 	שׁ; but 41 participles are 
listed.259 Even though this verb and F אַ are stative verbs (with the qamets/tsere 
vowels pattern), in the participle they take the holem/tsere pattern (when in the Qal) 
characteristic of non-stative verbs. So, distinguishing between participle and 
adjective—if there were adjectives—would be no problem. All 41 participles of " 	שׁ 
take objects. While the English versions routinely translate these participles as 
(“your” or “his”) “enemies,” this in no way diminishes the idea of hatred of the 
person, thing, or community (or even God—see Deut 5:9; 7:10 [x2]; 32:41; 33:11; 
2 Sam 19:6 [7]; 22:18, 41; Ps 21:8 [9]; 139:21) who/that is in the absolute state. The 
participle, for example, in Lev 26:17 is 1 ZD ("0 Qשׁ—which literally means “the haters 
of you (pl.),” or better, “those who hate you (pl.).”  
Several things can be learned from the above examples: first, spelling commonality 
between participle and adjective is not necessarily a problem; second, the context of each 
passage typically shows whether an adjective or a participle is present; third, the emotion 
words F אַ and " 	שׁ are mainly understood to be verbal (for in many cases they clearly 
take objects). In those cases that are typically translated (in the English versions) as 
genitive-possessives (“your friend/lover,” “your enemy”), the idea of possession is not as 
direct as with something owned (e.g., “the king’s horse”)—but more speaks of those who 
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 There are eleven $ 	% non-construct-state participles—and they continue to have the 
stative spelling (see e.g., Ps 144:13; Isa 6:1; 51:20; Jer 23:24). 
256
 According to BDB, DBLSD, ESL, and TWOT.  
257
 DBLSD is an exception.  
258
 These “friends” and “lovers” cases are close to—but not exactly like—the “possessor” 
relationships within the family (“the son of the man,” “the father of the son”). see Van der Merwe, 
Naudé, and Kroeze, 1999, sec. 25.4 (their “kinship/relationship—possessor” category).  
259There is the adjective )" 	שׁ (“disdained” DBLSD), but the yod makes it easily 
distinguishable.  
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are simply within one’s domain. Even if the genitive-possessive was intended by the 
writers, the fact remains that there is an emotion-action going on with the absolute-state 
person(s) as its object. In other words, what must be for “your enemies” to be 
grammatically employed is that there really is a group out there who hates (at least has 
something against) whoever “your” is/are. Using the genitive-possessive, of course, can 
mean that these emotion terms are used very loosely; “your friends” and “your lovers” 
(both 	R ZF[0) are very different ideas that may or may not have much to do with the 
baseline meaning of F אַ.260 One thing is sure, however: when F אַ or " 	שׁ is employed in 
a genitive-possessive construct-state relationship, the absolute-state person(s) is de facto 
understood to be the object of the emotions portrayed. Those who love and hate in the OT 
are rarely understood as people who love or hate in general. Unless an object is at least 
implicitly understood in all of the construct-state uses of these two emotion words, then 
the texts make no sense.261 The same lack of sense would be apparent if  	 was seen to 
operate this way. But this is what Becker insists to be the case for the Psalms group that 
has been the topic of this section. 
The above discussion demonstrates (as does the ambiguity in the grammatical 
terminology) that the simple facts that are represented by the biblical text can be quickly 
clouded over by too much speculation. In trying to get to the bottom of whether Becker is 
correct or not in his designation of these Psalms instances of  as “verbal-adjectives” 
which operate “adjectivally” (as well as his designation of them as genitive-possessives), 
one simply needs to ask, “is there action or not”? If there is, then it is not all about 
“possession,” but all about the people who fear and the object of that fear. A LDLS search 
for all non-Psalms  participles/adjectives does indeed show that there is action—and 
the situation is probably the same for the Psalms; other than a few cases in which the 
object of the fear is unclear, nearly all of the uses obviously portray both a subject who 
fears as well as an object of the fear. The results of the search are as follows:262  
Verbal + explicit object: Gen 32:12; 42:18; Exod 9:20; Deut 7:19; 1 Kings 18:3; 
18:12; 2 Kings 4:1; 17:32, 33, 34, 41; Job 1:1; Eccl 8:13; 9:2; Jer 26:19; 42:11, 16; 
Dan 1:10; Jon 1:9. 
                                                 
260Being from the same Fאַ linguistic form, one can only tell one from the other through 
consideration of the context.  
261
 It is inevitable that the reader of all of these construct-state participles will assume that 
the absolute person(s) is the object of the love or hate. If no object were understood, then Lev 
26:17bα, for example, would be translated, “your haters (who have an emotion of hate toward no 
particular object [or toward an unknown object]) will rule over you.” But that clearly would not 
make sense within the context of the passage. 
262
 Almost all of these are designated by LDLS as adjectives; but, as can be seen by the 
catalogue of the results, it strongly appears to me that most if not all have action and function as 
participles. This view agrees with BDB who also understand most of these as participles. 
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Verbal + implicit object: Deut 20:8; Judg 7:3; 1 Sam 23:3. 
Non-verbal (adjectival use): none. 
Construct state verbal + explicit object: Gen 22:12; Exod 18:21; Job 1:8; 2:3; Prov 
13:13; 14:2; 31:30; Eccl 7:18; 8:12; Isa 50:10; Mal 3:16 (x2), 20 (4:2).263 
Construct state verbal + implicit object: none. 
Construct state non-verbal (adjectival use): none. 
As can be seen, my perception when viewing these passages was that nearly all had an 
object of the fear and none of them—whether singular or plural, c/s or non-c/s—gave any 
indications of a true possessive situation. After considering the stative verbs briefly 
studied above as well as , it is clear that there is a very strong tendency for them to 
take objects. The main factor that brings me to this conclusion is context. Each text was 
submitted to the following question: “how well does the taking of an object fit the 
context?” In principle, there were five possible answers (which I now show below—each 
with a sample text [not necessarily using a stative verb] for clarity):  
1. Taking a direct object is impossible: 1 Kings 18:19 mentions the prophets of Baal 
and Asherah “who eat at Jezabel’s Table” ($ ZFQ	\ ) ! *G ($ ]﬩  $ (D0). Needless to say, the 
prophets are not eating Jezabel or her table, but in a sense, they belong to the table. 
To be more precise, the table represents the group that is close to Jezabel, and the 
Baal and Asherah prophets are a part of that group (what might be called a 
construct partative relationship).264  
2. Taking a direct object is possible, but unlikely: Gen 13:8: “Then Abram said to 
Lot, ‘Let there be no strife between you and me, and between your herders ( 	R Z+0) 
and my herders ( *+0); for we are kindred.’” The text is clearly referring to the 
shepherds owned by Abraham and Lot (or at least under their authority).  	+ 	 can 
pass action to an object (see 2 Sam 5:2); but in Gen 13:8, an object is not taken—
otherwise they would have been herding Abraham and Lot (a very unlikely 
situation [see also 1 Kings 10:28 where the “traders” do not trade “the king” but are 
traders of (owned by) the king]). 
3. It is a toss-up between taking an object and not taking an object: Moses says to 
the Israelites in Deut 1:16, “I charged your judges (1 ZD ^ (#0﬩) at that time: ‘give the 
members of your community a fair hearing ….’” “Your judges” could mean those 
                                                 
263
 I would put all Psalms cases of participles/adjectives in this category (except Psalms 
112:1 which I would put in the “Verbal + explicit object” category [it is not in the construct 
state]). 
264
 See Van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, 1999, sec. 25.4.3. 
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judging the Israelites (object of action) or the judges possessed by them (or even 
both).  
4. Taking an object is likely: in 2 Sam 19:5, 6 (6, 7) Joab bitterly complains to 
David (NASB): “Today you have covered with shame the faces of all your servants 
… by loving those who hate you ( 	R Z("0שׁ), and by hating those who love you 
( 	R ZF[0).” Both these construct uses here could be possessive (“the haters/lovers 
who belong to you), but that would nearly be nonsense in comparison with 
understanding both of these verbal-adjectives as taking “you”—i.e., King David—
as the object. The context must be seen in light of Joab’s implied message that he 
(and others) loved David, but David hated them in return.   
5. Taking an object is certain: Ps 3:21 (22) depicts a clear case of cause and effect 
in the second clause: “and those who hate [ ("0שׁ (] the righteous will be condemned.” 
The translation “and those haters possessed by the righteous will be condemned” 
would make no sense in context. On the other hand, the fact that these “haters” will 
be condemned makes perfect sense if this is a result of them hating “the righteous.”  
Of the construct-state Psalms passages (employing ) that Becker claims are 
genitive-possessive, I would put all of them in category four—i.e., they most likely take 
objects. There are several reasons I believe this is so: first, it is common to speak about 
fear in terms of an object of the fear, and it is probably the same here. Second, there 
seems to be no virtue in fear unless that fear is directed at an appropriate fear object; only 
then will an advantage be possible. Because the Psalms repeatedly mention the 
advantages of fearing, then it follows that that fear must have a correct object.265 For 
example, 25:14 asserts that “the friendship of the LORD is for those who fear him, and he 
makes his covenant known to them.” It must be remembered that fear-of-God in the Bible 
is always portrayed as a virtue, and, therefore, it makes sense that it will be rewarded. But 
if Ps 25:14 is genitive-possessive, then these rewards are given to people (owned by God) 
who simply are fearful with no particular object of their fear. This leads to the third 
reason: it is pointless to talk about “fearers” in general without the object of their fear 
somehow being understood. In very few instances is fear in the OT and NT without some 
explicit or (however vague) implicit object. The object can be one that makes the fear 
justifiable or not. Fear of God (and occasionally of human authorities when one has 
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 Benefits of fearing God (from Becker’s Psalms group) are: God’s friendship (25:14); 
abundant goodness (31:19 [20]); God’s attention (33:18); the angel of the LORD encamps around 
God fearers (34:7 [8]); they are delivered and have a good heritage (61:5 [6]); they have no want 
(34:9 [10]); they are out of bowshot (60:4 [6]); salvation (85:9 [10]); great steadfast love 
(103:11); God’s compassion (103:13); God’s steadfast love and his righteousness (103:17); food 
(111:5); God fulfills their desires and hears their cry and saves them (145:19); God takes pleasure 
in those who fear him (147:11). 
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sinned) is good; conversely, most other fears are portrayed in a bad light. But especially 
when it comes to God’s people, objectless fear is no virtue at all. This is why a genitive-
possessive rendering of all of these passages would be so strange; objectless fear would 
be encouraged and rewarded. If Becker is right, then Ps 103:11 (for example) should be 
translated like this: “For as the heavens are high above the earth, so great is his steadfast 
love toward God’s fearful people.”266 Such a translation would provoke questions like “if 
this is not fear-of-God, then what are they fearful of?” and “does objectless fearfulness 
define God’s people?” or a comment like, “I thought God’s people should not be fearful, 
but ‘bold and courageous’”! Fourth, it makes perfect sense that these texts are talking 
about the virtue that is mentioned so frequently throughout the OT—i.e., the fear of God. 
Especially when one considers that those who do not fear God are condemned and 
punished, it makes perfect sense in these Psalms texts that the verbal-adjectives are 
indeed verbal (i.e., participles of the verb ) and take God as object. These passages 
portray a predictable deed/consequence relationship—that is, those who fear God will be 
rewarded. Objectless fearing, however, is nothing deserving of reward.267 
Action is very important in understanding how  is used. Becker’s whole triad in 
this section relies on the belief that these Psalms texts that use m/p verbal-adjectives are 
operating totally adjectivally—i.e., without any kind of action. But  very often is 
fientive and transitive (in its strange sort of way). There is no reason, for example, to 
believe that the imperative has an object and the participle does not in Ps 34:9 (10): “O 
fear the LORD, you his holy ones, for those who fear him have no want.” The Psalmist is 
simply commanding the people to fear YHWH because doing so is virtuous and will 
bring reward. There is no virtue and no reward to be found in fear itself; therefore, the 
rewards mentioned in these Psalms are sufficient reason to believe that fear action is 
being depicted—with God as object—and as a result, the uses of  here are not 
adjectival, but participial. Because the context so strongly suggests transitive action in 
these Psalms, Becker’s designation of them as adjectival is surely incorrect. If so, then 
Becker’s triad which depends so heavily upon the aura of belongingness (to God) and 
ownership (by God) falls apart.268 This particular group of Psalms does not support the 
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 But this is not at all how the text is usually translated. For example, the following 
versions clearly depict God as the object of the fear: JB/NASB/NIV/NKJV/NRSV: “those who 
fear him”; NCV: “those who respect him”; KJV: “them that fear him”; LB: „die, so ihn fürchten“; 
LXX: τοὺς φοβουµένους αὐτόν; Vg: timentes se. Allen, 1983, 17, translates as “those who 
revere him,” but Gunkel, 1968, 441—over-translating in accordance with his evolution-of-the-cult 
understanding—omits any sense of fear and fear-object with: „Sondern so hoch der Himmel über 
der Erde, so hoch ist seine Huld über seinen Frommen.“    
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 In the NT objectless fear is subject to punishment (see Rev 21:8). 
268
 If Becker is right and “those who fear YHWH” means “belongingness to the 
community,” then it would seem that all other m/p verbal-adjectives in construct with God could 
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form-critical notion that the Psalmists used fear-of-God as code for the belonging 
community; rather, fearing God is simply shown to be a virtue worth practicing—for 
doing so will bring great reward. 
In summary, Becker’s interpretation of these Psalms fear texts is simply wrong.269 
Yes, they do refer to God’s covenant community, but fear-of-God here is not the covenant 
community itself; rather, it is a virtue that the covenant community should practice. In 
consideration of the sovereignty of God, the sinfulness of people, and the expectation of 
judgment that lingers in the background of these Psalms, fear-of-God means just what it 
literally says—i.e., fear. Each of these uses of  shows their own peculiar kind of 
“quasi-fientive” action and takes YHWH or Elohim (or “him” or “you”) as the object of 
the action. Because of this action they are used verbally and should be designated as 
participles, not adjectives. As participles, they do not indicate some remarkable shift in 
“idea-type” (especially to something as abstract as belongingness to the YHWH cult 
community); rather, the participle is simply the linguistic form of a verb used when one 
says something about a group (e.g., “blessed are …) that has a certain quality or action 
(… those who fear God”). In this case, the quality/action of the group is that they fear 
God. That is, God is the object of the fear. This is how the Septuagint takes every one of 
these Psalms; the participle is used and God is the object of the participle in every case. 
Likewise, the Vulgate uses participles and God as object.270 Both the LXX and the Vg put 
“Lord” and “God” (or “him” or “you”) each time in the accusative case. Finally, the 
English versions that were consulted also depict God as the grammatical object of these 
fear texts.271 The evidence then shows that fear-of-God in these Psalms—or any other 
Psalms for that matter—should not be taken as meaning something akin to belongingness 
to the YHWH community. The grammatical and contextual testimony of these Psalms 
show that   () + YHWH/Elohim has not evolved into something abstract and far from the 
literal meaning of fear, but is in reality still very close to its fear-feeling roots.  
                                                                                                                                                  
have this meaning also. See, for example, Ps 22:26 (27) (“those seeking him”), Ps 145:18 (“those 
calling him”), and Ps 145:20 (“those loving him”). Making these three texts genitive-possessive 
would wreck their clear contexts which show that doing these actions with God as the object are 
virtuous and worthy of reward. 
269
 See FN 235 above for list of these texts.  
270
 In the Vulgate, Psalm 66:16 (Vg 65:16) uses the 2nd person plural present active 
indicative verb (timetis) instead of the participle. Ps 119:74 (Vg 118:74) uses the 3rd person plural 
present active indicative verb (timent). In Pss 119:79 (Vg 118:79) and 147:11 (Vg 146:11), the 
Vulgate translates the MT using the 3rd person plural present active indicative verb; but the 
Vulgate’s translation of the LXX uses the participle (timentes). In every case, however, “Lord” or 
“God” (or “him” or “you”) is in the accusative case. 
271
 Consulted were the NASB, NIV, KJV, NKJV, and the NRSV. 
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Becker’s Wisdom Literary Form  
The biblical wisdom books, says Becker, contain “exclusively” the „sittliche“ 
(“moral” or “ethical”) idea of fear-of-God.272 The idea is also seen here and there 
elsewhere in the OT, and is characteristic of fear-of-God texts produced by the Elohist. 
Fear-of-God in these cases indicates a „sittliche Haltung“ (“moral attitude”); in other 
words, fear-of-God is the knowledge of what one should do before God, and the 
willingness to do it. According to Becker, the sittliche idea evolved from the numinous 
idea and actually runs on through the intertestamental apocryphal books, the NT, and can 
even be seen in our present use of fear-of-God. But there is no record—in the Bible or 
elsewhere—remaining of the development itself.273 There are, so to speak, no “missing 
links.” In my opinion, this is so because there was little or no evolution to begin with; it is 
true that semantic elasticity in fear-of-God is seen both early and late, but there is no 
linguistic or contextual evidence that comes close to suggesting that fear-of-God evolved 
completely away from its fear-feeling root meaning into a designation for a righteous 
attitude. The problem is that Becker perceives an evolution in meaning between the 
typically older narratives that depict fear-of-God before some kind of epiphany, and 
typically late narrative, poetic, wisdom, and prophetic Scripture that repeatedly mentions 
fear-of-God as a virtue. There could be an evolution in meaning; but the biblical shift to 
speaking of fear-of-God as a virtue in no way requires one—unless, of course, the 
interpreter believes at the start that the fear-feeling should never be considered as a virtue. 
So the biblical shift to speaking about fear as a virtue (as well as the contexts of those 
virtue-fear-of-God texts) does not give the interpreter justification for believing that a 
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 Ibid., 184, 192. About the longevity of the sittlichen idea Becker writes: „Während dem 
kultischen Begriff kaum ein Fortleben im späteren Sprachgebrauch beschieden war—im 
christlichen Raum wurde er durch pisteuein verdrängt, und im Judentum war das Anliegen der 
alleinigen Verehrung Jahwes nicht mehr dringend—, ist der sittliche Begriff von Dauer gewesen. 
Dabei hat die nomistische Prägung des sittlichen Begriffs keineswegs die Alleinherrschaft erlangt. 
Wir finden ihn in den detuerokanonischen Büchern des AT, in den Apokryphen und im NT. 
Besondere Erwähnung verdient die Vg-Fassung des Buches Tobias, in der häufig und 
ausschliesslich der sittliche Begriff vorkommt. Dieses besondere Hervorheben sittlicher 
Gottesfurcht hängt mit der sich auch sonst äussernden moralisierenden Tendenz dieser Rezension 
zusammen. Die modernen Sprachen kennen unter dem Einfluss der biblischen, alttestamentlichen 
Sprache die Wendungen ‚Gottesfurcht’, ‚gottesfürchtig’ in sittlicher Bedeutung“ (192, 193). It 
just seems strange to me that—given such a radical change of meaning as Becker asserts—fear-
of-God throughout the many hundreds of years of the Bible composition process did not develop 
a new word altogether (or a new word in which one could still detect the semantic roots of  or 
φοβέω). From start to finish, virtue fear-of-God is represented primarily by  and φοβέω. 
Because the feeling of fear is also from start to finish primarily represented by  and φοβέω, 
then the meanings of the two (virtue fear-of-God and fear feeling before God) cannot be far apart.  
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wholesale semantic development has taken place. The linguistic forms that Becker 
suggests as evidence for an evolution from fear to a moral attitude also do not provide 
sufficient reason to accept his evolutionary view—for they are no more semantically 
significant than those seen for his “cultic” texts, and, therefore, cannot justify the 
semantic evolution that he asserts.    
The semantic forms that represent the sittliche idea are the singular construct-state 
“verbal-adjective,” the noun, and some uses of the verb plus Elohim. The first of these 
has already been discussed above (see FN 247): to base such a great semantic difference 
upon number is highly questionable. The third of these (use of the simple verb) is once 
again making much ado about nothing—for the plain verb (most often in the Qal) is 
semantically neutral (i.e., it only delivers information such as person, gender, number, 
aspect, voice; but any significant semantic shift away from the basic meaning of the verb 
must be indicated by syntax and context). The second (the use of the noun אַ ()) is 
noteworthy because instances of hary are mostly congregated within the Proverbs. 
According to Stähli, out of 45 occurrences 14 are in Proverbs, five in Job—there are 
none, however, in Ecclesiastes. But the wisdom books do not have a total monopoly on 
hary: there are eight instances in the Psalms, five in Jeremiah, two each in 2 Samuel, 
Ezekiel, Jonah, and Nehemiah, and several other books have one instance apiece.274  
The problem with Becker’s interpretation of the noun hary is that—generally 
speaking—he assumes a sittliche meaning (or occasionally a cultic meaning) unless the 
context proves otherwise. This is in keeping with the form-critical tendency to see a more 
refined state of the religion reflected in the later parts of the OT. But this is opposite to 
the way things should be; as long as these texts use the plain noun for “fear,” then they 
should be interpreted close to that meaning unless the context clearly shows that some 
other meaning is intended. Then as today, a word usually has one general root meaning 
that a person first perceives when hearing or reading that word; but other factors provided 
in addition to the word can then prompt one to perhaps understand another meaning. With 
hary, Becker assumes a meaning far removed from the basic fear-feeling unless the 
context makes it unavoidable. As a result, virtue-fear-of-God cases that are so prevalent 
in the wisdom books are easy pickings for his sittliche category—in view of the fact that 
they typically do not have immediate context (other than the word itself) that tells a 
reader what is meant by the use of hary. Outside of Proverbs, however, several uses of 
hary—a few of them virtue-fear-of-God cases—possess enough local context to force 
Becker into designating these as depicting real fear.  
In Psalm 2, for example, the text in vv. 11 and 12 says “Serve the LORD with fear, 
with trembling kiss his feet, or he will be angry, and you will perish in the way; for his 
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 Stähli, 1971, 766. 
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wrath is quickly kindled.” The warning tone (see v. 10) of this messianic Psalm makes it 
hard to understand in hary anything other than plain fear. Thus, Becker categorizes this 
case under his “Furcht vor dem Numinosen” category.275 Psalm 90 speaks of the fragility 
and brevity of human life brought about by human sin and God’s judgment of it (“For we 
are consumed by your anger; by your wrath we are overwhelmed” [v. 7]). Because of this 
fearful and desperate reality, Moses writes in v. 11, “Who considers the power of your 
anger? Your wrath is as great as the fear that is due you.” Here (as also in Ps 2:11), the 
fear is of the virtue-fear-of-God kind—i.e., it is something that one should do, is desired 
by God, and brings a good result. Without the mention in Psalm 90 of “anger” and 
“wrath” (as well as the general distressing depiction of men and women being so 
hopelessly mortal), one could easily give hary a sittliche meaning here (e.g., “as great as 
the righteous conduct that is due you”); but as Psalm 90 stands, this would not at all fit 
the context. Even though the linguistic form of hary in construct with a possessive suffix 
is very similar to the several instances in Proverbs (which he deems as all having sittliche 
meaning), Becker is obliged by context to deem this use to mean „Furchtbarkeit.“276 Nor 
can the real fearfulness before YHWH indicated by hary in Jonah 1:16 be avoided, for 
the circumstances of the peril at sea clearly shows that the sailors were extremely fearful 
because of the storm and the circumstances that brought it about (Jonah’s disobedience). 
This terror in the face of what seemed to be certain death found YHWH as object after 
they threw Jonah overboard and suddenly realized that YHWH had not only caused the 
storm, but had also stopped it. When Jonah was still aboard the ship and had confessed 
his guilt to the sailors (who were already fearful that the storm might sink the ship), 
$-E  1." (“then the men were even more afraid”); but once the sailors threw 
Jonah overboard and they realized YHWH was behind it all,  $-E  1." 
 (“then the men feared the LORD even more”). Becker does not comment on the 
nouns here, but he does say that the verbs () in vv. 10 and 16 indicate “real fear.”277  
Most of the other OT fear-of-God cases employing hary are found in Proverbs and 
are all of the virtue-fear-of-God variety in which little or no immediate context is found 
that would shift the meaning one way or the other.278 There is, however, the truth that 
hary is the beginning of wisdom (Ps 111:10; Prov 9:10) and knowledge (Prov 1:7); these 
passages could possibly indicate that fear is more of an emotion or an attitude of the heart 
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 Becker, 1965, 284. 
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 Ibid., 49. 
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 Ibid., 176. Verse 16 is catalogued under the heading of “The Numinous in the Deeds of 
God” (37). For passages that employ hary to depict great fear before non-God objects, see Deut 
2:25; Ps 55:5 (6); Jon 1:10.  
278
 By “immediate” I mean context contained in the proverb four cola verse itself; but 
certain theological assumptions that stand behind the text can certainly move one to interpret 
these fear texts one way or the other. 
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which is a prerequisite for godly wisdom and knowledge.279 The meaning of  )﬩  (Ps 
111:10 and Prov 1:7) is not completely clear: BDB defines it (for these two verses) as 
simply “beginning.” BDB also defines  *לּ )G (תּ of Prov 9:10 as the “beginning” or “the first 
principle” of wisdom. Becker understands that when the Jews thought of the idea of the 
“beginning” of wisdom or knowledge, they were generally not thinking about time, but 
about what was “the best.” This “best” had some part in guiding people to wisdom, and 
was therefore somewhat antithetical to the fool (1:7b) who despised wisdom. Regarding 
this, Becker writes: „Die Gottesfurcht führt zur Weisheit, macht geneigt und fähig, die 
Weisheit zu erwerben. In diesem Falle hat re’šêt seine Entsprechung in bāzû: der ’äwîl ist 
nicht fähig und geneigt, die Weisheit zu erwerben, sondern verachtet sie.“ This more or 
less captures the essence of “beginning”—as used in these verses; it indicates something 
that allows or actuates godly wisdom and knowledge. Fear-of-God is the “beginning” in 
that it is foundational to wisdom and knowledge but is not wisdom and knowledge 
themselves, nor just a “choice part” of them.280 Waltke makes the valid point that the 
books preamble (vv. 1-6) and v. 7 are introductory and do not have the role of defining 
what godly wisdom consists of. In other words, v. 7 is not telling the reader what wisdom 
or knowledge consists of (i.e., fear-of-God is not a component of wisdom). The fear-of-
God must come first, but it is not something that comes first in horizontal time which can 
then be left behind; rather, this “temporally first step,” writes Waltke, is on a “vertical 
axis on which all else rests. It denotes both the initium and the principium. What the 
alphabet is to reading, notes to reading music, and numerals to mathematics, the fear of 
the LORD is to attaining the revealed knowledge of this book.”281 Whatever fear-of-God 
is and however it functions as a “beginning,” one thing is for sure: without it one can 
never be wise.  
If within the idea of wisdom is contained an attitude that is willing to do what is 
right (that is, a „sittliche Haltung“) then fear-of-God—being the foundation “on which 
all else rests”—cannot also be the same thing.282 If it were the same thing—and if 
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 Job 28:28 implies that fear-of-God is wisdom, and Prov 15:33 indicates that fear-of-God 
can teach one wisdom.  
280
 According to Waltke, 2004, 181, the idea that “beginning of” means “the choice part” 
“ranks the fear of the LORD as just another wisdom teaching and allows that wisdom can be had 
apart from it. That notion hardly fits this context, which is not concerned as yet to state the 
specific content of wisdom but to prepare the way for it.”  
281
 Ibid. 
282
 The Proverbs say that fear-of-God is a number of things: the beginning of knowledge 
(1:7); the hatred of evil (8:13); the beginning of wisdom (9:10); a fountain of life (14:27); 
instruction in wisdom (15:33); life (19:23). The last of these (19:23 “The fear of the LORD is life 
indeed”) plainly shows that absolute identity is not what is in view here. Prov 19:23 reminds one 
of Deut 30:20 where Moses implores the Israelites to love and obey the LORD, “for He is your 
life and the length of your days” (NKJV). Needless to say, human life and longevity are not 
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Becker’s idea were to be accepted—then, for example, Prov 9:10 could read “a moral 
attitude is the beginning of a moral attitude.” But that is obviously not what the writer is 
trying to say here. There is clearly in the Proverbs (as well as elsewhere) the 
understanding that fear-of-God is something that causes other things. If fear-of-God is the 
cause that brings about effects of prolonged life (Prov 10:27), strong confidence (14:26), 
the avoidance of snares in life (14:27), the avoidance of evil (16:6), resting secure and 
suffering no harm (19:23), riches, honor, and life (22:4), and praise (31:30), then fear-of-
God and these effects cannot be ontologically identical—for a cause must be something 
different than its effect. That fear-of-God is not ontologically the same as either an 
attitude predisposed to doing good works or the good works themselves is strongly 
suggested by Prov 16:6: +% b  F !+ #D % -bGF (“By loyalty and 
faithfulness iniquity is atoned for, and by the fear of the LORD one avoids evil”). The two 
halves of the proverb are set in parallel, both saying that something good comes out of a 
certain orientation of the heart (the “loyalty” and “faithfulness” of the first colon is most 
likely not that of God, but of men and women). Because Becker has so closely identified 
fear-of-God in the Proverbs with a “moral attitude,” he has created in this verse the 
awkward situation of the second half (“one avoids evil”) saying something that is patently 
obvious—i.e., “and by a moral attitude one avoids immoral action.” That self-evident fact 
is probably not what the author had in mind here. To get around this, Becker tries to get 
some of the sittliche quality out of the effect of fear-of-God, i.e., out of +% b (lit. “to 
turn from evil”). He does this by suggesting that +% b means “the general avoidance 
of evil”—that is, to “turn from evil” means that “one escapes disaster” („entgeht man 
dem Unheil“).283 Because the iniquity atonement in the first verse half is essentially the 
escaping of disaster, this then permits !+ #D and +% b to be in synonymous parallel. 
With this, the meaning of 16:6 in essence becomes: “a person who practices loyalty and 
                                                                                                                                                  
identical with God. But they are absolutely dependent upon him. Similar hyperbole is seen in 
Deut 32:47 where Moses asserts that the “word” (i.e., the law) “is your life” (NKJV—in both of 
these texts this version translates the Hebrew literally and accurately). Once again, the law is not 
life itself, but one’s success in life and quality of life is dependent upon whether or not one 
follows the law. The identification of fear-of-God and various phenomena mentioned in the 
above-listed Proverbs passages operate in a similar way; i.e., they are not trying to teach 
ontological identity, but rather that there is some kind of critical relationship between them. Fear-
of-God is not knowledge, hatred of evil, wisdom, or life, but is a feeling/emotion/attitude that 
allows all these phenomena to exist in the most excellent and flourishing way. (Clines, 2003, 73-
75, in his study of fear-of-God in Job 28:28 argues along similar lines. He writes: “[W]hen it is 
said that the fear of God ‘is’ wisdom it may not mean that wisdom consists of the fear of God or 
that wisdom and the fear of God are the same thing, or that theology is epistemology. It might 
mean that to fear God is a very wise thing to do, an act that is full of wisdom, or that the fear of 
God arises from wisdom” [75].) 
283
 Becker, 1965, 227. 
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faithfulness will escape disaster; a person who has a moral attitude will escape disaster.” 
But all this is simply over-interpretation of a text that is otherwise quite clear. I would say 
that the main parallel emphasis is not between “iniquity is atoned for” and “one avoids 
evil”; rather, it is between loyalty/faithfulness and fear-of-God which are both phenomena 
of the heart/mind that—when practiced—bring about a good outcome.  
Perhaps the starkest example of fear-of-God being used to bring about something 
good is found in Exod 20:20. Here, Moses says to the Israelites who were quaking in 
terror at the base of the mountain: “Do not be afraid; for God has come only to test you 
and to put the fear of him upon you so that you do not sin.” As has already been said 
above (see p. 88), it is very likely—given the context of the entire pericope—that God 
was using the fear feeling (with him and his awesome deeds as objects of the fear) to 
harshly drive the people away from sin. The context from Exodus through Deuteronomy 
shows that when the pressure was off and the people’s awareness of the danger of God’s 
wrath was far from their minds, they often went right back to their old ways. This is why 
God laments, “If only they had such a mind as this, to fear me and to keep all my 
commandments always, so that it might go well with them and with their children 
forever!” (Deut 5:29) In both Prov 16:6 and Exod 20:20, the avoidance of sin is the good 
result that fear-of-God brings about. It is unlikely, therefore, that the cause is more or less 
the same as the result. A sittliche Haltung is the desired result, but real fear (most likely 
all servile fear in Exod 20:20) is the cause which brings it about.284 
The in-verse context of Prov 16:6, however, does not tell the reader what kind of 
fear is meant by hary. But given the content of the previous two verses, one could almost 
imagine vv. 4-6 being a wisdom teaching that came from observing the Sinai events just 
mentioned!  
16:4 The LORD has made everything for its purpose, even the wicked for the day 
of trouble. 16:5 All those who are arrogant are an abomination to the LORD; be 
assured, they will not go unpunished. 16:6 By loyalty and faithfulness iniquity is 
atoned for, and by the fear of the LORD one avoids evil. 
When this context of God’s sovereignty (v. 4) and God’s judgment (v. 5) is taken into 
account, then the reader can better imagine the role the fear-feeling might play in 
dissuading one from evil. This is why the wise can say: “My child, fear the LORD and 
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 Becker nevertheless defines the fear of Exod 20:20 as a sittliche idea. He justifies this by 
pointing out Moses’ command “do not fear” which comes just before. I do not think this reason 
suffices. A father who has a highly rebellious son who is constantly in trouble might very well in 
the punishment process invoke in the son a fearful response that is too much. While employing 
some mild fear-of-punishment in order to keep the boy’s behavior within tolerable limits, the 
father might say “do not be afraid” if the punishment has had its intended effect. This is what 
happens in Exod 20:20 once God has “gotten their attention.”  
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the king, and do not disobey either of them; for disaster comes from them suddenly, and 
who knows the ruin that both can bring?” (Prov 24:21, 22)285 
Conclusion on Becker 
Because Becker’s fear-of-God investigation gives the form-critical assumptions 
behind each literary form such interpretational weight, fear-of-God views that might 
better fit in with orthodox Christian doctrine are mostly overlooked. This detracts greatly 
from what could have otherwise been—given the exhaustive nature of the work—an 
extremely valuable contribution to seminary and church. But Gottesfurcht im Alten 
Testament has as its foundation the historical-critical assumption that the idea of God first 
flowed out of human fear, and then (at least, for Israel) a highly developed cult resulted 
from that fear. Becker’s use of Otto’s “numinous” category strongly suggests that Becker 
assumes the critical foundational tenets of religious beginnings—i.e., that humans came 
first, then “God” appeared later as a result of human Angst. With this foundation, Becker 
uses the form-critical method of identifying literary form with linguistic form in order to 
determine the meaning of fear-of-God. This method, however, is top-down and rigid. In 
any given fear-of-God text, the meaning is generally assumed to be what the literary form 
says it should mean. But despite Becker’s opening appeal to „jeweiligen Kontext,“ not 
much of it that comes from the Bible text itself and from an orthodox understanding of 
the text is considered.286 Unless a text contains overpowering contextual evidence 
otherwise, Becker assumes a meaning that is appropriate to the form-critical assumptions 
behind the literary form. The reader, therefore, gets a naturalistic view of fear-of-God, not 
a theological view.  
Because of the length of my treatment of Becker, a short summary on my thoughts 
in regards to his is probably in order: Becker’s category of “numinous” fear highlights 
many cases of people who really did fear before God (and occasionally, before weather, 
people, etc.). But because Becker admits that the “numinous” is a “recognized history-of-
religion and psychology-of-religion terminus”287—which falls right in line with Otto’s 
thinking—I do not believe that the feelings and emotions that Becker perceives to be in 
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 The NRSV translation here follows the LXX; but the text of the MT in v. 21 makes it 
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the numinous reflect accurately the feelings and emotions that one has in a real 
relationship with the true God who made humans and in whom humans “live and move 
and have their being.”288  
Regarding Becker’s discussion of the Deuteronomistic literary form, he considers 
most of the virtue-fear-of-God cases but does very little to explain why they (nearly) all 
deserve the meaning of “loyalty” (or something similar) to the cult. His only real 
justification why this is so has to do with literary parallelism: not a few of the virtue-fear-
of-God cases here are set in parallel with a number of other virtues (that more or less 
indicate cult loyalty)—and Becker claims that these parallels are synonymous. But after 
looking at these cases as well as considering some basics of parallelism, I see no reason 
why these parallels must be synonymous; they can just as easily be—from a strictly 
literary standpoint—antithetical or any one of whole host of other parallel relationships. 
The problem of excessive semantic over-inflation also arises if these parallels are taken to 
be synonymous—for fear-of-God then comes to mean, for example, to serve, to hear, to 
not forsake, to not forget, to heed, to not rebel, to follow, to swear, and to love (to name 
just a few—see pp. 80-84, 90). But can  reasonably be understood to stand for all 
these? And yet, even though the very word for “fear” is used, Becker says that fear is 
“almost totally lost” in these Deuteronomistic cases.289 But how can he know that? The 
biblical text never says that this is so, and scattered between this virtue-fear-of-God 
passages in Deut-2 Kings are texts that clearly use  to depict real fear; so one cannot 
say that there has been a one way evolution in meaning—for  throughout the OT (and 
φοβέω throughout the OT as well as the NT) remains anchored in the meaning of the fear 
feeling/emotion. The problem is that the Deuteronomistic literary form is understood—
according to form-critical dogma—to reflect an advanced state of the cult and its idea of 
God. So despite much “big picture” contextual evidence (especially having to do with 
human sinfulness and God’s judgment) that still justifies real fear in the many cases of 
virtue-fear-of-God, Becker simply presses into the semantics of  what is required by 
the assumptions that are behind his method.  
In the section on the Psalms’ literary form, Becker again pressures all fear-of-God 
texts—unless local context obviously shows otherwise—to mean something related to the 
worship of YHWH in the advanced cult. He makes much of the fact that the Psalms in 
many cases employ the “verbal-adjective” of , and believes that the advanced meaning 
and the unusual form go hand in hand. But I argued that the verbal-adjective is nothing 
but a form that one can confidently expect in any non-narrative literature (including in 
song lyrics and poetry) that simply says something about certain people or groups of 
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people. That is, the Psalms are much about people or groups of people who have this or 
that quality (e.g., “Happy are all who take refuge in him” [my emphasis] Ps 2:12b). The 
verbal-adjective form, therefore, finds many opportunities for use simply because the text 
is so often referring to others; it has nothing to do with signaling a significant semantic 
shift. Becker also points out the fact that these verbal-adjectives are in the construct state, 
and they therefore indicate a state of possession. That is, when the Psalms speak about 
people who fear God, they are really referring to fearers (no particular object of fear) who 
are possessed by God. In response I can only say that, while this is grammatically 
permissible, this rendering (for both singular and plural verbal-adjective cases of ) is 
awkward and highly improbable. The Septuagint and the Vulgate in every case have 
“God” in the accusative case (i.e., God is the object of the fear) and no English version 
that I know of translates according to Becker’s view.  
In regard to the wisdom literary form of Becker’s that I discuss last, my main 
disagreement with his „sittliche“ (“moral/ethical”) idea-type is simply that it overlooks 
the large-scale contextual tone of God’s sovereignty, human absolute contingency, human 
propensity to sin, and the threat of punishment (from God) that reverberates throughout 
the OT wisdom books. And if fear-of-God is the “beginning” of wisdom, how can it be (if 
Becker is right) a “moral attitude” which is arguably the same as wisdom? On the other 
hand, if fear is understood as an unpleasant feeling that goads a person toward wanting to 
do what is right (in the eyes of God), then one can better see how fear-of-God can be 
wisdom’s “beginning.” Becker’s claim that the unusually high number of nouns (hary) in 
the Proverbs indicates a semantic development is, once again, making too much out of a 
run-of-the-mill form. “Fear” (the noun) simply designates the substance that is involved 
when one “fears” (the verb). There is no more semantic difference between noun and verb 
than that found, for example, with “rain” and “to rain.” Yes, the former names the 
substance and the latter names the action in which the substance is employed; anything of 
semantic significance beyond that, however, must come from some other source (like 
context and syntax). 
In closing this lengthy section on Becker, several big-picture and common sense 
items that Becker, in varying degrees, overlooks should be mentioned: first, the fact that 
the word “fear” (/φοβέω) is used means that the exegete’s first understanding of the 
term should be just that. Second, large-scale context often shows that there is much to 
fear: human frailty, mortality, and sinfulness, as well as God’s omnipotence, anger, and 
judgment are often very much a part of the context. Third, fear-of-God is never said in the 
OT or the NT to be a bad thing (nowhere in the Bible does God [or Jesus] ever say “do 
not fear me”); but the lack of fear-of-God is always portrayed in a negative light. Because 
of this, the exegete should be hesitant to empty out of fear-of-God the very element that is 
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never condemned, but only taught to be something good and beneficial. Finally, even 
when Becker does designate this or that fear-of-God use as signifying a “numinous” 
meaning, what are theologians and people in the church to do with an idea that assumes 
that God is all a projection of the mind?290 The main problem with Becker’s results is 
that—at the most meaningful level—he has nothing to say to theologians who are really 
theologians—i.e., those who study about the true God whom they really believe to exist 
apart from their own existence. Thinking that God is contingent upon men and not the 
other way around forms much of the base of form-critical thinking; it is also central to the 
idea of Otto’s „das Heilige,“ and „das Numinose.“ Becker does not at all wrestle with 
this problem, but simply incorporates Otto’s terminology and understanding about the 
“numinous” into his own work. With this as a flawed foundation upon which Becker 
builds his work, the results from his lengthy investigation of OT fear-of-God are bound to 
be inaccurate.  
Karl Barth 
Karl Barth said about fear-of-God:  
A wrong kind of fear, not to be confused with the right fear of the Lord, abounds 
around us. It would be better to call it anxiety. We are afraid of bad and dangerous 
people, afraid of spooks, afraid of death, afraid of the atom bomb, afraid of the 
Russians, and especially afraid of ourselves! Because we do not know how to go 
out and to come in and refuse to admit it! All this fear, this anxiety, is not the 
beginning, but the end of wisdom. Such fears have nothing, really nothing in 
common with the fear of the Lord. They have nothing to do with God, the true God, 
but only with little, apparent lords. In the face of all these fears we may and we 
must cling to the word of the gospel not to be anxious. Wisdom stemming from the 
fear of the Lord is the end of all these fears. 
Barth goes on to criticize the idea that people fear God because of his power and his 
justice: 
We are afraid of God because he is so great and mighty, and we are so small and 
weak. We are afraid that he will accuse us like a oversized giant prosecutor, and 
that he will judge us like some sky-scraping chief justice. We may also be afraid of 
God because he might send us forever to hell at the end of our days. All such fear 
has nothing in common with the fear of the Lord. 
This shows what Barth thinks fear-of-God is not; it has little to do with the fear-feeling. 
What fear-of-God is, on the other hand, is a realization of God’s love, mercy, and grace. 
“It is nothing short of a discovery when a man is suddenly confronted with this reality. It 
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is not unlike the experience of Columbus who, sailing out for India, suddenly hit upon the 
continent of America.”291    
Samuel Terrien 
Terrien (also writing about the time of Becker) provides a rare and refreshing 
description of fear-of-God in a lengthy dictionary article—rare and refreshing in that he 
takes the Bible literature at face value and therefore finds that fear-of-God contains a fair 
amount of fear. The origin of much of this fear has to do with the fact that “the whole 
tradition is embedded in the theological concept of Israel’s inability or unwillingness to 
fulfill her mission.”292 So there is a fear-of-God that repels—for fear of punishment; but 
there is a fear-of-God that attracts—for it is rooted in the love and worship of God. The 
problem, writes Terrien, is that western minds cannot understand how both can co-exist: 
The OT repeatedly associates the emotion of fear with the complex of faith, trust, 
love, and communion; and it is perhaps at this juncture that the biblical mode of 
thinking is most startling to the modern Western mind. For the ancient Hebrew, a 
member of the holy people, covenanted with a holy god for a unique purpose in 
history, there is no paradox in the liturgical command, “Serve Yahweh with fear, 
and rejoice with trembling!” (Ps 2:11)293 
Westerns (I assume here that Terrien is referring especially to western theologians) tend 
to disdain any idea of fear (of anything). But even though fear-of-God does become 
somewhat of a designation for the religion of Israel, Terrien nevertheless warns: 
It would be a grave error, however, to soften the meaning of the expression and to 
ignore its central element of mysterium tremendum. Although many commentators 
and historians have fallen into this error during the past hundreds years, the fear of 
the Lord is not merely to be equated with reverence, piety, or religion because it is 
impossible today to revaluate and again charge these terms with their ancient—but 
now largely lost—connotation of awesomeness. It is true that biblical religion is 
summed up in the law to love God absolutely and exclusively (Deut 6:4, 5), but this 
love, precisely because it is absolute and exclusive, imposes upon man a demand 
which is never devoid of fearful dimensions.294 
Even Terrien does not avoid Ottonian terms; but he does so with the following caution: 
The concept of the “numinous” is to be seriously qualified whenever it is applied to 
Hebrew modes of theological thinking, for the God of Israel, from the time of 
Moses, at least, is not an impersonal ‘numen’ but a personal Being who intervenes 
in the affairs of men and whose self-disclosure is ultimately a gracious uncovering 
of active will, saving intent, and creative purpose. 
This is a valuable disclaimer, and one that is, unfortunately, not heard more often. But 
after reading one of Terrien’s later works in which he champions womanhood and 
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women’s rights through pointing out the “numinous” quality of menstruation and 
sexuality, I do not think that Terrien in his fear-of-God article gives his disclaimer for 
theological reasons; rather, he is only alluding to the fact that Otto’s “numinous” concept 
differs from what the biblical literature says.295 In other words, Israel recorded a story 
about a personal God who worked wonders in their midst, and fear before God is a 
legitimate part of that story—but this is just the story that came down to us. One must 
keep in mind when reading the OT that Otto’s perception of God and the Jewish 
assertions about God are very different. But as far as what really happened in Israelite 
history and before, that is a different matter in which Otto’s views have a rightful place. 
From a historical standpoint, the Jewish religious leaders who composed much of the OT 
paid the high price of disallowing much of what was of numinous value in and before 
their day in order to build their androcentric cult.296  
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Whatever the motives are behind Terrien’s qualification of Otto’s terminology, I am 
still nevertheless thankful for it. Terrien ends his article with this fine observation:  
It is thus a grave error to maintain, with many moderns, that Christianity, as 
opposed to Hebraism, has replaced the fear of God by the love of God. The NT, as 
well as the OT, understands so profoundly the tragic dimensions of love and knows 
so acutely the awesomeness of the divine presence that it proposes to man no other 
prospect than the service of God “with fear and trembling” (Phil 2:12).297 
Horst Balz 
For Balz, the obsession with Angst (especially as provoked by Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger) has moved Furcht (i.e., fear with an object) almost completely out of the 
picture—and that has been to the detriment of theology.298 Angst is a by-product of 
human freedom; in the midst of freedom, Angst rises up as humans realize that what 
happens in the future is only what is possible. In other words, they know that neither they 
nor their futures are of their own making—they are totally contingent creatures. This 
Angst is a warning signal that informs people that not all is well and that something is 
terribly lacking. But if humans have fear before God, then they will have no objectless 
fear (Angst) or fear of things in the world. So, fear-of-God is ultimately not a problem, 
but a solution.299 
Balz defines fear of God in terms that are close to Becker, and he also understands 
that Otto has more or less correctly identified the feeling (the “numinous”) that fear-of-
God consists of.300 Some ANE texts are mentioned that indicate that fear-of-God flowed 
out of primitive human fear of their environment; but, even though the OT and NT are not 
unaffected by this primitive fear, these “mythic” ANE texts have not much to do with the 
biblical fear-of-God texts that depict a human/God relationship that is founded not on 
fear, but on trust and faith.301 Israel’s religion is one of trust in their God and utter 
dependence on him. To the Israelites, God’s love was big—and so was his anger. His 
“holy and righteous power” is experienced also as “frightening power” („schreckende 
Macht“). The fear-of-God signifies the “primitive shiver before the power of God” as 
well as compliance to his will.302 The NT concept of fear is one of “fright” and “horror”; 
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but the purpose—made plain by much of what Christ did and said—was to relieve people 
of not only their fear of punishment, but also of their Angst.303 
In general, Balz seems to come from approximately the same understanding of fear-
of-God as Becker; but while Becker pays little attention to the “numinous ground tone” 
that he himself asserts is present in all the developed fear-of-God varieties, Balz sees 
more value in fear-of-God’s numinous roots because it is a critical component of faith and 
serves to relieve men and women of Angst.  
„Furch vor Gott?“ So fragen wir am Anfang. Ja, vor Gott, dem in der Zuwendung 
seiner Liebe übermächtig packenden und in der konkreten Gegebenheit des Daseins 
total fordernden—müssen wir jetzt antworten. Unsere heutige theologische Rede 
vom Glauben muss sich die Frage nach der biblischen Gottesfurcht gefallen lassen. 
Unsere Verdündigung kann nur dann von der Angst des In-der-Welt-Seins befreien, 
wenn sie das biblische Furchtmotiv in rechter Weise aufnimmt und neu interpretiert 
als eine Qualität des Glaubens, der dem Zorn und der Liebe Gottes stets ganz 
ausgesetzt ist. 
Fear-of-God is honest in that it recognizes both the love and anger of God—and no true 
faith is possible without it; for faith spans that chasm in the human soul of Angst-filled 
uncertainty, and pins its hopes upon that one who made contingent human beings in the 
first place. Faith in this world is exercised in an atmosphere less than absolute certainty. 
Therefore, fear is a reasonable and necessary part of it. This is why Balz can write:  
Ein Verzicht auf die Rede von der Furcht würde einer Entleerung des 
Glaubensbegriffs überhaupt gleichkommen; Glaube ohne Furcht hätte etwas 
Entscheidendes verloren, denn er hätte die kontingente Erfahrung der totalen 
Abhängigkeit von einem Mächtigeren und die je totale Beanspruchung durch einen 
fordernden Willen aufgegeben; Glaube ohne Furcht wäre enthusiastische Feier des 
eigenen Selbstbewusstseins und damit Unglaube.304 
Much more than Becker (and most other modern commentators), Balz takes into 
consideration the great problem of human Angst and contingency, as well as the great 
biblical truths of God’s power and anger (about human sin), and concludes that a fearful 
feeling before God is justified—and even necessary. He does not see Angst/Furcht as 
something in Christian life that has to be simply gotten rid of; the question is “what do we 
do with fear?” rather than “how do we eliminate it?” His proposal that men and women 
should allow their fear to be focused upon the only necessary being who made all 
contingent beings is extremely valuable.305  
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H. P. Stähli 
Stähli’s 1971 lexicon article (in THAT) covers all the linguistic forms of , but 
his detailed presentation is mainly a distillation of Becker’s work.306 In describing the 
cases that clearly depict a strong emotional/feeling reaction of fear before 
something/someone, Stähli employs all the Ottonian terms—without “qualification”—
that are used by Becker. Out of “numinous” fear, the cultic and moral ideas of fear-of-
God develop, but—agreeing with Becker—throughout this development remains a 
numinous “ground-tone” that is never completely eliminated.307  
Henri Blocher 
Blocher—not unlike Balz—argues for the necessity of fear-of-God in biblical faith. 
His article is clearly written from the standpoint of faith and belief in the credibility of the 
biblical witness. “The role of fear of the Lord,” Blocher says, “in wisdom is intimately 
connected with main tenets of Old Testament faith. It agrees with its anthropology, with 
its unified view of the inner man and its concentration in the heart (cf. Prov 4:23).”308 In 
fact, fear-of-God is intimately bound up with the “creational monotheism” that lays out 
from the beginning the realities of God’s necessity and human contingency. Fear-of-God 
simply flows out of this reality and is an acknowledgement (i.e., knowledge) of the way 
things really are. Any kind of real wisdom requires a “clear distinction between Creator 
and creature.”309 And fear-of-God is a force that naturally makes that distinction. But the 
pagan religions that surrounded Israel, with their “latent pantheism,” obviously did not 
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have any true fear-of-God—or otherwise, they would have seen more of a distinction 
between the creator and the creation.310 Because of this unreliability of pagan faith, 
Blocher thinks it a mistake for theologians to look to the ANE nations around Israel in 
trying to illuminate the meaning of fear-of-God. The development of their religions was 
far different than how the Israelite faith came to be. The former developed idol worship; 
Israel developed monotheism. Therefore, one cannot learn anything meaningful about 
fear-of-God from those who worshipped and experienced fear before gods that did not 
really exist. According to Blocher, the pagan idea of fear-of-God had nothing 
corresponding to the Israelite idea that it was the beginning of wisdom (Blocher says “the 
principle of wisdom). One does not find in ANE wisdom writings something like, “The 
fear of Marduk (or Baal or Râ) is the principle of wisdom.” In fact there can be no such 
thing “because Marduk is no god, Marduk is a Nothing!”311 Blocher mentions that pagan 
religion can in some ways reflect the general revelation; but, in general, one must be 
careful not to see too many similarities between pagan and Israelite religion: 
In this light, the existence of scattered similarities to Biblical truths in the ancient 
Near-East could be considered as glimpses of God’s original revelation, with no 
damage done to uniqueness, and Godfearing teachers of wisdom in Israel could 
assimilate insights which Egyptians had gained by God’s common grace, just as 
their fathers had spoiled these Egyptians’ riches. The weakness of the comparative 
approach is that it tends to take the field of phenomena as the ultimate reference for 
judgement. But Veritas index sui et false! Reverent reference to the LORD first is 
the principle of wisdom! When one abides by this principle, he can appreciate (and 
there is plentiful evidence for him then to canvass!) how darkened and distorted the 
truth of God has been in nations deprived of special revelation.312 
With this pagan deprivation of “special revelation,” one should wonder why the Israelite 
wise men who set down the biblical wisdom truths would have wanted to borrow from 
their pagan neighbors any “wisdom” that had to do with the relationship between gods 
and humans. If they did, then maybe there is some truth to the claim that OT wisdom is, 
at bottom, pagan. But in Blocher’s view, this is highly unlikely.313  
The Israelite wise men knew, after all, that there was good wisdom and bad 
wisdom—and pagan wisdom that dealt with how a man or woman can be right with their 
god would have no doubt been understood as the latter. This distinguishing between good 
and bad wisdom is mentioned in the OT and is also alluded to in the NT. For example, 
Paul, in 1 Cor 1:19, 30, uses Isa 29:14 and Jer 9:23, 24 (22, 23) to say that Christ-less 
wisdom is really no wisdom at all. True (godly) wisdom, says Paul, is “in Jesus Christ, 
who has become for us wisdom from God—that is, our righteousness, holiness and 
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redemption. Therefore, as it is written: ‘Let him who boasts boast in the Lord’” (1 Cor 
1:30, 31 NIV). So there is, as Blocher puts it, a “principle” of wisdom, and this principle 
has to do with the faith that must come first before real wisdom can be had. This principle 
is knowledge of God as well as humble acknowledgment of the truth of that knowledge. 
From the OT to the NT, the emphasis of this wisdom principle shifts from fear to faith, 
and is all about accepting the God-man who “became flesh and lived among us”:  
Coming to Christ, taking his yoke, receiving the Spirit which is from God, this is 
the equivalent of fearing the LORD, and it can be summarized in the word “faith”. 
We suggest that fear can be translated faith because the critical element of “fear” 
belongs also to faith as soon as the Lord of faith is come down from heaven, a 
humble-hearted man and obedient unto death: when faith is in Christ and in him 
crucified, it pours contempt on human pride and it involves the denial of worldly 
wisdom.314   
What I like best about what Blocher writes is that reasonable and biblical anthropology 
and theology are assumed at the start. God is God (Christ is Christ) and humans beings 
are human beings; as a consequence, all wisdom is contingent upon there first being a 
knowledge of God and a humble recognition of one’s obligation to submit to him. For 
fear-of-God, however, I would tend to keep a strong emphasis on what the term 
semantically is rooted in—i.e., fear—and suggest that God does not just use knowledge 
and choice as a part of faith, but also the emotion/feeling of fear. When one, for example, 
because of fear of heights is prompted to move away from a cliff towards safer ground, 
the feeling is not so much intellectual knowledge; rather, it is mostly affective knowledge 
that helps him or her get out of harm’s way. This fear is automatic in most humans (i.e., it 
is God-given as a part of human nature) and can rise up and “goad” a person even if that 
person knows (intellectually) nothing about the danger. Humans have the life-preserving 
capability on earth to experience fear because the earth is not a safe place. A critical 
question that one exploring the fear-of-God subject needs to ask and definitively answer 
is, “is God safe?” If there exists anything in the providence of God that has the potential 
of being unsafe for humans, then fear ought to be understood to be a reasonable first 
response to that danger. Only if one believes that God is safe in any event could one 
reasonably not make any room for fear. But common sense and the Bible tell us that God 
is safe only if men and women obey him. Therefore, God can be unsafe, and fear, 
therefore, can be experienced before God. With fear-of-God, Blocher puts most of the 
semantic emphasis on faith; faith is the “principle” of wisdom. Faith is indeed necessary 
for wisdom; but I think that God can use fear to at least goad the disobedient person 
towards faith. In this way one might say that fear is the beginning of the “principle” of 
wisdom.  
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Michael Barré 
In trying to make the case that Israelite wisdom and its fear-of-God concept did not 
originate in a special sage circle that was far removed from the cult, Barré appeals to the 
existence of Jewish-like wisdom in the nations that surrounded Israel.315 Just as the fear-
of-God idea was intimately connected to the cult in the ANE, the same situation was 
likely in Israel. Barré’s effort to locate Jewish wisdom in the general OT flow of the 
YHWH cult is a worthwhile effort—for Jewish biblical wisdom should not be seen as a 
secular addition that was pressed into the sacred (perhaps based upon Greek influence). 
Biblical wisdom that is well-blended into the overall biblical flow—and not forced in 
from the outside—does indeed add meaning and purpose as Barré suggests;316 but while 
he may indeed have a point that ANE wisdom was an integral part of ANE cult life, and 
that ANE worship and Israelite cult worship were in some ways analogous, it must be 
questioned if the fear that was experienced before the gods of the nations around Israel 
could have been the same fear experienced before the true and living God who revealed 
himself to Israel.  
While Barré’s purpose in his article is to champion the value of OT wisdom—and 
especially the idea of fear-of-God that is a part of it—his linking of Otto’s “numinous” 
with fear-of-God, as well as his understanding that we can draw eternal truths from the 
ANE fear-of-God idea, puts this value into doubt. Barré’s baseline meaning for OT fear-
of-God is thoroughly Ottonian: “[Fear-of-God] does not convey the notion of enervating 
terror but rather of overpowering awe in the presence of the wholly other.”317 Then Barré 
writes, “Essentially it represents the basic and proper stance of mortals before the 
divine.”318 Right away, one should question if fear-of-God is at the same time 
“overpowering awe” and a “proper stance.” What does Barré mean by a “proper stance?” 
He goes on to speak about this “stance,” but not really about the stance per se, but about 
what flows out of this stance: “How was this relational stance expressed? What actions or 
behavior would have been recognized as fear of the gods and what behavior would have 
been perceived as contrary to this?” From here, Barré goes on to define fear-of-God more 
accurately; but one should notice that he has shifted from fear itself to what is a result of 
the fear. These are two completely different categories—one is an emotion/feeling; the 
other is behavior/action. Because he then goes on to looking at Babylonian, Egyptian, and 
Hittite texts to (at least partially) answer how this “relational stance [is] expressed,” not 
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only will he define OT fear-of-God by actions and not the fear itself, but these actions are 
to a large extent gleaned from false-god worship as depicted in the ANE texts. As Barré 
makes his way through these texts, he mentions the following meanings for fear-of-God: 
awesome respect; no arrogant defiance of the gods (i.e., “hybris”); reverence; respectful 
and submissive attitude; acceptance of responsibility to worship, to observe feast days, 
and to make appropriate sacrifices; the cult itself; to stand in the temple.  
This multiplication of meanings is quite like Becker’s; furthermore, his justification 
for seeing these meanings is based—like Becker—upon several alleged instances of 
synonymous parallelism. For example, Barré presents these parallel lines of The 
Babylonian Theodicy: “He who waits on his god has a protecting angel. The humble man 
who fears … his goddess accumulates wealth.”319 To “wait on” one’s god in the first 
clause, says Barré, means to stand before one’s god in the temple. This idea is parallel 
and synonymous to “the humble man who fears” of the second clause. Another ANE 
example provided by Barré is a Hittite prayer of Amuwanda I: “In Hittite territory alone 
we unceasingly make … offerings to you. It is only in Hittite territory that we do not 
cease to fear you, Oh gods.”320 Regarding this, he writes, “It is clear from this passage 
that “unceasingly make … offerings” is synonymous with “fear” … of the gods. When I 
read these texts, I do not see how it is “clear” that there is synonymous parallelism here. 
As has been argued above in the section about Becker (see pp. 80-84, 90-92), parallelism 
does not have to be synonymous; the idea of the second line may repeat, expand upon, 
disagree with, or have almost correspondence at all with the parallel first line. The 
relational possibilities are practically endless. Like Becker, Barré appears to be spring-
loaded to see synonymous parallelism in cases in which synonymity will yield a more 
refined and developed fear-of-God meaning. His case for synonymity could be somewhat 
stronger with the OT text he considers—2 Kings 17:24-28. Here (in a biblical 
acknowledgment of “ANE” wisdom!), the Assyrian king (in response to the crises of 
God-sent marauding lions in Israel) commands that an Israelite priest be sent back to the 
land in order to “teach [the people] the law of the god of the land” (17:27). The next verse 
then says that—upon arriving there—the priest “taught them how they should worship the 
LORD.” “Worship” here is the NRSV translation of  (lit. “they will fear”). Barré 
does not say that there exists a synonymous parallel between teaching “the law” and 
teaching the “worship [of] the LORD”; but he does say that the text is evidence that fear-
of-God “cannot be separated from the realm of the cult,” and that the mention of fear-of-
God “could not mean simply having a certain ‘attitude’ toward [YHWH].”321 The 
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concepts of “law” and “fear” as used here could indeed be quite similar; but I would say 
that one could also argue that the priest in following the king’s command to teach “the 
law” decided to first teach the “beginning of wisdom,” i.e., the fear of the LORD. That is, 
the priest endeavored to instill in the people’s hearts the attitude that would bring about a 
willingness to follow the law. The context of this pericope also should be seen in light of 
vv. 38, 39; here, the people are called away from the fear of “other gods” to the fear of 
“the LORD your God.” This call is based upon the following truth: “[the LORD] will 
deliver you out of the hand of all your enemies” (v. 39b). As already mentioned, the 
message here is that God alone is all-powerful—in fact, powerful enough to overcome all 
enemies. But false gods are dead and powerless to do anything—therefore, there is no 
reason to fear them. And in those days, there was much of real fear experienced before 
“the gods”: there must have been great fear felt, for example, before the false gods 
Adrammelech and Anammelech, to whom the people of Sepharvaim “burned their 
children in the fire as sacrifices” (2 Kings 17:31; see pp. 84-87 above).322   
Hans Kramer 
In a brief dictionary article about theological Angst, Kramer simply offers fear-of-
God “idea types” that are similar to Becker’s: „Furcht Gottes ist im AT das Bewußtsein 
der Abhängigkeit von Jahwe, dem Unbegreiflichen, die Treue zum Bundesgott und der 
Gehorsam im Sittlichen.“ In these ways one can say that fear-of-God is the “beginning of 
wisdom.”323 In the NT, the “perfect love,” spoken of in 1 John 4:18, excludes any idea of 
“fear of failure” or of “punishment.” In fact, the fear-of-God idea in the NT becomes 
“greatly reduced.” Kramer’s tendency to steer away from the fear feeling/emotion with 
fear-of-God is seen in his reference to Phil 2:12, 13: „Weil Gott das Wollen und das 
Vollbringen in den Glaubenden bewirkt, haben sie sich ‘mit Furcht und Zittern’, das heißt 
mit Ernst und Sorge—und gerade nicht mit Angst—um das Heil zu mühen.“ For Kramer, 
“fear and trembling” becomes “earnestness and worry”; there is no room for fear because 
God is the one doing his good work in the believer. In reference to 1 John 4:18, the reader 
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is invited to see pp. 219-220. There, I point out that because no one is “perfect in love,” 
then no one can be expected to be completely free of the fear of God’s punishment. 
Regarding Phil 2:12, his translation of µετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόµου is simply not accurate. In 
general he appears to be willing to bend the meaning of unambiguous fear-of-God texts 
so that they fit in with the overarching theological idea that God’s love absolutely assures 
the believer’s safety. This is arguably a true doctrine—but the exegete should not 
overlook the many NT passages which are stern warnings given to both believers and 
unbelievers (see chapter three).   
Jan Milič Lochman 
This article champions the idea of a „Jüngsten Gericht“ (“final judgment”); it is not 
about fear-of-God of God per se, but about the universal Angst that points to a need for 
justice as well as final judgment that will provide it. I nevertheless include Lochman’s 
article because the question of fear-of-God and fear of God’s punishment should figure 
predominately into this theme. The “emblem of humanity,” writes Lochman, is Angst.324 
It is a phenomenon that arises out of human freedom. In this freedom men and woman 
can plan for the future and choose to live their lives responsibly. This is the dignity of 
human beings; but freedom necessarily produces Angst—because humans are constantly 
aware of the possibility of „erfüllung“ (“compliance,” “fulfillment”) or „Verfehlen“ 
(“failure”). Angst functions as a “life-signal” and a “wake-up call” that alerts the 
experient that all is not well and safe in the world—and this is indeed the way the world 
is.325 Angst shows that the world—and all the people in it—are in great need of a final 
„Befreiung“ from the injustice and oppression that fill the world. Here is the main point 
of his article: the final judgment is for our good, and not for our harm.326 Angst is a 
universal phenomenon that cries out for a final judgment of all that oppresses and 
enslaves; unfortunately, our western world has mainly bought into the idea that the final 
judgment was only something used by the church to terrify the people into conversion and 
submission.327  
Lochman thinks this view is tragically mistaken because it does not understand how 
evil the world really is. Many in the west have not lived in poverty or under significant 
oppression; so the awareness of injustice as well as the awareness of the need for 
justice—especially final justice—in this world is not on their minds. But for those who 
have lived under great oppression and injustice, the idea of a final judgment brings great 
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comfort and hope. Lochman cites the example of those who lived under Stalinist-brand 
communism in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s. The people were abused through the 
“monstrous phenomenon” of the “perverted justice with its manipulating show-trials.”328 
Through this, the „Sensucht“ was awakened in many for justice to come that would bring 
righteousness, eliminate arbitrariness, and would free them once and for all. Under 
communism, God and his law were thrown out, and the highest court one could appeal to 
was the arbitrary court presided over by the communist rulers—and hope for righteous 
justice and for relief from their suffering was lost. The results were “hellish.”329 But 
righteous justice will indeed be provided in the final judgment—for God is good and God 
is love; he hates those who murder and oppress, and his judgment of them will be strong 
and complete. Jesus has come not to condemn, but to save. And because of his supreme 
act of love on the cross, men and women know that he is the right judge. 330  
Lochman’s call for appreciation of a final judgment is a legitimate response to those 
scholars who would criticize the biblical God because of his harsh judgment of 
unrepentant sinners. My only critique of his article would be that he almost seems to 
border on a liberation theology perspective that understands God’s justice mainly as a 
process to free poor and oppressed peoples. The „Kriterium“ for coming successfully 
through the final judgment is only drawn from Matt 25:31-46: to what extent one is 
“open” or “closed” to fellow human beings who are in emergency situations will 
determine one’s “fate before God.”331 In his effort to make the final judgment look 
attractive—i.e., mainly as a „Befreiung“, he draws too much attention away from a great 
biblical reality: for those who reject God and reject God’s son, the final judgment is 
horrible. This downplaying of the fearful side of the final judgment is seen in his criticism 
of how the church throughout its history depicted the final judgment: for example, the 
depictions of the lost in Baroque-era paintings are shocking, and the church in general 
used this theme to manipulate the people.332 Lochman reacts against this by calling us 
away from a “dualism” view of the final judgment („die Seligen rechts, die Verdammten 
links“) to a focus upon the benefits that come with a final judgment.333 Perhaps this 
positive emphasis on the final judgment is why he does not attribute at least a portion of 
that Angst to the prospect of a final judgment. Lochman rightly explains that Angst forces 
people to see that all is not right in the world—and that the final judgment will one day 
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make everything right; but he does not address the possibility that Angst is to some extent 
attributable to a sense of being at risk in a final judgment. Angst in this case is fear of 
God’s punishment (“servile” fear). Lochman does not want people to think in terms of 
those on “the right” and on “the left”; but in the very „Kriterium“ text that he cites (Matt 
25:31-46), a clear distinction between the saved and the lost is what is in view with the 
“sheep” and the “goats.” Actually, the “both halves” presentation of the final judgment 
that Lochman wants to move away from is (in an eschatological/soteriological sense) 
arguably already too weak: despite the truth that Christ came to save and not to condemn, 
he nevertheless indicated that more people would choose the “damned left” side than the 
other (see Matt 7:13, 14). If all people, as Paul asserts in Rom 1:18-20, “are without 
excuse” before God, then it follows that this knowledge of the possibility of moral guilt 
would cause Angst to be generated. Because this Angst is fear of judgment, then it is fear-
of-God—for God is the one who brings the final judgment and who presides over it. 
Angst is then simply a tool that God uses to get people to think about this judgment. It is 
indeed, as Lochman says, a “wake-up call”; but I would prefer to call it a warning.  
ANALYSIS OF COMMENTATORS IN VIEW OF THEOLOGICAL AND 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL REALITIES 
I will now comment briefly upon the fear-of-God commentators that have just been 
surveyed. The comments will be made in reference to a number of points of Evangelical 
Christian doctrine. 
God Created Human Beings and Created Them in His Image 
There is no problem with this belief for the pre-critical writers; it is evident that 
they assume orthodox views of God and human beings. The influence of empiricism 
followed by idealism in the 18th and 19th centuries took a strong hold on theological 
studies and one can see the results especially with Otto and Becker. To many casual 
observers the former appeared to write a book about the holy nature of God (“The Idea of 
the Holy”) and this is probably part of the reason for the book’s huge commercial success. 
But the subject of the study (“the Holy”) is not about God, but about any person’s 
religious emotions/feelings. In his effort to find a place for religion within an 
epistemological atmosphere that assumed the correctness of the empiricism of Kant, he so 
located “God” in the perceiving subject that “God” and the subject became hopelessly 
blended. Otto coined the term “numinous” for this ultimate-reality emotion/feeling. The 
numinous—“a recognized history-of-religion and psychology-of-religion terminus” 
(notice, not a theological terminus)—“posits” the “God” object which “no longer 
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belong[s] to the perceptual world.”334 Because it is an “a priori” category of mind, and 
epistemologically beyond doubt and without need of explanation or proof, then the final 
religious truth resides there and not in revelation.335 To Otto, claims to “supernatural” 
events are disqualified by both the then “acceptable” empiricist epistemological 
restrictions as well as his idealist positioning of religious epistemological knowledge in 
the experient.336 Even though Otto was trying to find a place for religion after the 
empiricists all but did away with it, he nevertheless dovetailed his numinous into their 
already influential “history of religions” theory of religious origins; if religion first came 
into being according to the feelings and needs of humans, then the combination of the 
emotions and feelings that prompted “primitive” men and women toward religion must 
have been the first stirrings of the numinous.  
Becker’s monumental work is built upon Otto’s understanding of the numinous and 
how it played a part in the development (or, better, the evolution) of religion. Becker then 
added the developmentally-minded ideas of form critics and wound up doing an 
exhaustive study about the feeling/emotion/orientation/virtue/etc. before a “God” who is 
“posited” by the subject, but is not really exterior to and different from the subject—and, 
therefore, not an object of true relationship. Because of this, one can see all through his 
monograph that the question of how fear-of-God fits theologically into a proper 
relationship with God is not a concern or the topic under investigation. Gottesfurcht im 
Alten Testament is not about fear-of-God per se; instead, it is about buttressing the form-
critical theories that had become generally acceptable in his day. He thought he could do 
this by showing that earlier literary forms showed “primitive” numinous fear, while later 
literary forms showed more refined properties of fear-of-God that were appropriate to the 
developmental stage of the cult. His method sought to match a literary form with a 
linguistic form as well as an idea-type. But his literary forms are very general, his 
linguistic forms are mostly run-of-the mill forms of  that do little to justify the wide 
semantic range that he claims for fear-of-God, and the fear-of-God idea-types are only 
marginally based upon biblical context; they come instead from the dictates of the form-
critical reconstruction of Israel’s history. This reconstruction flowed out of the 
epistemological skepticism already mentioned, and—before being utilized and defended 
by Becker—was built up into a forceful movement by the only scholar that Becker 
commends in his forward, Hermann Gunkel. Toward the end of his writing and teaching 
career Gunkel claimed that it was “childish” to believe in biblical miracles, und boldly 
pronounced that “the opinion that the Old Testament might be a sure guide to true 
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religion and morality is not any longer to be maintained.”337 For both Otto and Becker, 
fear-of-God is something altogether different from what the words (fear/of/God) plainly 
mean; because of this, their results cannot describe the fear-of-God emotion/feeling that 
the Bible so often mentions and ought to be had by people as a part of a proper 
relationship with the living God.338 
God Created Human Beings to Be in Relationship with Him 
Pre-critical commentators thought long and hard about the proper relationship 
between human beings and the God who made them. The writer of the Shepherd of 
Hermes, for example, clearly believed that fear-of-God ought to be part of that 
relationship because it is the “all” of man (the writer quoted Eccl 12:13) in view of God’s 
power, authority, and his coming judgment. But because many critical-era commentators 
located “God” in the mind, then they really could not write about what one normally 
understands as a relationship between two persons—because there was no one really 
exterior to the experient to have a relationship with. At best, one could only claim to have 
a relationship with an imaginary deity. So it is not a surprise that Becker could write a 
major work on fear-of-God that does little to determine how it functions in order to bring 
humans closer to the God who made them. As just mentioned, Becker’s work is mainly 
about supporting the form-critical notion that certain literary forms at certain stages of the 
cult development contain unique linguistic forms which in turn indicate specific 
meanings. The older forms (from “myths,” “legends,” “stories,” “sagas,” etc.) typically 
use the verb  plus an accusative object and the “numinous” emotion/feeling is 
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typically what is in view; the later Deuteronomistic narrative form employs the verb plus 
YHWH and generally indicates cult loyalty; those who wrote the Psalms also intended 
fear-of-God to mean something like cult loyalty, but their preferred form was the plural 
“verbal-adjective” in construct with YHWH or Elohim; the wisdom literary form used 
fear-of-God to stand for one who was moral („sittlich“) and used the singular “verbal-
adjective” in the construct state with YHWH or Elohim, the noun, and the verb plus 
Elohim. In each of these alleged idea-types (numinous, cult loyalty, and moral) are a 
plethora of sub-meanings that multiply far beyond what I think is a reasonable semantic 
range for .339 Becker claims that each literary form’s primary linguistic form provides 
evidence of semantic development; but I argued that each linguistic form is simply what 
one would expect to find in their respective sections of the OT: that is, the older narrative 
sections simply use the verb to narrate not a few cases of people fearing before an 
epiphany or before something/someone else; the “Deuteronomistic” section uses the verb 
plus YHWH simply because it too is mostly narrative (“And David was afraid of the 
LORD that day” [2 Sam 6:9]), and God’s name had by then been revealed at Sinai; the 
Psalms use the plural “verbal-adjective” (I prefer to call them participles) simply because 
they routinely mention groups that do this or that or have a particular characteristic (e.g., 
“happy are all who take refuge in him” [Ps 2:12c])—and the participle naturally fits when 
a Psalm’s writer is commenting about someone else. The linguistic forms of the wisdom 
literary forms are likewise unremarkable and do not in any way indicate any shift in 
meaning away from the fear-feeling semantic root. Those texts that indicate, according to 
Becker, “numinous” fear are in general rightly identified; but he really has no other 
choice in view of the obvious fear-portraying contexts. In the virtue-fear-of-God cases, 
however, there is usually no immediate context that indicates what is meant by the use of 
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“fear.”340 In these cases, Becker assigns meanings according to the demands of form 
criticism and justifies this mainly by only pointing out supposed synonymous parallels 
with surrounding text. But this semantic influence from outside the text is artificial and 
methodologically circular—and the appeal to synonymous parallelism is weak at best.341 
If Becker were approximately correct, one would expect that the LXX translation team 
would have translated the “newer” fear-of-God texts so that their real meaning could be 
understood in Greek; but in nearly every virtue-fear-of-God case, the LXX translates  
with φοβέω. In my view, the simplest explanation is most likely the best: fear-of-God 
first of all consists of the fear emotion/feeling because that is the main meaning for fear as 
found throughout both testaments. Because Becker’s semantic force does not come from 
the authoritative text, but comes instead from an un-authoritative reconstruction of 
Israel’s history in which “God” and fear-of-God evolved out of fears in the minds of 
primitive humans, then Becker’s professed meanings for fear-of-God in the main do not 
accurately describe the fear-of-God that a person experiences before the God identified in 
Scripture. 
Human Beings Are Vulnerable 
Angst comes as a result of human creatureliness and vulnerability. Humans are 
“thrown” into the world and there is uncertainty all around. But Balz complains that all 
the concentration upon Angst, especially since the time of Heideggar, has all but ignored 
what should be the legitimate object of Angst—that is, God. Angst is certainly a real and 
justified phenomenon; humans are fearful because they did not will to come into the 
world, they do not know if things will go bad or well with them (see Eccl 9:1), and the 
specter of death and the question of life after death is always before them. The solution to 
this, claims Balz, is faith; but faith must not lose altogether the Angst component because 
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criticism (by showing that certain literary forms will have certain linguistic forms that will 
indicate certain idea-types), but his method for doing this involves using the “new exegesis” of 
form criticism (as also stated in the forward) which in the case of the meaning of fear-of-God 
already has an opinion. The results from this method are seen throughout the rest of the book 
where the main semantic force for fear-of-God comes not from the biblical context, but from the 
expectations of form criticism based upon the assumption that fear-of-God evolved from the fear 
primitive humans experienced before their harsh and unknown environment to the “fear” that 
advanced monotheists experienced during cult ceremonies.  
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even with faith, the reality of human absolute contingency remains. In fact, faith without 
fear would be “an essential loss”:  
Glaube ohne Furcht hätte etwas Entscheidendes verloren, denn er hätte die 
kontingente Erfahrung der totalen Abhängigkeit von einem Mächtigeren und die je 
totale Beanspruchung durch einen fordernden Willen aufgegeben; Glaube ohne 
Furcht wäre enthusiastische Feier des eigenen Selbstbewusstseins und damit 
Unglaube.342 
Faith is only exercised in uncertainty and darkness. I would add that Angst is knowledge 
(or as Lochman says, a “wake up call”) that informs humans in a painful and distressing 
way that faith in God is needed, and even demanded. Fear-of-God, says Blocher, is 
perfectly understandable when one considers the realities of theology and anthropology. 
The words of Balz and Blocher are valuable in that they take up the universal 
phenomenon of Angst and seek to explain its existence as well as the solution for it.  
Human Beings Know about God 
The Bible teaches that all men and women are accountable to God because of their 
innate knowledge about God and his moral law. If they do not put their faith in God and 
turn from their sins, they, according to Paul, cannot plead ignorance—for “what may be 
known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them.… so that men 
are without excuse” (Rom 1:19, 20b NIV). Pre-critical views about fear-of-God include 
the assumption that men and women throughout time have either ran toward or ran away 
from God—with no middle ground where one might be completely oblivious to the 
existence of God. Tertullian understood this doctrine and his understanding of fear-of-
God reflects it: “[The soul] doubtless knows its giver; and if it knows Him, it undoubtedly 
fears Him too, and especially as having been by Him endowed so amply.”343 Critical 
commentators generally do not wrestle with how fear fits into the emotions and feelings 
that flow out of the awareness of the general revelation. But Otto—despite not believing 
in special revelation—does provide a possible contribution in that his “numinous” does 
express some of the emotions/feelings that are a reaction to the general revelation.344 Otto 
observed the religious emotions/feelings of many people in many religions during his 
worldwide travels and then included these emotions/feelings in the “numinous” when he 
wrote Das Heilige. The numinous can possess an object of its affections;345 but with 
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 Balz, 1969, 643. 
343
 Tertullian, 1989, chapter two. 
344
 See my discussion about Otto’s anti-revelation views on pp. 49-50.   
345
 The meaning of Otto’s “numinous” is ambiguous; the reader is hard-pressed to tell if 
Otto is referring to the subject of religious experience, the religious experience itself, or the object 
of religious experience. My understanding is that “numinous” means all three; but the ontological 
reality of all these “objects” are located in the mind of the experient.  
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Otto’s idealist and empiricist epistemological restrictions, there is no real (objective) 
external object to be had.346 So, the subject can only “posit” his or her own object, and 
then experience a full range of emotions—including “terror”—in “relationship” with this 
object. But this is just what God warns against repeatedly in Scripture: one should not go 
after their own gods (i.e., after their own “objects” of worship) and one should not fear 
them—because they are powerless to cause any harm or to do any good.347 One should 
instead fear only God because only he is real and only he has the power to do any real 
harm or good. Otto’s view is problematic in that he does not accept the truth that a 
person’s “numinous” emotions/feelings (as per the general revelation doctrine) are there 
to prompt one to look for and establish a relationship with the one true God. One could 
argue that general revelation is special revelation because it is God’s “Word” (i.e., 
information) which is given to men and women—therefore, it is a vital part of the 
God/human relationship. Because Otto does not allow special revelation the “numinous” 
is forced to go after any other object other than the YHWH and the Jesus Christ of 
revelatory Scripture—i.e., the “numinous” is forced to go after false gods. Because 
special revelation and the external, creator-, objective God of special revelation are 
epistemologically shut out of the “numinous,” then Otto’s description of the “numinous” 
cannot represent the “numinous” that one experiences before God. Emotions/feelings that 
arise in response to the general revelation might be reflected in Otto’s numinous 
characteristics of “tremendum,” “utter dependence,” “fear,” “wonder,” and “awe”; but the 
general revelation—because it is a provider of fundamental knowledge about the true 
God—probably does not provoke emotions/feelings such as “dizzy intoxication,” “strange 
                                                 
346
 Otto’s empiricism is reflected in the following quote: “And so we hold that in 
endeavouring to account for our assurance of the Risen Christ two sorts of interpretation must be 
excluded, the naïvely supernaturalistic and the rationalistic. The former is that which has recourse 
to the ‘Empty Tomb’. It holds that Christ’s tomb was proved to be empty by the evidence of the 
senses, that the Risen Christ was perceived by the senses, and that the truth of the facts so 
certified in sense-experience was then handed down by human testimony. On this view the 
conviction of the resurrection was from the first not faith, but a piece of empirical knowledge. 
This is the most serious objection that can be brought against the naïve ‘supernaturalist’ 
interpretation ….” (Otto, 1958, 222, 223.) 
347
 On pp. 84-87 above I consider God’s calls—in 2 Kings 17:7-41—for the Israelites to 
come out of the fear of false gods and, instead, to only fear him. I make the case there that people 
in those times really did experience terrible emotions/feelings as they found themselves in 
bondage to these gods. But God called them away from this to the fear of only himself with the 
reasoning that only God alone had the power and authority that was worth fearing (see 2 Kings 
17:39). The context of real fear in the employment of these virtue-fear-of-God cases is evident 
only if one understands the darkness and fearfulness inherent in idolatry. This reality is also the 
background of vv. 25 and 26 of David’s Psalm of thanksgiving (1 Chron 16:8-36): “For great is 
the LORD and most worthy of praise; he is to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the 
nations are idols, but the LORD made the heavens.” 
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ravishment,” “creeping flesh,” or “terror.” If the knowledge about God imparted to 
humans by God is considered to be a kind of special revelation, then according to Otto’s 
epistemological restrictions, both revelations would be considered by him to be non-
knowledge because they are both revelations that have their origin in the mind of the 
external God who created humans. Be that as it may, I do not think Otto has in any way 
any revelation in his mind about the God of the Bible when he lists the characteristics of 
his numinous; If this is so, the emotions/feelings that comprise the “numinous” are 
completely arbitrary, and, therefore, completely unpredictable (because they 
spontaneously spring up from a knowledge-base of completely subjective “truth”). The 
emotions/feelings can be anything; so it is not surprising then that Otto claims so many 
sensations and perceptions and emotions for the “numinous.” This also accounts for the 
mysteriousness of the numinous (mysterium tremendum)—because, by definition, the 
object of the “numinous” can never really be found and known. All this also explains 
Otto’s and Becker’s and others’ willingness to go to ANE texts; because one’s religious 
claim is just as arbitrary and “valid” as another’s, then the religious claims made by the 
nations of the ANE are just as valid as those made by Israel. No one ought to say—if 
Otto’s schema is correct—that one is right and another is wrong; for if both have their 
own a priori “numinous” experiences, then no argument can be made against them—for 
the truth of the claim is necessarily in the claim. The numinous cannot be extracted out 
and debated about; it is a categorical imperative that cannot and must not be explained (or 
even described—although Otto tries his best to do so). By thus presenting the numinous, 
Becker essentially denies that any challenge can be even made against his idea. But all 
this goes against common sense and against the information provided by the general 
revelation that lets us know that God does exist and that we are not him. Finally, the 
general revelation also provides enough knowledge for people to be at least minimally 
aware of God’s goodness. In Psalm 8, the writer says, “from the lips of children and 
infants you have ordained praise” (NIV); he does not say, “… you have ordained strange 
ravishment and creeping flesh.” There is something of the knowledge of God’s goodness 
that God provides to all; but most “exchange the glory of the immortal God” (Rom 1:23a) 
for objects of their “numinous” emotions/feelings that God never intended for them to 
have.  
Human Beings Know that They Are Guilty and Will Be Judged 
This appears to be generally assumed in pre-critical times. For example, the 
“shepherd” who visited Hermas professed that “all creation fears the Lord, but all creation 
does not keep His commandments.”348 According to Tertullian, “The soul doubtless 
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 Roberts and Donaldson, 1989, 25. 
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knows its giver,” and, because the soul knows of its evil, it fears the displeasure and the 
judgment of God: 
Whence, then, the soul's natural fear of God, if God cannot be angry? How is there 
any dread of Him whom nothing offends? What is feared but anger? Whence comes 
anger, but from observing what is done? What leads to watchful oversight, but 
judgment in prospect? Whence is judgment, but from power? To whom does 
supreme authority and power belong, but to God alone?349 
The pre-critical writers believed in the reality and the authority of God and believed that 
there was a final judgment to come—therefore, men and women should live 
circumspectly and honestly before him. Luther says this most forcefully: “Therefore your 
time in this kind of life must be spent in such a way that you reflect about the fear of God, 
humble yourself before Him, and remember that you are a son of Adam, sin, death, and 
damnation to an equal degree with other men ….”350 They also understood that it was 
perfectly appropriate for men and women to experience the emotion/feeling of fear in 
response to the awareness of their own guilt before God, and in response to the “prospect” 
of a final judgment. With the pre-critical writers surveyed earlier, there appears to be no 
question that fear-of-God contains firstly the emotion/feeling of fear—and that fear is 
always first associated with the prospect of punishment. Augustine calls the fear of 
punishment the “beginning of wisdom”;351 Thomas considers both the fear of punishment 
(“servile fear”) as well as the fear of losing relationship with God (“filial fear”) to be the 
“beginning of wisdom.”352 And this is not just a justifiable reaction, but, according to 
Calvin, a necessary tool employed by God to jar men and women out of their depraved 
state: “The stern threatening which God employs are extorted from him by our depraved 
dispositions. For while we are asleep it were in vain to allure us by soothing measures.”353  
But “soothing measures” is what many in the west think religion should only be 
about. Western society has become in the last century or more quite averse to the biblical 
God, his authority, his punishment, and the idea that real fear should be experienced 
before him. Several critical-era scholars acknowledge this prevailing attitude in their 
works: for example, Bamberger observed that fearing God “is repugnant to modern taste, 
which regards fear as incompatible with genuine religious sentiment”;354 Becker, in the 
forward of Gottesfurcht im Alten Testamentum, remarked that he would guard against the 
prevailing tendency of watering down the fearfulness of the OT God (a promise he could 
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 Tertullian, 1989, chap. 2. 
350
 Pelikan, 1965, 181. Luther aimed this remark specifically at Christians who had been 
called to offices of government. 
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 Schaff, 1956, “Homily Nine on the First Epistle of John,” sec. 2. 
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 Aquinas, 1981, 1249, “Question 19: of the Gift of Fear,” art. 8. 
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 Calvin, 1972, sec. 7.  
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 Bamberger, 1929, 39. 
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only partially fulfill because his hands were tied by his form-critical method); finally, 
Terrien worried about this tendency (and his warning is worth quoting one more time): 
It would be a grave error, however, to soften the meaning of the expression [fear-of-
God] and to ignore its central element of mysterium tremendum. Although many 
commentators and historians have fallen into this error during the past hundreds 
years, the fear of the Lord is not merely to be equated with reverence, piety, or 
religion because it is impossible today to revaluate and again charge these terms 
with their ancient—but now largely lost—connotation of awesomeness. It is true 
that biblical religion is summed up in the law to love God absolutely and 
exclusively (Deut 6:4, 5), but this love, precisely because it is absolute and 
exclusive, imposes upon man a demand which is never devoid of fearful 
dimensions.355 
One of the major works that was influential in moving people away from the idea of 
an exterior, supreme God who will judge men and women for their sins, was Otto’s Das 
Heilige. Not only did Otto turn “God” into a subjective experience—which makes him no 
longer a threat because he is no longer an objective reality—but he accused the biblical 
God (for all intents and purposes) of being evil. In his opinion, the biblical “wrath of 
Yahweh” possesses “no concern whatever with moral qualities,” but is more like 
stored-up electricity, discharging itself upon anyone who comes too near. It is 
‘incalculable’ and ‘arbitrary’. Anyone who is accustomed to think of deity only by 
its rational attributes must see in this ‘wrath’ mere caprice and willful passion.356  
In other words, YHWH, in his wrath, is just as likely to do good as he is to do evil. It 
must be remembered that Otto here is not speaking about his “God” (which is an 
imaginary “God” “posited” in the mind), but about the God of the Bible.357 
If church and society are to understand ultimate reality something along the lines of 
Otto and to minimize or eliminate the biblical idea of God, then, of course, there is 
nothing to fear from God or a future judgment presided over by God. But, there is much 
to fear—if this is the way things really are—from human beings; for if there is no God 
and no moral law that exists apart from human subjectivity, then there is no solution to 
the world’s evils. With no law and lawgiver above and outside of humans, then humans 
become a law unto themselves—with all the horrific consequences. But in view of the 
injustice that has been in the world and is in the world today, men and women should be 
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 Terrien, 1962, 258. Despite the use of Ottonian terms, Terrien in this article sounds very 
orthodox. A later article about the “numinous,” however, indicates that his understanding of God 
is similar to Otto’s (see section on Terrien above). 
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 Otto, 1958, 18. 
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 Because Otto’s idea of “God” is all a matter of an a priori phenomenon of the mind, 
then there is no objective God to fear and no objective judgment to fear. One could say that in 
Otto’s schema there really is no such thing as evil and sin; if the idea of God as true lawgiver is 
false, then there is no law by which humans can be judged—only arbitrary human justice is 
available. Maybe that was the goal that Otto was after: to present “the Holy” one such that guilt 
shifted from humans to God. 
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longing for righteous judgment. This is the plea of Lochman who, having lived under the 
“hellish” conditions of communism in which justice became completely arbitrary, well 
understood that the final judgment one day would be a blessing in that the world and 
humans would be freed and those who made others’ lives miserable would get their just 
punishment. This plea of Lochman is infinitely more in keeping with common sense and 
reality than Otto’s unfair accusation of the God of the Bible.358 
God Desires that a Love Relationship Once Again Be Established 
The consensus of the pre-critical writers and several of the critical ones surveyed above is 
that fear ultimately is good and a gift from God. It is a tool that he uses to bring human 
beings closer to him; it flows out of his love and is only for our good. Augustine and 
Thomas drew a marked distinction between the negative fear of punishment (what 
Thomas calls “servile” fear) and the positive fear of losing relationship with God (what 
Thomas calls “filial” fear). The former, as unpleasant as it is, is simply designed by God 
to be a warning to a man or woman that a dangerous situation exists. The latter is simply 
the fear that comes from the prospect of losing one’s beloved and (gently) goads a person 
not to God (for a person who has filial love for God is already in God), but into holding 
on to his or her Lord even tighter. Servile fear is motivated by the knowledge of God 
(God’s power and God’s wrath [but not of his love]) and the feeling of dependence and 
guilt before God. The object of servile fear is both the prospective suffering as well as the 
agent who brings the suffering—i.e., God. Filial fear, on the other hand, is motivated by 
the knowledge of God (God’s power, authority, wrath, and love) and by love for and 
adoration of God. The person experiencing filial fear is fearful about the prospect of 
losing friendship, intimacy, and favor with God.359 The objects of filial fear are the loss of 
relationship as well as the one with whom the relationship is lost and who also 
(ultimately, sovereignly) causes the loss—i.e., God. Servile and filial fear have the 
following characteristics according to Augustine and Thomas: 
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 Accusations against God mentioned only tangentially by Otto pale in comparison to 
those made against God’s character by James Crenshaw in a recent monograph. In Defending 
God—a title that I am convinced is deceptively ironic (the book is certainly no theodicy)—
Crenshaw declares that the time has come for the theological academy to finally bring the God of 
the OT to justice for all the evil he has done (see FN 19). 
359
 This is where the biblical marriage metaphor is so important (see Isa 62:5; Hosea 1-3; 
Eph 5:22-33; Rev 19:7; 21:1-4). Just like in a marriage relationship in which a woman deeply 
loves her husband and is always at least a little anxious about the prospect of losing that intimacy, 
so the believer who deeply loves God will always feel some anxiousness about the prospect of 
any kind of degradation in the quality of the relationship.  
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Servile fear 
Augustine 
*fears lest God come 
*does not give boldness in the judgment 
*prepares a place for charity 
*it removes “rottenness” from the body 
*is necessary for justification 
*is not based upon a person’s love 
Thomas 
*is not evil because it is end-ordered 
*originates in God’s spirit 
*is not based upon freedom 
*understands that God is the cause of 
punishment 
*is the beginning of wisdom 
*diminishes as charity grows 
*does not remain in heaven 
Filial fear 
Augustine 
*fears lest God depart 
*the charity (love) from whence it flows 
gives one boldness in the judgment 
*the charity from whence it flows drives 
out servile fear 
*comes from the desire to embrace God 
Thomas 
*originates in God’s spirit 
*wants to please God 
*is one of the seven gifts (Isa 11:2, 3) of 
the Holy Spirit 
*is fear of losing God’s fellowship 
*comes also from the prospect of God’s 
punishment 
*is the beginning of wisdom 
*grows as charity grows 
*remains in heaven 
 
The subject of Angst, so appropriately brought up by several of the critical-era 
scholars, surely sheds light on the fear-of-God subject and perhaps upon this just 
expressed thought. Angst is a fear/dread/anxiety phenomenon that is universal—the 
“emblem of humanity” and a “wake-up call,” as Lochman well put it. I do not think that 
Angst can be considered completely apart from fear-of-God—for, as Balz well points out, 
it points men and women to God. As Blocher puts it, Angst forces people to know that 
they are creatures and not the creator. And when faced with the great evils of this world, 
we rightfully cry out, as Lochman acknowledges, for help from God and for his righteous 
judgment. Angst has everything to do with the human condition—i.e., separation from 
God, contingency, vulnerability, death, etc. But the human condition cannot be 
considered completely apart from God because humans are created by God and their 
condition is sovereignly decreed by God. Human Angst cannot be considered apart from 
theology and anthropology and soteriology; in other words, Angst is a psychological 
phenomenon sovereignly provided by God for a purpose—and that purpose has much to 
do with human beings fulfilling God’s purpose for them. 
Angst might be considered the absolute “beginning of wisdom” in that it purely 
“goads” humans to look for answers that will bring relief. The concerns of humans that 
bring Angst include concerns of identity (“who am I?”), meaning (“am I doing what I was 
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designed for?”), food, injury, disobedience before every authority (including God), 
vulnerability, pain, death, and everything else that goes along with being a creature made 
by a omnipotent and absolutely holy Creator in a fallen and sinful world. Because the 
fearful situation of this world is a result of human sin and God’s punishment for it, one 
could argue that Angst is in fact fear of God’s punishment and ultimately, fear of God. Be 
that as it may, Angst surely points a person in the direction of God by raising to an acute 
level the need for someone who can help and comfort and explain the unknown. Many 
psychology of religion scholars (who are not that far away in their epistemological and 
“theological” views from the “history of religions” scholars) would say that Angst 
prompts a person to search for anything that can help bring relief—and a deity of some 
kind might be “posited” to help. In other words, fear comes first, and fear “invents” 
“God.” But Christian scholars would say that the knowledge of God, being implanted by 
God into the hearts of all men and women, is available all along. Angst simply taps a 
person on the shoulder and says, “just a reminder—God is over there, and he is 
available!” The awareness of God is in people from the beginning, if however vague. But 
that awareness grows as humans—in the process of growing up—experience more of the 
world. One might say, “this is just what Otto thought: humans grope their way through 
the world until they ‘discover’ God.”360 But I am not speaking about a “numinous” 
feeling that a people “discover,” but about acknowledging the God who they already 
know to exist apart from themselves. Coming to God by the process of “growing up” and 
learning more about the world is not an inductive process of receiving enough inputs from 
whatever impresses a person in the world—volcanoes, crocodiles, lilies, human love, big 
blue eyes, etc.—such that one day that person can admit that he or she has enough 
evidence to declare that God must exist; conversely, the encounters with evidence for 
God in the world only fits what a man or a woman already know to be the case. Coming 
to God can involve very little or very much evidential information. But when a person 
comes to the point of “belief,” he or she is really not at very heart crying out “Eureka!” 
Rather, that person is simply confessing what he or she knew to be the case all along.   
CHAPTER ONE CLOSING THOUGHTS 
After this brief survey, one can see that fear-of-God is a very big topic—for both 
those who consider the subject theologically and those who consider it critically. The 
subject is big to more conservatively-minded theologians because they recognize that 
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 Regarding my use of “discovers,” it should be remembered that when Otto says that the 
numinous “remains a pure feeling, as in ‘panic’ terror … or itself invents, or, better, discovers, the 
numinous object by rendering explicit the obscure germinal ideas latent in itself” (Otto, 1958, 125 
[italics mine]; see my p. 48 above), he is using “discovers” ironically. With his theology, 
“invents” is the more accurate and straightforward term. 
 144 
fear-of-God—and they mean real fear—can be experienced in all kinds of phases and 
stages of life, whether one is a believer or not. This only makes sense in view of who God 
is and who men and women are. They know that fear-of-God is a phenomenon that has 
much to do with pleasing God—and, therefore, much is at stake—up to and including 
human eternal destiny. On the other hand, fear-of-God is “big” to the critics in that it can 
mean so many things. If they are correct, biblical “fear” must be the most elastic word in 
the Bible—so there is much to say about it. Conservative theologians confess that 
(theologically speaking) there is much to fear from the God who has power to consign 
humans forever to heaven or to hell; so they tend to keep the fear emotion/feeling first in 
mind when handling fear-of-God passages. But the critics appear to have nothing 
restraining them from going far and wide with how they understand the meaning of fear-
of-God. So, the subject is very big for them—semantically speaking. After this study, I 
conclude that the critics come up with incorrect results because their methods are 
grounded in skepticism. Their results are theologically incorrect; their results are also 
incorrect from a simple literary point of view—for they have little regard for the biblical 
context. If fear-of-God and commandment keeping is the “end” and the “all” of 
humankind—as Qoheleth says—then to study fear-of-God without thinking that God 
might want to have a say (i.e., to study without the fear of God) is to make a mistake that 
guarantees that the results will be (once again, according to Qoheleth) “meaningless, and 
a chasing after the wind.”  
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CHAPTER TWO 
FEAR OF GOD IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 
Many of the observations that were made in the previous chapter—especially in 
reaction to Becker’s form-critical fear-of-God study—will now be considered within the 
context of an encompassing analysis of fear texts within the Old Testament. Because most 
mentions of fear in the Hebrew Bible use , the focus will be mainly upon that word in 
the statistical analysis that immediately follows.  
STATISTICS 
Fear is often mentioned in the OT, and fear-of-God comprises a large share of the 
total of fear texts. The vast majority of passages mentioning some kind of fear employ 
. ESL counts 436 instances of all forms based upon  and there are over 300 
instances of fear—or some emotion/feeling related to fear—that are signified by other 
Hebrew words.361 Shown below is a reasonably exhaustive list of Hebrew words that 
denote some kind of fear.362 
Biblical Hebrew Words for Fear 
 
hma 
 	% ,  	%   verb  S367  “dread”  17X 
1fאַ  adj.  S366  “terrible”  3X   
lhb 
$ * 	אּ  verb  S926  “disturb, terrify, to hurry”  39X   
(אּ ( ) 	$ 	 , $ * (אּ  (Aram.)  verb  S927  “dismay”  llX   
 	$ 	 Zאּ  n.f.  S928  “sudden terror, alarm”  4X    
ttj 
 * 	G  verb  S2865  “broken, afraid, dismayed”  54X 
 *[G  n.m.  S2866  “terror”  1X 
 *G  n.m.  S2844  “terror, dismayed”  4X 
 	תּ )G  n.f.  S2847  “terror”  1X 
 *G ( *G  n.m.  S2849  “terror”  1X 
 )תּ )G  n.f.  S2851  “terror”  8X 
 	תּ )G (%  n.f.  S4288  “destruction, ruin, terror”  11X 
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 ESL (in LDLS) counts 314 cases of the verb, 64 cases of the “adjective,” 45 cases of the 
feminine noun hrwy, and 13 cases of the masculine noun arwm. LDLS morphological search 
confirms the same total count of 436; my count of 437 in the table of statistics, however, is 
explained by my counting of the single use of  in 1 Sam 12:18 twice. The verb there has two 
objects: God and Samuel.  
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 The table includes Strong’s (Exhaustive Concordance) numbers, a brief definition from 
TWOT, and the number of instances of the word. lhb is not used to signify virtue fear-of-God and 
usually has more a sense of “dismay.” Most of the 98 uses of the verb of rwg have non-fear 
meanings (“to abide,” “to be a stranger,” etc.). BDB gives rwg three separate lexical entries, the 
third having mainly the meaning of “dread” (with a count of approx. 20X). ttj, which mainly 
means “shattered” and “dismayed,” is not used in virtue fear-of-God cases; but see Mal 2:5. םmv 
primarily means “to make desolate” and can have nuances of “to appall” or “to horrify.” 
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hhlb 
 	 	לּ *אּ  n.f.  S1091  “terror, destruction”  10X 
ץlp 
T *$ 	פּ  verb  S6426  “shudder”  1X 
הּh 	לּ *פּ  n.f.  S6427  “shuddering”  4X  
 Zh Z$ (# )תּ  n.f.  S8606  “shuddering, horror”  1X 
t[b 
 *+ 	אּ  verb  S1204  “terrify”  16X   
 	 	+ (אּ  n.f.  S1205  “terror, dismay”  2X   
הּ+ )אּ  n.m.pl.  S1161  “terrors”  2X   
rgy 
0E	  verb  S3025  “fear, dread”  5X 
0E	  adj.  S3016  “fearing”  2X 
rwg 
הּבּ  verb  S1481  “abide, gather together, fear”  98X 
 	0E (%  n.f.  S4034  “fear, terror”  1X 
 	הּE (%  n.f.  S4035  “fear, storehouse”  3X 
0E 	%  n.m.  S4032  “fear, terror”  8X 
ary 
 	  verb  S3372  “fear, be afraid, revere”  314X 
 	  adj.  S3373  “fearing, afraid”  64X 
אַ ()  n.f.  S3374  “fearing, fear”  45X 
 	0%,  	0%  n.m. S4172  “fear, terror”  13X 
gad 
Eשּׂ 	גּ  verb  S1672  “be afraid”  7X 
	Eאַ (גּ  n.f.  S1674  “care, anxiety”  6X 
rxm 
 *h %  n.m.  S4712  “straits, distress”  3X 
ljd 
$ *G (גּ  (Aram.)  verb  S1763  “to fear”  6X 
ץr[ 
T 	[+ *%, T * 	+  verb  S6206  “dread, fear, break”  15X 
T ) 	+  adj.  S6184  “mighty, awe-inspiring”  20X 
drj 
- * 	G  verb  S2729  “tremble, be afraid”  39X 
-  	G  adj.  S2730  “afraid, trembling”  6X 
 	- 	[G  n.f.  S2731  “quaking, trembling”  9X 
djp 
- *G 	פּ  verb  S6342  “fear, tremble, revere”  25X 
- *G *פּ  n.m.  S6343  “dread”  49X 
 	גּ (G *פּ  n.f.  S6345  “fear, religious awe”  1X 
[wz 
*+הּ\,  	+	\  verb  S2111  “tremble, be in terror”  3X 
*+הּ\  (Aram.)  verb  S2112  “tremble”  2X 
 	+	 (\  n.f.  S2113  “horror”  6X 
ץwq 
TהּS  verb  S6973  “be grieved, loath”  9X 
lhz 
$ *G	\  verb  S2119  “shrink back, fear”  3X 
ttr 
^ Z^ Z  n.m.  S7374  “trembling, panic”  1X 
agj 
	E 	G  n.f.  S2283  “reeling (i.e., in terror)”  1X 
d[r 
- *+ 	  verb  S7460  “tremble”  3X 
- *+ *,  	- 	+ (  n.m./f.  S7461  “trembling, fear”  6X 
zpj 
\ *# 	G  verb  S2648  “hasten, flee, fear”  9X 
r[c 
 *+ 	שׁ  verb  S8175  “be very afraid, sweep away”  8X 
 *+ *שׁ  n.m.  S8178  “storm”  4X 
grj 
E * 	G  verb  S2727  “quake”  1X 
םmv 
1 % 	﬩  verb  S8074  “be desolate, appalled”  92X 
 	מּ *﬩  n.f.  S8047  “waste, horror, appallment”  39X 
 147 
The total count of fear and fear-related texts in the OT is huge, numbering most 
likely somewhere between 700 and 800.363 As can be seen, fear was a topic of great 
concern to the biblical writers; but this is no surprise in view of the theology and 
anthropology of the Bible: God is creator and omnipotent; humans are created and nearly 
powerless compared to God. Humans are morally accountable to God and understand that 
they will be judged. Therefore, men and women fear.  
Analysis of Fear Texts Employing ארי 
I will now present the results of a more in-depth analysis of all the OT uses of all 
the forms of . The following table lists all  uses in the order that they appear in the 
Protestant canon. After the verse, the form of the word is shown; instead of cataloguing 
them according to noun, adjective, and verb, I decided—in keeping with my opinion 
presented in the Becker section—to designate the “adjectives” as participles (see 
“Becker’s Psalms Literary Form” section above).364 In the “Object” category, the object 
of the instance of fear is identified—usually God or something/someone in “nature” (i.e., 
a man, a tribe, a lion, a desert, etc.), an idol in a few instances, or “unclear” if the context 
is ambiguous as to who or what is being feared. The category entitled “Type” is meant to 
show which  uses are “event” fear-of-God cases and which are “virtue” fear-of-God 
cases. “Event” cases are those in which the biblical narrative depicts the event of a person 
or a group fearing before something/someone. This is usually a reaction to God or some 
fearful person or thing (e.g., when the Israelites stood before the quaking and smoking 
Mount Sinai, they “trembled with fear” [Exod 20:18]), but can also be fear generated in 
anticipation of some dreadful event (see, e.g., Deut 2:25). “Virtue” fear-of-God cases, on 
the other hand, are usually not describing events of fear; rather, they simply present fear-
of-God (and occasionally fear of a person or group) as a virtue. (e.g., “Happy is everyone 
who fears the LORD” [Ps 128:1]). For the “Meaning” category, unless something 
contextually indicates otherwise (which in my opinion—as can be seen below—is never 
the case), the  instance will be assumed to have the main meaning of “fear.” 
Secondary nuances of meanings (if any) are shown under the category “Second 
Meaning.” Many of these are designated “Abstract” because there appears to be—in 
                                                 
363
 The wide variation of my numbers here is a reasonable allowance for interpretation of 
individual texts. As indicated in the table, many of the words are semantically not centered on fear 
and in many cases may not indicate any emotion/feeling related to fear at all; on the other hand, 
other words (especially ) are semantically centered on fear, but may be interpreted by some to 
have non-fear meanings. As will be seen with the  statistics below, I consider all of the OT 
uses of  to primarily mean fear—but allow for secondary meanings in many cases.  
364
 I include all the many instances of  	וֹ" as participles (also understood as participles by 
BDB, occurring 34X). 
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addition to the root meaning of “fear”—an additional semantic implication or nuance of 
one of the more “abstract” meanings of fear (as often suggested by dictionaries and 
lexica—i.e., reverence, worship, obedience, loyalty, honor, etc.). The last category, 
“Context,” is simply a place to comment briefly upon the general context of each  text. 
Form, Function, and Meaning of ארי Texts 
 
VERSE FORM 
NOUN 
PARTICIPLE 
VERB 
OBJECT 
GOD 
IDOL 
NATURE 
UNCLEAR 
TYPE 
EVENT 
OTHER 
VIRTUE 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
NONE 
SECOND 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
NONE 
CONTEXT 
Gen 3:10 V G E F N Judgment because of original sin 
Gen 9:2 N N E F N Animal fear before men and women 
Gen 15:1 V U E F N God’s encouragement 
Gen 18:15 V G E F N Fear of God’s displeasure 
Gen 19:30 V N E F N God’s destruction of Sodom 
Gen 20:8 V G E F N Fear of God’s punishment 
Gen 20:11 N G V F N No fear of God and his punishment 
Gen 21:17 V N E F N Fear of unknown and death 
Gen 22:12 P G V F A God demands Isaac for a sacrifice 
Gen 26:7 V N E F N Fear of death 
Gen 26:24 V N E F N Esau Threat 
Gen 28:17 V G E F N Epiphany 
Gen 28:17 P G E F N Epiphany 
Gen 31:31 V N E F N Life threatened 
Gen 32:7(8) V N E F N Life threatened 
Gen 32:11(12) P N E F N Life threatened 
Gen 35:17 V N E F N Fear of death 
Gen 42:18 P G V F A Fear of punishment lest J. breaks oath 
Gen 42:35 V N E F A Fear of Joseph’s punishment 
Gen 43:18 V N E F N Fear of Joseph’s punishment 
Gen 43:23 V N E F N Calming from fear of punishment 
Gen 46:3 V N E F N Fear of going to Egypt 
Gen 50:19 V N E F N Fear of Joseph 
Gen 50:21 V N E F N Fear of Joseph 
Exod 1:17 V G V F A Fear of God more than Pharaoh 
Exod 1:21 V G V F A Fear of God more than Pharaoh 
Exod 2:14 V N E F N Fear of Egyptian punishment 
Exod 3:6 V G E F N Epiphany 
Exod 9:20 P G V F A F. of God’s punish. more than Phar. 
Exod 9:30 V G V F A No fear of God’s punishment 
Exod 14:10 V N E F N Fear of death at hands of Egyptians 
Exod 14:13 V N E F N Fear of death at hands of Egyptians 
Exod 14:31 V G V F A God showed he is stronger then Egy. 
Exod 15:11 P G O F N The conquering God is fear-worthy  
Exod 18:21 P G V F A Awareness of God’s punishment 
Exod 20:20 V G E F N Epiphany and God’s displeasure 
Exod 20:20 N G V F N Great fear used to dissuade from sin 
Exod 34:10 P G O F N The conquering God is fear-worthy  
Exod 34:30 V N E F N Fear of Moses and his glory 
Lev 19:3 V N V F A Parent/child rel. = God/man relation 
Lev 19:14 V G V F N Law and judgment 
Lev 19:30 V G V F A Judgment—sanctuary sym. for God 
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Lev 19:32 V G V F A Law and judgment 
Lev 25:17 V G V F A Law and judgment 
Lev 25:36 V G V F A Law and judgment 
Lev 25:43 V G V F A Law and judgment 
Lev 26:2 V G V F A Judgment—sanctuary sym. for God 
Num 12:8 V N E F N Punishment for not fearing Moses 
Num 14:9 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Num 14:9 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Num 21:34 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 1:19 P N O F N Terrible and dangerous desert 
Deut 1:21 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 1:29 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 2:4 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 2:25 N N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 3:2 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 3:22 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 4:10 V G V F A Law and punishment 
Deut 4:34 N G E F N God’s terrifying displays of power 
Deut 5:5 V N E F N Afraid of burning mount Sinai 
Deut 5:29 V G V F A Fear to avoid sin and punishment 
Deut 6:2 V G V F A Fear to avoid sin and punishment 
Deut 6:13 V G V F A Fear to avoid sin and punishment 
Deut 6:24 V G V F A Fear to avoid sin and punishment 
Deut 7:18 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 7:19 P N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 7:21 P G O F N God’s overwhelming power 
Deut 8:6 V G V F A God disciplines as a father 
Deut 8:15 P N O F N Terrible wilderness 
Deut 10:12 V G V F N Law and accountability 
Deut 10:17 P G O F N Awesome power of God 
Deut 10:20 V G V F A God is great and mighty 
Deut 10:21 P G O F N God’s awesome deeds 
Deut 11:25 N N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 13:4(5) V G V F A Law and accountability 
Deut 13:11(12) V G E F N God’s judgment on idolatry 
Deut 14:23 V G V F A God’s law 
Deut 17:13 V G E F N God’s punishment of sin 
Deut 17:19 V G V F A Law and punishment 
Deut 19:20 V G E F N Punishment 
Deut 20:1 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 20:3 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 20:8 P N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 21:21 V G E F N Punishment 
Deut 25:18 V G V F A Great judgment on Amalek 
Deut 26:8 N G E F N Fearful and powerful works of God 
Deut 28:10 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 28:58 V G V F A Law and punishment 
Deut 28:58 P G O F N Awesomeness of God 
Deut 31:6 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 31:8 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Deut 31:12 V G V F A Teach fear-of-God and follow law 
Deut 31:13 V G V F A Teach fear-of-God and follow law 
Deut 34:12 N N E F N Moses’s amazing displays of power 
Josh 4:14 V N V F A Fear of leaders in war setting 
Josh 4:14 V N V F A Fear of leaders in war setting 
Josh 4:24 V G V F A Fear in view of God’s miracle 
Josh 8:1 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
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Josh 9:24 V N E F N Fear of Joshua 
Josh 10:2 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Josh 10:8 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Josh 10:25 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Josh 11:6 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Josh 22:25 V G V F A Law and obedience 
Josh 24:14 V G V F A Stern warnings to fear and serve God 
Judg 4:18 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Judg 6:10 V I V F A Warning in the midst of judgment 
Judg 6:23 V G E F N Epiphany 
Judg 6:27 V N E F N Fear of disapproval of people 
Judg 7:3 P N E F N Fear of enemies 
Judg 7:10 P N E F N Fear of enemies 
Judg 8:20 V N E F N Boy asked to be executioner 
Judg 13:6 P G E F N Awesome characteristic of angel 
Ruth 3:11 V N E F N Fear of unknown people and events 
1 Sam 3:15 V N E F N Fear of Eli’s reaction to God’s word 
1 Sam 4:7 V I E F N Feeling of doom with perceived gods 
1 Sam 4:20 V N E F N Fear of death and pain and judgment 
1 Sam 7:7 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
1 Sam 12:14 V G V F N Stern warnings of God’s judgment 
1 Sam 12:18 V G E F N Great fear before God AND Samuel 
1 Sam 12:20 V G E F N Great fear before God AND Samuel 
1 Sam 12:24 V G V F N Great judgment and fear 
1 Sam 14:26 V N E F N Fear before authority’s command 
1 Sam 15:24 V N E F N Fear of people 
1 Sam 17:11 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
1 Sam 17:24 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
1 Sam 18:12 V N E F N Fear and jealousy before man 
1 Sam 18:29 V N E F N Fear and jealousy before man 
1 Sam 
21:12(13) 
V N E F N Fear of torture and death 
1 Sam 22:23 V N E F N Fear of being killed 
1 Sam 23:3 P N E F N Fear of enemies 
1 Sam 23:17 V N E F N Fear of Saul 
1 Sam 28:5 V N E F N Great fear before enemies 
1 Sam 28:13 V N E F N Fear before Saul and punishment 
1 Sam 28:20 V U E F N Great fear at prediction of death 
1 Sam 31:4 V U E F N Great fear at certainty of death 
2 Sam 1:14 V N V F N Condemnation of lack of fear 
2 Sam 3:11 V N E F N Fear for life 
2 Sam 6:9 V G E F N Fear of God’s power and judgment 
2 Sam 7:23 P G O F N God’s great and mighty deeds 
2 Sam 9:7 V N E F N Fear for life 
2 Sam 10:19 V N E F N Fear of defeat, death, by Israel 
2 Sam 12:18 V N E F N Fear of possible violent reaction 
2 Sam 13:28 V N E F N Fear of killing Anmon 
2 Sam 14:15 V N E F N Fear of people 
2 Sam 23:3 N G V F A A God-fearing king rules justly 
1 Kings 1:50 V N E F N Fear of Solomon and death 
1 Kings 1:51 V N E F N Fear of Solomon and death 
1 Kings 3:28 V N E F N Fear of Solomon’s justice 
1 Kings 8:40 V G V F A Punishment for sin, and forgiveness 
1 Kings 8:43 V G V F A Fear in view of God’s mighty power 
1 Kings 17:13 V N E F N Fear of starvation and dying 
1 Kings 18:3 P G V F A Fear of God more than Jezebel 
1 Kings 18:12 P G V F A More fear of God than fear of men 
 151 
2 Kings 1:15 V N E F N Fear of death 
2 Kings 4:1 P G V F A No context 
2 Kings 6:16 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
2 Kings 10:4 V N E F N Great, great fear of defeat and death 
2 Kings 17:7 V I E F A Great punishment for idol worship 
2 Kings 17:25 V G V F A Punishment for failure to fear God 
2 Kings 17:28 V G V F A Reaction to God’s judgment 
2 Kings 17:32 P G V F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:33 P G V F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:34 P G V F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:35 V I E F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:36 V G V F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:37 V I E F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:38 V I E F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:39 V G V F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 17:41 P G V F A God’s law and failure to meet it 
2 Kings 19:6 V N E F N Fear of siege and death 
2 Kings 25:24 V N E F N Fear of Babylonian threat 
2 Kings 25:26 V N E F N Fear of Babylonian punishment 
1 Chron 10:4 V U E F N Terror in sure-death circumstances 
1 Chron 13:12 V G E F N Fear of God’s power and punishment 
1 Chron 16:25 P G V F N More to fear with God than idols 
1 Chron 17:21 P G O F N God’s great and mighty works 
1 Chron 22:13 V U E F N Imposing task requiring great courage 
1 Chron 28:20 V U E F N Imposing task requiring great courage 
2 Chron 6:31 V G V F A Punishment and redemption 
2 Chron 6:33 V G V F A God’s mighty name and power 
2 Chron 19:9 N G V F N God-fearing judges avert God’s wrath 
2 Chron 20:3 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
2 Chron 20:15 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
2 Chron 20:17 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
2 Chron 32:7 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
2 Chron 32:18 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Neh 1:5 P G O F N Fear-provoking characteristic of God 
Neh 1:11 V G V F A Law, punishment, and redemption 
Neh 2:2 V N E F N Fear of punishment by the king 
Neh 4:14(8) V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Neh 4:14(8) P G O F N Great power of God 
Neh 5:9 N G V F N Fear of God averts abuse of brothers 
Neh 5:15 N G V F N Fear-of-God dissuades from bad rule 
Neh 6:9 P N E F N Fear of enemies 
Neh 6:13 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Neh 6:14 P N E F N Fear of enemies 
Neh 6:16 V G E F N God’s great power and favor 
Neh 6:19 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Neh 7:2 V G V F A —— 
Neh 9:32 P G O F N Power, judgment, and love of God 
Job 1:1 P G V F A Job was righteous 
Job 1:8 P G V F A Job was righteous 
Job 1:9 V G V F N Fear for good reason: God is a threat 
Job 2:3 P G V F A Job was righteous 
Job 4:6 N U V F N Context unclear 
Job 5:21 V N E F N God’s children fear not destruction 
Job 5:22 V N E F N God’s children fear not wild animals 
Job 6:14 N G V F A Hate goes with not fearing God 
Job 6:21 V N E F N Fear in view of Job’s terrible state 
Job 9:35 V G E F N God’s terror terrorizes Job 
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Job 11:15 V G E F N No need to fear God if Job is clean 
Job 15:4 N U V F A Context unclear 
Job 22:4 N U V F A Context unclear 
Job 28:28 N G V F A Fear-of-God is wisdom 
Job 32:6 V N E F N Fear of an elder 
Job 37:22 P G O F N God’s awesome majesty 
Job 37:24 V G E F N Fear before God’s power and wrath 
Ps 2:11 N G V F N Trembling and fearing before God 
Ps 3:6(7) V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Ps 5:8 N G V F A Bow down before God who hates sin 
Ps 15:4 P G V F A —— 
Ps 19:9(10) N G V F A Fear-of-God related to law keeping 
Ps 22:23(24) P G V F A God’s power and majesty 
Ps 22:25(26) P G V F A God’s power and majesty 
Ps 23:4 V N E F N Fear of pain and death 
Ps 25:12 P G V F A Human sin and God’s grace 
Ps 25:14 P G V F A Human sin and God’s grace 
Ps 27:1 V N E F N With God, no need to fear the world 
Ps 27:3 V N E F N With God, no need to fear the world 
Ps 31:19(20) P G V F A God’s judgment and God’s love 
Ps 33:8 V G V F A God is omnipotent creator 
Ps 33:18 P G V F A God is omnipotent savior 
Ps 34:7(8) P G V F A God is mighty to save 
Ps 34:9(10) V G V F A God is the great protector of saints 
Ps 34:9(10) P G V F A God is the great protector of saints 
Ps 34:11(12) N G V F A God gives long life to God-fearers 
Ps 40:3(4) V G V F A God protects his children from harm 
Ps 45:4(5) P G O F N God’s fearful deeds (Ps. Messianic) 
Ps 46:2(3) V N E F N God protects his children 
Ps 47:2(3) P G O F N God’s mighty power is fearful 
Ps 49:5(6) V N E F N Almighty God can save from all harm 
Ps 49:16(17) V N E F N Almighty God can save from all harm 
Ps 52:6(8) V G V F A The righteous see the evil be judged 
Ps 55:5(6) N N E F N Fear of enemies 
Ps 55:19(20) V G V F A They who don’t fear God are damned 
Ps 56:3(4) V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Ps 56:4(5) V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Ps 56:11(12) V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Ps 60:4(6) P G V F A God protects those who fear him 
Ps 61:5(6) P G V F A God has power to protect his people 
Ps 64:4(5) V G V F N Those who fear God not do evil 
Ps 64:9(10) V G V F N God’s wrath makes one fear/ponder 
Ps 65:5(6) P G O F N God’s awesome deeds 
Ps 65:8(9) V G E F N Fear of God’s fearful works 
Ps 66:3 P G O F N Fearfulness of God’s deeds 
Ps 66:5 P G O F N Fearfulness of God’s deeds 
Ps 66:16 P G V F A God’s great and mighty power 
Ps 67:7(8) V G V F A God has power to bless and save 
Ps 68:35(36) P G O F N Awesome is the God of power 
Ps 72:5 V G V F A All will fall before God—even kings 
Ps 76:7(8) P G O F N God is fearsome in his anger 
Ps 76:11(12) N G V F N God is fearsome in judgment 
Ps 76:8(9) V G E F N God’s judgment shuts every mouth 
Ps 76:12(13) P G E F N God’s wrath provokes fear in kings 
Ps 85:9(10) P G V F A God’s wrath is not on those who fear 
Ps 86:11 V G V F A God delivers from the grave 
Ps 89:7(8) P G O F N God is absolute sovereign 
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Ps 90:11 N G V F N Fear justified in view of God’s wrath 
Ps 91:5 V N E F N With God, there is nothing to fear 
Ps 96:4 P G O F N God is fearsome 
Ps 99:3 P G O F N God is fearsome; let all men tremble 
Ps 102:15(16) V G V F A God’s anger and God’s grace 
Ps 103:11 P G V F A God is slow to anger, full of love 
Ps 103:13 P G V F A God is slow to anger, full of love 
Ps 103:17 P G V F A God is slow to anger, full of love 
Ps 106:22 P G O F N God can destroy and he can save 
Ps 111:5 P G V F A God is the gracious provider 
Ps 111:9 P G O F N God is loyal and trustworthy 
Ps 111:10 N G V F A God’s power and awesomeness 
Ps 112:1 P G V F A God fearers are happy; not evil men 
Ps 112:7 V N E F N With God, no need to fear the world 
Ps 112:8 V N E F N With God, no reason to fear enemies 
Ps 115:11 P G V F A Fear God instead of idols 
Ps 115:13 P G V F A All-powerful God blesses God fearers 
Ps 118:4 P G V F A God-fearers triumph through God 
Ps 118:6 V N E F N No need to fear men when with God 
Ps 119:38 N G V F A God-fearers receive God’s promises 
Ps 119:63 V G V F A Importance of following God’s law 
Ps 119:74 P G V F A Importance of following God’s law 
Ps 119:79 P G V F A Importance of following God’s law 
Ps 119:120 V G E F N Fear of God and his judgment 
Ps 128:1 P G V F A Happy are all who fear God 
Ps 128:4 P G V F A Happy are all who fear God 
Ps 130:4 V G V F A Forgiveness in the midst of great sin 
Ps 135:20 P G V F A God’s power and justice 
Ps 139:14 P G O F N Humans are fearfully made by God 
Ps 145:6 P G E F N God’s deeds are fearful 
Ps 145:19 P G V F A God’s compassion on God fearers 
Ps 147:11 P G V F A God’s compassion on God fearers 
Prov 1:7 N G V F A Context does not comment 
Prov 1:29 N G V F A God-fearers avoid calamity and panic 
Prov 2:5 N G V F A Wisdom equated with fear-of-God  
Prov 3:7 V G V F A Fearing God necessary for success 
Prov 3:25 V N E F N God will strike the wicked 
Prov 8:13 N G V F A Fear-of-God is to hate evil 
Prov 9:10 N G V F A Fear-of-God is beginning of wisdom 
Prov 10:27 N G V F A Fate of God-fearers vs. evildoers 
Prov 13:13 P G V F A Blessings vs. destruction 
Prov 14:2 P G V F A —— 
Prov 14:16 P U V F A —— 
Prov 14:26 N G V F A God-fearers have confidence/refuge 
Prov 14:27 N G V F A God-fearers have life and not death 
Prov 15:16 N G V F A God-fearers are more content/happy 
Prov 15:33 N G V F A Fear of God and humility related 
Prov 16:6 N G V F A One avoids evil by fearing God 
Prov 19:23 N G V F A Fear of God is life 
Prov 22:4 N G V F A God-fearers are rewarded with life 
Prov 23:17 N G V F A Fearing God gives hope 
Prov 24:21 V G V F N God can bring disaster and ruin 
Prov 24:21 V N V F N King can bring disaster and ruin 
Prov 31:21 V N E F N With God no reason to fear the world 
Prov 31:30 P G V F A —— 
Eccl 3:14 V G V F A God’s absolute sovereignty 
Eccl 5:7(6) V G V F A God’s anger and destruction of works 
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Eccl 7:18 P G V F A Death and destruction for the proud 
Eccl 8:12 P G V F A Long life for God fearers 
Eccl 8:12 V G E F N Long life for God fearers 
Eccl 8:13 P G V F N The wicked have shorter lives 
Eccl 9:2 P N E F N Same fate comes to all 
Eccl 12:5 V N E F N Fear of heights as death approaches 
Eccl 12:13 V G V F A Duty and judgment 
Isa 7:4 V N E F N Fear of enemies 
Isa 7:25 N N E F N Fear of briars and thorns 
Isa 8:12 V N E F N One should fear God’s judgment 
Isa 8:12 N N E F N God’s judgment upon Israel 
Isa 8:13 N G V F N God’s judgment upon Israel 
Isa 10:24 V N E F N God’s punishment through Assyria 
Isa 11:2 N G V F A The messiah will have fear-of-God  
Isa 11:3 N G V F A The messiah will have fear-of-God  
Isa 18:2 P N O F N God’s judgment 
Isa 18:7 P N O F N God’s judgment 
Isa 21:1 P N O F N God’s judgment and destruction 
Isa 25:3 V G V F A God’s punishment and mercy 
Isa 29:13 V G V F A God’s judgment 
Isa 33:6 N G V F A Fear-of-God is Zion’s treasure 
Isa 35:4 V N E F N God’s vengeance 
Isa 37:6 V N E F N Judgment upon king of Assyria 
Isa 40:9 V N E F N God’s power and protection 
Isa 41:5 V N E F N God’s judgment 
Isa 41:10 V N E F N God’s judgment 
Isa 41:13 V N E F N God’s judgment 
Isa 41:14 V N E F N God’s judgment 
Isa 43:1 V N E F N God’s judgment and restoration 
Isa 43:5 V N E F N God’s judgment and restoration 
Isa 44:2 V N E F N God’s judgment and restoration 
Isa 50:10 P G V F A Fearers of God vs. the wicked 
Isa 51:7 V N E F N God’s protection vs. his punishment 
Isa 51:12 V N E F N Justice vs. grace 
Isa 54:4 V N E F N Overflowing wrath vs. eternal love 
Isa 54:14 V N E F N Overflowing wrath vs. eternal love 
Isa 57:11 V N E F N Dread and fear of idols vs. God 
Isa 57:11 V G V F N Dread and fear of idols vs. God 
Isa 59:19 V G V F N God’s wrath and judgment 
Isa 63:17 N G V F A Fear-of-God same as a hardened heart 
Isa 64:3(2) P G O F N Judgment causing nations to tremble 
Jer 1:8 V N E F N God’s word and his judgment 
Jer 3:8 V G E F N Great sin and God’s judgment of it 
Jer 5:22 V G V F N Wickedness and punishment 
Jer 5:24 V G V F A People’s rejection of God’s provision 
Jer 10:5 V N E F N Fear of God vs. fear of idols 
Jer 10:7 V G V F N Fear of God vs. fear of idols 
Jer 17:8 V N E F N God’s people have no fear of world 
Jer 23:4 V N E F N God’s people have no fear of world 
Jer 26:19 P G V F A Hezekiah feared God’s punishment 
Jer 26:21 V N E F N Fear of death 
Jer 30:10 V N E F N God’s promise of restoration 
Jer 32:21 N U E F N Great terror in midst of the exodus 
Jer 32:39 V G V F A God’s promise of restoration 
Jer 32:40 N G V F N Fear-of-God dissuades one from sin 
Jer 40:9 V N E F N Fear of the Babylonians 
Jer 41:18 V N E F N Fear of the Babylonians 
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Jer 42:11 V N E F N Fear of the king of Babylon 
Jer 42:11 P N E F N Fear of the king of Babylon 
Jer 42:11 V N E F N Fear of the king of Babylon 
Jer 42:16 P N E F N Fear of death and punishment 
Jer 44:10 V G V F N Great idolatry that God hates 
Jer 46:27 V N E F N After punishment comes restoration 
Jer 46:28 V N E F N After punishment comes restoration 
Jer 51:46 V N E F N After punishment comes restoration 
Lam 3:57 V N E F N Reassurance in times of God’s wrath 
Ezek 1:18 N G O F N Fearful characteristics of epiphany 
Ezek 1:22 P G O F N Epiphany 
Ezek 2:6 V N E F N God’s punishment of evil people 
Ezek 2:6 V N E F N God’s punishment of evil people 
Ezek 2:6 V N E F N God’s punishment of evil people 
Ezek 3:9 V N E F N God’s punishment of evil people 
Ezek 11:8 V N E F N God’s punishment of evil people 
Ezek 30:13 N U E F N God’s judgment on Egypt 
Dan 1:10 P N E F N Fear of king’s punishment and death 
Dan 9:4 P G O F N God’s awesome power and judgment 
Dan 10:12 V G E F N Epiphany 
Dan 10:19 V G E F N Epiphany 
Hos 10:3 V G V F A Apostasy and God’s punishment 
Joel 2:11 P G O F N The day of the LORD 
Joel 2:21 V N E F N Restoration after God’s judgment 
Joel 2:22 V N E F N Restoration after God’s judgment 
Joel 2:31(3:4) P G O F N The day of the LORD 
Amos 3:8 V G V F N One should fear before lions and God 
Jon 1:5 V N E F N Fear of death 
Jon 1:9 P G V F A God’s anger and punishment 
Jon 1:10 V N E F N Fear of death 
Jon 1:10 N N E F N Great fear before raging storm 
Jon 1:16 V G V F N Fear of God’s wrath and of death 
Jon 1:16 N G E F N Great fear before God  
Mic 7:17 V G V F N Judgment upon the nations 
Hab 1:7 P N O F N God’s punishment through Babylon 
Hab 3:2 V G V F A God’s wrath and mercy 
Zeph 2:11 P G O F N Terrible judgment against nations 
Zeph 3:7 V G V F N Terrible judgment against nations 
Zeph 3:15 V N E F N Restoration after judgment 
Zeph 3:16 V N E F N Restoration after judgment 
Hag 1:12 V G V F A God’s punishes wrong priorities 
Hag 2:5 V N E F N Restoration after judgment 
Zech 8:13 V N E F N Restoration after judgment 
Zech 8:15 V N E F N Restoration after judgment 
Zech 9:5 V G E F N God’s punishment of nations 
Mal 1:6 N G V F A Disobedience in worship 
Mal 1:14 P G O F N God’s anger at poor quality sacrifices 
Mal 2:5 V G V F A God’s anger at tribe of Levi 
Mal 2:5 N U V F A Judgment of the Levites 
Mal 3:5 V G V F A God’s judgment 
Mal 3:16 P G V F A Fear-of-God and salvation linked 
Mal 3:16 P G V F A Fear-of-God and salvation linked 
Mal 4:2(3:20) P G V F N Blessed God-fearers vs. the damned 
Mal 4:5(3:23) P G O F N Terrible day of the LORD 
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The following table breaks down this information according to individual books 
(only the totals are given): 
Form, Function, and Meaning of ארי Texts—Book Totals 
 
BOOK + total FORM 
NOUN 
PARTICIPLE 
VERB 
OBJECT 
GOD 
IDOL 
NATURE 
UNCLEAR 
TYPE 
EVENT 
OTHER 
VIRTUE 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
NONE 
SECOND 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
NONE 
Genesis 24 N 2 
P 4 
V 18 
G 8 
N 15 
U 1 
E 21 
V 3 
F 24 A 3 
N 21 
Exodus 15 N 1 
P 4 
V 10 
G 11 
N 4 
E 6 
O 2 
V 7 
F 15 A 6 
N 9 
Leviticus 8 V 8 G 7 
N 1 
V 8 F 8 A 7 
N 1 
Numbers 4 V 4 N 4 E 4 F 4 N 4 
Deuteronomy 
44 
N 5 
P 8 
V 31 
G 25 
N 19 
E 23 
O 6 
V 15 
F 44 A 14 
N 30 
Joshua 11 V 11 G 3 
N 8 
E 6 
V 5 
F 11 A 5 
N 6 
Judges 8 P 3 
V 5 
G 2 
I 1 
N 5 
E 7 
V 1 
F 8 A 1 
N 7 
Ruth 1 V 1 N 1 E 1 F 1 N 1 
1 Samuel 22 P 1 
V 21 
G 4 
I 1 
N 15 
U 2 
E 20 
V 2 
F 22 N 22 
2 Samuel 10 N 1 
P 1 
V 8 
G 3 
N 7 
E 7 
O 1 
V 2 
F 10 A 1 
N 9 
1 Kings 8 P 2 
V 6 
G 4 
N 4 
E 4 
V 4 
F8 A 4 
N 4 
2 Kings 19 P 5 
V 14 
G 9 
I 4 
N 6 
E 10 
V 9 
F 19 A 13 
N 6 
1 Chronicles 
6 
P 2 
V 4 
G 3 
U 3 
E 4 
O 1 
V 1 
F 6 N 6 
2 Chronicles 
8 
N 1 
V 7 
G 3 
N 5 
E 5 
V 3 
F 8 A 2 
N 6 
Nehemiah 14 N 2 
P 5 
V 7 
G 8 
N 6 
E 7 
O 3 
V 4 
F 14 A 2 
N 12 
Job 17 N 5 
P 4 
V 8 
G 10 
N 4 
U 3 
E 7 
O 1 
V 9 
F 17 A 7 
N 10 
Psalms 82 N 9 
P 43 
V 30 
G 67 
N 15 
E 20 
O 13 
V 49 
F 82 A 44 
N 38 
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Proverbs 23 N 14 
P 4 
V 5 
G 19 
N 3 
U 1 
E 2 
V 21 
F 23 A 19 
N 4 
Ecclesiastes 9 P 4 
V 5 
G 7 
N 2 
E 3 
V 6 
F 9 A 5 
N 4 
Isaiah 34 N 7 
P 5 
V 22 
G 11 
N 23 
E 20 
O 4 
V 10 
F 34 A 7 
N 27 
Jeremiah 24 N 2 
P 3 
V 19 
G 8 
N 15 
U 1 
E 17 
V 7 
F 24 A 3 
N 21 
Lamentations 
1 
V 1 N 1 E 1 F 1 N 1 
Ezekiel 8 N 2 
P 1 
V 5 
G 2 
N 5 
U 1 
E 6 
O 2 
F 8 N 8 
Daniel 4 P 2 
V 2 
G 3 
N 1 
E 3 
O 1 
F 4 N 4 
Hosea 1 V 1 G 1 V 1 F 1 A 1 
Joel 4 P 2 
V 2 
G 2 
N 2 
E 2 
O 2 
F 4 N 4 
Amos 1 V 1 G 1 V 1 F 1 N 1 
Jonah 6 N 2 
P 1 
V 3 
G 3 
N 3 
E 4 
V 2 
F 6 A 1 
N 5 
Micah 1 V 1 G 1 V 1 F 1 N 1 
Habakkuk 2 P 1 
V 1 
G 1 
N 1 
O 1 
V 1 
F 2 A 1 
N 1 
Zephaniah 4 P 1 
V 3 
G 2 
N 2 
E 2 
O 1 
V 1 
F 4 N 4 
Haggai 2 V 2 G 1 
N 1 
E 1 
V 1 
F 2 A 1 
N 1 
Zechariah 3 V 3 G 1 
N 2 
E 3 F 3 N 3 
Malachi 9 N 2 
P 5 
V 2 
G 8 
U 1 
O 2 
V 7 
F 9 A 6 
N 3 
TOTAL 437 N 55 
P 111 
V 271 
G 238 
I 6 
N 180 
U 13 
E 216 
O 40 
V 181 
F 437 A 153 
N 284 
 
Finally, the following table breaks the numbers down according to event and virtue types 
of fear.  
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Form, Function, and Meaning of ארי Texts—Summary Table of Event and Virtue Fear-
of-God  
 
TOTAL OT 
EVENT FEAR 
INSTANCES 
FORM 
NOUN 
PARTICIPLE 
VERB 
OBJECT 
GOD 
IDOL 
NATURE 
UNCLEAR 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
 
SECOND 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
NONE 
216 N 13 
P 16 
V 187 
G 34 
I 5 
N 169 
U 8 
F 216 A 5 
N 211 
TOTAL OT 
VIRTUE FEAR 
INSTANCES 
FORM 
NOUN 
PARTICIPLE 
VERB 
OBJECT 
GOD 
IDOL 
NATURE 
UNCLEAR 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
 
SECOND 
MEANING 
ABSTRACT 
FEAR 
NONE 
181 N 41 
P 56 
V 84 
G 170 
I 1 
N 5 
U 5 
F 181 A 148 
N 33 
 
Observations from Statistics 
Based on the data above, a few general observations that will work against Becker’s 
evolutionary thesis will now be made. The first thing to notice is that fear is a significant 
and consistent theme throughout the OT. According to my calculations, there are 216 
cases of event fear and 181 cases of virtue fear that are scattered throughout the OT. Of 
the event fear cases, 34 have God as their object; of the virtue fear cases, 170 have God as 
object. Event fear cases use the verb more often than virtue fear cases; this can easily be 
explained, however, by the fact that event fear cases are mainly found in narrative 
sections of the OT (including the prophets who “narrate” many future events). Many of 
the virtue fear cases, on the other hand, are found in the Psalms and in the Proverbs where 
there is little narrative. In the event fear cases, the meaning of  remains clearly 
centered on the emotion/feeling of fear (with varying degrees of intensity) throughout the 
OT. Virtue fear is also found throughout the OT; even in critically reconstructed histories 
of the OT’s composition and compilation, virtue fear cases are understood to exist in 
“early” material.365 As can be seen by the statistics, virtue fear can use the verb, 
participle, and noun. Going from one to the other does not indicate any significant 
semantic shift beyond the core meaning of fear.366 Becker’s form-critical opinion that a 
                                                 
365
 According to M. Noth, Exod 14:31 is from the J source; from the E source are Gen 
20:11; Exod 1:17, 21; 9:20, 30; 18:21; 20:20 (J and E texts according to M. Noth’s theory listed in 
Soulen and Soulen, 2001, 51, 89, 90. 
366
 Bamberger, 1929, 39, claims that the virtue fear-of-God cases in the OT all stress the 
“objective side of religion.” According to my estimation (as reflected in the stats above), all the 
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change from one to the other signals a semantic shift from fear to something more 
abstract is simply wrong. The difference in linguistic forms is merely a function of each 
section’s literary goals. This has already been discussed in response to Becker above, but 
a quick summary is perhaps in order. 
The problem with Becker is that he assumes as valid the form-critical idea that each 
major section of the OT was written by a person or persons in order to accomplish some 
political and/or cultic goal (this “goal” being a large component of the “literary form” [or 
“genre”]), and that each of these sections has its own unique linguistic “signature.” 
Because the form-critical view contains quite a strong element of the understanding that 
the writers were to a significant extent authors (i.e., not compilers or recorders [of 
history]), then it follows that each section would have a unique signature of linguistic use. 
This unique linguistic use will correspond to whatever theological views had become 
prevalent at the time of the writing of the section. For example, when Becker sees the 
high number of verbs in Deut-2 Kings, he understands this as the “signature” of the 
person and/or persons who created the work and as “evidence” that some significant 
semantic shift of  had taken place in the development of the religion and in the 
development of the fear-of-God idea. But this view is most likely not correct. It should be 
said right away that the Deut-2 Kings use of the verb (which Becker deems to generally 
mean something related to “loyalty” to the cult) is not remarkable; it is simply the 
linguistic form that is common to narrative. In fact, Genesis through 2 Kings—being 
mainly narrative—contains a fairly steady rate of about 78% (verb rate for all  
instances in Gen-Num is 78%; Deut-2 Kings is 79%). The verb rate for the Major 
Prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel runs at an un-surprising 70%. The similarity 
between the major narrative OT sections and the prophets is based largely upon their 
common mission to describe events: Exodus records that Moses feared when God spoke 
to him from the burning bush; Isaiah records that Egypt will one day fear with trembling 
when the day of the Lord comes. So it is no surprise that these large sections of Scripture 
would, first, tend to possess many verbs and, second, would tend to contain high 
percentages of “event” fear-of-God—for the narratives (whether historically describing 
events of the past or prophetically describing events of the future) are in the business of 
describing events. The “event” and “virtue” fear-of-God types for these OT sections are 
as follows: Gen-Num: 61% event and 35% virtue; Deut-2 Kings: 63% event and 31% 
virtue; Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel: 65% event and 26% virtue. As can be seen, the verb 
                                                                                                                                                  
OT virtue fear-of-God cases stress the subjective side of the Israelite religion—i.e., the fear 
emotion/feeling. 
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distribution of  and the functions of  are quite consistent in sections of the OT that 
contain extended sections of narrative.367  
The  demographics, however, of the Psalms and of the Proverbs are—as Becker 
rightly points out—quite different. But this is not to be explained by a complicated 
critical reconstruction of Israel’s history which assumes that later writers put fear-of-God 
into a more refined light through the use of their own specialized language of the day; 
rather, the reason Psalms and Proverbs are heavy with—respectively—participles and 
nouns is because their literary mission is not to present a simple historical narrative. The 
Psalms often comment upon what happens to certain people or groups (“blessed are those 
who ….”; “cursed are those who ….”); the Proverbs also speak about the fate of certain 
people (especially the “wise” vs. the “fool”), but they especially concentrate on “wisdom” 
and “fear of the LORD” as topics in their own right (“the fear of the LORD teaches a man 
wisdom” [Prov 15:33 NIV]). In view of these literary features, one would therefore 
expect to find many participles of  in the Psalms and many nouns of  in the 
Proverbs; and that is just what is found: 52% of all the  instances in the Psalms are 
participles (total participles number 43 out of a total  count of 82) and the Proverbs 
employ the noun in 61% of the  cases (14X out of 23X). Also, because the Psalms are 
much about commenting upon the virtues of this or that person, and the Proverbs are 
focused upon living virtuously, then one would not be surprised to find fear-of-God in 
these books often used as a virtue. This is indeed the case: virtue fear-of-God cases 
comprise, respectively, 60% and 91% of instances of  in the Psalms and the Proverbs. 
There is nothing in the change from verb to participle or noun that warrants any semantic 
change more than what changes in grammatical form usually admit.  
In fact, the local context and wider context of the OT virtue-fear-of-God passages in 
general indicate that the idea of virtue-fear-of-God remains quite tied to the 
emotion/feeling of fear all the way through. Virtue-fear-of-God is always a virtue, is 
never condemned, and there is no OT text that says that virtue-fear-of-God has evolved 
into something other than fear. Rarely do the virtue-fear-of-God passages have any local 
context that would inform the reader what is meant by “fear.” Most passages are not 
unlike Ps 34:9(10): “O fear the LORD, you his holy ones, for those who fear him have no 
want.” In this case, a command is given, and a benefit is stated; but what “fear” is is not 
said. Becker makes up for this lack of information by suggesting that many adjacent or 
nearby lines of text are in synonymous parallel with the line containing the fear-of-God 
concept. This supposed evidence for more abstract translations of  can be called into 
question at several levels: first, were all of the parallels really intended originally to be 
                                                 
367
 The Minor Prophets are not too far from these percentages: verb, 58%; event, 36%; 
virtue, 45%.  
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poetic parallels? Second, if many were intended as parallels, how does one know the kind 
of parallel that was intended in each case? Among the many parallels that Becker cites, he 
assumes that all are more or less synonymous parallels; but this simply disregards many 
other possibilities that could really be the case: parallel cola might emphasize and expand 
upon a virtue-fear-of-God colon, or the virtue-fear-of-God colon might emphasize and 
expand upon the parallel cola in an almost unlimited number of ways. For example, 
Becker understands the fear imperative in Deut 6:13 (“the LORD your God you shall 
fear”) as synonymous to the two following cola: “him you shall serve, and by his name 
alone you shall swear.” According to Becker, fearing God here means serving the cult (in 
a “cultic adoration” sense), and—by swearing by his name—“the recognition and worship 
of divinity ….”368 But this verse could just as easily be mentioning three independent 
phenomena that should be features of worshipping, or the second and third cola could 
simply be actions that flow out of the fear emotion/feeling that precedes them.  
I am not saying that parallels to virtue-fear-of-God do not exist; they most certainly 
do. I just want to point out that parallelism can be of many kinds, and the exegete should 
be hesitant to interpret parallel texts such that fear-of-God ends up meaning something 
quite far removed from fear. On the other hand, interpretation of parallel texts that uphold 
the well-established and consistent semantic anchor of  ought to be preferred. The 
opportunity to go one way or the other is contained within many virtue-fear-of-God 
passages; Ps 2:11, for example, admonishes the reader to “serve the LORD with fear and 
rejoice with trembling” (NIV). One might be tempted to find a semantic association 
between “fear” and “serve” and “rejoice”; but the much more likely parallel to “fear” is 
“trembling” because of its close relation to fear and because the general context of this 
verse is about the (messianic) son’s great wrath and punishment. Serving and rejoicing, 
then, should be both accomplished with a high level of the fear emotion/feeling. In the 
case of this verse, parallelism exists between colon A (“serve the LORD with fear”) and 
colon B (“rejoice with trembling”). “Serve” and “rejoice” are not synonymous, however, 
but simply describe two very different actions that are a part of proper YHWH worship; 
“fear” and “trembling” are technically not synonymous either—the first is the 
emotion/feeling itself, and the second is the physical reaction to it. But it is clear that 
                                                 
368
 Becker, 1965, 94. This is a good example of where the interpretational power for “fear” 
is coming from. Even though Becker cites “serve” and “swear” as “synonymous” with “fear,” the 
clarification he first gives regarding the meanings of “serve” and “swear” shows that the 
synonymity is really between fear/serve/swear and the pre-determined meaning of the verse 
according to sweeping form-critical assumptions. This reveals that Becker is not really that 
concerned about poetic nuances that might indicate one meaning for “fear” or another; in fact, the 
mentions of fear-of-God (as a virtue) as well as all the associated “parallels” are all forced to 
mean what the form-critical consensus says was the prevailing emphasis of the day. In the case of 
Deut 6:13, this means that fear/serve/swear means “cult loyalty and [the] adoration of YHWH.”   
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serving the LORD and rejoicing before him ought to include trembling (that comes from 
fear) and to include fear (that manifests trembling).  
Any suggested parallel that drives meaning far away from the fear emotion/feeling 
should be resisted—especially in cases in which the fear text is within a wider context of 
God’s fearful anger and judgment. As can be seen in the table above that covers all the 
OT cases of , I discern contextual elements in nearly all of them that could be 
considered fear provoking. Given those elements, I am very hesitant to find parallels—
like Becker does—that takes  away from the fearful context and to more abstract 
concepts (loyalty, reverence, obedience to the law, piety, etc.) that may or may not have 
anything to do with fear. And, as I have mentioned a number of times before, the exegete 
ought to be hesitant to follow Becker’s tactic of finding so many synonymous parallels in 
so many virtue-fear-of-God texts is just for the reason that this results in a highly unlikely 
semantic expansion of . If Becker is right and all these synonyms to  really do 
exist, then  is all but semantically useless for normal communication; for any given 
use—if the immediate context does not clearly indicate something otherwise—would 
only confront readers with a baffling array of possible meanings that might be intended 
by the writer/speaker. But this surely should not be the case with , just as much as it 
surely is not the case with how “fear” is used today; for whatever implications, shadings 
of meaning, or nuances that “fear” might in any given conversation possess, we typically 
understand the word to mean the fear emotion/feeling unless something in the context or 
syntax clearly informs us otherwise. But with , Becker and others take the opposite 
position:  means something different than fear unless something in the context makes 
a fear designation unavoidable.  
While most of the OT virtue-fear-of-God texts do not have local context that would 
lead the reader to understand the use of “fear” one way or another, there does exist a 
number of texts that contain local contexts that do reveal—at least in these texts—what is 
meant by fear-of-God.369 It should be pointed out first that there are several passages in 
the Proverbs that appear to literally say what fear-of-God is: Prov 1:7 records that “the 
fear of the LORD is the beginning of knowledge”; Prov 8:13 says that “the fear of the 
LORD is hatred of evil”; Prov 9:10 declares that “the fear of the LORD is the beginning 
of wisdom”; Prov 14:27 states that “the fear of the LORD is a fountain of life”; Prov 
15:33 teaches that “the fear of the LORD is instruction in wisdom”; and Prov 19:23 
professes that “the fear of the LORD is life indeed.” “Is” is used most straightforwardly in 
1:7 and 9:10; fear-of-God really is the beginning of knowledge and wisdom. On the other 
hand, with 8:13, 14:27, and 15:33 the writer cannot be thinking of exact identity, but that 
                                                 
369
 By “local” context, I mean context that is contained within the same verse in which the 
mention of fear is found and/or the several verses surrounding it. 
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the “hatred of evil,” “a fountain of life,” and “life indeed” are the consequences of a god-
fearing life. These are no more fear-of-God than the Mosaic Law is life (see Deut 32:47) 
or an ice axe is life for mountain climber who climbs Mount Everest.370  
VIRTUE FEAR-OF-GOD ארי TEXTS WHOSE CONTEXTS INDICATE FEAR 
Virtue-fear-of-God texts that have local contexts that quite clearly indicate the 
emotion/feeling of fear are the following (all use  unless otherwise noted):  
Gen 20:11: when Abraham said regarding Abimelech’s kingdom that “there is no 
fear of God at all in this place,” he clearly referred to no fear of God’s retribution should 
Abimelech kill Abraham for his wife. As it turned out, Abraham was wrong: the officials 
(v. 8) of the king (and perhaps the king as well) were very much afraid once God had 
warned Abimelech in a dream, and they quickly sought to make the situation right in 
response to the fear.371 It may be that vv. 8 and 11 are in a sort of ironic parallel. 
Exod 20:20: the reason God put “the fear of him” upon the people—obviously 
referring to people’s fear and trembling as they stood at the base of Mount Sinai—is 
clearly stated at the end of v. 20—“so that you do not sin.” The local context of the fear 
emotion/feeling being used as dissuasion from sin is backed up by the wider context of 
God’s perception of the people as “stiffnecked” (32:9) the people’s sin of idolatry (chap. 
32), and God’s punishment of it (32:27, 28).  
1 Sam 12:18: this text is somewhere in between event fear and virtue fear; it is 
probably a mixture of both. The fact that v. 18 is bracketed by two other virtue-fear-of-
God texts (vv. 14 and 24) adds some weight to the opinion that “all the people greatly 
feared the LORD and Samuel” is meant to be taken not only as a response to God’s 
punishment in the destruction of the years crops, but especially as a virtue that they 
should have been practicing before, but failed to do so. That “fear” here is real fear—and 
not one of the abstract virtues—is made sure by the use of dam; “great fear” certainly 
makes sense (vs. great reverence or great loyalty or etc.) in light of the local and wider 
circumstances.372 
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 See my FN 282.  
371
 If one should accept the v. 11 translation suggested by Skinner, 1910, 318 (“there is no 
piety in this place”), then the probable inference to v. 8 would mean that the same meaning should 
be understood there too: “and the men were very much pious”; but that would not fit the context 
at all. It is better to go with “fear” in both verses and, with that, let v. 11 reveal to the reader that 
Abraham was wrong: Abimelech and his men indeed did fear God and his punishment. Matthew’s 
opinion (re. Gen 20:11) that “Fear of God … means in this context conformity to a moral code of 
behavior … not the absence of religion” is just as awkward and over-complicating of the narrative 
(Mathews, 2005, 256, 257).   
372
 The Exod 20 and 1 Sam 12 passages discussed here are remarkably similar with regards 
to the fear topic: In the two present manifestations of God that terrorize the sinful people, there is 
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2 Chron 19:7, 9: King Jehoshaphat appointed judges, telling them to “let the fear of 
the LORD be upon you” and, in v. 9, to act “in the fear of the LORD.” The use of -G# 
(v.7) clearly refers to a fearful emotion/feeling—especially with its use of “upon you” 
                                                                                                                                                  
some level of repentance, the prophets (respectively, Moses and Samuel) attempt to calm their 
fears by saying “do not fear,” and there is a final reference to the value of fear-of-God. That the 
fear emotion/feeling is being referred to in Exod 20:18 and 1 Sam 12:18 is obvious—for the 
people in both cases were clearly in a state of extreme fear. But some believe that the fear that has 
the power to dissuade one from sin (Exod 20:20b) and that is commanded to be practiced (1 Sam 
12:24) is something altogether different from the fear emotion/feeling (otherwise, as Bamberger, 
1929, 39, 40, suggests, Moses would be contradicting himself). I do not think this at all must be 
the case: the raw emotion of fear is used quite effectively by God to get the people’s attention. In 
other words, it has an effective utility (to jar people into understanding who God is, to have them 
come to grips with their own sinfulness, and to dissuade them from further sin) which can be to 
some small extent voluntarily exercised by people as a preemptory act against sin. In these two 
instances, fear is used as a “wake up” call: reasoning with the people had run its course and 
something stronger was needed. After the terrible epiphany (Exod 20) and crop-destroying wrath 
of God (1 Sam 12:18), the people—in great fear—realized that God was angry and that they had 
best repent. According to Davis, 1994, 123, the fear drove home the reality of their situation more 
than would have been possible without it; and this opened the way to repentance. Moses and 
Samuel—being the good shepherds/fathers that they were—saw their change of heart (i.e., the 
fear had accomplished what it was supposed to do) and immediately sought to calm their fears. 
God is, after all, ultimately not about judgment, but about grace. As Peterson, 1999, 72, well puts 
(in addressing the 1 Sam 12:20 text): “Nothing we do puts us outside the power of God’s grace to 
forgive and reconcile. A thousand years later Jesus embodied what Samuel preached: Do not be 
afraid.… Yes, you have sinned, but don’t let your sin paralyze you with guilt; don’t let your sin 
dupe you into thinking you are irredeemable; don’t for a minute suppose that God has called it 
quits on you. It is God’s business to save you, and God is not giving up (12:20-22).” The danger 
of fear is that one can be driven into despair. Nevertheless, fear has its place and God is willing to 
use it. With the utility of fear in mind, one can better understand that despite Moses’s and 
Samuel’s calls to “not fear,” there is nevertheless some value in an ongoing experience of 
fearfulness of God and of his punishment. Moses (in Exod 20:20b) and Samuel (in 1 Sam 12:24) 
when speaking about fear could be referring to reverence or obedience; but in view of the ability 
of the fear emotion/feeling to dissuade from sin (they had just witnessed this ability in action), 
there is no reason to suppose that God would not be willing to use it again—albeit in an 
attenuated form—as an ongoing sin-avoidance tool. That this was “real fear” (Birch, 1998, 1064) 
is further suggested by the forecast of doom in 1 Sam 12:25: “But if you still do wickedly, you 
shall be swept away, both you and your king.” In both of these passages, the people are, as 
McKane, 1963, 87, rightly observes, “warned,” and the tone that is clearly heard throughout is 
one of “threat.” Between the epiphany, the mighty displays of God’s power and wrath, and the 
threatening tone of these two passages, Davis, 1994, 123, 124, is correct when he challenges those 
who question the utility of fear-of-God: “Why then did Paul write Colossians 3:6 after Colossians 
3:5? What matters is whether there is a true basis for fear. If there is reason to tremble, we ought 
to tremble. Neither the church nor individual Christians should be above truthful terror. If God 
grants us a sight of our own sin and of his displeasure, we can be sure he does not do so merely to 
see us tremble but to see us tremble and be restored. In 1 Samuel 12 we see both the kindness and 
the severity of God (Rom 11:22); Yahweh intends fear as the way to faithfulness (vv. 20-25).” 
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(1D$+) which would not at all be expected if worship or obedience or the like was 
intended.373 The calls to be in fear of God in vv. 7 (-G#) and 9 (hary) are most likely in 
synonymous parallel—especially considering that both commands are given to groups of 
judges in order to dissuade them from administering perverse justice. The wider context 
makes clear that Jehoshaphat’s aim was to steer the people away from sin and God’s 
wrath (v 10)—something that could only be realized if each of the people’s judges had a 
proper fear of God.  
Ps 2:11: serving “the LORD with fear” is in parallel with rejoicing “with 
trembling.” “Fear” and “trembling” are in close semantic relationship, and—seen in view 
of the son’s “wrath” that can be “quickly kindled”—clearly signify a very fearful state.374   
Ps 64:4, 9 (5, 10): the antithetical parallel in v. 4 shows that a lack of fear and 
killing a “blameless” man are somehow related. That this lack of fear is referring to fear-
of-God is made most probable by v. 9 which also through the use of parallelism presents 
two actions for those who, on the other hand, do fear: “they will tell what God has 
brought about, and ponder what he has done.” The wider context shows that these two 
verses present a contrast between those who do not fear God and those who do, and the 
fearful promise of judgment for those who do not fear (v. 7: “But God will shoot his 
arrows at them; they will be wounded suddenly) indicates that God is the implied object 
and that the fear emotion/feeling is here in view. More abstract meanings of fear would 
seem quite out of place in these two verses—especially in v. 4. 
Ps 90:11: the wrath of God is suggested here to be proportional to the fear of God. 
Fear is something that is “due”—i.e., it is a virtue—in view of the fact that God becomes 
angry when human’s sin. “Anger” and “wrath” are both part of the local context, and they 
indicate that “fear” should be taken as real fear and a high level of it at that. 
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 -G# is used elsewhere to signify virtue-fear-of-God: see Ps 36:2; Ps 119:161; Jer 36:24; 
Hosea 3:5; Mic 7:17.   
374
 Dahood, 1966, 14, says that this text reminds the rebel kings of vv. 1, 2 that “they too 
are appointed for the inevitable hour [of death]” and, therefore, should “accordingly acknowledge 
the supreme suzerainty of Yahweh and live in fear of incurring his wrath.” The “reverence” 
translation of Barnes, 1979, 24, nevertheless contains a significant component of fear: “Serve the 
LORD with fear: with reverence, and with deep apprehensions of the consequences of not serving 
and obeying him. That is, serving him in not opposing, but in promoting his purpose of 
establishing a kingdom under the Messiah, with the deep apprehension that if you do not do it, he 
will arise and crush you in his wrath.” Alexander’s “religious awe” is also not devoid of great 
fear: “Serve the Lord with fear, religious awe, not only on account of his tremendous majesty, but 
also in view of his vindicatory justice and destroying power.” He also understands the 
“trembling” of the second colon to be “employed as an equivalent or parallel to fear itself” 
(Alexander, 1864, 18).  
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Prov 24:21: the son, here, is told to “fear the LORD and the king” and not to 
“disobey either of them.” In view of the “disaster” and “ruin” that “both can bring” (v. 
22), “fear” in v. 21 is most likely signifies real fear.375   
Isa 8:13: The LORD tells Isaiah (v. 12) not to fear or dread what is typically feared 
and dreaded; rather, the prophet is told that only the LORD—who alone is to be regarded 
as holy—is the one to be feared and dreaded. Verse 12 is in synonymous parallel with v. 
13: the fear/dread of v. 12 is clearly referring to the fear emotion/feeling and the improper 
objects of that fear; the fear/dread of v. 13, however, takes the simple negative commands 
of v. 12 and states them positively by including the name of the one who should be the 
“object” of fear and dread—i.e., the LORD.376 In other words, the fear/dread that is 
commanded to be manifested before God is the same fear/dread that is commanded not to 
be manifested before inappropriate objects. Because any abstract notion of fear is highly 
unlikely in v. 12, it is also unlikely to be the case in v. 13.377 
Isa 57:11: the inappropriate “dread” and “fear” before idols is contrasted in this 
verse with the appropriate fear of God. Given that one of the most infamous and notorious 
idols, Molech, is mentioned in v. 9, and also that people would experience much dread 
and fear in false god worship, one can with certainty understand “fear” and “dread” in v. 
11a as real fear. The contrast in v. 11b that points out the lack of legitimate fear—i.e., fear 
towards God—continues with the same subject of the fear emotion/feeling, but implies 
that the people’s manifestation of it had been misdirected up till then.  
Jer 5:22: in the midst of the theme of Israel’s and Judah’s disobedience and 
downfall, God rhetorically asks, “Do you not fear me?” followed by “do you not tremble 
before me?” these two questions are nearly identical. This is made especially likely by 
God’s claim to omnipotence which comes in the second part of the verse and which 
provides justification for an affirmative answer to the two questions: yes, God should be 
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 Waltke, 2005, 287, 288, understands that “both” in v. 22 refers to the LORD and the 
king (i.e., they are the ones who can bring “disaster” and “ruin”), and that vv. 21 and 22 are a 
warning against getting caught up in political intrigue. 
376
 The fear/dread referred to in v. 12, says Kidner, 1994, (Isa 8:12, 13), most likely refers 
to the fear/dread that king Ahaz and his people experienced before the threat of the 
Damascus/Samaria attack (7:2), and/or before the later Assyrian threat (8:7, 8).  
377
 Calvin, 1948, 278, 279, nevertheless sees “reverence” as the main characteristic of the 
“fear” and “dread” of v. 13: “Though [Isaiah] speaks not only of fear but of dread, yet he does not 
mean that the Jews should be filled with horror at the name of God, so as to desire to flee from 
him, but merely demands from them reverence for God, and uses both words in order to express 
continuance.” Calvin jumps over the milder fear that could be legitimately exhibited before God 
and used by God as a means of prodding people towards him. The concept and parallelism is 
nearly identical in Matt 10:28: there, Jesus’ call for the disciples not to fear their persecutors is 
clearly set in contrast with a call to only fear God. “Fear” here (φοβέω) is obviously nothing more 
than the emotion/feeling of fear (see chapter three).  
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feared; and yes, one should tremble before him. “fear” and “tremble”—in view of God’s 
power to control nature and God’s power to judge and punish—are synonymous in that 
they are both based upon the fear emotion/feeling.  
Jon 1:16: were this verse without the previous story about the storm and the terror 
of the sailors, one might say—if one were to use Becker’s criteria—that “feared the 
LORD” and “offered a sacrifice to the LORD” are synonymous, and, therefore, “feared 
the LORD” must mean something like “worship” or “obedient service” or the like. But 
the presence of “great fear” ($-E ) in v. 16a and the previous context and syntax 
plainly show that the sailor’s previous extreme fear of the storm (and for their lives) 
comes to be focused (in v. 16) on the “object” of the one who created and calmed the 
storm—YHWH.378 It should be noted that the adverbial use of “great fear” does not have 
semantic influence upon “the men feared”; it only intensifies the action of the verb (thus 
the NRSV’s “then the men feared the LORD even more” [emphasis mine]). And it is 
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 Various Jonah 1:16 commentators resist leaving “fear” at its semantic root: Boice, 1983, 
225, “respected”; Laetsch, 1956, 228, “awe and amazement,” “adoration”; Pusey, 1907, 106, 
“great awe”; Wade, 1925, 128, “worshipped”; Wolff, 1986, 121, “worship,” “obedience,” “trust.” 
Butler, 2005, 275, understands the fear as transforming in v. 16 into worship, but nevertheless 
allows room for some “terror” to remain. I would instead keep the emphasis here on fear and 
understand that other mental/emotional states might be connoted. There are several reasons for 
this: first, as mentioned in the main text above, v. 5 obviously is referring to the fear 
emotion/feeling and v. 10 clearly escalates that fear by the use of the $-E modifier. Verse 16 
simply adds “the LORD” which syntactically means that the escalated fear already referred to has 
now found an object. Every other case of  plus $-E (or -%) in the OT depicts the fear 
emotion/feeling, and this case should be understood as no exception. Second, it is unlikely that  
and  as employed in vv. 10 and 16—with their syntactic identity—would represent such 
radically different (and, arguably, mutually exclusive) states of mind/heart (i.e., great fear and 
great worship). Third, even though the storm ceased, the sailors knew that the cause of the 
storm—and, therefore, the cause of their fear—was still present, and now, more real than ever. 
They had just witnessed YHWH’s anger and could not really know if that anger would perhaps 
next be directed at them. What Jonah told them turned out to be true, and the storm did stop—but 
many questions about YHWH still remained. Therefore, the sailors could not really worship 
YHWH “in spirit and in truth,” but, at best, only stand in fearful awe of his power and wrath. The 
terror of the crashing waves and towering swells, the dread at the certainty and nearness of death, 
the appalling conditions aboard the severely damaged ship, and the discovery that a real and 
living God was behind it all—in response to one man’s wrongdoing—was sufficient to instill a 
terror that few people today can understand. When that terror discovered its object—YHWH—it 
might have resulted in groveling and even some primitive worship. That terror also goaded them 
to immediately offer sacrifices and vows (i.e., they were so in shock that they would give 
anything and say anything in order to keep YHWH’s anger away from them). Were these sailors 
really converted? No one can say; but as I try to explain elsewhere (see pp. 84-87) pagan worship 
was full of dread and fear, and much of the dread and fear that the sailors experienced before their 
own gods was probably shifted over in very short order to YHWH. And such an experience—as 
powerful as it was—could not provide enough information about YHWH for the sailors to fully 
and purely worship him. But they could fear him, and this was a good step toward worship.  
 168 
interesting that what could be taken as a parallel—i.e., “offered a sacrifice”—actually has 
no bearing whatsoever upon the semantics of  or .379  
Mic 7:17: the prophet professes that the day would eventually come when the 
nations would repent and finally turn to God. The process of this is seen in vv. 16 and 17 
as the nations suffer shame and poverty and, as a result, “come trembling out of their 
fortresses” and—literally quoting the MT—“they will be in dread (-G#) and they will 
fear () before you.” This future event, of course, will be an event of fear; but the 
dread/fear that will have YHWH as its focus is clearly understood here as an appropriate 
(i.e., virtuous) response. For this reason, I catalogue both “dread” and “fear” here as 
virtue-fear-of-God cases.380  
These virtue-fear-of-God cases that strongly indicate the emotion/feeling of fear are 
quite diverse in their grammatical makeup and they come from both older and newer parts 
of the Bible. The texts employing forms of  are: Gen 20:11; Exod 20:20; 2 Chron 
19:9. Ps 2:11 and 90:11 use , Isa 8:13 uses hrwm, Prov 24:21 employs the imperative 
verb + YHWH, and 1 Sam 12:18; Ps 64:4(5), 9(10); Isa 57:11; Jer 5:22; Jon 1:16; and 
Micah 7:17 all use the imperfect verb with God either as the explicit or implicit verbal 
object; only Micah 7:17 employs !m before the object (in this case “you,” which refers to 
God)—a situation that shows that !m (or ynpm/"#$%) is not necessary for  + 
Elohim/YHWH to indicate the fear emotion/feeling. It should not be overlooked that djp 
is also employed twice (2 Chron 19:7 and Mic 7:17)—once as a noun, and once as a 
verb—to stand for virtue-fear-of-God. The reason I point out these features is only to 
show that one general “idea type”—in this case, the fear emotion/feeling before God 
presented as a virtue—is not tied to any one linguistic form or to any particular place in 
the OT (or, as Becker would say it, to any “literary form”).  
One important truth that the use of djp in 2 Chron 19:7 illuminates should also be 
mentioned: the virtue-fear-of-God text here clearly tells the reader that real fear—even 
dread—of God is legitimate and even necessary for the proper administration of 
justice.381 The lexica keep the semantic range of djp much tighter than , centering it 
mainly on “fear” (DBLSD) and “dread” (BDB). This text clearly shows that the fear 
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 See my comments on Jonah 1:16 at p. 66.  
380
 The older commentators are more willing to let fear be fear. For example, Keil, 1986, 
514, says regarding the fear presented in this text: “The heathen will submit themselves to 
Jehovah in the humblest fear.” Achtemeier, 1996, 366, on the other hand, interprets the fear here 
as “awe and obedience.” 
381
 Ps 36:1(2) says that the wicked have “no fear [djp] of God before their eyes.” When one 
considers the information in 2 Chron 19:7 and in this psalm, one cannot avoid the conclusion that 
no djp of God has no place in the life of the believer; for if a believer has no djp of God, he or she 
would be deemed—by the rule of Scripture—“wicked.” And if that believer happens to be a 
judge, he or she would be considered one that perverts justice. 
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emotion/feeling with God as its object is a virtue—and not just a minor one, but a virtue 
that when practiced can bring about the administration of good and godly—i.e., 
righteous—judgment. The lesson to be learned is this: if real fear of God is indeed a 
virtue, then perhaps real fear is the virtue that the virtue-fear-of-God texts that use  
intend to signify. The use of  might have overtones or nuances of more abstract 
meaning that djp does not; but if real fear and dread is suitable for those providing 
leadership in places of great authority (e.g., judges), how much more suitable is it for 
everyone else. At least the chronicler believed this to be so; but from a Scriptural 
standpoint that upholds the inspiration, inerrancy, and authority of all Scripture, what the 
chronicler says here must be taken very seriously. Presented here is the truth that it is 
desirable to experience and be led by (or goaded by) some fearful emotion/feeling before 
God. Because this is so, there is no reason for the exegete to expend great effort to try and 
move virtue-fear-of-God texts that use  toward abstract meanings that have little or 
nothing to do with the fear emotion/feeling—unless the context plainly shows otherwise; 
but this is hardly (if ever) the case.  
NON-ארי FEAR-OF-GOD CASES THAT INDICATE REAL FEAR 
 is the main Hebrew word for fear, but—as has just been seen in the case of 
djp—it is not the only word that can signify fear. In this section, I will mention a number 
of texts that employ words other than  to indicate fear. These texts relate in one way or 
another to my theme that the fear emotion/feeling before God is a legitimate part of OT 
worship. 
hmya: as part of the ceremony of God (Gen 15) giving a solemn and unconditional 
oath to Abram (which included God’s self-imposed death penalty—indicated by the 
firepot and the torch passing between the pieces of the slain animals—if he did not 
uphold the promise)—a “terrifying darkness” descended upon Abram (v. 12). This was 
not directly fear-of-God; but it was apparently God’s will to use the “terrifying darkness” 
to make a deeper impression upon Abram. God was deadly serious about his promise to 
bless him, and he wanted Abram to be deadly serious in his understanding of this 
promise. From what the psalmist writes in Ps 88, it appears that God likewise uses 
“troubles” (v. 3), “wrath” (vv. 7, 16), “dread assaults” (v. 16), and “terrors” (hmya v. 15 
[Heb. v. 16]), in the midst of a believer’s life (at least in the midst of the life of the 
believing writer) in order to accomplish his will as one’s “life draws near to Sheol” (v. 3).   
rwg: in Ps 33:8 are “fear” () and “dread” (rwg) in an approximate synonymous 
relationship: “Let all the earth fear the LORD; let all the inhabitants of the world stand in 
awe of him.” Most versions translate rwg as “stand in awe” in this verse; I believe a more 
precise and literal rendering would be “stand in dread” as rwg is semantically centered 
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upon fear and dread (“awe,” in today’s American parlance, has lost much of the fear 
component). In any case, fear and dread (or awe) before God are understood by the 
psalmist as universal virtues that the whole earth should practice. The emotions/feelings 
referred to here are, as in many other texts, justified by the mention of Gods omnipotence 
(see vv. 9-11).   
zgr: in the process of repentance and coming to the LORD, the nations—according 
to Micah 7:17—come “trembling” (\E) as they turn to the LORD in “dread” and “fear.” 
The four verbs in the verse—“lick” [“dust like a snake”], “tremble,” “dread,” and “fear,” 
present an obviously fearful state of affairs. One searching for synonymous parallels here 
could not stray much beyond the core meaning of fear. 
drj: in Ezra 9:4 and 10:3 those who “tremble” (BDB) before God’s—
respectively—“words” and “commandment” are understood to be aware of the sin of 
marrying foreign wives and are willing to repent. Their “trembling” is clearly a virtue. Isa 
66:3 also makes clear that the one who “trembles at [God’s] word” and is “humble and 
contrite in spirit” is virtuous—in fact, the one upon whom God will “look.” And Hos 
11:10, 11 says that when God roars like a lion, his “children” will come trembling from 
“the west,” and come trembling like “birds from Egypt” and “like doves from the land of 
Assyria.” As with other “trembling” passages, the picture here is one of repentance and 
turning back to God.   
ttj: in the course of praising the Levites, God indicates through the prophet 
Malachi that they both feared and “stood in awe” (G") of God as well as God’s name. 
The syntax of the MT is somewhat perplexing: the text (הּ Q  *G)"  )% (﬩ " (פּ )%הּ  )"  	Q )יּ*  	0%) 
after the first clause of v. 5 literally appears to say “[in] fear he will fear me, and before 
my name he will be dismayed.” For ttj BDB has the general definition of “be shattered, 
dismayed,” but in this instance of the Niphal verb, BDB understands the meaning as “and 
at my name he is put in awe.” In any case, the obedience of the Levites was in some way 
bound up with fearful awe—perhaps even to the point of being “shattered” or 
“dismayed”—before the LORD, and all this was understood as a virtue. 
ץr[: in Isa 2:19 and 21 God uses “terror” (djp) and “the glory of his majesty” in 
the process of turning people away from idolatry (v. 20)—all as “he rises to terrify the 
earth” (0%הּS (אּ T Z Qאַ 	 T0[+ *$ [in both vv. 19, 21]). ץr[ typically indicates “to tremble” 
(BDB) and most likely means here that God, in his quest to rid the world of idols, will 
cause peoples on the earth to shake in fear.  
djp: next to , djp (“dread, be in dread” BDB) is the most often used word for 
fear in the OT. A number of OT uses clearly show that that fear before God is a 
commendable virtue. As already mentioned in the previous section, djp, as used in 2 
Chron 19:7, plainly signifies fear/dread of the LORD and is a virtue that the Israelite 
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judges must have in order to judge righteously. Ps 36:1(2) mentions that “there is no fear 
of God” before the eyes of the wicked. As said elsewhere in this work, a lack of fear-of-
God is always put in a bad light; conversely, fear-of-God—whether of the virtue kind or 
of the event kind—is never portrayed as something undesirable. Ps 120:119 literally says, 
“My flesh has goose bumps (DBLSD; or “bristles” BDB) for fear (djp) of you, and I am 
afraid () before your judgments.” The writer is one who loves God’s laws—i.e., he is a 
virtuous man—and his fear here is in no way seen as out of place in his loving obedience 
to the LORD. The same can be said for his fear before the words of God in v. 161. In a 
rather remarkable passage that appears to uphold the value of fear in general (Prov 
28:14), the proverbs writer says “Happy is the man that feareth alway.” This translation 
(from the KJV) translates the phrase literally, as does the NRSV: “Happy is the one who 
is never without fear.” The NIV perhaps over-interprets by adding “the LORD” as the 
object of the fear; “the LORD” as verbal object is probably intended to be understood by 
the proverb writer, or it could simply be referring to fear in general. Whatever the case, 
fear is indicated as a virtue and at the same time as an emotion/feeling that brings a 
significant blessing (i.e., happiness). Isa 60:5 is not much different: in the joyful day 
when the nations come to the light of the LORD (vv. 2, 3), the hearts of the Israelites 
shall “fear” when their dispersed people come flowing from the nations. The use here is 
not of the virtue variety, but of the acceptableness of fear as a part of joy in view of what 
the LORD has done (or will do). Once again, a lack of fear is connected with evil in Jer 
36:24; King Jehoiakim disdained the prophetic Word of the LORD (which had been 
dictated by Jeremiah and written upon a scroll) by burning the scroll upon which the 
words were written in a fire in his palace (v. 23). This act was evil, and the king’s desire 
to imprison Jeremiah—through whom the condemning words had come—was also evil. 
V. 24 records that neither the king nor his servants feared or tore their clothes when 
Jeremiah’s prophecy was read to them. This could mean that the king did not fear God, 
the words of God, or the Babylonians about whom the prophecy referred to. Perhaps a 
blend of all three is intended. One thing is sure: lack of fear here is linked with arrogant 
pride, condemnable behavior, and a lack of appreciation for God’s Word and for his 
inevitable judgment. Finally, fear before God is part of the process of Israel (Hos 3:5) and 
the nations (Mic 7:17) coming to faith in God. Both passages have the interesting feature 
of -G# being related to LORD—its usual object—not with a direct object marker, but the 
preposition $; thus, the NRSV translates the clause as “they shall turn in dread to the 
LORD” and the NIV “they will turn in fear to the LORD.” The syntax of -G# (Hos 
3:5)/-G# (Mic 7:17) (with God as a kind of indirect object towards whom the action of 
the verb flows) is unique. But the overall context (especially of “trembling” and “fear” in 
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Mic 7:17) makes it clear that God is both cause and the object of the fear and that the fear 
is understood to be a virtue.382 
EXCURSUS: THE FEAR-OF-GOD UNDERSTANDING OF QOHELETH 
Much has been said about the OT fear-of-God idea (and some about the NT idea as 
well—see just above). As can be seen, it is a significant biblical topic; and there are many 
different opinions of what fear-of-God meant in biblical times. But I would like in the 
next few pages to think about what fear-of-God means to people today, both inside and 
outside the church. The thoughts that will now be written down will be generated through 
an exegetical analysis of the fear-of-God passages of the book of Ecclesiastes.383 The 
observations and opinions of Qoheleth are quite suitable for this task because what he 
writes is theologically toward (or at) the end of the OT. In other words, in Ecclesiastes 
one sees the limits of the old covenant and the awakening of a great yearning for the new 
one—that is, for Jesus Christ. This frustration with the old is very much tied up with 
Qoheleth’s frustration with all that was “under the sun.” The old covenant led him to 
understand that much of God’s ultimate reality for him and for the Israelites had much to 
do with things under the sun; especially for king Qoheleth, that meant the 1lw[ promised 
land and the 1lw[ Davidic kingdom. But having set his hopes on these, it did not take 
long for him to learn that these—as he understood them under the old covenant—were 
but dust in the wind.384 And the older he became and the closer to death he drew, the 
                                                 
382
 After surveying a number of Hebrew words for fear (in addition to ), Clines, 2003, 
69, writes: “This survey of the semantic field of words for ‘fear’ shows that the  word group 
belongs to a wider group of words for ‘fear’ which behave very similarly. I find no evidence for 
distinguishing among these terms. Though in two cases (lhb and perhaps gad), there is or may be 
evidence of a semantic development, in no case do words of this semantic field demonstrate a 
semantic development from ‘fear’ to ‘respect’, still less to ‘act justly’ or ‘show appropriate 
religious behaviour’. Most occurrences of the ‘fear of God’ use the  word group, but -G# is 
also used in exactly the same senses, and no distinction can be found between the two terms. The 
fact that the other terms are not much evidenced in a religious sense of ‘fear of God’ is merely 
accidental, I would suggest. 
As far as the ‘fear of God’ is concerned, I conclude that, while no doubt to fear God implies 
also to be in awe of him and to show him respect, and while those who fear God engage in 
appropriate ethical and religious behaviour precisely because they fear the consequences of not 
doing so, these can only be connotations of ‘fear’; the terms for ‘fear’ studied above mean no 
more or no less than the emotion of fear.” 
383
 Eccl 3:14; 5:6 
384
 Delitzsch, 1968, 184, writes: “The Book of Koheleth is, on the one side, a proof of the 
power of revealed religion which has grounded faith in God, the One God, the All-wise Creator 
and Governor of the world, so deeply and firmly in the religious consciousness, that even the most 
dissonant and confused impressions of the present world are unable to shake it; and, on the other 
side, it is a proof of the inadequacy of revealed religion in its O. T. form, since the discontent and 
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more intense grew the feeling that it had all been lbh. So Qoheleth craved something 
more than all he did and experienced under the sun. Therefore, he can awaken in any man 
or woman the craving for something more; in every generation human beings all begin 
life at zero and end at zero—for, as Qoheleth himself taught us, “What has been will be 
again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun” (1:9 
NIV). All human beings—just like Qoheleth—must go through this process of learning 
that “life under the sun” is breathtakingly meaningless (perhaps “absurd” might be better) 
when life is lived apart from God and lived not in accordance with his moral law.  
But the claims of Qoheleth only have their deep significance because what he said 
is now in the Church’s canon of Holy Scripture, and this has been the case for a very long 
time. In the time of Christ’s first advent, the Scripture—which “cannot be broken” (John 
10:35 NASB)—most likely included Ecclesiastes, and the early church accepted it along 
with the other Jewish holy books right from the beginning.385 How Ecclesiastes came to 
be recognized by the Jews as Scripture—and when—is not known today.386 The earliest 
allusions to it are perhaps in Sirach and the Wisdom of Solomon, but some still question 
this.387 Several fragments of Ecclesiastes were found at Qumran and have been dated to 
                                                                                                                                                  
the grief which the monotony, the confusion, and the misery of this earth occasion, remain thus 
long without a counterbalance, till the facts of the history of redemption shall have disclosed and 
unveiled the heavens above the earth. In none of the O. T. books does the Old Covenant appear as 
it does in the Book of Koheleth, as ‘that which decayeth and waxeth old, and is ready to vanish 
away’ (Heb viii. 13). If the darkness of earth must be enlightened, then a New Covenant must be 
established; for heavenly love, which is at the same time heavenly wisdom, enters into human 
nature and overcomes sin, death, and Hades, and removes the turning-point of the existence of 
man from this to the future life. The finger of prophecy points to this new era. And Kohelth, from 
amid his heaps of ruins, shows how necessary it is that the heavens should now soon open above 
the earth.”  
385
 Krüger, 2004, 32, lists several allusions to Ecclesiastes in the NT: Rom 3:10 (Eccl 7:20); 
Mark 2:18-20 (Eccl 3:1-8); James 1:19 (Eccl 7:9); Matt 6:7 (Eccl 5:1); Luke 12:13ff (Eccl 5:9-
6:9); 1 Tim 6:7 (Eccl 5:14). Krüger also mentions that NA27 consider a portion of Rom 3:10 to be 
a direct quote of a portion of Eccl 7:20 (see “loci citati vel allegati ex Vetere Testamento” p. 789): 
NA27 (Rom 3:10) as well as Rahlfs (Eccl 7:20) both have οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος (“there is not a 
righteous one”). Because Qoheleth’s way of signifying the universal depravity idea is unique ( !
S-h), NA27 is most likely correct. One more NT text should be considered. Jesus might be 
referring to Eccl 11:5 when he gently admonishes Nicodemus in John 3:10: “You are Israel’s 
teacher … and do you not understand these things?” The commonality of the themes of wind, 
womb, human limited knowledge, and God’s sovereignty in Eccl 11:5 and John 3:3-10 is 
remarkable (this is also noticed by Hengstenberg, 2001, 35). 
386
 Murphy, 1992, xxii, writes that “… we are in total ignorance of the nature of the 
canonical process.” 
387
 Regarding similarities of ideas in Sirach and Ecclesiastes, Murphy (Ibid., xlvi) claims 
that “there is no serious sign of dependency” between the books. After reviewing other proposed 
similarities, he concludes that “it is not possible to prove dependence in either direction. The data 
are simply ambiguous, and some of the similarities could easily derive from a common source.” 
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the mid (or earlier) second-century BC.388 But possible allusions of Sirach and the fact 
that the Qumran community chose to store up a copy (or copies) of Ecclesiastes do not 
necessarily mean that the book was considered to be Scripture. But later (ca. 80 AD) 
Josephus quite likely understood the book as one of the twenty two books which made up 
their Scripture, and (ca. 90 AD) the rabbis setting down and commenting upon the oral 
law obviously understood Ecclesiastes as one of the books that had for some time been 
regarded as sacred.389  
Ecclesiastes also has applicability for today because it is a canonical wisdom book; 
that is, it exists in the Christian canon as a valid source of wisdom that a Christian can 
mine today in order to live an excellent life before God. The wisdom in Proverbs and 
Ecclesiastes is to a significant extent portrayed as the wisdom of Solomon—and this 
gives the books an aura of value, for Solomon was recorded to have been profoundly 
blessed with the wisdom of God (1 Kings 3; 2 Chron 1). Solomon was the wisest man in 
the world and people from all over the earth sought his audience (1 Kings 10:24; 2 Chron 
9:23). And many throughout the ages could relate to those kings and queens as they too 
came to the feet of Solomon—that is, to Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs—for 
wisdom. Even though the name of Solomon is not mentioned in Ecclesiastes, it is 
nevertheless clear in the introduction that Qoheleth and Solomon are intended to be 
                                                                                                                                                  
About the alleged dependence of Wisdom of Solomon on Ecclesiastes, Murphy writes: “the 
message of Wisdom may not be envisioned solely in terms of Ecclesiastes. There is simply no 
necessary connection” (xlviii). 
388
 Muilenburg, 1954, who did the paleographic evaluation on the DSS fragments of 
Ecclesiastes states: “It goes without saying that the Hebrew Book of Qoh. must now be dated 
before c.150 B.C., and how much earlier we cannot yet say on the basis of the evidence afforded 
by the fragments.  In any event we must reckon with the possibility that Qoh. had attained 
canonical status, or something approaching it, in the Essene community by the middle of the 
second century B.C.”  
389
 Of the twenty-two books referred to by Josephus, 1987, he claims that “five belong to 
Moses, which contain his laws and the traditions of the origin of mankind till his death. This 
interval of time was little short of three thousand years; but as to the time from the death of Moses 
till the reign of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, who reigned after Xerxes, the prophets, who were after 
Moses, wrote down what was done in their times in thirteen books. The remaining four books 
contain hymns to God, and precepts for the conduct of human life” (“Against Apion,” bk. 1, secs. 
39, 40). Regarding early rabbinic mentions of Ecclesiastes, a number of discussions that raise 
various questions about the inspired status or the usefulness of Ecclesiastes were recorded; but, as 
Fox, 2004, xv, points out, “In none of their discussions were the Rabbis actually deliberating 
whether to grant or deny Ecclesiastes canonical status. This was already a fact for them. These 
discussions were an intellectual exercise whose purpose was to raise the difficulties the book 
presents in order to resolve them” (see Fox, 2004, xiv, and Murphy, 1992, xxiii, for the rabbinic 
sources where these discussions are recorded).  
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understood as the same person.390 Other than employing the enigmatic name “Qoheleth,” 
the testimony regarding author, lineage, and place given in 1:1, 12 is not unlike that in a 
number of biblical books as well as in extra-biblical literature as well.391 Especially in 
view of the absence of debate about authorship among the early Christian-era rabbis, and 
in consideration of the near-universal assumption up to the modern age that Qoheleth was 
Solomon, the scholar today has some justification to suspect that the writer of 
Ecclesiastes intended that the whole work (minus, perhaps, the introduction and epilogue 
that speaks of Qoheleth in the third person) be understood as originating from Solomon 
and, ultimately, from God—for when Solomon asked for wisdom, God gave it to him in 
abundance (1 Kings 10:24).392 If the book has many voices speaking in it, then one would 
be justified in doubting the continuity of the king Qoheleth persona throughout; but 
despite the twists and turns, apparent contradictions, sudden topical shifts, and the almost-
bi-polar declarations of life’s futility while at the same time uplifting the value of living 
                                                 
390
 Most commentators would say this is so at least in 1:2-2:26 (see, e.g., Childs, 1979, 584; 
Loader, 1986, 19; Fox, 2004, x); after that the opinions of the author (who is a wise sage who 
lived in inter-testamental times) are no longer presented through the Qoheleth-as-Solomon mask, 
but only through Qoheleth. But I would say that the mood set by Solomon-Qoheleth at the 
beginning continues till the end and that there is no literary sign (with the possible exception of 
the epilogue) to tell the reader that a major character shift has occurred. If there is one, the readers 
of Ecclesiastes for about two millennia or more—both Jews and Christians—did not recognize it. 
The same Qoheleth who struggles in chapters one and two with the determinism, 
meaninglessness, and lack of God’s justice in life, is the same Qoheleth of the rest of the book: 
complaining continues regularly throughout (see FN 394); themes that concern kings also 
continue through the book (see Eccl 4:13-16; 5:1-7; 5:8, 9; 5:11, 12; 7:21, 22; 8:2-6; 8:8b; 9:13-
16; 10:4; 10:5-7, 16, 17; 10:20) as well as texts that seem to echo the life and times of Solomon 
(Eccl 1:5-7; 2:4-7 [naturalist]; 1:13-18 [wisdom]; 2:4-6 [building]; 2:7 [slaves]; 2:8a, 9 [gold and 
silver]; 2:8b [harem]; 1:4-11; 3:1-8; 12:1-7 [poetry]; 3:16, 17; 5:8; 8:11 [justice]; 5:1-7 [temple]; 
5:4-7 [vows]; 5:10-17; 61-9 [wealth]; 7:20, 26-28 [depravity]; 3:14b; 5:7; 7:18; 8:12, 13; 12:13 
[fear-of-God]; 1:15; 4:5, 6, 9-12; 5:3, 10, 11, 12; 6:9a, 11; 7:1-12, 16-19; 9:17, 18; 10:1-4, 8-10, 
12-14a, 15, 18, 19; 11:1-7 [proverbs]).  
391
 See Koh, 2006, chapter three, for a presentation of ancient near eastern texts whose 
introductions are similar to the introduction of Ecclesiastes. 
392
 The early rabbinic comments and debates about Solomon, according to Christianson, 
2007, 89, usually do not mention the author—but when they do, Solomonic authorship is 
assumed. Luther is often mentioned to be the first to question Solomonic authorship, but 
Delitzsch, 1968, 190, and Christianson, 2007, 95, point out that the editions that contain these 
parts of Luther’s „Tischreden“ are suspect, and Luther might have been referring to 
Ecclesiasticus (my own perusal of Luther’s commentary on Ecclesiastes [see Pelikan, 1972] 
shows that he never assumed any other author other than Solomon). While Didymus the Blind 
(died ca. 398 AD) might have wondered about the sources of certain verses in Ecclesiastes, and 
some medieval Jewish scholars believed that Ecclesiastes consisted of disparate fragments of 
Solomon’s wisdom collected by Hezekiah’s court scholars, the first to challenge Solomonic 
authorship in a substantial way was the Dutch lawyer, statesman, and theologian Hugo Grotius (d. 
1645—see Christianson, 2007, 95, for details and sources).  
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life to the fullest, there remains in Ecclesiastes a constant tone of a strange mixture of 
frustration and faith. Delitzsch says that in Ecclesiastes, “there appears everywhere the 
same view of the world”—and I think he is right;393 but this “same view of the world” is 
the view expressed by Qoheleth, “king in Jerusalem,” and this view has explanatory 
power for the book’s many knots and riddles. 
Perhaps the entire book is a riddle set within the literary form of a complaint 
(Klage). While this may or may not be so, the wisdom to be gained from Qoheleth 
certainly does not always jump out at the reader from every verse. Much of what he says 
is at the immediate literary level plain enough; but one gets the sense that there is more 
present than what first meets the eye. However one might designate the book, it cannot be 
denied that Qoheleth complains often and bitterly.394 He is exceedingly vexed by the utter 
meaninglessness that he feels in regards to the life that God has given him—so his 
positive advice in life (found in the carpe diem texts) appears concessionary.395 Many of 
Qoheleth’s observations and opinions do not seem to be based upon revelation, and so, 
the reader is hesitant to trust everything he says (e.g., that there is no life after death—see 
9:5, 6). And despite this, the book is ever goading readers onward towards priceless 
truths.396 It could very well be that this is why the book was eventually considered by the 
                                                 
393
 Delitzsch, 1968, 188. 
394
 Complaining is found in 1:2-9, 11, 13-18; 2:1, 2, 11, 12, 14-21, 23; 3:9-11, 14, 16, 19, 
20; 4:1-4, 7, 8; 5:8, 13-17; 6:1-8, 10, 12; 7:1, 13-15, 20, 23, 24, 26-29; 8:7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 17; 9:1-
3, 5-16; 10:1, 5-9, 14; 11:5, 8, 10; 12:1-8. 
395
 Whybray, 1982, 87, suggests that Qoheleth recommends a “whole-hearted pursuit of 
enjoyment” in the following verses: 2:24a; 3:12; 3:22a; 5:17; 8:15a; 9:7-9a; 11:7-12:1a. He 
writes, “It may first be noted that these texts are arranged in such a way as to state their theme 
with steadily increasing emphasis and solemnity.” But Qoheleth cannot be arguing for the 
principle of carpe diem because this is just what he did—as he records in chapter two—but found 
“meaningless” and “a chasing after the wind” (2:11 NIV). In fact, he hated life (2:17) because of 
this. Qoheleth does see value in the simple pleasures of life (i.e. eating and drinking and enjoying 
one’s wife); but, in the end, Qoheleth—in exasperation (see 6:12)—appears to have the opinion 
that even these simple pleasures get overwhelmed by the general pall of meaninglessness which 
falls over life “under the sun.” Qoheleth’s injunction to “enjoy life with your wife, whom you 
love, all the days of this meaningless life that God has given you under the sun—all your 
meaningless days” (9:9) seems to almost be mocking the idea that one can really find contentment 
if the wider scenario is so gloomy. This statement invites a reply like: “how can I enjoy life—
even life with my wife—if it is so meaningless and absurd and we all in the end die like animals?” 
Any emphasis put upon carpe diem is partially or completely attenuated by the spectre of death 
and the threat of judgment (see 3:17 and 11:8, 9 [and see 12:13 section below]).  
396
 In Eccl 12:10, Qoheleth is said to have written words that were “upright and true” 
(NIV). Regarding % F- ., Fox sees this as a superlative phrase and translates thus: “the most 
honest words of truth” (Fox, 1977, 97). According to Krüger, “words of delight” and “words of 
truth” are used synonymously, both being what Qoheleth sought to find/write. (Krüger translates 
12:10: “Qoheleth sought to find pleasing words and to correctly record true words.” [Krüger, 
2004, 207, 210]). The “truth” of Qoheleth’s words are sometimes not at the immediate literal level 
 177 
Jews to be holy: Solomonic authorship did not make it holy (his reputation was 
questionable anyways [see 1 Kings 11; Neh 13:26]), and the epilogue could not make the 
distressing words of Qoheleth any more palatable.397 But those who had a say in the 
matter perhaps recognized the good effect of Ecclesiastes—the good effect of goading the 
reader/listener towards God. Even with Qoheleth’s perceived lack of meaning in life, and 
despite his observation that life is full of pain and hardship and culminates inevitably in 
death, Qoheleth demonstrated that faith in God nevertheless was realizable and 
appropriate.398 Job was a model of faith for those who might be bitter through loss; but 
Qoheleth was a model of faith for those who have gain, but find in it dissatisfaction and a 
sense of emptiness.  
Those who first recognized that Ecclesiastes was valuable and worthy of sacred 
status, however, must have nevertheless been unsettled by Qoheleth’s cutting against the 
grain of Torah-based wisdom.399 Whatever role the Law played in his life, it certainly did 
not make him happy and content. In fact, Qoheleth was miserable, and life seemed 
pointless—certainly not what ought to be the experience of one who lives according to 
the Law! So, among the many complaints in Ecclesiastes is this implicit complaint that 
becomes apparent as one reads the book through: the Law given to Moses had failed to 
provide meaning, ultimate answers, and life-satisfaction to those who were obedient to it. 
In this way, Ecclesiastes made Jewish readers/hearers ready to receive something new 
that would bring them beyond the meaninglessness of life “under the sun” and out of the 
utter hopelessness of death.400  
                                                                                                                                                  
(e.g., that the dead have “no further reward”—9:5). This is somewhat like some of the opinions 
expressed by Job’s three friends—they should be taken with a grain of salt. But both Job and 
Ecclesiastes, through questionable opinions expressed within each, nevertheless goad readers 
toward apprehending great truths about God, humanity, and their relationship.  
397
 According to Hengstenberg, 2001, 33, the Talmud (Tractate Schabbath, f., 30, b. 
[Hengstenberg’s source designation]) records that some early rabbis thought that the book was 
originally recognized as valuable because (in the rabbis words) its beginning and end are words of 
the law.” My view is that the whole book surely must have been under discussion in those days 
when the book was transitioned to scriptural status, and that the whole book must have been 
perceived to have been valuable.  
398
 Qoheleth’s many mentions of death (see 1:11; 2:18, 21; 3:2, 19-21; 4:2, 3; 5:16, 18; 6:3, 
6, 12; 7:1, 2, 15, 17, 26; 8:8, 10, 13; 9:2-6, 10; 11:8; 12:1-7) are meant, in my view, to generate 
fear in the hearts and minds of his readers and thereby generate in them a desire for a solution to 
the fear of death and to death itself.  
399
 It is obvious that Qoheleth is a Hebrew who, as Krüger, 2004, 25, points out, 
presupposes the Torah—but with a somewhat liberal interpretation.  
400
 Loader, 1986, 15, writes, “We can view the Preacher as a painter who offers a realistic 
portrayal of human life as it looks apart from Christ. The more severe his words, the more 
terrified the readers are; the more effective his reproduction of life, the more the readers sense 
their own helplessness.… So we can regard the book as a poetic forerunner of the first part of the 
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The contexts of the fear-of-God texts of Ecclesiastes—to which we now turn—are 
also part of Qoheleth’s wisdom that negatively goads; but they influence the reader in the 
fairly straightforward way of providing information about God and his sovereignty, 
human beings and their dependency, and the judgment in which God will bring all the 
deeds of men and women to account. In these passages, Qoheleth is not complaining 
about what he has simply observed; instead, he is repeating theological and 
anthropological truths that had long since been known from the Torah. But Qoheleth does 
this in a way that takes a step toward more formalized doctrine and that jars the Jewish 
religionist who had become comfortable with the idea that he or she was made righteous 
through adherence to the law. The contexts of each of the fear-of-God texts show the 
following: 
3:14: God is omniscient and omnipotent; human beings are not.  
5:7(6): God is the ultimate authority, far above humanity. 
7:18: Men and women all do evil—even when they try to be righteous. 
8:12, 13: Men and women who do evil will tend to have their lives cut short. 
12:13: God is the ultimate judge of all the deeds of human beings. 
Fear-of-God is appropriate and beneficial in view of these realities. The specific nuances 
of each fear-of-God text and how this applies to the church will now be discussed.  
Eccl 3:14: Fear God because He Is Sovereign 
The fear-of-God text of Eccl 3:14 is bound up with the idea that God is absolutely 
sovereign and men and women are absolutely dependent upon him.401 In the local context 
                                                                                                                                                  
Heidelberg Catechism—how great our misery is—that cries out, as it were, for a new 
dispensation: a deliverance from the misery of meaninglessness.” Regarding the life-after-death 
question, Qoheleth does indicate some ambivalence about it by his questions found in 3:21 and 
6:12, for the rhetorical questions there suggest the answer, “no one knows—except God.” Also, 
“under the sun” is mentioned along with the death theme at several points (6:12; 9:3; 9:6; 9:10, 
11), which may be Qoheleth’s way of saying that this is only what he empirically observed.  
401
 This unforgettable little poem contains an introduction and seven Bible verses. In the 
following discussion about the poem, I use the following terminology (using v. 2 as an example): 
Colon—“a time to be born”; Bicolon (consisting of two cola)—“a time to be born and a time to 
die”; Couplet (consisting of two bicola)—“a time to be born and a time to die; a time to plant, and 
a time to pluck up what is planted.” The biblical verses match the couplets (total of seven), so we 
can see that there are fourteen bicola and twenty eight cola—the same number of cola, as Loader 
interestingly points out, as the much more modern Petrarchan (14th century) sonnet. (Loader, 
1969, 241. Also see Loader, 1986, 34, 35, for a very informative and less technical description.) 
Each bicolon consists of cola that mention positive and then negative (or vise-versa) phenomena 
of human existence.  
“a time to be born” (colon A—something positive); “and a time to die” (colon B—
something negative) 
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of this pericope, the necessary and contingent ontological statuses of, respectively, God 
and human beings, are strongly suggested in the poem of 3:1-8.402 As the NASB 
accurately renders 3:1, “There is an appointed time for everything. And there is a time for 
every event under heaven.” The word for “appointed time” has the sense of—and is used 
elsewhere for—a time that some authority decrees for some event to occur.403 Qoheleth 
                                                                                                                                                  
Meanwhile, the two bicola of each couplet (i.e., in each Bible verse) run more or less parallel to 
each other: 
“a time to be born and a time to die;” (bicolon 1 theme: life [something positive] and death 
[something negative])  
“a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted.” (bicolon 2 theme: life [something 
positive] and death [something negative]) 
The seven couplets go on to cover the “whole range of human activity” (Eaton, 1983, 34). Loader 
sums up the idea and mood of the poem well: “In this regard we can again be in agreement with 
the Preacher. No matter how advanced the development of human capacities, science, and 
technology may be, man cannot guarantee his own happiness. But there is also something very 
unsatisfactory about the poem. There is a restlessness like that of a weaver’s shuttle in it, a 
persistent uncertainty in the back-and-forth movement of its ideas. It is a restless and 
unfathomable sea in which the human lifeboat tosses about. Rest is possible only at anchor—and 
that is what the gospel of Christ offers” (Loader, 1986, 38). That “anchor”—in my view—is 
perhaps prefigured at the end of the poem (3:8b) where the desirable/undesirable order of the 
bicolon is unexpectedly switched such that “war” is not the last word, but “peace” (1$.). To 
consider this in view of the promise made to David, the meaning of Solomon’s name, and how the 
Messiah is described in both testaments, is to suspect that Qoheleth—or perhaps better, the Holy 
Spirit working through him—had something very important to say here. Any change in the 
expected syntax of a biblical text is often exegetically significant. Here we have a sudden change 
in the poetical structure that indicates some sort of exegetically critical point. 
402
 In other words, the poem appears to support the following: the essence of God includes 
his necessity; that is, he is the “independent, indestructible, incorruptible, uncaused eternal being” 
who can “never be caused not to be” (Angeles, 1992, 202). Human beings are the opposite—i.e., 
they are contingent beings. It follows then that they are destructible, corruptible, caused, temporal, 
and can be caused not to be. These philosophical terms are, of course, not a part of Qoheleth’s 
vocabulary; but the realities of God and of human beings which they denote resonate throughout 
Ecclesiastes. 
403
 !%\ (“appointed time,” “time”—BDB)—is used in several contexts in which a particular 
time is decreed by a high authority. In the case in Neh 2:6, Nehemiah, based upon the king’s 
request, sets a !%\ to return from Jerusalem to Susa. Esther 9:27 records that the Jews decided to 
celebrate the heroic deeds of Esther and Mordecai over a period of two days “according to the 
written instructions and according to their appointed time” (1"%\D [trans. NKJV]) annually the 
festival of Purim. The word, as used in these texts, has the feel of something decreed in the 
context of important events and high authority in which people are under compulsion to do certain 
things at the certain appointed times in the future. It is interesting how these uses of !%\, as well 
how it is deployed in Eccl 8:5, all depict times that have been “appointed” as a result of the 
actions and decisions of kings: Nehemiah—at the king’s request—sets a time for him to return; 
Mordecai issued letters to the Jews to celebrate “feasting and gladness” based upon the decree of 
King Ahasuerus to let the Jews protect themselves and seek revenge upon their accusers; In Eccl 
5:6, there is an “appointed time” that comes about from the sovereign proceedings of the king that 
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then lists those events that men and women find themselves subjected to while existing in 
life “under the sun.” The first bi-cola of v. 2 establish the confines within which all the 
other events must fit: “a time to be born, and a time to die.”404 Needless to say, no one has 
any say over the day of one’s birth, and one does not choose the day of one’s death 
(suicide, of course, is an exception). “You are not your own” (1 Cor 6:19); in other words, 
someone else made us, put us on planet Earth, and “has appointed [our] pre-appointed 
times” (Acts 17:26 NKJV). Birth and death, in Qoheleth’s view, are events appointed by 
God; but all other human events are too: love and marriage and sex are sovereignly 
ordained by God, as are laughing and healing and dancing. The unpleasant phenomena of 
hate, killing, and war are also God-appointed—and Qoheleth here does not comment 
upon which are good or evil; he just says that they will be.405  
                                                                                                                                                  
men and women who appear before the king must conform to in order to have the best chance of 
favorable outcomes. These uses of !%\ illumine the way we should go exegetically with its instance 
in 3:1. 
404
 But see my remarks about Eccl 3:17 below in FN 466.  
405
 There are some commentators who tend to see in the poem more of the ability of 
humans to do things and therefore have some measure of control over their destinies—as long as 
these things are done at the appropriate “time.” Blenkinsopp, 1995, 57, 58, is one who leans this 
way. He understands 3:1-8 to be a somewhat orthodox wisdom statement—influenced by 
Stoicism, and originally not a part of Ecclesiastes—on the ability of human beings to coincide 
their actions with the favorable times afforded by “fate” in order to bring about favorable 
outcomes. There is a problem, however, with this view: the favorable/unfavorable phenomena of 
verse 2a (being born and dying) are not at the disposal of people. To solve this, he interprets the 
Qal infinitive -$$ literally (“to give birth”) but—in keeping with Stoic teaching (and practice!)—
he suggests that %$ (lit. “to die”) be taken to mean suicide. (Ibid., 57. Blenkinsopp mentions that 
the founder and his successor [Zeno and Cleanthes] of the Stoic school both committed suicide 
[59]) With this adjustment and all 28 Cola depicting those phenomena that are at the disposal of 
human beings, the poem, according to Blenkinsopp, “seems to proclaim the conventional message 
of the sages, and incidentally of contemporary Stoic philosophers, that we have the resources and 
knowledge required to exercise control over our lives by doing things at the right time, a message 
which Qoheleth refutes in the following verses (especially 3.10-11, 16-18)” (Ibid., 57, 58). A 
number of things can be said in reply: is this little gem of biblical verse—with its exquisite 
symmetry and gentle ebbing back and forth between titanic themes of love and hate, birth and 
death, war and peace (and even making love and refraining from doing so [if that is what v. 5 
involves])—only a kind of Greek-based philosophy inserted into the book for Qoheleth to argue 
against? What one argues against is usually made to look not so attractive. But someone put a lot 
of love, deep thought, and poetic care into this poem; therefore, it seems that the message would 
be something of significant substance and also a message that Qoheleth thought worthy enough to 
include. The poem has also been one of the more memorable—if not the best remembered—parts 
of the book. If the author of Ecclesiastes drew the poem out of Stoic-influenced thinking because 
he wanted to refute it, then he terribly miscalculated how the reading public would take it. But 
this could not have been the case; a non-fragmenting approach better explains the poem and its 
place within the context of Ecclesiastes: Qoheleth throughout his work depicts human beings as 
being unable to control their destinies (See 1:9, 10; 2:11, 17, 25; 3:11, 14, 15, 17; 5:19; 6:1-6; 
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So humans are limited in their ability to change the circumstances which befall 
them. Therefore, there is not much—if anything—to be gained from working hard in 
order to improve one’s “lot.” As Qoheleth several times asks (laments), “What gain have 
the workers from their toil?” (3:9—see also 1:3; 2:22; 5:16) The rhetorical question most 
likely expects the answer, “none,” because “time and chance happen to them all” (9:11b). 
But this is a terrible burden for men and women because God has set a sense of the 1lw[ 
(“passing of times” [Eccl 3:11]) in their hearts and thereby made them aware of the past 
and the future.406 By being aware of the past, a person knows that there was a time when 
he or she was not—and that realization leads to the awareness that someone must have 
brought him or her into existence. By being aware of the future, a man or woman knows 
that there is continued life to be had, but anxiety arises because he or she does not know 
how it will go (see 9:1). As life is lived, experience demonstrates that life is unpredictable 
and difficult to control—and the knowledge of the future termination of life is especially 
distressing. With this “eternity” in their hearts, men and women know that they are not of 
their own, that God is the agent by which they have come into being, and that God is Lord 
over all events—but they do not know what God is doing and why.407 As Qoheleth says, 
“yet they cannot fathom what God has done from beginning to end.” This image of God 
inserted by God into human hearts gives men and women the ability to know God, but to 
not know him completely. The miracle of 1lw[ allows human beings to deduce God’s 
reality from the general revelation—such that they are, as Paul writes, “without 
excuse”—and, at the same time, to know that God is far beyond them, and his wisdom 
“far off, and deep, very deep.”408 In this human situation in which all is contingent upon 
                                                                                                                                                  
7:13, 14, 23; 8:5-8, 16, 17; 9:1, 2, 11-16; 11:1-6, 9; 12:1-8, 14), and “time and chance” (9:11) 
cruelly fall upon them all (9:12). The same view is most likely also contained within the poem of 
3:1-8.  
406
 “Passing of times” suggested by Jenni, 1953, 26, 27. 
407
 “Eternity” suggested by Eaton, 1983, 81. 
408
 Murphy, 1992, 35, writes, “The interpretation of 1$+ has been a crux interpretum.” I 
think he is right as the commentaries spend quite a lot of space talking about the meaning of this 
word. Furthermore, it seems be central to Qoheleth’s description and understanding of humans 
and therefore central to understanding the relationship between them and God. What is this 1lw[ 
“given” into the hearts of humankind? The opinions on this range quite widely—several examples 
being: eternity, desire for eternity, ever new repetition, duration, the world, spatiality, obscurity, 
ignorance, darkness, and toil (these last three with emendation). (these were culled from the lists 
of Ogden, 2007, 59, 60; Eaton, 1983, 81; and Murphy, 1992, 34) Despite this diversity, the greater 
numbers of commentators have leaned toward some sort of duration time concept vis à vis the 
point idea of time provided by + (see 3:1-8, 11a). Ogden, 2007, 60, is right to point out that this 
fits the book’s context best: “Given the temporal setting of the chapter, we should resist any 
attempt to offer a solution which falls outside [the time] field of reference. Thus we shall accept 
the meaning, ‘a consciousness of the eternal.’” Eaton, 1983, 81, concurs: “‘Eternity’, by far the 
commonest meaning, fits the context well, for the whole passage has been concerned with God’s 
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God’s sovereign will, the best that human beings can do, in the view of Qoheleth, is to 
find contentment in the basic pleasures of life—eating, drinking, work, and marriage—
but to know that these things and the enjoyment of them are only made possible by 
God.409 Men and women can and should enjoy life, but they can only do so insofar as 
God allows; for the feelings of pleasure and contentment cannot be humanly self-
generated.  
                                                                                                                                                  
scheme of ‘times.’” This is in keeping with the BDB overall translation of 1lw[ (“long duration,” 
“antiquity,” or “futurity”; and with 3:11 specifically, “age [duration] of the world.”). Although 
Jenni, 1953, 26, 27, (in his thorough study of 1lw[ in the OT) admits significant challenges with 
trying to pin down the meaning (in 3:11) of the word, he nevertheless „in Ermangelung einer 
besseren Lösung“ goes with „Zeitenablauf“ (“the passing of times”) or „die ausgedehnte Zeit“ 
(“the stretched-out time”).  
But that being said, “eternity” still might be the most suitable translation based on a more 
precise understanding of the function of this knowledge—something that Machinist, 1995, 171, 
172, perceptively brings to light: “But in an admittedly difficult passage, 3:11, Qohelet seems 
once more to have taken the meaning [of 1lw[] to a new level of abstraction and self-
consciousness. Here ‘ôlām is not simply ‘eternity’, but the ‘ability to consider and reflect on the 
concept of eternity’, which God has put into the minds (lēb) of human beings ‘so that’ (mibbĕlî 
’ăšer), paradoxically, they are able to see that they cannot discover the nature of God’s own 
pattern of activity, his ma‘ăśeh. In other words, ‘ôlām in 3:11, like ‘wisdom’ (hokmâ) elsewhere 
in the book (e.g., 1:13; 2:21 within the context of 1:12-2:23; 7:23; 9:10; cf. also hešbôn …), 
seems to be the capacity God gives humans to be able to discover the limits of their 
understanding. The word ‘ôlām, it would appear, allows the discovery of limits precisely because 
it gives human beings an awareness of the ‘eternal’ that lies beyond” (transliteration style his). I 
think Machinist gets to the real essence of 1lw[ as used in 3:11 and in the process provides the 
justification for using a more theologically (and philosophically) loaded word like “eternity.” The 
substance of what God puts into the hearts of human beings is mysterious—“who can understand 
it?” But the function of it is to open their eyes to the reality of their situation. This reality, as 
Loader, 1986, 39, 40, points out, is not only the awareness of the possibility of eternity (i.e., time 
extending out into the future without end), but also the awareness of the determined events that 
force their way into human lives: “If then God has set the temporal world order in the human 
center of reflection, that means he forces man to occupy himself, in his mind, with the unceasing 
succession of the fixed dispensations of fate that come upon him.… Man cannot escape the 
torment of his fate, for God has made it a part of his nature to think about it ….” The “burden” 
given by God mentioned in v. 10 most probably consists of these two realities that humans are 
made aware of. The knowledge of “eternity” results in anxiety because men and women are aware 
of the concept of an unending future (i.e., of eternity), but they do not know if they will be a part 
of it. Anxiety (“torment”) also comes as a result of their knowledge about their inability to control 
their lives—either in the present or in the future.  
409
 Enjoyment is said to be a gift of God in 2:24, 25; 3:13; 5:18-20. Qoheleth’s emphasis on 
enjoying life (2:24; 3:12, 13, 22; 5:18, 19; 8:15; 9:7-10; 11:8, 9) should be considered alongside 
6:12a (“For who knows what is good for mortals …?”). Also to be kept in view is that all 
enjoyment occurs in an overall atmosphere of lbh (9:9; 11:8), impending soul annihilation (9:10; 
11:8 [but see 3:21; 12:7]), and impending judgment (11:9).   
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God determines the times and seasons of human existence and—through the 
placing of 1lw[ into the heart—makes human beings know that he is the determiner of all 
events. But not only are men and women aware that God does, but whatever he does is 
unchangeable. Qoheleth laments that all human achievement is meaningless—in fact 
“there was nothing to be gained under the sun” (2:11b); on the other hand, “whatever God 
does endures forever; nothing can be added to it, nor anything taken from it” (3:14a). And 
Qoheleth believes that God does this so that men and women might fear him. The MT of 
the last clause in 3:14, "#$% . .+ 1$, can be literally translated, “and the 
God does so that they [human beings] will fear before him.” The Bible versions here 
translate  variously—e.g., “respect” (NCV), “revere” (NIV), “stand in awe” (NRSV), 
and “fear” (ESV, NASB, NKJV). This text could reflect some or all of these; but the use 
of the preposition "#$%—which, like !m and ynpm, is employed to denote that something is 
occurring before (or sometimes “from before”) someone—emphasizes that fear is being 
experienced before a very specific object (in this case, God).410 Real fear combined with 
awe—and perhaps with a by-product of reverence—is also made more likely by 
Qoheleth’s portrayal in chapter three of God’s power and knowledge vis-à-vis human 
limitations.411 God pre-ordains all and is transcendent; but this is tempered by the 
understanding that God in accordance with the times and seasons that he decrees does 
give wonderful gifts—from the miracles of life (3:2a) and love (3:8a) to the joys of 
eating, drinking, and happiness (3:12, 13). In other words, because God is omnipotent and 
sovereign, human beings fear him and are in awe of him; because God gives men and 
women all that is good, they love and revere him. Both of these combine in worship. But 
“worship” is most likely getting beyond what Qoheleth intended to say in 3:14. When one 
seriously contemplates omnipotence and omnipresence, and also seriously considers that 
                                                 
410
 In the numerous OT mentions of fear that are not virtue fear-of-God cases,  and 
!m/ynpm/ynplm + fear object is often employed to clearly signify the fear emotion/feeling. But when 
virtue-fear-of-God instances employ this form, BDB shifts the meaning from being “afraid” to 
“stand in awe of.” From the context and grammar I can understand that awe could indeed be a part 
of what is being signified; but just because God becomes the object, I do not see how BDB can 
justify such a semantic shift—unless there is a bias already present that resists understanding that 
fear exhibited before God can be a legitimate emotion/feeling. Even Becker, 1965, 254, perceives 
in Eccl 3:14 a “stronger trait of numinous fear” because of the employment of ynplm (but this is in 
addition to the “moral” [„sittliche“] fear-of-God idea that he understands as predominant in the 
OT wisdom literature). See my FN 499.  
411
 Curtis and Brugaletta, 2004, 131, agree that fear-of-God has much to do with 
understanding who God is and who human beings are: “The fear of the Lord, which comes out of 
a clear understanding of who God is and what He is like, together with a clear understanding of 
who we are as human beings created by God, involves a full-orbed understanding about God that 
is informed by His revelation of Himself to people. Although attributes of God such as His power, 
majesty, and holiness are often related to the fear of the Lord, His kindness, compassion, and 
forgiveness are no less related to the concept.” 
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the God who possesses these attributes is the highest authority who will judge all men and 
women (a fact that Qoheleth explicitly mentions in 3:17 and 11:9 [see also 12:14]), then 
the semantic centering of Eccl 3:14’s use of  on real fear is made much more likely.412  
Loader writes that because of the limited revelation in Qoheleth’s time, men and 
women were “without direction or goal” and had “no destination.” Furthermore,  
without the future of Christ no other posture is in fact conceivable.… When the 
resurrection of Christ broke through the endless circular movement of history, a 
direction and a destination was set for human life. Labor then becomes meaningful 
because in the new circumstances it becomes service.413 
Those in the church praise God for this “direction” and “destination” and accept with joy 
their toil on earth because they know that it has ultimate meaning through the faith in the 
One with whom they will spend eternity. But does this mean that fear-of-God is no longer 
necessary in the Church? Qoheleth did not know about the redemption and eternal life 
that would be provided through Christ. He also did not know that the Word of God would 
become flesh (John 1:14) or that God would send his Holy Spirit into believers to teach 
(John 14:26), strengthen (Eph 3:16), and encourage (Acts 9:31) them. For Christians, God 
is not as far away as he was to Qoheleth; and yet, the realities of God’s sovereignty and 
human contingency that Qoheleth was aware of are also realities today. God makes his 
home in people who have been—as Jesus described to Nicodemus—“born again” (John 
3:3); at the same time Christ is seated “at the right hand of the throne of the majesty in the 
heavens” (Heb 8:1) and “all authority in heaven and on earth” has been given to him 
(Matt 28:18). Christians are “God’s chosen ones, holy and beloved” (Col 3:12); and yet, it 
is not for believers to “know the times or periods that the father has set by his own 
authority” (Acts 1:7). Human contingency even extends to salvation—for faith in Christ 
is a gift only made possible by the sovereign God (John 3:5-8; 6:44). The reasons for 
fearing God that Qoheleth gave in chapter three are still reasons to fear God today—for in 
him, there “is no variableness, neither shadow of turning” (James 1:17). It is perfectly 
natural to fall in fear before the king of kings who made the universe (the universe which 
still cannot contain him—1 Kings 8:27): James, John, and Peter fell down “overcome by 
fear” when they heard God’s voice (Matt 17:6), and John fell in fear “as though dead” 
                                                 
412
 About the meaning of  in Eccl 3:14, the commentaries vary: for example, for 
Lohfink, 2003, 62, fear-of-God here “is silence before the divine mystery, which is closed to 
human understanding”; Garrett, 2001, 300, notes that humans are “altogether contingent beings, 
and our only appropriate response is reverence”; Fox, 2004, 24, says “Koheleth’s unpredictable 
and aloof deity provokes real fear and consternation, not only pious reverence.” Perhaps Loader, 
1986, 41, sums it up best: “God’s dispensations are such that human beings stand in awe of him. 
This fear of God is not a form of piety; it is terror and a shrinking from him. No other possibility 
exists in the face of a power that man cannot affect and does not understand.” 
413
 Loader, 1986, 42. 
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(Rev 1:17) at the feet of the ascended and glorified Christ. And it is perfectly appropriate 
to feel some of the same fear, wonder, and awe when Christians today contemplate the 
glorious majesty of God.414  
Eccl 5:7 (6): Fear God because He Is the Highest Authority 
In this injunction to fear God is reflected the moral authority that God has over 
human beings. This authority is assumed in 5:1-6 (4:17-5:5) through a number of 
references to the obligations that were incumbent upon Israelite men as they worshipped 
at the temple. But before mentioning these, I should say that this passage—like Eccl 3:1-
14—first assumes the realities of God’s sovereignty and human contingency. But this is 
not argued for here, but simply stated in one terse and memorable epigram: “God is in 
heaven, and you upon earth; therefore, let your words be few” (5:2b [5:1b]). This should 
not be taken as absolute: what Qoheleth says here can be interpreted in view of the 
Israelite idea that God’s glory should under favorable circumstances reside in the temple. 
When the Ark of the Covenant was first brought to the newly built temple, the “glory of 
the LORD filled the temple” (favorable circumstances—see 1 Kings 8:11); but then the 
Spirit of God later left the temple because of the nation’s rebellion (unfavorable 
circumstances—see Ezek 10). With the visitations that God had made to his people as 
well as the many promises of God to dwell with his people, even in times of unfavorable 
circumstances, the Israelites in general certainly did not understand God as European 
Deists did much later—i.e., as being absolutely transcendent and uninvolved with human 
affairs. The understanding of the Israelites after the time of Moses was always sliding on 
a scale somewhere between the two extremes mentioned by Solomon at the temple 
dedication: “The heavens, even the highest heaven, cannot contain you. How much less 
this temple I have built!” (1 Kings 8:27) Sometimes they perceived God’s presence as 
within the temple and close at hand; at other times, they felt like God had abandoned 
them altogether—but even so (at least with the ones who had not given up all hope), they 
remembered God’s promises and understood that God was always willing to re-establish 
the relationship should the people repent and humble their hearts and pray (2 Chron 7:14). 
This was in fact the main thrust of Solomon’s temple dedication prayer: if the people 
                                                 
414
 After both of these instances of falling in fear before God, Jesus says “do not be afraid.” 
In these cases as well as all the others in the OT and NT in which people fear before God and are 
then told not to be afraid, the Lord never says “do not be afraid of me.” As I have said before, God 
never condemns displays of some fear before him; but when the Bible depicts someone or some 
group as having no fear before God, it is always presented as evil. All these instances of God’s 
admonitions not to fear in response to cases of event fear-of-God must be interpreted in light of 
the many OT and NT admonitions to fear God as well as the various texts that condemn a lack of 
fear-of-God (see Marshall remarks, in my FN 505; also see FN 487). 
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sinned but then later humbled their hearts and turned back to God, Solomon entreated 
God to hear their prayers and, “from heaven, [God’s] dwelling place,” and “forgive” (1 
Kings 8:30—see also vv. 34, 36, 39, 43, 45, 49).  
In general, it appears that Qoheleth understood God as being far away in the 
heavens instead of being close by in the temple. In Qoheleth’s view, even though God is 
omnipotent, there is enough chaos and injustice in the world for him to sense that God is 
distant and detached. Over against this remote God are men and women—“under the sun” 
and “on earth”—who are weak and corrupt, and can at the drop of a hat become a stench 
in God’s nostrils. But maybe Qoheleth does not really understand God to be so far away. 
One thing that might be noticed in this passage is the echo of the phenomena of king, 
palace, and protocol. How Qoheleth views the place of God and the proper relationship to 
him is affected by his understanding of the place of the king and the conduct of people 
when they are in his presence.415 Eccl 8:2-6 is a rough parallel to the passage at hand: the 
matters of king, oaths, and proper conduct before the king are of concern to Qoheleth, and 
the same concerns echo in Eccl 5:1-6 (4:17-5:5)—but the “king” in this case is God. As I 
have argued for above, Qoheleth is never far away from presenting his views from the 
perspective of a king. As the king had his palace and the “proper time and procedure” 
(8:5b NIV) for everything that occurred there, so God has his temple before which one 
should carefully tread and come to “listen rather than to offer the sacrifice of fools ….” 
(Eccl 5:1 [4:17] NIV) But this talk of location is in one respect superfluous: theologically 
speaking, God is omnipresent. But more to the point, communication—which defines 
relationship—is what is important. If there is no communication with God, then God 
would appear—at least from the human perspective—to not be present (i.e., he is 
                                                 
415
 The author of Ecclesiastes presents Qoheleth as being an Israelite king (Solomon) in the 
beginning of the work (1:1, 12; 2:4-9, 12) and the rest of the work at times appears to assume that 
a king is nearby (4:13-16; 5:8, 9; 7:27; 8:2-6; 10:16, 20; 12:9, 10). One might understand this king 
as one of the Hasmonean rulers—but the terminus ante quem of the mid- to early-second century 
BC (based upon the paleographic dating of the Ecclesiastes Qumran fragments [see Muilenburg, 
1954]) makes this unlikely. The author of Ecclesiastes could, of course, simply be writing with a 
fictional united monarchy setting in mind. But if he is in fact referring to the conditions in his day, 
it is difficult to see how the ruling authority—as it is presented by Qoheleth—could be one of the 
Greek, Persian, or Babylonian kings who ruled a far distance from Jerusalem. Krüger assumes 
Jerusalem under Ptolomaic rule to be the setting in which Ecclesiastes was composed (second half 
of the third century BC). His dating is based upon (in addition to linguistic factors and subjects 
under discussion in the book) “its references to political and social circumstances”; But these, 
writes Krüger, are “by no means clear” (Krüger, 2004, 19. The “Tobiads” [Joseph and Hyrcanus] 
and/or the high priests during the time of waning Ptolamaic influence are perhaps reflected, 
suggests Krüger, in Eccl 1:12-2:26 [p. 20]). My opinion is that beyond the opening texts that refer 
to Solomon (Eccl 1:1, 12; 2:4-9), the texts in Ecclesiastes that depict situations of royalty are of 
too general a nature to indicate specific times or specific kings. As Murphy appropriately remarks, 
“the text is simply too vague to support historical reference ….” (Murphy, 1992, xxii)  
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somewhere else). But Qoheleth assumes in Eccl 5:1-6 (4:17-5:5) that the people come to 
the temple in order to have an experience of and a relationship with God—albeit one in 
which the less human words spoken, the better. Listening and offering sacrifices (5:1 
[4:17]),416 uttering words before God (5:2 [1]), making vows to God, being considered a 
fool by God (5:4 [3]), and being the object of God’s anger because of unfulfilled vows, all 
presume that a relationship exists and communication really does occur between God and 
worshippers—and that this communication happens at the temple. But whatever nearness 
that Qoheleth might understand about God should not detract from the fact that Qoheleth 
thinks of God as almighty and human beings as weak and flawed creatures who 
understand God to be massive, unmovable, and, in the main, unknowable. 
But with Eccl 5:6 [5] the fear that is commanded is also provoked by the moral 
authority that God has over men and women. Evil is a concern (5:1 [4:17], 6 [5]) and, to 
avoid it, one should guard one’s steps and be ready to listen instead of offering sacrifices 
of fools (5:1 [4:17]). One should also not be hasty in thought or speech before God (5:2 
[1]), not make vows to God that one cannot fulfill (5:4 [3], 5[4]), and not make the excuse 
before God (or his “messenger”—probably the priest) that he really did not mean to make 
the vow—for if he does, God will be angry and punish him (5:6 [5]).417 When the 
awesomeness of God’s power and works is contemplated, as well as the authority that 
flows from these, then one begins to understand the gravity of life “under the sun.” As 
Ellul well says, “approaching God and entering into a relationship with him is a matter of 
infinite seriousness. If you cannot listen, be silent (humble yourself), and keep your 
promises, it would be better not to approach this God.”418 Loader also mentions the peril 
that Qoheleth perceives in worship of the almighty God: “God is an enormous power 
before whom people must stand in awe. For that reason it is perilous to take part in the 
worship of this God, and it is better just to listen quietly than to take part unthinkingly.”419 
In view of the propensity to worship amiss, Eaton concurs that “… the worshipper is 
treading on dangerous ground. The remedy is to fear God.”420  
                                                 
416
 According to BDB G *FZ\ (n.m.) is a “general name for all sacrifices eaten at feasts.” It is 
probably not inappropriate here to draw a parallel to Christian worship which remembers and 
appropriates the sacrifice of Christ through the partaking of the bread and the wine. As the 
Israelites were admonished to conduct themselves circumspectly and with some fear before God 
as they brought their sacrifices, Christians ought to have the same mind as they claim forgiveness 
through the blood of Jesus Christ.  
417
 One thinks of Jephthah (Judg 11:30-40) who fulfilled his vow even though it meant 
killing his daughter. The command of Christ to not swear at all but simply fulfill one’s “no” or 
one’s “yes” (Matt 5:33-37) also indicates how serious God is about intentions of the heart and 
honoring one’s word.  
418
 Ellul, 1990, 273. 
419
 Loader, 1986, 58. 
420
 Eaton, 1983, 100. 
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The meaningless things that are an affront to God—like too many words said before 
him in the temple—can be avoided if one just fears God.421 Qoheleth, in 5:7 [6] employs 
the imperative Q 	(, and the direct object marker makes clear that the commanded fear 
should have God as its object:  1$  (lit. “Fear the God!”). Using Ottonian 
terms, Murphy writes that this fear is a “basic reverence for the numinous, the distance 
from the Wholly Other ….”422 Krüger’s understanding is similar:  
[I]t is clear that this “fear of God” also includes here the numinous element of “fear 
before God.” A point of the exhortation to “fear God” at the close of 4:17-5:6 lies in 
the fact that in the view of the text the (temple) cult is apparently not eo ipso 
already an expression of the “fear of God”; rather, the “fear of God” functions here 
as a criterion for judging cultic practices and a guideline of behavior in the cultic 
realm.423   
Krüger’s last point is valuable: there is something about this fear that is not piety, cultic 
loyalty, or religious obedience (or even the religion itself), but something more 
foundational by which the religious practices of worshippers can be judged. If this fear-
of-God were something more abstract (i.e., more developed), the command to practice it 
would seem out of place in the pericope’s context: what Qoheleth says is not a gentle 
encouragement given to mature worshippers to fan their worship of God to the next level; 
rather, Qoheleth scolds those who come to the temple for acting like fools. They speak 
rashly, break their vows, and make dishonest excuses in the process. If someone acts like 
a fool before the king in his court, a wise person would probably not whisper to the fool, 
“worship the king!” but more likely whisper, “you’d better be afraid of the king and quit 
acting like a fool—or you might lose your head!” Likewise, those acting like fools before 
God’s throne are in danger—and the emotion/feeling of fear is meant to alert one to that 
danger and also be an unpleasant goad that forces one away from the danger. The fear 
that Qoheleth commands in Eccl 5:7 (6) (very much from the perspective of his office as 
“king in Jerusalem”) is mainly fear of the titanic and demanding God and fear of his 
anger and punishment (which corresponds approximately to the “numinous” fear that 
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 Crenshaw, 1987, 118, writes: “Despite the ambiguous syntax, the final command leaves 
nothing to the imagination. This imperative, ‘Fear God,’ concludes Qohelet’s remarks about cultic 
obligations. Fear of God results in few words, faithfulness in paying vows if one ever resorts to 
them, and generally in conduct that does not invite punishment.” 
422
 Murphy, 1992, 49. Two fear-of-God uses in Ecclesiastes, suggests Murphy, capture “the 
quality of the numinous. These are 3:14 and 5:7 [6]. Regarding the latter, he writes: “The 
command to fear God appears in the ‘liturgical’ context of 5:6. It is a conclusion from several 
admonitions that advise caution relative to speech and making vows before God. The temper of 
the advice is clear from 5:1—God is in heaven and you are on earth, so let your words be few. In 
short, God is dangerous for humans to deal with in a casual way” (Ibid., lxv). 
423
 Krüger, 2004, 110. Becker on this verse holds on to the  
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Murphy and Krüger mention above [but see my strong reservations about this term in the 
Otto section of chapter one]).424 
The ontological realities of God and humans as well as the moral authority that God 
has over human beings that justifies Qoheleth’s call to fear-of-God are the same realities 
that exist today. God’s sovereignty was emphasized in chapter three. Here, the reality of 
God’s moral authority is added—and the appropriate reaction by people then as well as 
now is some healthy level of fear. A Christian today should be aware of the grandeur and 
majesty of God as well as his eternal wisdom and ultimate authority. The Christian should 
possess a certain sobriety in his or her worship that respects God by behaving wisely and 
circumspectly before him and by carrying out all that he or she has vowed to do—for 
Christians are still part of the sum of humanity that is an “evil generation” (Luke 11:29; 
see also 1 Kings 8:46; Ps 14:1-3; Eccl 7:20; Rom 3:23; 5:12; 1 John 1:8, 9). And even 
though Christians are commanded to “be perfect as [their] heavenly Father is perfect” 
(Matt 5:48), all, nevertheless, fall short of this goal and are susceptible to acting like 
“fools” before God. When a Christian thinks deeply about God and human depravity, the 
honor that he or she will feel towards God will be inseparable from fear—as Ellul 
insightfully points out:  
We can translate this word as “respect,” if we keep both ideas together: fear in the 
sense of respect, and respect in the sense of fear. We do not want to suggest mere 
“respect” in the sense of the courtesy we owe our superiors …. “Fear” in the 
biblical sense, then, involves being conscious of something of infinite seriousness: 
recognizing and approaching the Wholly Other. For “fear-respect” necessarily 
involves approaching the one who is infinitely distant from us. But an approach 
presupposes a desire, a will, a hope, and an anticipation.”425 
While Christ has brought the God who is “infinitely distant from us” into the hearts of 
those who accept him, Christians should not let this truth cause them to let their guard 
down, to take their faith lightly, and to forget that Jesus Christ is not just the “lamb of 
God” (John 1:36), but also the “lion of the tribe of Judah” (Rev 5:5) who is the 
                                                 
424
 Qoheleth treats the subject of vows (once again, a subject for a king) with deadly 
seriousness. Not only will God be angry (mhS, “be wroth”—BDB) at vows that are broken, but he 
will also punish by destroying the vow-breaker’s work (Eccl 5:6b [5b]). There may be also an 
overtone of filial fear-of-God that Qoheleth might intend here; for even though his words are quite 
blunt, Qoheleth would have likely understood that some worshippers—even though acting like 
fools at times at the temple—would have been really trying to serve and worship God and could 
be motivated by not only the fear of punishment, but also the fear of losing God’s favor. 
425
 Ellul, 1990, 275. His use of “Wholly Other” is from Otto. As with “numinous,” I 
question the value and accuracy (as a means to describe God) of the term—at least as it is 
understood and employed by Otto (see Otto section in chapter one). My attempt here to 
understand the fear-of-God passages of Ecclesiastes demonstrates how affected the scholarly 
world is by Otto. 
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“consuming fire” (Heb 12:29) that will one day clean his threshing floor with 
“unquenchable fire” (Luke 3:17). “Thus our impatience with God,” as Eaton says, 
is rebuked by God’s greatness compared to man’s smallness. Mankind must always 
be a suppliant, never an equal. To restrain the tongue is the Preacher’s way of 
wisdom. The point was later embodied in the Lord’s Prayer, where the twin truths 
that God is ‘Father’ but ‘in heaven’ guard against craven fear on the one hand and 
flippancy on the other.426  
Eccl 7:18: Fear God because Men and Women Are Evil 
This pericope associated with this verse teaches the virtues of humility and 
temperance in view of the reality of human depravity. It begins (in 7:15) with Qoheleth 
once again bringing the reader face to face with his or her inability to influence the 
world—for God is the one ultimately in control. Even though a person might try his or 
her best to be righteous, this will not necessarily bring about longer life; in fact, wicked 
people might very well outlive the righteous. Verse 15 fits with Qoheleth’s pessimistic 
opinion that stands in some tension with orthodox wisdom: the way things go for people 
“under the sun” is distressingly not in accordance with their deeds; there is the “righteous 
man perishing in his righteousness” and the “wicked man living long in his wickedness” 
(NIV). This is what Qoheleth has observed from time to time.427 So Verse 15 once again 
reminds the reader that his or her ability to control the future is tenuous at best; God alone 
is sovereign.  
To discern what Qoheleth goes on to say in vv. 16-18, we must first understand his 
view about universal human depravity as stated in v. 20: “There is not a righteous man on 
earth who does what is right and never sins” (NIV). The reality of human depravity is 
delivered in this verse in three ways: first, S-h ! 1- (“there is not a righteous man”) is 
a unique OT phrase that is picked up by Paul in order to bolster his case for universal 
depravity (See my FN 385); second, F^ .+ . … ! 1- (“there is not a man who 
does good”) mirrors phrases in Ps 14:1, 3 and Ps 53:1, 3 that make the same point (also 
employed by Paul in Rom 3:12);428 third, ^G $ … . … ! 1- (“there is not a 
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 Eaton, 1983, 98, 99.  
427
 Krüger, 2004, 140, writes, “The observation formulated in v. 15 deals critically with the 
conviction that a righteous man lives a long time, whereas an evil doer is quickly destroyed. The 
reference to (more or less numerous?) individual cases … in which this is not true does not so 
much call into question the connection, assumed in this conviction, between behavior and result 
as such, as it points out that we have here at best a rule to which there are also exceptions and not 
an absolute and seamlessly valid conformity to a law.” 
428
 In Rom 3:10, 12, Paul could be drawing from a variety of OT texts simultaneously. Rom 
3:12’s οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ποιῶν χρηστότητα (“there is no one who shows kindness”) quotes from Ps 
14 (MT: 14:1b, 3b. LXX: 13:1b, 3b) and/or Ps 53 (MT: 53:2b, 4b. LXX: 52:2b, 4b) and/or 
elements of Eccl 7:20 (F^ .+ . … ! 1- [“there is not a … man … who does what is right” 
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man … who … and never sins”) repeats the same idea—but, this time, in the way 
Solomon expressed it at the temple dedication (see 1 Kings 8:46). The use of ^G (verb, 
“to sin”—DBLSD) with the double-negation syntax is unique to these two texts (along 
with 2 Chron 6:36, the parallel text to 1 Kings 8:46) and presents to the reader in yet 
another way the universal depravity idea.429 Qoheleth, by declaring this idea in so strong a 
fashion, puts the first observation listed in v. 15 in question: if “there is not a righteous 
man on earth,” how could he really say that the man he observed to perish before his time 
was really righteous? By seeing 7:15 in the light of 7:20, one can see that the whole 
notion of achieving (or being) righteous is, for Qoheleth, unattainable—and this makes all 
the consequences of life “under the sun” unpredictable and potentially unpleasant.430 A 
deed done even by the most “righteous” person finds its origin in the murky waters of the 
human soul and can therefore not guarantee a favorable outcome (for “every deed” is 
subject to God’s judgment—see 3:17; 9:11; 12:14). So, Qoheleth goes on to advise 
moderation (vv. 16, 17) and to profess that the fear-of-God is the best attitude of the heart 
to bring this about (v. 18).  
But what kind of “moderation” is this? Some have understood this call to reflect the 
influence of Aristotle’s “golden mean” which the philosopher offered as a means of 
achieving the most fulfilling and virtuous life. But Aristotle did not apply moral 
categories to this mean: what was evil was evil in any case (murder, for example) and 
should always be avoided. Instead, human phenomena that could have too much or too 
little (e.g., courage, laughing, anger) were best subject to the mean.431 But Qoheleth here 
                                                                                                                                                  
NIV]). On the other hand, Rom 3:10’s οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος (“there is no one who is righteous”) 
quotes Eccl 7:20a (S-h ! 1-), although Paul also might be aware of Ps 143:2b: R"#$ S-h $ D
G $D (“for no one living is righteous before you”).  
429
 The parenthetic reminder in 1 Kings 8:46 (^G $ . 1- ! D) is nearly identical to 
the components of Eccl 7:20 that express the same idea (^G $ … . … ! 1- D). This is 
additional evidence that the author of Ecclesiastes intended the Solomonic presence to be felt 
beyond the first two chapters. 
430
 The overpowering tendency to sin is also alluded to in 7:21, and universal depravity 
seems to be the subject in 7:28, 29.  
431
 Aristotle, 1985, 45. “But not every action or feeling admits of the mean. For the names 
of some automatically include baseness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy [among feelings], and 
adultery, theft, murder, among actions. All of these and similar things are called by these names 
because they themselves, not their excesses or deficiencies, are base. 
Hence in doing these things we can never be correct, but must invariably be in error. We 
cannot do them well or not well—e.g. by committing adultery with the right woman at the right 
time in the right way; on the contrary, it is true unconditionally that to do any of them is to be in 
error.” Choi, 2002, and Seow, 1997, 254, both argue that Qoheleth’s call for moderation does not 
necessarily reflect Greek influence. They site the Semitic Proverbs of Ahiqar (7th or 6th century 
BC [Choi’s and Seow’s source is Lindenberger, 1985]) as demonstrating that concepts of 
moderation and humility were known in Semitic-speaking lands well before the incursion of 
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appears to suggest a “golden mean” for moral issues—and this is a tough pill to swallow 
for Christian exegetes who try to interpret this passage. So what is going on? In my view, 
Qoheleth’s term S-h (adj., “just, righteous”—BDB) is indeed morally loaded when he 
writes,F S-h  $ (“do not be too righteous”). S-h (also S-h) is used several times 
in Ecclesiastes to signify moral goodness (see 3:16; 5:7 [6]; 7:15; 8:14). Qoheleth—even 
if he were influenced by Greek thought—is still an Israelite who understands life in terms 
of God, temple, and the Mosaic Law (the latter never explicitly mentioned, but the reality 
of which always resonates in the background). The moral import of S-h is strongly 
evident in v. 15 (especially as it is held in opposition to another morally loaded term: +. 
[adj., “wicked”—BDB]) as well as in v. 20 where the “righteous” man is said not to exist. 
So S-h is a morally significant term—but can there be degrees of S-h? 7:20 would 
seem to say no: a person is either righteous or a person is not. 7:15 only depicts two 
categories of people: the righteous and the wicked—with no degrees of either. Perhaps v. 
16 is meant to be taken the same—but with this ironic twist: the reader is warned   $
F S-h (“be not righteous overmuch”).432 This suggests at first glance that the 
quality/quantity of S-h can increase; but, actually, Qoheleth is commanding against 
something that he actually knows can never be attained. Qoheleth here writes as if the 
adjective of S-h can signify a little or a lot of righteousness; but this is not what he really 
believes can be the case. Rather, this is what he believes his audience might assume to be 
the case. In other words, he observes that many people are prone to think that they can be 
more righteous (than someone else) and even be righteous (see Prov 20:9). But verse 16a 
warns these readers to forsake this journey before it begins. They might as well run after a 
desert mirage than pursue righteousness with the intention of having more of it or of 
actually achieving it.433 So Qoheleth is not suggesting an Aristotelian “golden mean” for 
the simple reason that “righteousness” cannot be manifested in degrees.  
According to Qoheleth (in v. 18a), the best way to proceed along life’s path is to 
keep the admonishments of vv. 16 and 17 firmly in mind: one should not be too wise or 
righteous in one’s own eyes, and one should not let one’s guard down and thereby fall 
into excessive foolishness and sin. As Seow well points out, “humility and restraint” are 
called for.434 “The one who fears God will come out with both of them” (v. 18b NASB). 
                                                                                                                                                  
Greek influence in the fourth century BC (Choi also mentions Egyptian, Buddhist, and Confucian 
sources that might have brought the “golden mean” idea into Israel before the Greeks [pp. 372, 
373]).  
432
 Translation from Owens, 2001, Eccl 7:16. 
433
 The undertaking to achieve perfection is, in the words of Fox, 2004, 49, 
“presumptuous.” Murphy, 1992, 71, calls it “foredoomed.” 
434
 Seow, 1997, 254. Regarding the fear-of-God instance here, Seow writes, “The fearer of 
God is one who knows the place of humanity, both human potential and human limitations. For 
Qohelet in this passage, the fear of God is the recognition of human limitations and the acceptance 
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Qoheleth here argues for humility and an honest assessment of the facts: “God is in 
heaven and [humans] are on earth” (Eccl 5:2 [1]). God is sovereign and human beings are 
temporal and weak—and hopelessly bound to sin. The knowledge of these realities 
provokes fear in human beings; but the fear itself is “knowledge,” in that it informs the 
experient that there are threats in the world and that all is not well. Krüger writes: 
To what extent the fear of God helps one do justice to both recommendations … is 
not clear at first glance. Verse 20 (with a look back to chap. 3) suggests that for 
human beings the fear of God contains a realistic estimation of one’s possibilities 
(cf. v. 17) and limits (c.f. v. 16) in behaving “wisely” and “justly.” The “fear of 
God” is then, in any case, to be distinguished from “righteousness” and “wisdom” 
and ranked above them.435 
If fear-of-God is to be “ranked above” righteousness and wisdom by Qoheleth (I think 
Krüger is right), then, it is most likely not obedience to the cultic laws (the sittliche fear-
of-God idea) that Becker suggests for this and other wisdom fear-of-God texts.436 There is 
something much more foundational in view here—and it is the same or closely related to 
the “beginning of knowledge” and the “beginning of wisdom” that the Proverbs mention, 
respectively, in 1:7 and 9:10.437 I agree that this fear-of-God is knowledge, but 
“knowledge” that finds its source in the fear emotion/feeling. Fear-of-God here should 
                                                                                                                                                  
of divine will” (255). The comments of Andrews, 2001, 300, are also apropos: “The human 
dimension of realism is authenticity. To be ‘real’ is to acknowledge strengths and weaknesses, 
embrace the elemental ‘earthiness’ (the humus in humility) in our finitude, and to live with energy 
and esteem within the limitations of who we are. Authenticity assumes imperfection, sinfulness, 
failure—for ‘surely there is no one on earth so righteous as to do good without ever sinning’ 
(7:20). According to Ecclesiastes perfectionism is the opposite of wisdom.” Wardlaw, 1982, 228, 
however, thinks that Qoheleth’s call to moderation will be taken by some as a license to steal: 
“But there are none to whom this favorite caution is of more essential service, than those 
professors of religion, of whom, alas! The number is not small, who, disliking ‘the offence of the 
cross,’ are desirous to keep on good terms with both Christ and the world; and who cover from 
others, and try to cover from themselves, the real principle of their conduct, by prudential maxims 
of imposing plausibility, and some of them in the terms of Scripture. The wisdom of the serpent, 
they say, is recommended to us, as well as the harmlessness of the dove.” 
435
 Krüger, 2004, 141. 
436
 Becker, 1965, 253. Earlier, I have argued that the fear-of-God semantic distinctions that 
Becker makes based upon differences in linguistic forms are inappropriate. In the case of Eccl 
7:18, the use of a singular “verbal-adjective” is evidence, in Becker’s opinion, that a sittliche 
meaning is in view (that is, this virtue fear-of-God instance denotes a person who lives in a 
morally excellent fashion). But I would say that the use of the singular participle is only a 
function of grammar appropriate to what Qoheleth wants to say: when Qoheleth says something 
about an individual person who fears God, then the singular participle is quite naturally employed 
(“for the one who fears God comes forth with both of them”). As far as the core meaning of  is 
concerned, a shift from the pure verbal to a verbal-adjectival form is not—unless context dictates 
otherwise—significant (see “Becker’s Psalms Literary Form” section above).   
437
 See pp. 111-112 for some thoughts about how fear-of-God is a “beginning” of 
knowledge and wisdom.  
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first be described in terms of the psychological and physiological nature of that fear 
which informs the experient that dangers await if he or she proceeds down the path of 
over-righteousness (i.e., of “righteous” pride and arrogance) or the path of sinning 
intentionally. This emotion/feeling which dissuades one from religious pride is, once 
again, mainly servile fear (that is, fear of God’s punishment)—although Qoheleth might 
intend some element of filial fear (the fear of losing God’s favor and fellowship) to also 
be understood.438  
This servile fear ought to be recognized by the church as being exceptionally 
valuable in the mission of goading people away from the sin that Jesus condemned so 
harshly and so often: the sin of religious pride (mainly found in the scribes and Pharisees 
of his day—see Matt 23:1-36). The Pharisee who followed the law to a tee but looked 
down his nose at the repentant tax collector praying nearby went home from the temple 
unjustified according to Jesus (Luke 18:9-14). Paul warned against Christian pride in this 
way: “For by the grace given to me I say to everyone among you not to think of yourself 
more highly than you ought to think, but to think with sober judgment, each according to 
the measure of faith that God has assigned” (Rom 12:3).The fear-of-God that Qoheleth 
mentions here has much to do not only with the generation of knowledge, but also with 
the wonderful ability to instill humility in men and women. And this results in the 
willingness, in humility, to “regard others as better than [our]selves” (Phil 2:3).439 Fear of 
God, writes Calvin, is  
that trepidation which takes possession of our minds whenever we consider both 
what we have deserved, and the fearful severity of the divine anger against sinners. 
Accordingly, the exceeding disquietude which we must necessarily feel, both trains 
us to humility and makes us more cautious for the future440 
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 Crenshaw, 1987, 156, calls this use of fear-of-God as “awe in the presence of dreadful 
power, the numinous.”  
439
 Humility, writes Ellul, 1990, 115 (perhaps a bit hyperbolically), involves de-centralizing 
ourselves: “Faith represents another area in which self-centeredness has made victims of us all. 
Our private understanding of Scripture is vanity. If I am to comprehend revelation, I must listen to 
others. I must also struggle against the nagging temptation to substitute my interest or my person 
for the center of revelation: the person of Jesus Christ! If I fail to realize that I am vanity, the ideas 
that preoccupy me (such as my personal salvation) or interest me (revolution, for instance) 
become the basis of my interpretation of Scripture. Thus the Bible becomes a sort of mine in 
which I hunt for my answers and arguments! Remember when you do this that you and your ideas 
are only vanity. Listen to something besides yourself.” 
440
 Calvin, 1972, book 3, chap. 3, sec. 15. On the other hand, Thomas understands that 
humility is born out of filial fear: “Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because, since it 
belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to God, whatever results from this 
submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it 
follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it only in God.” 
(Aquinas, 1981, “Question 19: of the Gift of Fear,” 12th art.)  
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In Eccl 7:18, Qoheleth allows for sin in the lives of the faithful, but he certainly does not 
command it. He simply admits that there a point of diminishing returns in the religious 
life: one should try to follow God’s laws; but if one tries too hard, pride is inevitably 
manifested—and the honest worshipper ends up worse off than before.441 Fear-of-God is 
a corrective to this problem for it helps one see things as they really are. This was true 
back in Qoheleth’s day, and is also true today. Fear-of-God instills humility in the heart 
of a Christian and, with that, helps him or her avoid the sin of religious pride.442 
Eccl 8:12, 13: Fear God because It Brings Benefits 
Up till now, fear-of-God in Ecclesiastes has been justified by the differences 
between God and human beings as well as the moral accountability that the latter has 
before the former. Now Qoheleth brings up another reason to fear God—but one that is 
less excellent, yet a real reason just the same: it is good to fear God because life will go 
better for the God-fearer than for the person who does not fear God. This text, however, 
comes in the midst of a pericope that bitterly laments the prevalent atmosphere of 
injustice that God allows to exist upon earth (see 8:9-12a, 14). These unjust phenomena 
are deemed by Qoheleth to be lbh. So this orthodox confession (of what he “knows”) 
seems out of place—especially in view of the overall trend of the book to question the 
standard wisdom principle of retribution (i.e., that the bad get what they deserve, and 
vise-versa). Some think that 8:12b, 13 is a gloss.443 Many more, in order to relieve the 
tension, however, understand that Qoheleth here quotes standard wisdom that he goes on 
to refute in v. 14. The meaning of the text in this case goes something like this (quoting 
Lohfink’s translation of vv. 12b, 13 [and the first word of v. 14]): “Of course I recall the 
saying: Those who fear God will prosper, because they fear before him; The lawless will 
not prosper, and their life, like a shadow, does not last, because they do not fear before 
God. However ….”444 Those exegetes who offer this interpretation do not see how 
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 Krüger, 2004, 141, 142, puts it this way: “Read with the hindsight of v. 20, the advice of 
vv. 16-18 also now appears in a new light: for if a person in his conduct of life absolutely cannot 
avoid making mistakes and ‘sinning,’ he can only strive to be unjust as seldom as possible (v. 17). 
Being ‘too righteous’ (v. 16) would then consist in closing one’s eyes to one’s own fallibility and 
in striving for a completely ‘sinless’ way of life—or at least evoking the external appearance of a 
faultless and error-free conduct of life. Such excessive righteousness can then easily lead to 
mercilessness toward other people.” 
442
 At the same time, the fear of winding up with some religious pride while trying not to 
sin should not preclude one from resisting sin with all one’s might. The general biblical teaching 
is that sin is something that people should strive to “master” (Gen 4:7)—even to the point of 
“shedding blood” (Heb 12:4). One should fight the “good fight of faith” (1 Tim 6:12) and not let 
the inevitability of sin cause one to take an attitude of resignation to it.  
443
 E.g., Crenshaw, 1987, 155. 
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 Lohfink, 2003, 107. 
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Qoheleth could suddenly change his tack and sail along with prevailing Israelite 
wisdom—especially in the context of the lbh that Qoheleth has already deemed 
everything to be (including the phenomenon of injustice that he observes all around [vv. 
10, 14]). Loader understands Qoheleth’s surprisingly orthodox statement here as an 
answer that Qoheleth foresaw would be made (by those holding to more orthodox 
wisdom) in response to his claims of injustice in vv. 9-12a; but he sets up this “answer” in 
vv. 12 b, 13 in order to “torpedo” it in v. 14.445 If this is the case, then Qoheleth is 
teaching in vv. 12b, 13 that advantages to fearing God are really all an illusion and, 
therefore, lbh.  
I can understand the pressure to make Qoheleth more consistently negative—but I 
do not think it is necessary in this case. There are several reasons why. First of all, that 
this really is Qoheleth’s view is supported by the consistent use of “I know” throughout 
the book. As Fox points out, what Qoheleth “knows,” he affirms.446 In other words, he 
does not offer something that he knows to be the case in order to call the truthfulness of it 
into question. Secondly, there are many twists and turns in Qoheleth’s thinking 
throughout the book—not just here in the present text. These “twists and turns” have 
prompted many commentators to try to make Qoheleth more consistent by either making 
him more orthodox or by making him less orthodox than he really is. This has been 
noticed by Fox: 
Whereas earlier commentators found Koheleth’s skeptical assertions difficult to 
accept at face value (and sometimes attributed them to a student or a fool), modern 
interpreters find it hard to credit him with his expressions of faith. Yet Koheleth’s 
problem is precisely that he holds both to what he observes and to what he believes 
(in his words, what he says he “knows”).447  
                                                 
445
 Loader, 1986, 101. Also amazed at Qoheleth’s about face is Ellul, 1990, 181: “This is 
absolutely staggering! This man who questions everything, this antiestablishment person who 
goes to the bottom of things, now comes up with a platitude that flies in the face of reality.” But 
Ellul does not go on—despite his surprise at Qoheleth’s sudden orthodoxy—to suggest that this is 
either a gloss or an idea that Qoheleth wants to refute. Instead, Ellul says that this is a remarkable 
declaration of faith. Even though so much of life “under the sun” is seen as lbh in Qoheleth’s 
eyes, he will nevertheless trust God to work things out for the “good” for those who fear God. 
According to Ellul, Eccl 8:12b, 13 “involves a kind of declaration or confession of faith: ‘But 
myself, I know …,’ begins Qoheleth. Again he calls himself into question, and in an act typical of 
faith, he proclaims the opposite of what the evidence seems to show. Our experience indicates that 
the unjust person reigns and lives on, and that the good person fails to be recognized. Faith rears 
up in the face of this evidence and declares: ‘True, that is how things are, but I know …,’ making 
its appeal to another dimension—something qualitative and not observable. As I have often 
emphasized, faith like this, that stands in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, is the very 
essence of hope.”  
446
 Fox, 2004, 59. See Eccl 2:14; 3:12, 14; 7:25; 8:12. 
447
 Fox, 1977, 59. 
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In fact, there are many “expressions of faith” in Ecclesiastes—so there is no reason to 
strain the text in order to make Qoheleth appear gloomier than he really is: it should be 
recalled that Ecclesiastes is Holy Scripture. This means that there is something in the 
book which upholds the foundational truths that God is, human beings are his creation, 
and that God has their best interests in mind. The alternating dark shadows and sudden 
flashes of light can be partially explained by the persona of Solomon which is clearly 
present at the book’s beginning and (although perhaps in somewhat attenuated form) is 
discernable here and there throughout the rest of the book. This gives readers a valuable 
hermeneutical tool: Solomon was an extremely gifted and deep thinker (1 Kings 4:29-34) 
who provoked the truth into being revealed through extremely unusual means (1 Kings 
3:16-28). The biblical history also shows that as time went along, he struggled with his 
faith and struggled with the world (1 Kings 11). With Solomon understood a being the 
mask of Qoheleth (or Qoheleth himself), then the zigzag course which he sails comes not 
as a surprise.448 But the wonderful thing about Qoheleth is that he does ever move—if 
however erratically—toward the safe port of God. As much as he complains about the 
distressing state of things in the world, his faith in God and his trust that every deed will 
eventually be properly judged remains intact.449 In fact, Qoheleth is more orthodox and 
positive than many give him credit for; there are many expressions in Ecclesiastes that 
reflect the generous providence of God.450 Finally, one other item should be mentioned: it 
                                                 
448
 The first extant Jewish comments on Ecclesiastes (Mishna, Talmud, Targum, etc.) 
demonstrate that Solomonic authorship was assumed. See Christianson, 2007, 89, 92.  
449
 I very much appreciate Ellul’s identification of Qoheleth’s faith that he sees in this and 
other passages. But Ellul’s existentialist perspective perhaps centers reality a bit too much in 
Qoheleth’s awareness and minimizes the ideal that God intends for the reader to understand 
through Qoheleth’s words. “We must interpret [Eccl 8:12b, 13],” Ellul, 1990, 182, 183, writes, 
“as a confession of faith; otherwise we will make the mistake of identifying Qohelet’s words with 
traditional doctrine. Nothing in the text indicates that God will intervene to reestablish justice in 
this life, on this earth .…”  
In any case, Qohelet deals in this passage with the possibility of living. He affirms that his 
faith in God’s justice, presence, and care, and in his relationship with him, enables him to go on 
living in spite of everything, in a universe of wickedness and cruelty. But he always reminds us of 
the fragility of this possibility. Yes, life remains possible, but the whole pyramid rests on this tiny 
point: ‘I know ….’” 
450
 For example, see 2:10b (heart is delighted as a reward for work), 2:13 (wisdom better 
than folly), 2:14 (wise see better than fools), 2:24-26 (eating and drinking and satisfaction are 
gifts of God), 2:25 (God-pleasing man has happiness and sinners store up wealth for others), 3:12, 
13 (eating and drinking gifts of God), 3:17 (God brings everyone to justice), 3:22 (enjoyment of 
work is man’s “lot”), 5:18 (eating and satisfaction man’s “lot”), 5:19 (enjoyment and wealth gifts 
of God), 5:20 (God gives “gladness of heart”), 7:11, 12 (wisdom is good and adds life), 7:19 
(wisdom is good), 7:26b (man who pleases God will escape the evil woman), 7:29 (God made 
man upright), 8:1b (wisdom brightens the face), 8:8b (wicked get trapped by evil), 8:12v, 13 
(things go better for God fearers), 8:15 (God gives days to eat and be joyful), 9:4 (the living have 
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is not necessarily the case that v. 12a and v. 14 teach a universal refutation of the 
retribution principle. Actually, they both appear to be speaking about exceptions to the 
rule. If this is the case, then what Qoheleth says in vv. 12b, 13 is not so out of place.451 
But one wonders if the text can really support the interpretation that Qoheleth is 
here saying something that he really does not believe. A closer look at Eccl 8:12, 13 
might be worthwhile at this point:   
 
*+ -0V1*בּ  )כּ 0$ (R )[ *%הּ שּׂ (% + 	  Zשׁ0+  Z^ 0G  Z﬩[ 
 הּ (Q )  Z﬩[ 1 )0$q 	   () ($ F0טּVZ ( )  Z﬩[  )"אַ
sQ	" 	# (לּ )% 
For: A sinner can do evil a hundred times 
and afterward live long. Of course I recall 
the saying: Those who fear God will 
prosper, because they fear before him 
(Lohfink translation).452 
 
Lohfink’s suggested translation is a paraphrase of what he believes was in the mind of the 
author. Nevertheless it is appropriate to ask if the text itself can justify it. The likelihood 
that D in the first line above can signal such an abstract notion as “of course I recall” is 
unlikely. The particle D simply expresses basic relationships between clauses (as though, 
as, because that, but, certainly, except, for, surely, since, that, then, when, etc.—TWOT). 
The various current Bible versions mostly—based upon Qoheleth’s shift in perspective 
between 12a and 12b—translate with some sort of adversative conjunction (e.g., NASB 
“still,” NJB “but,” NKJV “yet,” NRSV “yet”). Some give the adversative force to . at 
the beginning of the verse (e.g. NIV: “although a wicked man … I know that it will go 
better with God fearing men ….”). The result is a seeming contradiction between 12a and 
12b; but as long as 12a is understood as an (albeit regular) exception to the retribution 
principle, 12b can then be understood as what typically is the case—and no contradiction 
is created.  
The other fear-of-God texts in Ecclesiastes also lead the exegete to understand that 
the fear-of-God mentions in 8:12b, 13 refer to something that is—in the eyes of 
Qoheleth—desired by God and that will bring about something “good” in the long run: 
fear-of-God is the purpose of God’s revealing of himself and his ways to human beings 
                                                                                                                                                  
hope), 9:7-9 (God gives days for a man to enjoy eating and drinking and his wife), 9:17, 18 
(wisdom and wise words better than fools and war weapons), 10:10 (skill brings success), 11:9 
(God will judge), 12:7b (spirit returns to God), 12:10 (Qoheleth’s words “upright” and “true”), 
12:14 (God will judge all people for all deeds). 
451
 Krüger, 2004, 159, sees this. He writes, “Verse 12a also does not necessarily have to be 
understood as a basic disagreement with the postulate of a “deed-result connection” in view of the 
reality of experience. It can also be interpreted in the sense that the rule of the “deed-result 
connection” allows exceptions: not every, but many a ‘sinner does evil a hundred times and still 
lives a long time.’” Verse 14, says Krüger, “relates again to vv. 10-12a and states that a ‘deed-
result connection’ is valid in experiential reality—if at all—only as a rule with exceptions” (161). 
452
 Lohfink, 2003, 105, 107. 
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(3:14); fear-of-God protects one from God’s anger and also helps one avoid being a fool 
(5:7 [6]); fear-of-God gives one the best chance to avoid destruction and early death due 
to religious arrogance (7:18); and, if the exegete is willing to consider the epilogue, fear-
of-God pleases God because this is naturally what all human beings should do and 
because it is the state of heart and mind that best befits the judgment (12:13).453 In view 
of this fear-of-God contextual evidence, the rather orthodox view expressed by Qoheleth 
in 8:12b, 13—that things will go “good” for God fearers—should not come as a surprise.  
Qoheleth more than likely really believed that there are advantages for those who 
fear God: things will go F^ (“good”) for God fearers and they could very well end up 
with longer lives. But what do the three uses of  in vv. 12, 13 exactly mean? All three 
are virtue cases—although "#$% (“from before”) makes two of them sound very much 
like the several event cases which employ this preposition.454 The first fear-of-God 
mention is identical in form to the many fear-of-God instances in the Psalms that employ 
the plural participle of  in construct with YHWH (Qoheleth throughout his work uses 
“Elohim”). Becker claims that this form denotes loyalty to the Jerusalem cult (see 
“Becker’s Psalms Literary Form” section in my chapter one). That might be the case here; 
the translation “it will go better with cult devotees that fear God” is certainly a possibility; 
if so, then this could be a critique against “God-fearers”: they are only righteous in the 
eyes of God if they really do fear before God. There is the chance also that the  
1$ (“fearers of God”) in v. 12b are the counter-pole to the “wicked” in v. 12a and v. 
13. If this is the case, then the “fearers of God” are “righteous ones.” The redundancy of 
 in 12b does seem odd, and would perhaps indicate that “fearers of God” does have a 
more abstract meaning. Another possibility to consider is this: in v. 12a, the  Z^ 0G 
(“sinner”—m/s Qal participle) and what he does—+ 	 (“evil”)—are semantically very 
close; so perhaps 1 )0$q 	   () (“fearers of God”—m/p Qal Participle) and what they 
do—Q	" 	# (לּ )% הּ (Q ) (“they fear before him”)—are also semantically very close. If so, the 
meaning would mainly be driven by the presence of "#$%: that is, “fearers of God” are 
those who “fear before God.”  
                                                 
453
 This last verse Delitzsch, 1968, 438, calls the “kernel and the star of the whole book, the 
highest moral demand which mitigates its pessimism and hallows its eudaemonism.”  
454
 See 1 Sam 18:12; Esther 7:6; Ps 97:5; 114:7; Jonah 1:10. The two uses of "#$% in Eccl 
8:12, 13 could be taken to indicate that fearing “from before” the presence of God—i.e., being 
driven away from God by fear—is the virtue that Qoheleth intends to signify (like Jonah fled 
“from before” the LORD—Jonah 1:3). But it is quite unlikely that this is the case. Comparisons 
with 1 Sam 18:12 and Esther 7:6 show that while there might be an impulse to flee, movement 
away from the feared object may or may not occur. One could make the case, however, that any 
movement towards the ground in fear—even with a righteous person (see, e.g., Dan 8:17)—is a 
movement (at least initially) away from God (see also my comments FN 410). 
 200 
Previously, I have argued that the linguistic/grammatic peculiarity of the plural 
participle of  in construct with YHWH or Elohim is no basis for a semantic shift in 
 away from the core fear emotion/feeling meaning—and I will hold to that opinion 
here. Only context should lead one to justify a more “developed” and abstract meaning. 
The only context presented here (other than the possibilities pondered just above), 
however, keeps the meaning quite close to the fear emotion/feeling; the subject matter 
involves life and death, wickedness and fear “before” God—and God’s judgment always 
reverberates menacingly in the background. Qoheleth is deadly serious. Yes, sinners may 
“do evil a hundred times”; but it is also true, according to Qoheleth, that “God will bring 
[all deeds] into judgment” (11:9b). Whatever 1$  might mean, one thing is quite 
sure: fearing "#$% (“before”) God is the central virtue in this text that brings “good” as 
well as longer life (the latter implied: if the days of the one who does not fear before God 
will “not extend,” then it follows that the days of the one who does fear before God will 
extend). The use of "#$% (as discussed with 3:14) moves the object of fear much closer 
so that the fearfulness of the object is accentuated and the resultant fear made more 
acute.455  
It is interesting that Qoheleth never relativizes the value of fear-of-God. While the 
“righteous” might or might not have the life that common wisdom would say that they 
should have (and even the notion of being righteous at all is put into question by 
Qoheleth—see section above on Eccl 7:18), the virtue of fear-of-God, on the other hand, 
is never presented in any kind of bad light. There is no question about its attainability or 
its value. This holds true in all the fear-of-God texts in Ecclesiastes (and in all of 
Scripture for that matter). In Eccl 8:12, 13, to “fear before God” is a virtue that causes life 
to go well when God-fearers have it and to cause life to not go well when wicked people 
do not have it. Qoheleth speaks here in the most general terms. “God-fearers” might refer 
to Israelite cult worshippers (I think, at most, only in an implied way), but the value of the 
virtue of fearing “before God” is assumed in this text; Qoheleth speaks here in terms that 
are very much in keeping with the recurring biblical truth that a lack of fear-of-God is 
never good for any people at any time.  
Eccl 12:13: Fear God because Death and Judgement Are Inevitable 
So far, Qoheleth has said that fear-of-God is appropriate in view of several realities: 
God’s sovereignty and human contingency (3:14), the propensity of worshippers to not 
conduct themselves with proper decorum before God and to not keep their vows (5:7 [6]), 
the universality of human sin (7:18), and the fact that life will not go well—and, indeed, 
                                                 
455
 Because of this, Becker, 1965, 254, understands in Eccl 8:12, 13 some element of the 
“numinous” See my FNs 410 and 499. 
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will be shorter—for those who do not fear God. These texts relate loosely to several areas 
of Christian doctrine: 3:14—theology and anthropology; 5:7 [6]—theology, 
anthropology, and ecclesiology; 7:18—hamartiology; and 8:12, 13—soteriology. Now we 
come to the last fear-of-God text in the book: Eccl 12:13. Here at book’s end, the subject 
matter will presage the Christian doctrine of soteriology and (appropriately) eschatology. 
Qoheleth will now once again uphold the value of fear-of-God (he will command it) in 
view of the inevitable death and judgment that will fall upon all people.456 I should say 
before going any further that what Qoheleth writes in this last chapter—as well as in 8:12, 
13—only potentially relate to the Christian doctrines of soteriology and eschatology. The 
only soteriological information that one might glean from 8:12, 13 is the possible Holy 
Spirit-led implication that days that “extend” is a euphemism for eternal life, and the only 
soteriological and eschatological information that one might glean from chapter twelve is 
the possible Holy Spirit-led implication that “judgment” is an event that occurs after life 
“under the sun” is complete, and fear-of-God has something to do with having the best 
chance for a good outcome in that judgment. But having said that, I do believe that there 
are some good reasons to understand that Qoheleth at least (intentionally, or through the 
leading of the Holy Spirit) creates an awareness of the possibility of eschatological 
judgment.  
The exegete must first make sure to consider 12:13 in view of the graphic portrayal 
of slow death in 12:1-7. Qoheleth wants the reader to look at death 1"# $ 1"#. 
                                                 
456
 Throughout this section I assume that Qoheleth wrote the epilogue. Many commentators 
believe that the parts of Ecclesiastes that speak about Qoheleth in the third person (1:1, 2; 7:27; 
12:8-14) were written by someone other than Qoheleth. This may be the case—although it does 
not have to be. He could have been his own “host” in order to comment upon his own work; but 
he did not want his audience to know that he could stand outside himself, as it were, and analyze 
all that he observed and believed to be the case. This is admittedly speculative, but not beyond the 
pale of possibility (Krüger, 2004, 208-215, seriously considers the possibility of the “editor” and 
Qoheleth being the same person—but for quite different reasons than my own). As I have said 
before, the whole book appears to be a big riddle—and it seems that the source of the contents is a 
part of that riddle: the beginning of the book alludes to Solomon; but why is he called 
“Qoheleth?” Are they really the same? If not, then who is he (or she! [see 7:27a])? Who narrates 
the book? And are Qoheleth’s thoughts the thoughts of Solomon, Qoheleth, the narrator, the 
“shepherd,” or someone else? I tend to see Qoheleth’s hand in the “hosted” sections (and he 
continues the Solomon persona here too): he “winks” (7:27a—use of the feminine verb) at his 
characterization of women in 7:28; he would be the most qualified to know that his words had 
been inspired by the “one shepherd” (v. 11); and—in very Solomonic fashion—he admonishes his 
“son” to refrain from adding to his words (v. 12—also see Prov 1-9). Also, Qoheleth was quite 
likely in the best position to judge the purpose of his words (“fear God and keep his 
commandments”—v. 13), and the means by which this purpose would be accomplished (through 
being a “goad”—v. 11). For these reasons, in this section that concerns the epilogue of 
Ecclesiastes, I will assume that Qoheleth is the author—but this, of course, does not have to be the 
case.  
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Although he delivers this by using a series of metaphors (operating euphemistically), the 
details of death and dying are all still there such that the attentive reader will find himself 
or herself distressed and maybe even frightened:457 vision degrades and suffering comes 
more frequently (v. 2); one cannot straighten one’s back, stop trembling, or see right, and 
the teeth have fallen out (v. 3); hearing goes away yet one is awakened by any sound (v. 
4); one grows increasingly fearful of the things in the world that he or she cannot control, 
and sexual desire and function dries up and disappears (v. 5); in the end, life is tragically 
and irrevocably smashed—like a clay “pitcher is shattered at the spring, or the wheel 
broken at the well, and the dust returns to the ground it came from, and the spirit returns 
to God who gave it” (vv. 6b, 7 NIV). Why is Qoheleth so desirous that the reader—here 
and throughout his work—be so often and so harshly hammered with the reality of 
death?458 If his main message is to enjoy life, then it would seem that just the mention of 
the fact of death would be sufficient to convince readers that they had best take advantage 
of their days now to eat, drink, and be merry. I believe that Qoheleth’s concentration on 
death has the much more important purpose of manifesting the question in the reader, 
“what happens after death?” And this question is inexorably linked with the subject of 
judgment. To fully appreciate this, however, one should first see how incongruous 
Qoheleth’s death obsession would be if the inculcation of the spirit of carpe diem in his 
readers were his main goal.   
                                                 
457
 Because Qoheleth uses euphemisms, the interpretation of them, of course, is not always 
clear. Here I follow how many commentators view them, but there can be other interpretations. 
That the pericope is in general an allegory of human decay and death has always been widely 
accepted. Fox, 2004, 76, 77, sees apocalyptic overtones of “cosmic disaster” in the poem and cites 
remarkably similar subject matter in Isa 3:18-4:1; 13:9b-10; Ezek 30:3; Hosea 1:4-5; 5:9; Joel 
2:2a, 6, 10b; Amos 5:18, 20; 8:3, 9; Zeph 1:15. His explanation of the poem is worth quoting at 
length: “In Koheleth’s telling, the two events—the end of a world and the end of a person—
resonate in each other. The poem is intended to be mysterious and ambiguous, and the process of 
interpreting it may be as important as the particular solution one arrives at. Koheleth sets us in a 
dark and broken landscape through which we must find our way with few guideposts. In a 
fundamental sense, however, the obscurity of the details does not prevent us from understanding 
the poem; in fact, it is hard to fail. The gist of the poem is clear: Enjoy life before you grow old 
and die. 
Clear too is the poetic power of the passage. The scene is weird and unsettling, evocative of 
diminution, quaking, darkening, silence, and fear. The poem depicts the inevitable aging and 
death of the youth who is addressed in 11:9 and who merges with the ‘you’ of the reader in 12:1-
7. We can never fully penetrate the fog of the scene, but when we peer through the murk of the 
images, metaphors, and symbols, we realize with a shudder that we are descrying our own 
obliteration” (77). 
458
 Death is one way or another in view in Eccl 1:4, 11; 2:16, 18, 21; 3:2, 19-22; 4:2, 3; 
5:14-16, 18; 6:3-6, 12; 7:1-4, 15-17, 26; 8:8, 10, 12, 13; 9:2-10; 11:8; 12:1-7. 
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Carpe diem (Eccl 2:24; 3:12, 13; 22; 5:18; 8:15; 9:7-9; 11:8-10) and final judgment 
(Eccl 3:17; 8:6; 11:9; 12:14) are both significant subjects in Ecclesiastes. Qoheleth does 
indeed mention the value of eating and drinking, work and marriage, but these all come 
under the rubric of lbh that he deemed everything already to be.459 Besides, Qoheleth—
as the king—had experienced every possible pleasure that a man could have on earth; but 
he found it all to be lbh and a “chasing after the wind” (2:11). And despite his (I believe, 
concessionary) calls to enjoy life, they are all relativized by the Klage nature of the whole 
book in which he in essence cries out, “there must be something more!” With such an 
overpowering sense of inadequacy of life-as-it-is, how can he seriously promote in life 
“under the sun” the “virtue” of carpe diem? Does the idea of final judgment (and the fear-
of-God that would be manifested in consideration of it) fit better with Qoheleth’s big 
picture? I think it does, and there are good reasons why: first of all, the Klage nature of so 
much of what he says pleads for something more than life as it is “under the sun.” 
Inherent in this constant Klage is the acute desire for justice—justice for all that is full 
and complete justice. Final justice also fits better with the sovereignty of Qoheleth’s God; 
the themes that are of interest to King Qoheleth are macro-themes that are of interest to 
God. In other words, it is characteristic of both God and (good) kings to care much more 
about proper justice than how well their subjects “seize the day.” Carpe diem is trivial 
compared to the obligations that men and women have due to their absolutely dependent 
and morally accountable status vis-à-vis the eternal and omnipotent God. Because of the 
macro-scale issues that are involved with Qoheleth’s complaints—especially the issues of 
justice and death—I am convinced that a concern about and a desire for final justice and 
life-after-death are tacitly indicated. Qoheleth does not teach that there is life after death 
or that there is a judgment after death; but he does imply that these phenomena could—
and ought to—be.460 And just the possibility of them relativizes down to lbh the value of 
                                                 
459
 See Eccl 1:2, 14, 17; 2:1, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26; 3:19; 4:4, 7, 8, 16; 5:7, 10; 6:2, 9, 
11, 12; 7:6, 15; 8:10, 14; 9:9; 11:8, 10; 12:8.  
460
 I realize that my view here runs against the grain of many modern interpretations of 
what Qoheleth means by “judgment.” Earlier opinions tended to interpret Ecclesiastes through the 
lens of orthodox faith and understand that when Qoheleth spoke of “judgment,” he must have 
been referring to an event that necessarily had to come after the injustice of the present world. 
Delitzsch, 1968, 400, 401, for example, writes regarding Eccl 11:9: “in view of the facts of 
experience, that God’s righteous requital is in this life too frequently escaped, viii. 14, the author, 
here and at iii. 17, xii. 14, postulates a final judgment, which removes the contradiction of this 
present time, and which must thus be in the future; he has no clear idea of the time and manner of 
this final judgment, but his faith in God places the certainty of it beyond all doubt.” 
Hengstenberg, 2001, 268, understands that “judgment” in Eccl 12:14—and as generally depicted 
in the book—is principally a future one. “Still,” he writes, “there is no reason for confining our 
thoughts entirely to the future judgment: we should rather think of judgment in its widest 
compass, as it is begun in time and perfected in eternity.… Even Luther saw how comprehensive 
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carpe diem.461 This is where the spectre of death is used effectively by Qoheleth: death 
forces the reader to get his or her priorities straight. Carpe diem may bring some pleasure 
in life (that is, if God grants it), but it will not prepare one for death or for any possible 
judgment after death.462 On the other hand, if one puts a much higher emphasis on 
preparing for death and for any possible judgment after death, then one will fear God and 
have done all one can do to bring about the best outcome should there really be a final 
judgment. If a man or a woman wants to discover the answer of what is more important in 
Ecclesiastes—carpe diem or judgment—he or she must simply ask “which has the 
greatest potential to affect my life for for the worse?” (i.e., which is the bigger threat?). 
This is somewhat like Pascal’s wager: on what big-picture life option should one bet 
one’s life? The wise answer is that one should put one’s money (bet his or her life) on the 
option that gives the greatest potential good return. While some have argued that 
Qoheleth makes carpe diem out to be a virtue by which God will judge men and women, I 
do not see how this could really be the understanding of Qoheleth.463 He allows carpe 
                                                                                                                                                  
was the application of the expression: he remarks, ‘the author does not speak here only of the 
judgment at the last day, but, according to Scripture usage, of judgment in general. There is a 
judgment and an hour for everything with God, and no one can escape. Wherefore Arius and all 
heretics are already judged. But at the last day it will be made still clearer in the presence of all 
creatures, angels and men, that even now in the day of visitation, God the Lord has laid bare their 
sin and disgrace, that in a word, there is no more concealment.’” 
461
 While Loader, 1986, 130, would not agree that Qoheleth relativizes carpe diem down to 
triviality, he does understand in Qoheleth’s order—of encouraging carpe diem for the last time 
(11:9) followed by the allegory of dying and death (12:1-7)—that Qoheleth does in the end hold 
the subject of death to be more important. Up till this passage, Qoheleth’s negative sentiments 
were followed by calls to enjoy life (Loader lists 3:12, 13, 22; 8:15; 9:7-10), but in 11:9-12:7, this 
is different. “That which logically should have come first,” writes Loader, “now comes last. This 
is very striking and indicates that the poem was specially composed to serve as the book’s finale. 
By ending with the dark notes of death the Preacher shows that for him the negative tone of the 
book is intentionally dominant. For that reason the book’s first word and its last are identical, and 
the closing formula (v. 8) is the same as the opening formula (1:2): Vanity!” 
462
 The “young man” is encouraged by Qoheleth (11:9) to “follow the ways of [his] heart”; 
but this is mocked a moment later (and properly identified as trivial) when Qoheleth warns, “but 
know that for all these things God will bring you to judgment.”  
463
 Ogden, 2007, 210, 211, understands that the criteria of the “judgment” will be how well 
a person followed Qoheleth’s advice to live life to the fullest. The judgment in view in Eccl 11:9 
is, according to Krüger, 2004, 197, humanity’s condemnation to “transitoriness.” Failing to “seize 
the day” would also be part of this judgment because a man’s or a woman’s meaningless life 
would be even more degraded. It seems to me that the text fairly clearly means that the “young 
man” is to be judged for any sins that arise as a by-product of following his “heart” and “eyes.” 
“All these” of $ $D $+ D +- simply refers to the actions of the “young man”—in thought and 
deed—that flow out of the desires of his “heart” and “eyes.” Qoheleth then says:  1$ RF
^#.%F (lit. “God will bring you to justice”). The text of 12:14 is quite similar (lit. “God will bring 
every deed to justice”). Many commentators understand these warnings of judgment as too 
orthodox for Qoheleth—and so insist that they were later “pious” additions. When these verses 
 205 
diem repeatedly as a concession, but his Klage indicates concerns that are infinitely 
greater and of infinitely greater consequence.  
These “concerns” are what Qoheleth is trying to generate in the reader when he 
goes through the death march of 12:1-7. The mind is turned away from any pleasure 
found in earthly life to dealing with the dreadful facts of inevitable death and the possible 
judgment of “all deeds” that follows. These are “goad” and “nails” (12:11 NIV) that drive 
one into the heart/mind state that best corresponds to and prepares one for death and 
judgment—i.e., fear-of-God. In the end, Qoheleth does not say that the “end” (12:13 
[LXX: telos]) of the matter is “sieze the day”; but he says what one would expect to be 
the telos that he has mentioned (and alluded to) many times before and which best fits 
with the titanic themes of life and death, sin and judgment that burst forth from his many 
complaints about life “under the sun”: “fear God” orders Qoheleth, and “keep his 
commandments, for this is man’s all” (v. 13 NKJV).464 The MT and NRSV of Eccl 12:13, 
14 are as follows: 
 
  	( 1 )0$q 	V Z + 	% (﬩)" $0כּ *  	F 	גּ m0b
s1Q 	-אַ 	V$ 	כּ Z\V )כּ 0% (﬩  	וֹ (h )%V Z( 
 ^ 	פּ (﬩ )% (F  )F	 1 )0$q 	  Zשׁ[+Q *%V$ 	כּV Z  )כּ
s+Q 	V1 ) ( F0^V1 ) 1 	$ (+Z"V$ 	כּ $ *+ 
The end of the matter; all has been heard. 
Fear God, and keep his commandments; for 
that is the whole duty of everyone. 
For God will bring every deed into 
judgment, including every secret thing, 
whether good or evil. 
 
This command might have been the addition of a “pious” glossarist; if so, he certainly did 
not diverge from Qoheleth’s trajectory of thought about what is good and right for human 
                                                                                                                                                  
are read in light of 3:16, 17, however, there is no need to deem them “pious” glosses or to 
understand them as referring to a judgment of how one kept the carpe diem principle. For in 3:16, 
17, Qoheleth says “in [his] heart” (i.e., what he affirms to be the case) that there is a time for God 
to judge every deed. The components are essentially the same as those in 11:9 and 12:14: God 
will judge (bring to justice) all deeds. But 3:16, 17 plainly makes this an orthodox judgment of the 
“righteous” and the “wicked” which will solve the problem of “wickedness” in the places of 
“justice” and “righteousness.” In other words, the criteria of judgment is not based upon carpe 
diem-keeping, but based upon God’s moral law (as reflected in the Mosaic Law). The main 
problem that distressed Qoheleth was the existence of wickedness in high places, not the failure of 
men and women to “seize the day.” This verse could also be a “pious” gloss, but Qoheleth’s first-
person appeal here makes that unlikely. And how much are commentators willing to fragment the 
canonical text anyways in order to keep Qoheleth as pessimistically consistent as possible? But 
even if these three judgment texts were to be eliminated, there would still be much in Ecclesiastes 
that indicates that the book flows out of an orthodox Israelite worldview (see FN 450).   
464
 The command here to fear God is what Delitzsch calls “the kernel and the star of the 
whole book” (Delitzsch, 1968, 438).   
 206 
beings to do.465 As the other fear-of-God passages in Ecclesiastes demonstrate, fear-of-
God is obviously important to Qoheleth and is, in his understanding, at the heart of a 
right—and good behavior-producing—relationship with God. The imperative  	( 
(“fear!”) in 12:13 merely summarizes what he has already said in various places. 
Qoheleth’s themes of obedience to and humility before God, and his concern about the 
many injustices he saw in the world and his heartfelt belief that God would make an 
“appropriate time” (3:17) to righteously judge all deeds, do not conflict with what is 
written in 12:13, 14. And just like in 3:17 and 11:9, the time and means of the judgment 
are not specified—although one can make the case that a judgment that will account for 
“every deed” necessarily must occur after one dies.466 
The general context of Scripture—in both NT and OT—as well as the hope of 
something more than death and lbh that is implicit in Qoheleth’s Klage lead me to 
understand that Qoheleth (or at least the Holy Spirit working through him) did in fact 
think of the judgment as occurring after death. The scholarly idea that death was in fact 
the final judgment that Qoheleth had in mind does not, in my mind, fit with the overall 
direction of the book. It offers no solution and leaves life and death and justice and God’s 
administering of “final justice” all under Qoheleth’s rubric of lbh. But the warning tone 
that is often heard in Ecclesiastes—if it is meant to goad readers on to more god-pleasing 
works—sounds absurd if there is no advantage at all in behaving one way or another. If 
all end up with the same sentence—that is, death—then why live one’s life with the 
thought in mind that one will get righteous justice in the end? One could say that 
                                                 
465
 Garrett, 2001, 345, gives several reasons for his view that 12:9-14 is not the work of a 
“pious epilogist”: “The use of first level (vv. 9-10) and second level (vv. 11-14) discourse has 
many parallels throughout the book; and the language, style, and sentiments are not unlike those 
found earlier in the book. More than that, treating the conclusion as a secondary epilogue, either 
as a pious gloss or as part of an emerging canon consciousness, decapitates the entire work. 
Everything Ecclesiastes has affirmed up to this point—the sovereign freedom of God, the limits 
of human wisdom, thoughts on the use and abuse of wealth and power, and the brevity and 
absolute contingency of human life—all lead to the command to fear God. To excise the 
conclusion is to throw away that which binds together all the separate strands of the Teacher’s 
thought. It arises from a failure to think like the Teacher, so to speak.” 
466
 A glossarist—especially if he were writing at a relatively late date in which 
eschatological awareness was growing—could have easily said that the final judgment would 
occur after death and would determine one’s destination in the afterlife. But the warning in 12:14 
remains as ambiguous as those in 3:17 and 11:9 in regards to these questions. But there is an 
interesting feature of 3:17 that perhaps points towards the future: 3:17b clearly looks back to the 
poem in 3:1-8 and even perhaps completes it. Both 3:1 and 3:17 have T#G $D$ + (“[there is] a 
time for every matter”). The “matter” of birth at the beginning—a one time event—is 
complemented by the one-time “matter” of judgment which occurs at the end. From an 
eschatological perspective, it is interesting that “war” and “peace” (3:8) and “judgment” (3:17) 
are mentioned towards the end of the poem.   
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“judgment” in Qoheleth’s view is administered by God throughout a person’s life and the 
judging process ceases at death; but this is just what Qoheleth observed not to be the case 
(i.e., he observed that injustice was rampant)—and he complained bitterly as a result. If 
god-fearing men and women do not get justice (that is, some really meaningful  וֹ for 
their faith in God and their righteous deeds) in this life, then—in view of the justice that 
Qoheleth guarantees in 3:17, 11:9, and 12:14—they must get it after they die.467  
So for many different reasons, I believe that the Holy Spirit works through the 
words of Qoheleth to instill in the reader a deep concern about immortality and a deep 
desire for final judgment.468 At the very least, the first readers of Ecclesiastes would have 
been moved by Qoheleth’s words to be distressed by the lack of clarity in their day about 
immortality and final judgment—and, as a result, to want something more. But whether 
one is a Christian today looking back from the perspective of faith in Christ, or was a 
post-exilic Jew reading Ecclesiastes from the perspective of faith in YHWH, the call to 
“fear God” is equally valid. And this virtue has something to do with bringing about a 
“good” outcome in the judgment—whatever or whenever it might be. The text here is 
straightforward:  	( 1 )0$q 	V Z (“fear God!”). The direct object marker leaves no doubt 
about the object of the imperative, and putting Elohim before the imperative verb further 
accentuates the fact that God is the object of the fear. Beyond this, the linguistic form of 
the verb and the syntax do not inform the reader about the action beyond the root meaning 
of . The immediate context, as elsewhere in Ecclesiastes but here especially so, gives 
reason for one to fear: God’s judgment of every “hidden” thing has the potential to be a 
catastrophic experience. But Qoheleth says that fearing God and keeping his 
commandments is “man’s all” (NKJV). And here a question is raised: can the fear 
emotion/feeling alone be the telos that justifies men and women in the judgment? The 
answer depends upon a wider understanding of Scripture. The emotion/feeling of fear-of-
God is indeed a virtue. Belief in God is also a virtue. They are both foundational to a 
proper relationship with God; but, as the Scripture says, “even the demons believe—and 
tremble” (James 2:19 NKJV). James argues that belief alone is insufficient to save—for 
“faith without works is dead” (James 2:26 NKJV). Similarly, it can be argued that if 
someone believes in God and “trembles” (i.e., experiences the fear emotion/feeling) 
before God—but has no “fruit” (i.e., does not keep God’s commandments)—then that 
                                                 
467
 BDB lexical meaning for  וֹ is “superiority, advantage, excess.” See Eccl 2:15; 6:8, 11; 
7:11. 
468
 See the thoughts of J. Lochman in chapter one. Having suffered under communist 
injustice, he recognizes the acute need for God’s final judgment to rid the world of the monstrous 
acts of evil men and women. He laments the fact that many think of the final judgment as 
something to avoid; but Lochman argues that it is something to eagerly desire—for only then will 
we be free.  
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person is not justified in the eyes of God. It is interesting (in Eccl 12:13) that the Τέλος 
λόγου (LXX—lit. “end of the word”) and the πᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος (LXX—lit. “all the man”) 
are to “fear God” and to “keep his commandments.” One without the other is not the 
“end” of Qoheleth’s teaching or the “all” of human beings. As mentioned before, 
Qoheleth was an Israelite whose worldview foundation was the Torah. This foundation 
(parts of which he questions from time to time) is quite evident here at book’s end; the 
“commandments” to which Qoheleth refers to are the laws prescribed by Moses—
although there might be a universalizing of its moral components that would apply to all 
human beings. Arguably, the book was designed to be read by both Israelites and gentiles. 
If so, it is improbable that Qoheleth would have ordered the latter to follow the Mosaic 
Law. Be that as it may, the “heart” of the Mosaic Law is universally valid: “Hear, O 
Israel: the LORD our God, the LORD is one. Love the LORD your God with all your 
heart and with all your soul and with all your strength” (Deut 6:4, 5). Also in the Law are 
the commands to honor (Lev 10:3) and to worship (Deut 26:10) God. While there may be 
echoes of these in the command in Eccl 12:13 to “fear God!” the fact that the Law’s 
commands to honor and worship God are assumed in 12:13’s “keep his commandments” 
means that “fear God!” must not contain these ideas for the entire verse to fit within 
Christian orthodoxy.469  
One might argue that the two commands here are in synonymous parallelism; but 
this certainly must not be.470 In Ecclesiastes, fear-of-God is mainly presented as a fearful 
emotion/feeling before God. Qoheleth’s understanding of fear-of-God is quite in keeping 
with how it is employed in the Proverbs; there is something in fear-of-God that is 
foundational to wise and righteous conduct. It is not the conduct itself, but states of the 
heart and mind that plow the ground, so to speak, and allow the seeds to be planted that 
eventually spring up into good works. The pertinent question here is this: is experiencing 
the fear emotion/feeling before God a virtue apart from following the law? An affirmative 
answer is indicated by fear-of-God passages such as Isa 66:2b: “But this is the one to 
whom I will look, to the humble and contrite in spirit, who trembles at my word.” Ezra 
9:4 and Ps 119:120 are similar: fear-of-God is presented as something that is different 
than the Law (God’s “word” [God’s “judgments” in Ps 119:120]) and is a reaction to it 
(or, at least, a reaction to the giver of the Law). The emotion/feeling of fear exibited 
                                                 
469
 Actually, commands to fear God abound in the Torah—and, therefore, could also be 
subsumed under Eccl 12:13’s “keep his commandments.”  
470
 Becker, 1965, sees synonymous parallelism in many fear-of-God texts—including Eccl 
12:13: „Gottesfurcht werde hier als Beobachtung der Gebote beschrieben und mit dem Glauben 
an das göttliche Gericht über Gut und Böse in Verbindung gebracht“ (254). As I have mentioned 
before, if Becker is right, then fear-of-God (and ) has a range of meaning that makes it 
semantically unusable (see my pp. 80-84, 90).   
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before God and his “word” is a virtue in and of itself. But while it is not the Law itself 
(other than those parts of the Mosaic Law which command fear of God), fear-of-God 
does “goad” one—out of the fear of God proper, fear of God’s punishment, and fear of 
losing relationship—towards obedience to the Law.471  
Qoheleth’s directive to “fear God, and keep his commandments” has authority in 
the church today—but with the caveat that Christians are now under grace, not law. The 
ritualistic laws of the Torah have been transcended by the new covenant actualized by 
Christ’s work on the cross. Debts for (unintentional) sins are no longer paid for by the 
“blood of goats and calves” (Heb 9:12); instead, the sins of believers are paid for by Jesus 
Christ (Heb 9:14, 15). The moral principles that are behind the parts of the Mosaic Law 
that are concerned with personal ethics (especially as reflected in the Ten 
Commandments), however, do have power today—unless any of them are relativized by 
any higher standard that Christ might have taught (see especially Matt 5, 6). In view of 
Christ’s call for Christians to be “perfect” (Matt 5:48), the inevitableness of Christians to 
fail to reach this standard (Rom 3:23), the “price” by which Christians were “bought” (1 
Cor 6:20), and the many warnings not to fall away, Christians are wise to heed the NT’s 
advice to “work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (Phil 2:12). It is good 
that they regularly consider the “kindness” of God (Rom 11:22); but they are warned to 
dwell upon the “sternness” of God as well (Rom 11:22). Christians will “inherit the earth” 
(Matt 5:5; Rom 4:13); but this was only made possible because of God’s love for human 
beings, his hatred of sin and evil, and his willingness to send his only begotten Son to 
bear the consequences of their disobedience. “Therefore,” as the author of the book of 
Hebrews says, “since we are receiving a kingdom which cannot be shaken, let us have 
grace, by which we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear. For our 
God is a consuming fire” (Heb 12:28, 29 NKJV).  
                                                 
471
 Clines, 2003, 64, understands that while fear-of-God might connote a number of 
different realities, it nearly always denotes the fear emotion/feeling: “My own view is suspicious 
of the alleged ‘semantic development’ from fear as an emotion to fear as ‘religion’ or ‘moral 
behaviour’ and indeed of the common assertion that the ‘fear of god’ can mean something other 
than the emotion of fear. I believe that the whole edifice of a moral, ethical and cultic meaning for 
the phrase ‘fear of God’ is built on a confusion of sense and reference, which is to say, of 
denotation and connotation. My conclusion is that the  word group always signifies the 
emotion of fear (which is its sense or denotation), but that sometimes that emotion leads to actions 
(or avoidance of actions) of an ethical or cultic kind (which are then its reference or connotation). 
In brief, when people do not lie, for example, because of the ‘fear of God’, it does not mean that 
they do not lie because they behave ethically but because they are afraid of God and of the 
consequences he may exact of them for lying.” 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DOES FEAR-OF-GOD CHANGE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT? 
The work done so far has sought to demonstrate that the fear-of-God concept in the 
OT has not evolved, as many mainly critical-age scholars have claimed, but has in fact 
remained quite close to its fear emotion/feeling semantic roots. The scholarly efforts 
(especially of J. Becker) which claim that fear-of-God evolved cannot by their methods 
and evidences overcome two important facts: first, the fact that the OT never teaches that 
fear-of-God changes, and, second, the fact that the local and wider contexts of the many 
virtue fear-of-God OT texts seldom if ever give indicators that fear-of-God has to any 
significant degree moved off its fear emotion/feeling foundation. But my study as 
presented thus far is myopic in that the NT—which explains, clarifies, and fulfills the 
OT—has not in any meaningful way been used to shed light on OT fear-of-God. As was 
said in the introduction, the NT must be used (by any reader, but especially by 
theologians seeking to find God’s truth for the Church) to understand in the deepest and 
truest way what God purposed in providing his revelations to the Jewish/Israelite people 
in the time before the coming of the Messiah. And this can potentially provide strong 
interpretational force on the OT fear-of-God topic. If Jesus, for example, had said in one 
of the gospels, “Moses taught you to fear me by trembling, the prophets taught you to fear 
me by serving me, but I say to you that you should fear me by loving me”, then this 
would be a good indicator that the idea of fear-of-God was indeed changing in the 
centuries preceding Christ. On the other hand, if the NT indicates that the same OT 
reasons for the emotion/feeling of fear before God still remain, and the NT possesses 
semantic, syntactic, and contextual factors that do not give strong reason for moving fear-
of-God off its fear emotion/feeling base, then this would further support the 
understanding that OT fear-of-God mainly denotes real fear.   
Before proceeding, a few remarks about φοβέοµαι are in order. This verb will be 
the center of attention because it is most often found in the LXX where  	 is found in the 
MT and is the most general word for fear in the NT as well. Likewise, when the Hebrew 
nouns אַ () or  	וֹ% occur in the MT, the noun φόβος usually occurs in the LXX.472 Like 
the Hebrew, these Greek forms can indicate real fear (from being “alarmed” to “terror”) 
as well as “respect,” reverence,” or “worship” (DBLSD). The root meaning of φοβέοµαι 
(as indicated by its use in Homeric epics) is “to flee” or “to be startled” (TDNT). Balz 
mentions the interesting (and useful for our fear-of-God theme) fact that the Greeks and 
Spartans used to worship φόβος (TDNT). Homer (ca. 8th cent. BC) and Hesiodus (ca. 6th 
                                                 
472
 TDNT. φοβέοµαι and φόβος are also used for the Hebrew - *G 	פּ (verb “to quake”) and 
- *G *פּ (noun “quaking,” “horror”).   
 211 
cent. BC) indicate that φόβος was one of the deities in the Greek pantheon, and a fifth 
century BC votive inscription names φόβος just under Zeus and above all the other gods. 
The Spartans, according to Plutarch, even had a temple to φόβος.473 This particular 
practice of the ancient Greeks is mentioned only to show that the emotion of fear—at 
least for the Greeks—was an important component of their religion and religious 
experience. The appreciation for fear (to the point of worship) was based upon what the 
Greeks saw as its usefulness and wisdom-provoking quality. Fear informed a person in a 
harsh way of the reality of power and authority. Fear was, as Balz says, a “reaction to 
man’s encounter with force.” In the process of seeking relief from this force-caused fear, 
fear would go from “spontaneous terror and anxiety to honour and respect.” This made 
fear in the Greek mind the basis for respect. The unpleasant feeling of fear made 
submission and respect good in that they were states of mind that could lessen or 
eliminate the fear; thus, “the absence of fear [was] … an objective worth seeking” 
(TDNT, Sec. A, 4). 
THE NT HAS THE SAME THEOLOGY/ANTHROPOLOGY 
That the NT shows that Christ is Lord and will preside as judge of all humanity is 
clear. The God who is described by Isaiah as “the consuming fire” (33:14), is the same 
God who’s “axe is already at the root of the trees” (Matt 3:10), has authority to divide the 
sheep from the goats (Matt 25:31-46) and to cast both soul and body into hell (Matt 
10:28). The incommunicable attributes of God (e.g., his independence, immutability, 
eternity, omnipresence) seen in the OT are the attributes of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit in the NT.474 Humans, on the other hand, though made in his image, are creatures 
                                                 
473
 According to Balz (TDNT) these mentions of φόβος  as object of worship comes from 
Homer’s Illiad (ed. G. Monro and T. W. Allen, 1908, 13, 298-300.) Hesiodus’s Theogonia (ed. A 
Rzach, 1913, 933-936.) and Plutarch’s De Cleomene (Vitae, ed. T. Doehner and F. Dübner, 1877, 
8f, 808b-e.). Also see Loader, 2001. 
474
 The Biblical depiction of God and humans leave no doubt as to where the highest 
ontological reality resides. Although humans are created to perceive God, and the ultimate reality 
could seem to a person to reside in his or her awareness of God—and not in God himself—the 
Bible presents God as a substance that has infinitely more being-ness that whatever of him is 
perceived in the mind. God is God, and not, as Tillich, 1967, believes, a subjective “answer to the 
question implied in man’s finitude” (211). Tillich’s idea of God is not far away from Otto’s. The 
subjective “ultimate concern” that persons find in themselves “does not mean that first there is a 
being called God and then the demand that man should be ultimately concerned about him. It 
means that whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him, and, conversely, it means 
that a man can be concerned ultimately only about that which is god for him” (211). Tillich 
dilutes the power of the biblical God to generate fear by, first, placing too much of the reality of 
God in the subject, but he also dilutes God’s ability to evoke certain emotions—like fear—by 
minimizing his particular biblical attributes in favor of an idea that understands God as “being-
itself.” With being-itself, one cannot say that it is the most perfect, or most powerful, or most 
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made by the creator. They are dependent, mutable, and limited in time and space. 
Therefore, as the writer of Hebrews says in full agreement with Isaiah, one should 
“worship God acceptably with reverence and awe, for our ‘God is a consuming fire’” 
(Heb 12:28b). 
This essential difference between God and humanity means that men and women 
are dependant and accountable to God. This moral accountability is reflected in the Bible 
by the fact that God judges all men and women. Lochman, who argues that the „jüngsten 
Gericht“ is for our good, writes that the theme of judgment is strong throughout both 
testaments: 
Dass menschliches Leben, und zwar sowohl das persönliche Leben des Einzelnen 
wie das der Völker, ja des Menschengeschlechts insgesamt, unter dem Gericht 
Gottes steh, sich unwiderstehlich auf den letzten Richter hin bewegt, gehört integral 
zur Botschaft des Alten und des Neuen Testamentes. Allerdings handelt es sich 
dabei um keine allgemeinen kosmischen Gesetze oder namenlose Fatalitäten. Hier 
schalten und walten keine gnadenlosen Fatalitäten. Die Bibel kennt und nennt den 
Richter. Er ist dein anderer als Jahwe, der Gott Israels in der hebräischen Bibel; im 
Neuen Testament der mit ihm identische „Vater Jesu Christi.“475 
Or as Balz says in reference to fear in the NT, “the menacing seriousness of God’s 
judgment is decisive.” The epiphanies of God and the “mighty works of Jesus” in the NT, 
display plainly his power and authority and, according to Balz, naturally result in fear 
(TDNT, sec. D2a).  
God’s omnipotence and human powerlessness are seen in the many displays of 
Christ’s power and authority that result in fear. The following examples are 
representative: in Mark 4:35-41 (parallels Matt 8:2; Luke 8:25) the account of the 
disciples “great fear” is strongly reminiscent of the “great fear” of the sailors who had 
thrown Jonah overboard (Jonah 1:15, 16). In fact, the Greek texts from each account of 
the fear that is generated after the waters are calmed are almost identical; both the 
disciples and the sailors “feared a great fear” (ἐφοβήθησαν [aorist passive verb] + φόβ— 
[noun] + µεγ—[adjective]). In addition, the fear (explicitly in the Jonah text, implicitly in 
the Mark text) has as its object, respectively, YHWH and Jesus. Of great interest for the 
fear-of-God theme is the fact that the greatest level of fear is depicted to have come not 
                                                                                                                                                  
loving—for that just makes God out to be the most superlative among other beings. Any theology 
that does not understand this, says Tillich, “relapses into monarchic monotheism, for if God is not 
being-itself, he is subordinate to it, just as Zeus is subordinate to fate in Greek religion” (236) 
While Tillich rightly does not subordinate God to being, to strip away God’s “monarchic 
monotheism” in what in Tillich’s mind rationally follows from this, is to strip away the attributes 
that cause humans to love or fear him, and to eliminate the particulars about God that give 
believers assurance that he has the intention and ability to save their souls.  
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 Lochman, 1993, 83, 84. He lists the following NT judgment texts: Matt 6:4ff.; 7:22; 
13:36-43; 25:31-46; Luke 13:25-27; Rom 2:3ff.; 14:10; 1 Cor 4:4f.; 5:13; 11:32; 2 Cor 5:10; 1 
Thess 4:6; 2 Thess 1:5.) 
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during the storm, but after. The object of the “great fear,” then, could not have been the 
storm; rather, the focus of the fear was upon the great power and authority before which 
the waters and wind obeyed. The “great fear” is clearly not reverence here, but results in 
reverence: after the storm was stilled, the sailors “offered a sacrifice to the LORD and 
made vows,” and the disciples said to each other, “Who then is this, that even the wind 
and the sea obey him?” Also clear (once again, explicit in Jonah, and implicit in Mark) is 
the awareness YHWH’s/Jesus’ authority over the sailors’/disciples’ lives (especially clear 
in the Jonah story is the moral component of Jonah’s sin of evasion of responsibility and 
the sailors’ perceived possible sin of throwing Jonah overboard). Plain to see here is the 
powerlessness, dependence, and accountability that the sailors/disciples feel vis à vis 
God’s power.  
Another example of epiphany that reveals the power of God and the powerlessness 
of men is the transfiguration of Jesus. Matt 17:1-8 (parallels Mark 9:2-8; Luke 9:28-36) 
indicates by Jesus’ face shining “like the sun” and his clothes becoming “dazzling white” 
that Jesus showed Peter, James, and John some measure of his glorified divinity. The 
feature of Moses and Elijah talking with Jesus only adds to the perception that God was 
involved. When the voice of God came from the cloud, any doubt of God’s involvement 
disappeared: the three amazed disciples “fell upon their face[s] and feared exceedingly” 
(TM). Matthew uses the aorist verb plus adjective σφόδρα (“exceedingly”—DBLSD). 
Mark employs ἐγένοντο (“they became”) plus the adjective ἔκφοβος (“terrified”—
DBLSD). Clear in this account is the disciples’ realization that all was beyond their 
control. The divinity of Christ was being plainly revealed to them for the first time, and 
the natural reaction was to fear (see p. 221 below, and especially FN 487).  
Jesus’ divinity and the people’s fearful reaction to it are also seen in Luke 8:26-39 
(parallels Matt 8:28-9:1; Mark 5:1-20) where Jesus commands the “legion” demonic 
spirits out of a man. The demons at once acknowledge Jesus’ identity as the “son of the 
most high God” and are bound by Jesus’ authority. They beg not to be cast back into “the 
abyss” and instead request permission to go from the man into a nearby herd of swine. 
This they do, but only with Jesus’ permission. The pig herders fled to the nearby town 
with the news, and when the townspeople came out to see for themselves what had 
happened, they saw the demoniac—who they were apparently familiar with—in his right 
mind, and “they were afraid” (ἐφοβήθησαν). Within a short period of time, the news of 
the exorcism became generally known, and the reaction—curiously enough—was not one 
of joy; instead, “they experienced great fear” (TM of φόβῳ µεγάλῳ συνείχοντο). Like in 
the case of the calming of the storm, it is interesting to see how the “great fear” came long 
after the danger had passed: the waters were calmed and the demons were cast out and 
gone; yet, the response was fear—and the texts strongly suggest it was more fear than that 
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experienced when the danger of storm or demons was still present. This last text, 
however, is unique (compared to the accounts of the storm and transfiguration) in that the 
response of fear does not result in the Gadarenes accepting and revering Jesus. They 
apparently recognized something extremely powerful in him, but they did not want 
anything to do with him. They were perhaps more concerned about the loss of swine. 
Thus, we see how fear-of-God can push people toward him or push them away. Yet, the 
feeling is a necessary step that informs a person of the reality of what is going on. Jesus 
had confronted the Gadarenes and the resultant fear forced them to make a choice. There 
is little doubt, however, that their “great fear” was focused on Jesus. This brings us to a 
significant truth: fear is given as an emotional gift by God. It comes (at least in these 
cases) involuntarily. Humans rarely if ever choose to fear. As unpleasant as it is, fear—
like pain—is ultimately information (i.e., its purpose is to inform). To the disciples in the 
boat, Peter, James, and John on the mountain, and the Gadarenes, fear came upon them to 
inform them that they were in the presence of a great—and, potentially dangerous—
power. The intensity of the fear was evidence of this truth. The information delivered by 
the fear also made plain their vulnerability and served as a sign that God alone is 
omnipotent and that humans are completely subject to him.  
Throughout the NT, Christ is presented as the necessary being who has “all 
authority” (Matt 28:18) to determine the times and seasons of their habitations and to 
judge their actions. This is evident from John the Baptist’s call to repentance at the 
beginning of the NT to the great white throne judgment at the end; everything in between 
presents Christ as the Word who became flesh who, in the beginning, was with God and 
“was God” (John 1:1), is the “son of God” (John 1:49) and the great “I am” (John 8:58), 
created all things (Col 1:16), is the alpha and omega (Rev 22:13)—and only he will judge 
the living and the dead at the end of history. But—as Lochman rightly laments—the idea 
of God as sovereign and judge has been largely disregarded in our relatively comfortable 
western society. But Lochman, who lived and suffered under Czechoslovakian 
communism, points out a fact that should be obvious to modern men and women: justice 
is for our good, not for our harm. Having lived under the show trials that made a mockery 
out of justice (in his words, “a particularly monstrous phenomenon” and “hellish 
justice”), many people who suffered terribly had awakened in them the „Sehnsucht nach 
einem Gericht, das Gerectigkeit schafft, die Willdür stillegt und durchkreuzt, die 
Sehnsucht nach dem gerechteren, letztgültig befreienden ‚Appellationsgericht.’“ Because 
Lochman and his fellow citizens experienced the need for true justice, they understood 
that the final judgment was not „ein Mythologumenon, dessen man sich als aufgeklärter 
Mensch schämen müsste, sondern, rechtverstanden, ein menschenfreundliches, ein 
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befreiendes Motiv.“476 Lochman’s concerns are mentioned here because of the intimate 
relationship between judgment and fear-of-God. Lochman reacts against (rightly in my 
opinion) a general dilution of the reality of a final judgment in modern theology. When 
the prospect of a final judgment is diluted, then there appears to be in God less to be 
feared.  
But this dilution runs very much against the grain of the biblical testimony, both OT 
and NT. In a text in which Paul may have been drawing upon Eccl 12:13, 14, he writes: 
“For all of us must appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each may receive 
recompense for what has been done in the body, whether good or evil” (2 Cor 5:10). He 
follows this with: “Therefore, knowing the fear of the Lord, we try to persuade others” 
(5:11a). Biblically speaking, the knowledge of God’s sovereignty and, hence, his moral 
authority, begets the understanding of human dependence and moral culpability. The 
result from this should be some amount of fear. Balz writes (in regards to the relationship 
between faith and fear), “Trembling and fear bring out the radical and total dependence of 
the believer on the saving work of God.”(TDNT, sec. D, 4) So if there is not an accurate 
enough understanding of God’s omnipotence and humankind’s impotence, then 
“trembling and fear” will not occur, and neither will the “total dependence” that is a 
necessary component of saving faith.  
THE NT HAS THE SAME TENSION BETWEEN BELIEVER ASSURANCE AND 
NON-ASSURANCE 
The NT displays a tension between believer assurance (“perseverance of the 
saints”) of always remaining “in Christ” and therefore having no reason to fear, and the 
possibility that a believer can fall away—and, therefore, has some reason to fear. In this 
section, I will try to illuminate this tension and explain how this tension begets some fear 
before God.  
Not a few biblical texts plainly point in the direction of assurance. In John 10:28, 29 
Jesus says that he gives his sheep eternal life and no one can snatch them out of his hand 
or his father’s hand. Paul in Eph 1:4 writes that believers have been chosen in Christ 
“before the foundation of the world.” His idea of God’s sovereign election is developed in 
Rom 8:28; 9 where he writes the encouraging truth—of which he is convinced—that 
nothing “will be able to separate us from the love of God that is in Christ Jesus our Lord” 
(NIV). The writer of Hebrews applies to Christian believers the unconditional promise 
made by God on oath to Abraham: in Heb 6:13-20, the Christian “heirs of the promise” 
who have “taken refuge” in Christ have “a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul.” The 
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Holy Spirit, writes Paul in 2 Cor 5:1-5, is a “guarantee” of the “heavenly dwelling” to 
come when the mortal body will be “swallowed up by life.” Echoing Deut 31:6, 8, and Ps 
118:6, the writer of Hebrews once more encourages his readers with God’s promise, “I 
will never leave you or forsake you.” One can then “say with confidence, ‘the Lord is my 
helper; I will not be afraid. What can anyone do to me’” (see Heb 13:5-6). The list of 
these encouraging passages could go on. Elwell gives the following list of passages that 
give evidence that the saints will persevere:  
John 5:24; 6:37, 39–40; 6:68–69; 10:27–30; 16:27, 29–33; 17:8, 11; Acts 1:3; Rom 
4:9, 20–22; 5:1–5; 8:15–17, 28–30, 33–35, 37–39; 11:29; 1 Cor 1:8–9; 2 Cor 1:21–
22; Gal 4:6; Eph 1:4–5; 4:30; Phil 1:6; 2:12–13; Col 2:2; 1 Thess 5:23–24; 2 Tim 
1:12; 4:18; Heb 6:11; 7:24–25; 10:14, 22–23; 11:1; 1 Pet 1:3–5; 5:10; 1 John 2:1–2; 
3:9, 14, 18–20; 4:13; 5:10–11, 13, 18; Jude 1, 24.477  
On the other hand, there are many pleas in the Bible for the saints to persevere, and 
even some passages that indicate that people walked away (or would/could walk away) 
from the faith. For example, after Jesus spoke the hard saying about his flesh and blood 
being true food and drink (John 6:53-58), a number of his disciples stopped following 
him (6:66—although see v. 64 which indicates that they did not believe in the first place). 
Paul wrote about those who in “later times” would “renounce the faith” (1 Tim 4:1), 
about Hymenaeus and Alexander who had “shipwrecked” their faith (1 Tim 1:19, 20), 
and about those who, through “the opposing ideas of what is falsely called knowledge … 
[had] wandered from the faith” (1 Tim 6:20, 21 NIV). Paul also gave the Corinthians this 
stern warning regarding the susceptibility to sin: “So if you think you are standing, watch 
out that you do not fall” (1 Cor 10:12). “Salvation,” according to Paul, is to be worked out 
“with fear and trembling” (Phil 2:12). 
Jesus’ parable of the soils (Matt 13:1-9, 18-23; Mark 4:1-9, 13-20; Luke 8:4-8, 11-
15) is also a sober warning. The second sown seeds that “sprang up quickly,” but were 
“scorched” by the sun because they had “no root,” give the reader some cause for alarm—
especially when Jesus says in clarification of the parable:  
As for what was sown on rocky ground, this is the one who hears the word and 
immediately receives it with joy;  yet such a person has no root, but endures only 
for a while, and when trouble or persecution arises on account of the word, that 
person immediately falls away. (Matt 13:20, 21)   
Some commentators would say these “seeds” never believed; but Jesus in telling the 
parable or explaining it does not comment on whether there was true belief or not. It 
would seem that if one receives the Gospel “with joy,” he or she would at least for a short 
time believe. If the parable is not meant to be heard or read by people who believe at least 
to some small measure and have some joy based upon that belief, then the parable would 
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 Elwell and Buckwalter, 1991 (under Salvation/Perseverance/The Assurance of Eternal 
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appear to be pointless. In any case, this parable indicates that there is some amount of 
mystery at that point between unbelief and belief, between non-faith and faith. It is easy 
to say “For by grace you have been saved through faith,” but it is harder to explain 
exactly what faith is, and what quantity and quality of it is sufficient to be the kind of 
faith possessed by those people who represent the fourth type of seeds in the parable of 
the sower (who understand the word and produces a great harvest of “fruit”).   
The possibility of losing one’s faith is perhaps suggested most powerfully by Paul 
in his metaphor of the Olive tree branches in Rom 11. Here, after Paul gives his gentile 
readers the good news that—through the unbelief of the Jews—salvation has come to 
them, he gives them this warning: 
11:17 If some of the branches have been broken off, and you, though a wild olive 
shoot, have been grafted in among the others and now share in the nourishing sap 
from the olive root, 11:18 do not boast over those branches. If you do, consider this: 
You do not support the root, but the root supports you. 11:19 You will say then, 
“Branches were broken off so that I could be grafted in.” 11:20 Granted. But they 
were broken off because of unbelief, and you stand by faith. Do not be arrogant, but 
be afraid. 11:21 For if God did not spare the natural branches, he will not spare you 
either. 11:22 Consider therefore the kindness and sternness of God: sternness to 
those who fell, but kindness to you, provided that you continue in his kindness. 
Otherwise, you also will be cut off. 
The text speaks for itself; there is a danger of sliding from belief to unbelief.478 Paul tells 
his readers what the proper Christian response is in view of this fact: µὴ ὑψηλὰ φρόνει 
ἀλλὰ φοβοῦ (“do not have a proud attitude, rather fear!” TM). The imperative “fear!” is 
likely a blend of the servile and filial varieties of fear—with the emphasis being on the 
former. Paul appears to be primarily giving a warning about God’s wrath (God’s 
“sternness”) and God’s punishment (God’s breaking off of the branches). His teaching 
can be taken as distressing in that one can choose to leave the faith, or as encouraging in 
that one can choose the faith. This text reflects that these two options are always open, 
and one should not be completely certain that one will at all times choose the right way. 
The failure of the Christian to appreciate this precariousness, according to Barth, results 
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 Moo, 1996, 706, 707, writes, “But Paul’s main purpose in this verse appears at its end: 
to repeat his warning to the Gentile believer who may (like the Jew; cf. 2:4-5) presume on God’s 
goodness. For the goodness of God is not simply a past act or automatic benefit on which the 
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issuing this warning, Paul echoes a consistent NT theme: ultimate salvation is dependent on 
continuing faith; therefore, the person who ceases to believe forfeits any hope of salvation (cf. 
also Rom. 8:13; Col. 1:23; Heb. 3:6, 14).” In a footnote, he goes on to say, “Does this then mean 
that a genuine Christian can lose his faith and thus be eternally condemned? Certainly it is 
possible to infer this from Paul’s warning. But it is no necessary inference.”  
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in anti-Semitism. In view of Jewish unbelievers being broken off, the Christian should not 
take special pride or a sense of superiority for being grafted in. “If the Gentiles were to be 
‘highminded in their thoughts’ about the eternal Jew, they themselves would at once be 
subject to the same fate.”479 Humility, then, is humbly admitting that as Jews fell and 
were broken off, so to can grafted-in believers fall and be broken off. This is the idea of 
Murray:  
It is noteworthy that the attitude compatible with and promotive of faith is not only 
lowliness of mind but one of fear (v. 20). Christian piety is constantly aware of the 
perils to faith, of the danger of coming short, and is characterized by the fear and 
trembling which the high demands of God’s calling constrain (cf. 1 Cor 2:3; Phil 
2:12; Heb 4:1; 1 Pet 1:17). “Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall” 
(1 Cor 10:12).480 
With Paul, human freewill must be held in tension with God’s sovereignty. This 
reality that Paul so carefully explains brings its own set of questions that bear upon the 
fear-of-God theme: for example, if men and women are truly pre-destined for 
“destruction” (Rom 9:22) or “mercy” (v. 22), how can one really be certain that he or she 
has chosen according to the sovereign will of God? Can one have absolute assurance that 
their faith is really the will of God and that it will endure till death? It seems whether one 
leans toward the bondage of the will or toward the freedom of the will, there is in any 
case some room to have some fear about the possibilities.481 But this mention of the 
election/freewill issue brings up questions that are beyond the scope of the current work; 
it is sufficient here to simply point out that the Bible in addition to comforting words of 
assurance contains not a few texts that indicate that believers have the potential of falling 
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 Even a solid Calvinist like Charles Hodge acknowledges the danger highlighted in this 
text: “The effect which the consideration of these dispensations of God should produce, is 
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warnings against apostasy in the OT and NT always appear to be given in a context that makes the 
apostasy potential seem very real. Why would the warnings issued be made so earnestly if there 
were in reality no threat at all?  
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away. Biblical texts that, in one way or another, display the virtue of persevering in the 
faith are (according to Elwell):  
Matt 10:22; Mark 4:3–8; Luke 22:31–32; John 8:31–32; 15:4–10, 14; Acts 11:23; 
13:43; 14:21–22; Rom 2:6–8; 1 Cor 10:12–13; 15:1–2, 58; 16:13; 2 Cor 13:5; Gal 
5:1–4; 6:9; Eph 6:13, 16, 18; Phil 1:27; 3:12–15; 4:1; Col 1:22–23; 2:5–6; 1 Thess 
5:21; 2 Thess 2:15–17; 1 Tim 6:11–12; 2 Tim 2:12; 3:14; 4:7–8; Heb 2:1; 3:14; 
4:14; 6:4–6, 11–12; 10:23, 35–36; 11:27; 12:1–13; James 1:2–4, 12; 5:10–11; 1 Pet 
1:5–7; 2 Pet 1:10–11; 3:17; Jude 21; Rev 2:10, 17; 3:5, 11–12, 21; 14:12; 16:15; 
21:7; 22:11.482 
The NT Indicates that People Will Not Be Perfect in This Life 
Some fear is reasonably to be expected when one is confronted with God’s 
omnipotence, the threat of judgment, and when one wonders—in view of the many 
biblical calls to persevere—if the “race” can really be run all the way to the end. But 
these reasons to fear could be a moot point if one could completely conquer the sin which 
separates people from God in the first place. Human beings are commanded in the Bible 
to be perfect (e.g., Matt 5:48; 2 Cor 13:11). When the goal is achieved—that is when one 
has reached, as the apostle John puts it, “perfection in love”—then men and women will 
have no reason to fear (1 John 4:18). This key verse gives great hope that (servile) fear of 
God and of his judgment can decrease and eventually be eliminated. Love will replace it 
when Christians love each other and the love of God is then perfected in them (v. 12). 
With this perfected love, Christians “may have boldness on the day of judgment” (v. 
17).483 
But can one really in this life love perfectly? Can one even know what it exactly 
means to love perfectly? How can one expect to achieve this when—as John says earlier 
in his letter—“If we claim to be without sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in 
us” (1:8 NIV). John, of course, only echoes the OT and NT acknowledgment that 
humankind is hopelessly sold over to sin. Qoheleth, for example, said “Surely there is no 
one on earth so righteous as to do good without ever sinning” (Eccl 7:20), and the apostle 
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 Augustine indicates that fear-of-punishment is not something that is all or nothing; its 
intensity is inversely proportional to the quantity of love one has. He writes: “Fear, so to say, 
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Paul professed that “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom 3:23).484 
Assuming that being “perfected in love” cannot occur in a person who is still in sin, then 
it follows—given the universality of sin just mentioned—that perfection in love is 
impossible to achieve in life “under the sun.” Consequently, fear will remain. 
The fear spoken of in First John is servile fear-of-God. This is clear from John’s 
remarks about “boldness on the day of judgment (4:17) and that “fear has to do with 
punishment” (v. 18). John indicates that this fear diminishes as charity increases—until 
perfection is reached, at which point this servile fear is altogether cast out. Thomas 
(whose “servile” category of fear we use at the moment) understands this also: 
Servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being cast 
aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect charity in the man who is moved to 
perform good actions not only through love of justice, but also through fear of 
punishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which 
casteth out fear, according to 1 Jo. iv. 18.485 
This shows that servile fear and charity are inversely proportional; when the latter 
increases, the former decreases. 486 It follows that a man or woman exercising near-perfect 
love will still experience a small element of fear. And this servile fear is real fear. Thomas 
(in explicating it) and John (in presenting how it can be eliminated) are both clearly 
dealing with the unpleasant feeling of fear, and not, for example, with reverence or honor.  
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In this section on NT fear, my aim has not been to argue for or against the doctrine 
of believer security. I have only tried to point out that, in consideration of the human 
propensity to do evil, and in view of the warnings (both to believers and unbelievers) that 
permeate the NT (and OT), there is good justification while still here “under the sun” not 
to feel anxiety-free before God. It is certainly true that Jesus said many times “do not be 
afraid!” But he never said “do not be afraid of me!”487 There are many calls to “fear 
God!” (again, both to believers and unbelievers, often in contexts of the threat of 
judgment) in the NT, but no biblical author writes “do not fear God!”488 This is extremely 
significant in view of my thesis. When one looks at the biblical data and considers, as 
Paul puts it, the “kindness” and the “sternness” of God, can one say—in all honesty and 
humility—that he or she is sufficiently sanctified such that the biblical calls to “fear 
God!” no longer apply? The feeling of fear is, after all, simply a gift from God that warns 
of danger. In this way, it is no different that the feeling of pain.489 Just as human beings 
are alerted to danger by pain, they are also alerted to danger by fear. If there is even the 
remotest chance of threat to the body and/or soul from God, then to completely disregard 
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fear-of-God’s value and utility would be folly—for one then disregards the God-given 
warning signal that alerts a person to situations in which he or she is coming under God’s 
“sternness.”490  
A Key Text: Matt 10:28 
Matt 10:28 (and its parallel in Luke 12:4, 5) is a teaching of Jesus to his disciples 
that contains all the main points discussed above: first, orthodox theology and 
anthropology is reflected by the fact that only God has dominion over the soul; second, 
because the logion serves as a warning to the disciples who were being sent out into 
unfriendly and dangerous territory, assumed is the possibility of losing faith in Christ; 
third, this possibility of losing faith would be driven by the sin of fearing humans more 
than God. This “worldly fear” (which Thomas deemed in every case to be evil) would be 
sinful in that it would perhaps prompt the disciples to conform to the will of their 
persecutors and not to the will of God.  
 
Matt 10:28 καὶ µὴ φοβεῖσθε ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἀποκτεννόντων τὸ σῶµα, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν µὴ 
δυναµένων ἀποκτεῖναι· φοβεῖσθε δὲ µᾶλλον 
τὸν δυνάµενον καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶµα 
ἀπολέσαι ἐν γεέννῃ. 
Matt 10:28 Do not fear those who kill the 
body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear 
him who can destroy both soul and body in 
hell. 
 
In this text is seen the tension between “do not be afraid!” and “fear!” If one takes 
the many cases in both testaments where God/Christ says “do not be afraid” to mean “do 
not be afraid of me,” then all the other biblical calls to “fear God!” (especially when said 
to believers) would appear to be contradictory. But this interpretation that posits God as 
the absolute object of the “do not be afraid” commands is unlikely for the reasons I have 
already mentioned in the section above.491 In reality, the psychology of the fearers in each 
biblical case is different and needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. When one 
fears before an epiphany of God, the fear that one feels is based upon one’s circumstances 
and mental makeup as well as—and perhaps most importantly—one’s relationship with 
God at that moment. The idolatrous Israelites cringing and trembling before God at the 
base of Mount Sinai (Exod 20:18-20) manifested a very different emotional response 
than, for example, the joyful and fearful women who beheld the empty tomb and then 
encountered the risen Christ (Matt 28:8, 9). Both groups were told “do not be afraid!” but 
the “of what” question is answered differently for each: for the Israelites, the admonition 
(by Moses on behalf of God) meant, first, that their fear response was excessive and a 
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purely “paradoxical” (see my closing quote of his at the end of this section). Marshall, 1970, 280.  
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misunderstanding of who God is and what he planned to do (that is, they still did not 
understand that he is a God of love, not only justice); second, they had no reason to fear 
God’s punishment if they would be obedient to his commands. For the women meeting 
Jesus, the Lord’s gentle command was based upon their unreasonable fear of, first, the 
angel who had given them the good news and, second, the fear and confusion that arose 
within the experiential matrix of seeing Jesus crucified, seeing the empty tomb, and 
suddenly seeing a dead man alive again. In these texts, as well as all the others in which 
God appears and commands “do not be afraid!,” God could in some cases be partly or 
wholly referring to the fear that has himself as object; but based upon the context of these 
passages as well as the already mentioned fact that God/Christ never says “do not be 
afraid of me,” the admonition is not one that is commanding all fear-of-God away, but 
only the inappropriate quantity of the fear (based upon the fearer’s sinfulness at the 
moment).  
The testimony of Matt 10:28 should prompt Bible interpreters to think twice before 
interpreting the fear emotion/feeling out of other fear-of-God passages. The text itself, as 
well as the “do not be afraid of them” inclusio in which it rests, gives credibility to the 
idea that the main reality that humans are not to fear is not the reality of God, but the 
reality of the things of this world. Verses 26 and 31 as well as 28a indicate that people 
who follow Christ have no reason to be afraid of those who persecute them. In other 
words, Christians should not succumb to “worldly” fear. On the other hand, Christians 
should practice appropriate fear towards God because he has authority and power over 
both body and soul. Based upon this authority and power—and the right to judge that 
flows from them—the fear referred to here is mainly fear of punishment (that is, “servile” 
fear). 
There should be no doubt that v. 28a (and 26a; 31a) is speaking of real fear—even 
to the point of dread and terror; for the “them” (v. 26a) that is the object of the fear are 
those who can “kill the body” (v. 28a). Even though Jesus says believers should not 
manifest this worldly fear, the context (especially as described by Matthew) within which 
he sets this command appears to provoke that fear: Jesus says that his disciples will be 
flogged (10:7), betrayed (v. 21), rebelled against (v. 21), called “Beelzebub” (v. 25), and 
put to death (vv. 21, 28). The fact that the Pharisees accused Jesus of being possessed by 
“Beelzebub” (i.e., Satan—see Matt 12:24; Mark 3:22) gives good reason to believe that 
Jesus was deadly serious when he spoke to his disciples about who to fear and who not to 
fear.492 One would naturally be expected to have great fear before a person who 
threatened one’s life. And yet, disciples of Christ are not to fear anything that humans can 
do to them—for they, τὴν … ψυχὴν µὴ δυναµένων ἀποκτεῖναι (“who are not able to 
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kill the soul” [TM]), are of no ultimate threat.493 Therefore, as Hill says, “The fear of men 
and of persecution ought not to menace the apostles’ work.”494 After all, why fear 
someone who can only “carry off our clothing.”495 The first part of v. 28, writes Marshall, 
is in fact encouragement to the disciples, for even if one is killed in his or her mission to 
tell the world about Jesus’ love, “God will uphold the stand which he took. His position 
will be vindicated. Men will have done all that they can do, and that was merely physical. 
The moral and spiritual issues lie in the hands of someone else ….”496 
This “someone else” implied by v. 28b is God.497 Only God is τὸν δυνάµενον 
(“the one who is able” TM) to determine the destiny of the soul. What follows from this is 
well stated by Hagner: “The persecutors may kill the body, but only God has power over 
the soul and thus the whole person. It is thus God, the final judge of all, and not human 
beings, who alone is to be feared ….”498 A mild decrease in the intensity of this fear 
might be implied by the dropping of the ἀπό (used in v. 28a) from the imperative 
command to fear God (φοβεῖσθε). In both the OT and NT, fearing ἀπό (“from” or 
“before”) something or someone is generally taken to heighten the element of awe and/or 
fear based on the presence of the fear object. It is rarely used when God is the object of 
the fear.499 But whatever might be diminished by the syntax of this logion is regained in 
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view of the fact that the fear’s object, God, is a much more powerful and deadly threat 
than any human being who can only “kill the body.” Whatever terror one might 
experience before a human executioner should pale in comparison to the terror 
experienced by someone who has been found guilty by the God who can “destroy” his or 
her soul “in Gehenna.” But the imperative of φοβέοµαι plus the accusative is not 
constrained to a lower level of fear; for not a few instances of this plainly denote intense 
fear (e.g., 1 Sam 12:18; 2 Sam 6:9 [parallel 1 Chron 13:12]; Jer 5:22; Jonah 1:16). 
In fact, the fears mentioned in the two clauses of v. 28 are approximately 
synonymous. The context of the logion clearly demonstrates this: the disciples are warned 
about making a mistake by fearing human persecutors more than God. Fear is clearly in 
play here, not reverence or honor.500 This fact is further made evident by the reason Jesus 
gives to fear God: he can “destroy” not only the body, but also the soul; if there is 
something to fear from people, there is much more to fear from God. Furthermore, the use 
of the comparative adverb µᾶλλον tells the reader that the distinction intended is not one 
of action, but of object of the action. The fear that one manifests toward the inappropriate 
human-object should instead be manifested toward the God-object. That is not to say that 
fear before humans and fear before God cannot be or should not be ultimately different; 
but this text does not comment upon that. Whatever other feelings might comprise a 
healthy and mature Christian “fear” of God, this text makes it clear that servile fear is 
fear-of-God’s most elementary characteristic. Jesus’ warning is given lest the disciples 
                                                                                                                                                  
and BAGD do not mention an escalation of the intensity of fear with this formula (BDB: “be 
afraid of” vs. “fear, be afraid” for the accusative [for Lev 19:14, 32; 25:17, 36, 43, BDB has 
“stand in awe”]; BAGD: “be afraid of someone” vs. “fear someone or something” for the 
accusative), the OT texts that use it do appear to depict a quite high level of fear. Because the 
formula accentuates the “presence” of the feared object (Ogden, 2007, 61), it shows a “greater 
emphasis upon the action of fearing” (Murphy, 1992, 35). The two NT cases in Matt 10:28a and 
the parallel Luke 12:4 are insufficient to demonstrate a trend; but they both do imply intense fear. 
In any case, one should not see a significant change in the fear type or intensity when the ἀπό 
formula is used then dropped in favor of a simple accusative—for the simple accusative in both 
OT and NT can also denote great fear (e.g., the intense blend of servile and filial fears manifested 
by the sailors on the ship as well as the thief on the cross [resp. Jonah 1:16 and Luke 23:40]). 
BDB assigns most instances of  + accusative person/thing/God to the “fear, reverence, honor” 
category (vs. “fear, be afraid”); this, however, is a product of the over-reliance upon the 
evolutionary paradigm already discussed in the sections on Otto and Becker.  
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judging God who has unlimited power” and that “the idea of the fear of God is connected with the 
sovereignty of God.”  
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apostatize through succumbing to the threats of men.501 The warning is meant to instill 
the simple servile fear of God’s punishment in the disciples. This fear has something 
intimately to do with the disciples’ right—and, therefore, saving—relationship with God. 
Therefore, it is dangerous to give “fear” here some other meaning than what is intended.  
Whether “destroy” (ἀπολέσαι) in this passage implies soul annihilation or an 
ongoing destruction is not made clear.502 The concept of “Gehenna” set within the wider 
context of Matthew, however, gives the reader good justification for understanding that 
Jesus here was referring to the latter.503 Plus, if the threat here were simply soul (and 
body) annihilation, then the mention of the place where it occurs would be somewhat 
pointless.504 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT FEAR-OF-GOD IN THE NT 
This section on the NT began by asking if there is a paradigm shift in the fear-of-God 
concept in the NT. My answer is no. The God who created humankind and began a 
process through Abraham and the Israelites to bless “all the families of the earth” is the 
same God—through his son, Jesus Christ—who brings that process to fulfillment in the 
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NT. But the NT reveals much more about God, the specifics of his salvation plan, and the 
after-death future for humans. The “kindness” and the “sternness” of God are brought into 
much shaper focus. In one way fear-of-God is decreased because of the assurance gained 
through Christ’s promises; but in another way, fear is increased based upon the 
knowledge that there is punishment after death, and that it lasts into eternity. When this 
knowledge is combined with the many warnings in the NT against sinning and falling 
away, then even a believer should fear—for although the true believer walks with the 
Lord on one side, there is still a terrifying burning bottomless canyon on the other side. 
Lest a person fall, he or she will maintain a death grip on his or her savior. But can the 
Christian really disregard the possibility of hell and say with supreme confidence, “I will 
never deny my God”? In this question we encounter the paradox of fear and faith: fear-of-
God bespeaks humility and drives one towards God; but supreme faith—to the point of no 
longer considering the possibility of losing faith—is indicative of pride and not true faith, 
but self-righteousness.505 This paradox is seen throughout the Bible and because of it, 
Paul can say, “Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall” (1 Cor 
10:12 KJV).506 There is something about fear-of-God that functions as a check against 
totally disregarding God on the one hand, and completely seeing one’s self as having 
perfect faith on the other. Qoheleth perhaps expresses it most creatively (and perhaps 
hyperbolically) when he says,  
Do not be overrighteous, neither be overwise— why destroy yourself? Do not be 
overwicked, and do not be a fool— why die before your time? It is good to grasp 
the one and not let go of the other. The man who fears God will avoid all extremes 
(Eccl 7:16-18).   
                                                 
505
 Marshall, 1970, 280, also notices (in Matt 10:28) this paradox: “Here is sufficient 
evidence that fear is part of the Christian attitude to God and that the New Testament holds 
together in paradox the commands not to be afraid before God and yet to fear Him. To abandon 
either part of the paradox is to become sub-Christian. Our God, as He has revealed Himself to us 
in His Son Jesus Christ, is gracious and loving, and He invites our faith and love. But His love is a 
holy love which judges and condemns sin, and therefore His people will fear His judgment upon 
their sin and tremble lest they succumb to temptation. Yet at the same time they know He is 
faithful and just to forgive all those who confess their sins to Him, and in this lies their comfort 
and their strength. Because they fear Him more than they fear any man or the devil himself, they 
flee from sin and apostasy. Because they love Him and trust Him, their chief desire is to enter into 
that close fellowship with Him in which perfect love casts out fear.” 
506
 Thus, Calvin says: “God assigns repentance as the goal towards which they must keep 
running during the whole course of their lives” (Calvin, 1972, book 3, chap. 3, sec. 9). 
 228 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the foregoing work was to find out if any fear remains in OT fear-
of-God. I do not consider it to be simply another voice among many other just-as-valid 
voices in “conversation” in our modern/post-modern world; instead, I consider the results 
of the dissertation to really reflect (or, at least, to closely reflect) the truth—because they 
are grounded in the truth of God’s Word. One might say that my method is ultimately 
circular; in response, I can only reply like Peter, “Lord, to whom shall we go? You have 
the words of eternal life” (John 6:68 NIV). The view that God is holy, humankind is 
sinful, and that evildoers will be condemned in the final judgment, used to be considered 
a necessary starting point in Christian theological studies. But this view has not been held 
for a long time by the main bulk of the theological academy. Much has changed in the last 
century or so, such that the academic results of those who still hold to this starting point 
(i.e., who are “conservative”) are considered to be—as James Barr put it—“increasingly 
untenable in the modern world.”507 Therefore, as Barr explains, “far from the 
conservative case making an impact on scholarship, the world of scholarship has no 
respect for the dogmatic and supernaturalistic kind of conservative apologetic and rightly 
ignores it.”508 Here, Barr reveals the bottom-line difference between the conservative and 
liberal theological academic worlds: supernaturalism is assumed by one, rejected by the 
other. Barr does not overstate the case; in fact, it could be no other way. “Conservative 
apologetic” is ignored because supernatural causation is ignored. This difference can 
easily be traced back to the epistemological assumptions that each of the worlds embrace. 
There is no middle ground; if one rejects supernaturalism in one’s scholarly quest to get 
at the truth, then one—by definition—can only consider naturalistic explanations for 
anything that is contained within the Bible. If supernatural explanations are disallowed, 
then only natural ones will do. J. Becker and many of the critical-era scholars operated 
from this anti-supernatural position; but the main problem with this—as I have mentioned 
in various parts of this work—is the inability to discern what an Israelite’s 
mental/emotional state would have been when confronted with a real epiphany and the 
real prospect of inevitable judgment. In other words, because of their anti-
supernaturalistic assumption, scholars who have written upon the fear-of-God topic have 
the following limitation: if there really is a God who broke into time and space in order to 
raise up a people (the Israelites) in order that the Christ would one day appear, then there 
is no way for them to correctly discern the emotions and feelings that those people would 
have experienced before God. This is because the emotions and feelings evoked by the 
supernatural are different from those evoked by the natural. Insofar as the Bible records 
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human reactions to natural events, theological studies undertaken as science have at least 
a chance to get at the truth of things; but insofar as the Bible tells us about God and the 
works of God that really occurred in history, theological studies undertaken as science 
can only be silent or try to account for them through naturalistic explanations.  
Assumed in my stance is the reliability of the Bible. This is a reflection of God’s 
love for his creation; he cared enough to provide human beings with a clear message so 
that men and women could read it, apprehend it, and order their lives according to it. This 
stance is not based on blind faith, but built upon the witness of the God who so loved me 
that he gave up his only son so that I might have life; it is built upon the witness of those 
Apostles who knew Christ and were willing to give up their lives so that the world might 
know him too; my stance is also justified by the amazing history of the church that—
despite its many shortcomings (many warned against in the Bible)—has brought great 
light to the world in proportion to her obedience to preach and live out the true Gospel. 
The Bible answers all of humankind’s greatest questions in a way that is marvelous. Such 
love, beauty and grace could not have come out of the natural events of primitive men 
and women fearing before thunderstorms and volcanoes—men and women who then 
went on to create fictional stories about God in order to drive the cult center to Jerusalem 
so that religious and political power might be focused there. The main thrust of thought 
behind the critical reconstruction of Israel’s history (that Becker—following Gunkel—
relied upon) is that Israel largely created the religious history and theology that is 
contained within her Scriptures; but how could such love, beauty, grace, and calls to 
always tell the truth (for the Lord is truth) flow out of—if the critics are right—the most 
stupendous, complicated, long-lived, and most effective fabrication that has ever been 
foisted by human beings upon their fellow human beings? Can one small people group 
whose holy book commands “you shall not bear false witness” be so accused? Could the 
world’s greatest lie beget the world’s greatest love? I do not think that this is humanly 
possible—to this titanic scale, at least—nor would God allow it. So I am compelled by 
conscience to make the assumption of God’s reality and God’s goodness to be a starting 
point in both my private and academic lives—for the two cannot ultimately be separated.  
I believe in the reliability of the Bible because of my understanding that God—
being love—would deliver instructions to his earthly children so that they, being made in 
the image of God, would choose to love God and thereby find eternal life in him. What he 
would say in his Word about a proper relationship between God and human beings would 
be especially important because this relationship relates directly to the subject of 
salvation. Therefore, the phenomenon of fear-of-God in the Bible would be a critical 
subject because fear is one of the ingredients of a proper relationship with God. Because 
fear-of-God had come to mean so many different things to scholars in the last century or 
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so, I perceived that the fear emotion/feeling element of fear-of-God had been excessively 
downplayed. This perception is what motivated the initiation of this dissertation and its 
thesis that the fear emotion/feeling does in fact largely remain in OT fear-of-God.  
To substantiate this thesis, I thought that it would be important to first look at a 
number of fear-of-God commentators from the pre-critical and critical eras. As it turns 
out, real fear was by and large assumed to exist in fear-of-God by the pre-critical 
commentators based upon their biblical understanding of God as the author, sustainer, and 
judge of all life. Fear could be generated in the hearts of men and women not only 
because of the fear of God’s punishment, but because of the fear of losing fellowship with 
God. In the 2nd century AD, Tertullian asked, “Has [the soul] no fear of him whose favour 
it is so desirous to possess, and whose anger it is so anxious to avoid”?509 These two fears 
are highlighted by Augustine in his analogy of the unfaithful and faithful wives: “The one 
says, I fear my husband, lest he should come: the other says, I fear my husband, lest he 
depart from me.”510 In a relationship with God, as the fear of losing God’s favor grows 
(which grows with love), then the less excellent—but, nevertheless, legitimate and 
useful—fear of punishment diminishes. But as Augustine and Thomas taught, they both 
remain in the believer—because of universal imperfection—till he or she goes to be with 
the Lord. Thomas claimed, however, that the fear of losing God’s fellowship (filial fear) 
would remain in the eternal state. All the pre-critical era commentators surveyed were 
unanimous in their understanding that God would one day bring about a final judgment, 
and that this judgment and God were worthy of one’s fear.  
But the assumptions and the emphases change in the critical era. To a large extent, 
theological study was undertaken with the assumption that the history of the Israelites 
could be accounted for by naturalistic explanations. As a result, the emphasis fell away 
from the right emotions/feelings that Israel’s God insisted that men and women should 
exhibit before him (and that should also be exhibited today) to an emphasis upon how 
fear-of-God developed from fear of physical phenomena (volcanoes, thunderstorms, etc.) 
to the more refined and abstract “fears” (worship, reverence, loyalty, etc.) that appeared 
as the Israelites/Jews created and refined their cult. This development replaced the fear of 
the unknown with worship of and obedience to the more predictable God of the cult who 
could be satiated (and, therefore, less feared) through compliance with the rules of the 
cult. The supernatural work of God which the pre-critical commentators assumed to result 
in a legitimate fear emotion/feeling in men and women was largely replaced by a human 
(natural) work in which humans sought to explain the unknown and thereby reduce the 
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level of fear.511 The skeptical epistemology flowing out of the late-eighteenth century that 
drove OT studies into a more history-of-religions direction was supplemented by the 
intellectual movements of idealism and romanticism which put an emphasis on personal 
experience. Between the reconstruction of Israel’s history, which resulted in questions 
about her Scripture’s claims to supernatural events, and the turn to the self to find the 
deepest truths about God, the authority of the Bible diminished and the authority of the 
individual person increased. As a result, the notion that one should fear the biblical God 
appeared increasingly irrelevant.  
Both of these streams combine in the critical-era work that was the object of major 
scrutiny in this dissertation, J. Becker’s Gottesfurcht im Alten Testament. Because so 
many after him built upon his results and assumed that they were true, I thought it would 
be worthwhile to see if his results were based upon convincing evidence. It should be 
pointed out first that Becker is spring-loaded in the non-fear (emotion/feeling) direction; 
unless a fear-of-God text depicts an “event” that clearly portrays people being in a state of 
fear (or terror or dread) before God, or unless a “virtue” fear-of-God case (that is, a case 
that is not a historical event, but is fear-of-God mentioned as a virtue [e.g., “The fear of 
the LORD is the beginning of knowledge”—Prov 1:7]) has overwhelming contextual 
indications that real fear is in view, Becker will normally translate fear-of-God as a more 
abstract idea—e.g., loyalty, worship, obedience, etc. When he does deem a text to reflect 
the emotion/feeling of fear, he calls this “numinous” fear—that is, fear of the numinous. 
But, as I argued in the section on R. Otto, this term (which was invented by Otto) denotes 
an understanding of God that makes the difference between God and the person who 
perceives God indistinct. When Otto speaks about the numinous, one is not really certain 
if he is talking about the biblical God or a God that is completely subjective and does not 
correspond to objective reality. There is confusion as to whether the numinous is the thing 
feared or the fear itself. This subjectivity then dovetails with Becker’s form-critical 
assumption that the Israelite religion began as emotional responses to threatening natural 
phenomena that were first experienced long before the nation came to be. Therefore 
Becker can call the “numinous” a “recognized history-of-religion and psychology-of-
religion terminus” and use it to denote the fear that generally appeared early in the 
formation of the religion.512 But, to the best of my knowledge, neither Otto or Becker use 
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the term “numinous” to designate the biblical God, or, for that matter, to designate the 
emotion/feeling experienced before the biblical God. Somehow the notion of God and the 
emotion/feeling of God get blended together. But this is nothing like the God of the Bible 
and actually goes against the most basic truth presented in the Bible that God is radically 
distinct from the creation and existed long before the creation (including human emotions 
and feelings) ever came to be.  
For the virtue fear-of-God cases whose contexts do not so much illumine what is 
meant by “fear,” Becker usually assigns these abstract meanings that are more or less in 
accord with the form-critical expectation for the literary form they are in. It should be 
recalled that Becker’s study is not an investigation into the meaning of OT fear-of-God 
per se; rather, it is an investigation that seeks to add support to the discipline of form 
criticism by showing that the fear-of-God concept did evolve and was used in particular 
ways in large sections of the OT that were written by certain people at certain times 
during the development of the cult.513 As a result, Becker designates most virtue fear-of-
God cases found in the Deuteronomistic literature as denoting loyalty to the covenant 
God; in the Psalms, he designates most as indicating belongingness to the cult 
community; the literary form of wisdom literature generally uses fear-of-God to denote 
those who live morally and who are upright. Perhaps the main evidence that he gives that 
this is true is the fact that each literary form tends to have its own unique fear-of-God 
linguistic form (usually using various forms of ): the Deuteronomistic literary form 
prefers the plain verb, the Psalms group employs the plural verbal-adjective plus YHWH, 
and the wisdom group uses the noun. This is in keeping with Gunkel’s idea that each 
literary layer of the OT would have its own linguistic fingerprint. Becker also appeals in 
many cases to synonymous parallels that always drive the meaning of “fear” toward the 
meaning of the parallel. For example, “fear” in “now fear the LORD and serve him with 
all faithfulness” (Josh 24:14 NIV) means that one should serve God. The semantic force 
never goes the other way (i.e., “serve” means “fear”).  
But all this is insufficient reason to bring fear-of-God so far off its semantic base of 
the fear emotion/feeling. There are several reasons why this is so: first, the linguistic 
forms can be easily accounted for by the function of the material in which they are found 
(that is, there are many verbs in Deut-2 Kings because it is mainly narrative; there are 
many plural participles in the Psalms because the Psalms refer to groups of people who do 
this and who do that; there is a preponderance of nouns in the wisdom literature because 
fear-of-God is a topic in its own right.). Second, the conclusions that he draws from the 
                                                 
513
 Becker, in his foreword, acknowledges that his work builds upon and seeks to confirm 
the form-critical theories of H. Gunkel. Gunkel’s anti-supernatural bias is evident when he calls 
the OT a “roguish piece of [Hebrew] folk-lore” (Gunkel, 1928, 16, 17). 
 233 
many cases of parallelism involving virtue fear-of-God are most likely not accurate—for 
even if a virtue fear-of-God text is in synonymous parallel with, for example, “serve,” the 
main element that drives the meaning of the parallel may not be “serve,” but “fear” (but 
Becker always has it such that the parallel to fear-of-God always drives the meaning); the 
parallelism could also be something other than synonymous, or the two components of 
the parallel could simply mean what each of them literally says. In addition, it should also 
be said that it is unlikely that the alleged synonymous parallels could drive fear-of-God to 
signify as many meanings as Becker suggests (i.e., it is unlikely that  could 
semantically be so elastic). Third, there are few contextual clues that support Becker. In 
his foreword, Becker says that he will let the “prevailing context” provide evidence that 
certain linguistic forms do indeed correspond to certain fear-of-God meanings; but, at 
least with most of the virtue fear-of-God instances, the “prevailing context” does not give 
any indication that would support Becker’s interpretations. The only context that might 
(and in my view probably does) provide any interpretational weight to many of the virtue 
fear-of-God passages is the general threatening mood that surrounds them. With many, 
the clouds of judgment for sin can be seen on the horizon—but that is all. The “local” 
(that is, within a verse or two) context usually contributes nothing to what “fear” might 
mean in most virtue fear-of-God OT texts. But Becker still gives meanings that 
correspond to form-critical expectations, and in this way it strongly appears that his 
results do not in the end support form-critical assertions, but repeats them.  
After the interaction with the various fear-of-God commentators, I then presented 
the results from an investigation of all the OT fear texts that employ  (chapter two 
[and I looked at a number of passages employing other words for fear as well]). As 
mentioned already, most of the “event” cases (total of 216) have contexts that clearly 
indicate the fear emotion/feeling. The “virtue” fear-of-God cases (total of 181) by their 
nature mostly do not have any immediate contextual clues that would inform the reader of 
what “fear” means. These virtue fear-of-God texts are thus vulnerable to 
misinterpretation. The statistics generated show that virtue fear-of-God is seen in early 
and late sections of the OT, and although there are—as Becker pointed out—clusters of 
linguistic forms in certain literary forms, these literary forms by no means consist 
exclusively of these linguistic forms. This shows that, while there may be a trend of 
linguistic form use in a given literary form, it is certainly not law-like. Finally, I could not 
find anything in the OT that teaches that the idea of fear-of-God has semantically shifted. 
I could also find no text that condemns the emotion/feeling of fear exhibited before 
God;514 on the other hand, every passage that mentions any lack of the fear 
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emotion/feeling before God always in some way presents that lack of fear in a bad light 
(see, e.g., Ps 36:1[2] and Eccl 8:13).  
But perhaps Becker was correct, and the fear-of-God concept really did 
significantly evolve. If this were so, it would not be surprising to find fully-evolved uses 
of fear-of-God in the NT. But after studying many NT fear-of-God texts, I concluded (see 
chapter three) that NT fear-of-God still remains very close to its fear roots—although it 
can at times connote more abstract meanings. The threat of God’s judgment remains in 
the NT; but because the solution to evil and death has been identified, it could be said that 
there is no more need to fear God. This is a good point; but it must as well be pointed out 
that, while death is overcome, the NT reveals that the everlasting life that will be given to 
unbelievers will be one of unspeakable suffering—and this therefore justifies fear before 
God (see, e.g., Luke 23:40). It was not my aim in chapter three to argue for or against the 
doctrine of eternal security (perseverance of the saints). While I tend to agree with this 
comforting doctrine, at the same time I am compelled to point out the many warning 
texts—given to both believers and unbelievers—in the NT that seem to be a check against 
believers falling into pharisaical behavior and/or falling away from faith. The 
admonishments to persist in one’s faith and the warnings to not fall away are so prevalent 
in the NT that the following fact cannot be avoided: from the perspective of human 
beings on earth (who cannot completely know the eternal mind of the God who 
predestines the eternal direction of human beings) the option of walking away from God 
is always open (otherwise, there would—for believers at least—be no need for such 
urgent warnings). In other words, during life “under the sun,” human beings are in 
danger.515 While there are NT passages that indicate that fear is no longer necessary 
because of the assurance that believers have in Christ, these must be held in tension with 
many others that discourage a completely relaxed (i.e., fear-free) attitude when it comes 
to a believer’s relationship with God and his or her understanding of his or her own 
salvation. For example, Paul says in Rom 8:15 that believers “did not receive a spirit of 
slavery to fall back into fear,” but have instead received the “spirit of adoption.” But later 
in the book, Paul warns the grafted-in Church to “consider … the kindness and sternness 
of God: sternness to those who fell, but kindness to you, provided that you continue in his 
kindness. Otherwise, you also will be cut off” (Rom 11:22 NIV). Once again, my 
intention is not to argue this question along the lines of one doctrine or another, but only 
to point out that the NT has many warnings—many given to believers—and not a few 
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calls to fear God. These combine to give the strong impression that believers should not 
be completely fear-free before God and take their salvation for granted. 
That fear-of-God can connote a more refined aspect of a person’s relationship with 
God is perhaps best attested in Jesus’ quote of Deut 6:13 in Matt 4:10 (parallel Luke 4:8). 
When Jesus responded to Satan’s desire to be worshipped, he said: “Away with you, 
Satan! for it is written, ‘Worship the Lord your God, and serve only him.’” Jesus’ use 
here of “worship” (προσκυνέω) is different from Deut 6:13 where the MT employs  
(and the LXX uses φοβέω). This is noteworthy and demonstrates at least that virtue fear-
of-God can connote more abstract concepts, and, at most, can actually denote them.516 It 
should be pointed out that προσκυνέω has its roots in the idea of prostrating one’s self 
(before a king, god, etc.—see TDNT); falling prostrate before a mighty authority and 
fearing were in those days often understood to go together—so the fear emotion/feeling in 
Jesus’ quote might not be altogether out of view. It might also be mentioned that Jesus’ 
reply was driven somewhat by Satan’s offer to be worshipped in exchange for all the 
world’s kingdoms. I do not want to say that Jesus changed the Deuteronomy text in order 
to fit the occasion, but only that he perhaps emphasized a secondary meaning instead of a 
primary one. Whatever the case, this passage should be considered in view of Rom 3:18 
in which Paul quotes Ps 36:1 (2). The source text strongly suggests that wicked people 
should fear God because of the danger that they are in. Paul’s highlight of universal sin 
indicates that he uses this fear-of-God text in the same way: wicked people have “no fear 
of God before their eyes”—but they ought to. These OT quotes by Jesus and Paul indicate 
that worship (at least in the sense of bowing down) and the emotion/feeling of fear are 
both NT components of fear-of-God. Many of the remaining NT fear-of-God texts, 
however, tend to emphasize the latter—and perhaps Matt 10:28 (parallel Luke 12:5) is the 
bluntest; for there Jesus clearly taught that one ought to exhibit the fear emotion/feeling 
before the God who alone has the authority and power to “destroy both body and soul in 
hell.”  
Between how Jesus quoted Deut 6:13 and how Qoheleth speaks of the fear-of-God 
being the “whole duty” of human beings (Eccl 12:13), it seems clear that virtue fear-of-
God can be much more than fear, yet never devoid of fear. The idea of “worship” is 
perhaps not far away from what Qoheleth (or the epilogist) intended for the reader to 
apprehend; for the fear emotion/feeling alone cannot be—from either an OT or a NT 
perspective—the state of the human heart that justifies a man or a woman before God. 
The “whole duty” that will best prepare a man or a woman for the judgment of God that 
Qoheleth mentions can certainly begin in being afraid of God’s punishment, but must 
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transform into faith before it can be credited to him or her as righteousness. Yet, if one’s 
faith—if it were possible—were to develop such that no fear of God remained, then this 
would put a person back under the condemnation of Rom 3:18 (Ps 36:1 [2])—because all 
men and women are sinful. That person would also be in violation of Jesus’ command 
(Matt 10:28) to fear God.517 But with Eccl 12:12, it still might be the case that Qoheleth 
did intend “fear God!” to denote real fear, and knew that the commandments of the 
Mosaic Law referred to in “keep his commandments” would include the relational 
components—especially the component of love (see Deut 6:5)—that justify a man or a 
woman before God. 
An important fact should not be forgotten: even in those virtue fear-of-God 
passages that could connote something other than the fear emotion/feeling, the fact still 
remains that “fear” is the biblical word of choice. As per my understanding of the inspired 
nature of Scripture that I mentioned in the introduction, I must view this as an intentional 
choice by the Lord. If he chose to frequently define a desirable relationship with him with 
the word “fear,” then translators and interpreters should be hesitant to do otherwise. In 
most of the OT (and NT) cases in which translators interpret virtue fear-of-God into 
something other than fear, the translators—as best as I can tell in view of the foregoing 
study—simply do not have enough information to make their translations sure and 
accurate. In most virtue fear-of-God texts, one of any number of abstract ideas could fit; 
there are simply few if any contextual clues that would show which translation is best. 
This is the reason why virtue fear-of-God texts in the OT are translated in so many ways. 
God could have very easily used words for “to honor” or “to revere” or “to be obedient,” 
for example, if he had wanted readers to do these things (and, in fact he does in the many 
“virtue” cases that use these words). But with 181 OT cases, God chose to let  (“fear”) 
define a desirable relationship with him. If translators take out this word—which God 
chose to use—then the fear emotion/feeling that God might well have intended to denote 
will be lost. There are also tacit (intentional or unintentional) ramifications for theology 
and anthropology: to reduce God’s fearfulness is to reduce the attributes of God that 
evoke fear in human beings—i.e., his omnipotence, omniscience, absolute authority, and, 
most important, his absolute holiness. To reduce the fear that he is due (see Ps 90:11) is to 
not fully appreciate what these attributes are, what they mean, or how a sinful man or 
woman would react when confronted with the holy God who in both testaments (Deut 
4:24; Heb 12:29) is said to be a “consuming fire.” Anthropology is also affected—but in 
an ironic way: by downplaying the idea that men and women should manifest the fear 
emotion/feeling before God, this at first seems to make men and women closer to God; 
but the effect could be the opposite. Men and women are made in God’s image, which 
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means each has a mind and a moral nature by which a man or a woman—just like Adam 
and Eve in the garden—can choose the right or the wrong and exercise the greatest love 
or hate in the process. Human beings are “fearfully and wonderfully made” and—for 
those who are in Christ—will one day be the bride of the Son of God. Christians are being 
conformed into the image of Christ (who was made “a little lower than God” [Ps 8:5]) 
through their consent. If people do not want anything to do with Christ—at least from our 
earthly perspective—it appears that God will not bring them into a relationship with him 
against their will (and there are enough warning passages in Scripture to strongly suspect 
that this is indeed the case). When theologians are pressured to take away human consent 
in order to achieve, for example, eternal security for believers, then these theologians 
would predictably understand less reason for believers to fear God; but the price they pay 
is the degradation of the essential imago dei of humankind.   
In view of the results from this study, I conclude that the fear emotion/feeling 
remains at the heart of OT fear-of-God. We in the West should not think badly about 
fear—for it is in the end simply a pain-like sign that God graciously gives to men and 
women to alert them of danger. In the OT, reporting about the good blessings of God is 
balanced by the reporting about the curses of God. This balance was apparently designed 
to bring about the right kind and the right level of fear-of-God that would give the best 
chances for a proper relationship with God. In preaching and teaching we should strive 
for a similar balance—that is, between love and fear, God’s grace and God’s judgment, 
and heaven and hell; for eternal destinies of men and women are at stake, and God will 
hold preachers and teachers to a stricter judgment (James 3:1) because they present 
themselves—and people perceive them—as shepherds. Finally, when teaching or 
preaching about fear-of-God, the flock should be reminded that it is in the end all about 
God’s love; for God is “not willing that any should perish but that all should come to 
repentance” (2 Pet 3:9 NKJV). He takes “no pleasure in the death of the wicked” (Ezek 
33:11); nevertheless, the Bible clearly teaches that most men and women have refused, 
are refusing, and will refuse to accept Jesus Christ as Lord—for “the gate is wide and the 
road is easy that leads to destruction, and there are many who take it” (Matt 7:13). The 
future for them, according to the writer of Hebrews (Heb 10:27), is the “fearful prospect 
of judgment, and a fury of fire that will consume the adversaries.” The “fear of the LORD 
is the beginning of wisdom” (Prov 9:10) because it is a foundational part of God’s loving 
providence that gives men and women the ability to sense that they are in danger, and 
provides for them the motivation to seek the God who can save them from that danger.  
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8:11…185 
8:27…184, 185 
8:30…186 
8:34, 36, 39…186 
8:40…79, 150 
8:43…79, 150, 186 
8:45, 49…186 
8:46…189, 191, 220 
10:24…174, 175 
10:28…105 
Ch 11…197 
17:13…79, 150 
18:3…79, 104, 150 
18:12…79, 104, 150 
18:19…104 
18:28…86 
II KINGS 
1:15…151 
4:1…79, 104, 151 
6:16…79, 151 
10:4…66, 79, 151 
Ch 11…177 
Ch 17…56, 84 
17:5…85 
17:7…79, 85, 151 
17:12…85 
17:13…85 
17:16…85 
17:17…85, 86 
17:7-41…85, 137 
17:24-28…127 
17:25…79, 89, 151 
17:27…127 
17:28…79, 151 
17:31…128 
17:32…104, 151 
17:33…104, 151 
17:34…104, 151 
17:33-39…79 
17:34…80, 90, 151 
17:35-39…85, 151 
17:35…80, 86, 90, 151 
17:36…80, 90, 151 
17:37…85, 151 
17:38-39…86, 87, 128, 151 
17:39…89, 128, 137, 151 
17:41…79, 104, 151 
18:22…88 
19:6…141 
19:37…88 
21:3…88 
23:10…86, 226 
25:24…151 
25:26…151 
 
I CHRONICLES 
Ch 1…174 
3:12…72 
10:4…151 
13:12…151, 225 
16:8-36…137 
16:25…151 
16:25-26…86 
16:30…224 
17:21…151 
22:13…151 
II CHRONICLES 
6:31…151 
6:33…151 
6:36…191 
7:14…185 
9:23…174 
19:7…168, 170 
19:7, 9…164, 165 
19:9…151, 168 
19: 10…165 
20:3…151 
20:15…151 
20:17…151 
28:3…226 
32:7…151 
32:8…151 
33:6…226 
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EZRA 
9:4…170, 208 
10:3…170 
NEHEMIAH 
1:5…151 
1:11…57, 151 
2:2…151 
2:6…179 
4:14 (8)…151 
5:9…151 
5:15…151 
6:9…151 
6:13…151 
6:14…151 
6:16…151 
6:19…151 
7:2…151 
9:32…151 
11:30…226 
13:26…177 
ESTHER 
7:6…199 
9:27…179 
JOB 
1:1…25, 100, 104, 151 
1:8…25, 100, 105, 151 
1:9…24, 151 
1:21…10 
2:3…25, 100, 105, 151 
4:6…151 
5:21…151 
5:22…151 
6:14…151 
6:21…151 
9:35…65, 151 
11:15…152 
15:4…152 
22:4…152 
27:24…65 
28:28…2, 57, 112, 116, 152 
31:30…57 
32:6…152 
37:22…152 
37:24…152 
PSALMS 
2:1-2…165 
2:10…110 
2:11…111, 119, 152, 161, 
165, 168 
2:11-12…110 
2:12…117, 134 
3:6 (7)…152 
3:21 (22)…106 
4:2 (3:20)…100 
5:4-6…56 
5:7-8…56,57 
5:8…152 
8:2…138 
8:5…237 
Ps 14…190 
14:1-3…189 
14:1, 3…190 
14:3…220 
15:4…95, 152 
19:9a…31, 152 
19:7…11 
21:8 (4)…103 
22:23 (24)…81, 95, 96, 152 
22:24, 26…24, 57 
22:25(26)…95, 152 
22:26 (27)…108 
23:4…152 
25:12…99, 100, 152 
25:14…24, 95, 106, 152 
27:1…152 
27:3…152 
28:1…61 
31:19 (20)…95, 106, 152 
32:11…101 
33:8…152, 169, 224 
33:9-11…170 
33:18…57, 95, 106, 152 
34:7(8)…95, 106, 152 
34:9 (10)…95, 101, 106, 107, 
152, 160 
34:11…152 
36:1(2)…168, 171, 234, 235, 
236 
36:2…165, 236 
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40:3…152 
45:4…152 
45:5…24 
46:2…152 
47:2(3)…152 
47:3…97 
49:5…152 
49:16…152 
52:6…152 
Ps 53…190 
53:1, 3…190 
55:5 (6)…111, 152 
55:19…152 
56:3 (4)…152 
56:4 (5)…152 
56:11 (12)…152 
60:4 (6)…95, 106, 152 
61:5 (6)…95, 106, 152 
64:4 (5)…152 
64:4, 9 (5, 10)…165, 168 
64:7…165 
64:9 (10)…152 
65:5 (6)…152 
65:8 (9)…152 
66:3…152 
66:5…152 
66:16…95, 108, 152 
67:7 (8)…152 
68:35 (36)…97, 152 
72:5…152 
76:7…97, 152 
76:8 (9)…152 
76:7-8…37 
76:8-9…37 
76:11…152 
76:12 (13)…152 
85:9 (10)…95, 106, 152 
86:11…152 
88:3…169 
88:7…169 
88:15-16…169 
89:7 (8)…152 
Ps 90…111 
90:7…111 
90:11…153, 165, 168, 236 
91:5…153 
96:4…153 
96:9…224 
97:5…199 
99:3…153 
102:15 (16)…153 
103:11…VII, VIII, 95, 106, 
107, 153 
103:13…95, 106, 153 
103:17…95, 106, 153 
111:5…95, 106, 153 
111:9…153 
111:10…111, 112, 153 
112:1…99, 105, 153 
112:7…153 
112:8…153 
114:7…199 
115:1…153 
115:11…95, 153 
115:13…95, 153 
118:4…95, 153 
118:6…153, 216 
119:38…153 
119:63…153 
119:74…95, 108, 153 
119:79…95, 108, 153 
119:120…153, 171, 208, 224 
119:130…11 
119:161…165, 171 
128:1…99, 100, 153 
128:4…99, 100, 147, 153 
130:4…153 
135:20…95, 153 
139:14…153 
139:21…103 
143:2…191 
144:13…103 
145:6…153 
145:18…108 
145:19…95, 106, 153 
145:20…106 
147:11…57, 95, 106, 108, 
153 
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PROVERBS 
Ch 1-9…25, 201 
1:1-6…112 
1:6…11 
1:7…25, 37, 90, 111, 112, 
153, 162, 193, 231 
1:7a…1, 64, 135 
1:7b…112 
1:29…25, 153 
2:5…25, 153 
3:7…153 
3:25…153 
4:23…123 
8:13…112, 153, 162 
8:17, 21…103 
9:10…25, 90, 111, 112, 113, 
153,162, 193, 237 
9:10a…30 
10:27…57, 113, 153 
13:13…100, 105, 153 
14:2…25, 100, 105,153 
14:16…153 
14:26…113, 153 
14:27…112, 113, 153, 162 
15:16…153 
15:33…25, 112, 153, 160, 
162 
16:6…113, 114, 153 
16:4-6…114 
19:23…112, 113, 153, 162 
20:9…192, 220 
22:4…57, 113, 153 
23:17…153 
24:21…153, 168 
24:21-22…115, 166 
28:14…171 
31:21…153 
31:30…100, 105, 113, 135, 
153 
31:30b…1, 64 
ECCLESIASTES 
1:1…175, 186 
1:1-2…201 
1:2…203 
1:2-9…176 
1:2-2:26…175 
1:3…181 
1:4…202 
1:4-11…175 
1:5-7…175 
1:9…173, 180 
1:10…180 
1:11…176, 177, 202 
1:12…175, 186 
1:12-2:23…182 
1:12-2:26…186 
1:13…182 
1:13-18…175, 176 
1:14, 17…203 
1:15…175 
1:27…33 
2:1…203 
2:1-2…176 
2:4-6…175 
2:4-7…175 
2:4-9…186 
2:7…175 
2:8…175 
2:9…175 
2:10…197 
2:11…4, 176, 180, 183, 203 
2:12…176, 186 
2:13-14…197 
2:14…196 
2:14-21…176 
2:15…203, 207 
2:16…202 
2:17…176, 180, 203 
2:18…177. 202 
2:19…203 
2:21…177, 182, 202, 203 
2:22…181 
2:23…176, 203 
2:24…176, 182, 203 
2:24-26…197 
2:25…180, 182, 197 
2:26…203 
3:1-8…173, 175, 179, 181 
3:1-14…185 
3:2…177, 183, 202 
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3:8…183, 206 
3:9…181 
3:9-11…176 
3:10-11…180 
3:11…51, 180, 181, 182 
3:12…176, 182, 183, 196, 
197, 203 
3:13…182, 183, 197, 203 
3:14…15, 24, 36, 153, 172, 
175, 176, 178, 180, 183, 184, 
188, 196, 199, 200, 201, 224 
3:15…180 
3:16…176, 192 
3:16-17…175, 205 
3:16-18…180, 191 
3:17…176, 180, 184, 191, 
197, 203, 206, 207 
3:19…203 
3:19-20…176 
3:19-21…177 
3:19-22…202 
3:21…178, 182 
3:22…176, 182, 197, 203 
4:1-4…176 
4:2-3…177, 202 
4:4…203 
4:5…175 
4:7…176, 203 
4:8…176, 203 
4:13-16…175, 186 
4:16…203 
4:17-5:5…185, 186, 187 
4:17-5:6…188 
5:1…173, 186, 187, 188 
5:1-6…185, 186, 187 
5:1-7…175 
5:2…187, 193 
5:3…175 
5:4…187 
5:4-7…175 
5:5…187 
5:6…24, 172, 179, 187, 188, 
189 
5:7…153, 175, 178, 185, 188, 
192, 199, 200, 201, 203 
5:8…175, 176 
5:8-9…175, 186 
5:10-12…175 
5:10-17…175 
5:9-6:9…173 
5:10…203 
5:11-12…175 
5:13-17…176 
5:14…173, 202 
5:15…202 
5:16…177, 181, 202 
5:17…176 
5:18…177, 182, 197, 202, 
203 
5:18-20…182 
5:19…180, 182, 197 
5:20…197 
6:1-6…180 
6:1-8…176 
6:1-9…175 
6:2…203 
6:3, 6…177 
6:3-6…202 
6:6…177 
6:8…207 
6:9…203 
6:9-12…175 
6:10…176 
6:11…203, 207 
6:12…176, 177, 178, 182, 
202, 203 
7:1…176 
7:1-2…177 
7:1-4…202 
7:1-12…175 
7:6…203 
7:9…173 
7:11…207 
7:11-12…197 
7:13-14…181 
7:13-15…176 
7:15…177, 190, 191, 192, 
203, 220 
7:15-17…202 
7:16-18…190, 192, 227 
7:16-19…175 
7:16-20…193 
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7:17…177 
7:18…25, 100, 105, 154, 175, 
178, 190, 195, 199, 200, 201, 
220 
7:19…197 
7:20…173, 175, 176, 189, 
190, 191, 192, 219, 220 
7:21-22…175, 191 
7:23…181, 182 
7:23-24…176 
7:24…12 
7:25…196 
7:26…177, 197, 202 
7:26-27…175 
7:26-29…176 
7:27…186, 201 
7:27-28…201 
7:28-29…191 
7:29…197 
8:1…197 
8:1-8…176 
8:2-6…175, 186 
8:5…179, 186 
8:5-8:8…181 
8:6…203 
8:8…175, 177, 197, 202 
8:9…196 
8:9-12…195 
8:10…176, 177, 202, 203 
8:11…175 
8:12…154, 196, 197, 202 
8:12a…25, 100, 105 
8:12-13…65, 175, 178, 195, 
197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 224 
8:13…104, 154, 177, 197, 
202, 234 
8:14…176, 192, 195, 196, 
203 
8:15…176, 182, 197, 203 
8:16-17…176, 181 
8:16-18…195 
9:1…135, 191 
9:1-2…181 
9:1-3…176 
9:2…104, 154 
9:2-6…177 
9:2-10…202 
9:3…178 
9:4…197 
9:5…177 
9:5-6…176 
9:5-16…176 
9:6…178 
9:7-9…176, 198, 203 
9:7-10…182, 204 
9:9…176, 182, 203 
9:10…177, 178, 182 
9:11…178, 181, 191 
9:11-16…181 
9:13-16…175 
9:17-18…175, 198 
10:1…176 
10:1-4…175 
10:4…175 
10:5-7…175 
10:5-9…176 
10:8-10…175 
10:10…198 
10:12-14…175 
10:14…176 
10:15…175 
10:16-17…175 
10:16-20…186 
10:18-19…175 
10:20…175 
11:1-6…181 
11:1-7…175 
11:5…173, 176 
11:7-12:1…176 
11:8…176, 177, 182, 202, 
203 
11:8-9…176, 182 
11:8-10…203 
11:9…181, 182, 184, 198, 
200, 203, 205, 206, 207 
11:9-12:7…204 
11:10…176, 203 
12:1…176 
12:1-7…175, 177, 201, 202, 
203, 205 
12:1-8…176, 181 
12:2-3, 5-6…202 
12:5…65, 154 
 258 
12:7…182, 198 
12:8…203 
12:8-14…201 
12:9-10…186 
12:9-14…206 
12:10…176, 198 
12:11…205 
12:12…236 
12:13…24, 90, 154, 175, 176, 
178, 199, 200, 201, 205, 206, 
208, 215, 235 
12:13a…26 
12:14…181, 184, 191, 198, 
203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 215 
ISAIAH 
2:19…170 
2:20-21…170 
3:18-4:1…202 
6:1…103 
7:2…166 
7:4…154 
7:25…154 
8:7, 8…166 
8:12, 13…166, 154 
8:13…168 
10:24…154 
11:2…154 
11:2, 3a…33, 142 
11:3…154 
13:9-10…202 
18:2, 7…97, 154 
21:1…24, 154 
25:3…154 
29:13…55, 56, 154 
29:14…124 
30:27…21 
33:6…154 
33:14…211 
35:4…154 
37:6…154 
40:8…10 
40:9…154 
41:5…154 
41:10…154 
41:13, 14…154 
43:1, 5…154 
44:2…154 
45:5a…69 
50:10…100, 105, 154 
51:7…154 
51:12…154 
51:20…103 
54:4…154 
54:14…154 
57:9…166 
57:11…65, 154, 166, 168 
59:19…154 
60:2-3…171 
62:5…141, 171 
63:17…154 
64(3)…154 
66:2…208 
66:3…170 
66:24…226 
JEREMIAH 
1:8…154 
3:8…154 
4:4…39 
5:22…65, 154, 166, 168, 225 
5:24…154 
6:11…102 
7:19…226 
7:30-34…226 
9:23-24 (22-23)…124 
10:5…154 
10:7…154 
17:8…154 
23:4…154 
23:24…103 
26:19…104, 154 
26:21…154 
30:10…154 
32:25…226 
32:39…154 
32:40…154 
36:24…165, 171 
36:23…171 
40:9…154 
41:18…154 
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42:11…104, 155, 224 
42:16…104, 155 
44:10…155 
46:27…155 
46:28…155 
51:46…155 
LAMENTATIONS 
1:8…102 
3:57…155 
EZEKIEL 
1:18…155 
1:22…24, 155 
2:6…155 
3:5-6…102 
3:9…155 
Ch 10…185 
11:8…155 
17:2-24…11 
30:3…202 
30:13…155 
33:11…10, 237 
DANIEL 
1:10…104, 155 
7…11 
8:17…199 
9:4…103, 155 
10:12, 19…72, 155 
HOSEA 
Ch.1-3…141 
1:4-5…202 
3:5…165, 171 
5:9…202 
10:3…155 
11:10-11…170 
JOEL 
2:2…202 
2:6…202 
2:10…202 
2:11…155 
2:21-22…155 
2:28…11 
2:31 (3:4)…97, 155 
3:4…97 
3:32…21 
AMOS 
3:8…155 
5:18…202 
5:20…202 
8:3…202 
8:9…202 
JONAH 
1:3…199 
1:5…66, 155 
1:9…57, 104, 155 
1:10…66, 67, 111, 155, 199 
1:12…36 
1:15-16…212 
1:16… 66, 67, 111, 155, 167, 
168, 225 
1:16b…67 
MICAH 
7:16…168 
7:17…155, 165, 168, 170, 
171, 172, 224 
HABAKKUK 
1:7…155 
3:2…155 
ZEPHANIAH 
1:15…202 
2:11…155 
3:7…155 
3:15-16…155 
HAGGAI 
1:12…155, 224 
2:5…155 
ZECHARIAH 
8:13…155 
8:15…155 
9:5…155 
MALACHI 
1:6…155 
1:14…155 
2:5…145, 155 
3:5…155 
3:16…155 
3:5…57 
3:16…100, 105 
3:20…105 
3:23…24 
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4:2 (3:20)…155 
4:5 (3:23)…97, 155 
MATTHEW 
1:20-21…11 
2:19…11 
3:10…211 
4:10…56, 94, 235 
Ch 5, 6…209 
5:5…209 
5:8…219 
5:33-37…187 
5:37…69 
5:48…189, 209 
6:4…212 
6:7…173 
7:13…237 
7:13-14…131 
7:22…212 
8:2…211 
8:28-9:1…213 
9:8…26, 68, 221 
10:7…223 
10:21…223 
10:22…219 
10:25…223 
10:26…223 
10:28…21, 86, 128, 166, 211, 
221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 
235, 236 
10:31…223 
12:3-5…11 
12:24…224 
13:1-9…216 
13:9…15 
13:18-23…216 
13:33-36…12 
13:36-43…212 
13:42…226 
14:22-33…221 
14:26…26, 68 
15:9…56 
17:1-3…221 
17:1-8…213 
17:6…26, 68, 72, 184, 221 
19:14…11 
22:13…226 
22:31…11 
22:37…72 
23:1-36…194 
23:39…18 
24:33-43…221 
24:35…10 
25:14-30…221 
25:21, 23…40 
25:30…226 
25:31-46…130, 131, 211, 
212 
25:41…226 
25:46…226 
28:1-10…221 
28:4…26, 68 
28:8, 9…221, 222 
28:10…225 
28:18…184, 214 
MARK 
2:18-20…173 
3:22…223 
4:1-9…216 
4:3-8…219 
4:13-20…216 
4:35-41…211 
4:41…26, 68 
5:1-20…213 
5:15…26, 68 
5:25-34…221 
6:9…26, 68 
6:45-52…221 
6:50…26, 68 
7:7…56 
9:2-8…213 
16:8…26, 68 
LUKE 
1:12…26, 68 
1:50…221 
1:65…26, 68 
2:9…26, 68 
3:17…190 
4:8…56, 94, 235 
5:10…26, 68 
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5:26…68 
5:28…26 
7:16…26, 68 
8:4-8…216 
8:11-15…216 
8:25…26, 68, 212 
8:26-39…213 
8:35…26, 68 
8:37…26, 68 
9:28-36…213 
9:34…26, 68 
11:29…189 
12:4…225 
12:4-5…222 
12:5…221, 235 
12:13…173 
13:25-27…212 
18:2…221 
18:9-14…194 
19:11-27…221 
22:31-32…219 
23:40…221, 225, 234 
24:5…26, 68 
24:37…26, 68, 221 
JOHN 
1:1…214 
1:14…184 
1:36…189 
1:49…214 
3:3…184 
3:3-9…11 
3:3-10…173 
3:5-8…184 
3:10…11, 173 
3:16-17…12 
5:24…216 
6:37…216 
6:14-21…221 
6:39-40…216 
6:44…184 
6:53-58…216 
6:66…216 
6:68…9, 216, 228 
6:69…216 
8:31-32…219 
8:58…214 
10:27-30…216 
10:28-29…215 
10:35…173 
14:26…184 
15:1-17…2 
15:4-10…219 
15:14…219 
16:27…216 
16:25-30…12 
16:29-33…216 
17:8…216 
17:11…216 
ACTS 
1:3…216 
1:7…184 
2:17…11 
2:21…21 
2:43…26, 68 
5:5…26, 68 
5:11…26, 68 
8:26-39…12 
9:31…184, 221 
10:2…221 
10:4…26, 68 
10:22…221 
11:23…219 
13:16…221 
13:43…219 
14:21-22…219 
17:26…180 
17:30-31…39 
19:17…26, 68 
ROMANS 
1:18-20…12, 131 
1:19-20…12, 136 
1:20b…51 
1:23…138 
1:32…12 
2:3…212 
2:6-8…219 
2:8…12 
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3:10…173, 190, 191, 220 
3:12…190 
3:18…220, 221, 235, 236 
3:23…189, 209, 220 
4:9…216 
4:14…209 
4:20-22…216 
5:1-5…216 
5:12…189 
8:13…217 
8:15…234 
8:15-17…216 
8:28, 9…215 
8:28-30…216 
8:33-35…216 
8:37-39…216 
9:22…218 
11:17-22…217 
11:19-20…218 
11:20…221 
11:20-25…164 
11:22…164, 209, 222, 234 
11:29…216 
11:33-35…12 
12:3…194 
14:10…212 
16:14…26 
I CORINTHIANS 
1:8-9…216 
1:19…124 
1:30…124 
1:30-31…125 
2:3…218 
2:6-16…5 
2:14…13 
4:4…212 
5:13…212 
6:19…5, 180 
6:20…209 
10:12…216, 218, 227 
10:12-13…219 
11:32…212 
13:12…4 
15:1-2…219 
15:19…20 
15:58…219 
16:13…219 
II CORINTHIANS 
1:21-22…216 
3:14-16…13 
3:15-18…5 
4:3-4, 6…13 
5:1-5…216 
5:10…212, 215 
5:11…215 
7:1…221 
11:13…69 
13:5…219 
13:11…219 
GALATIANS 
4:6…216 
5:1-4…219 
6:9…219 
EPHESIANS 
1:4…215 
1:4-5…216 
3:16…184 
4:30…216 
5:22-23…141 
6:13, 16, 18…219 
PHILIPPIANS 
1:6…216 
1:27…219 
2:3…194 
2:12…26, 68, 121, 129, 209, 
216, 218 
2:12-13…128, 216 
3:12-15…219 
4:1…219 
COLOSSIANS 
1:15…3 
1:16…214 
1:22…219 
1:23…217, 219 
2:2…216 
2:5-6…219 
3:5…30, 164 
3:6…164 
 263 
3:12…184 
3:22…221 
I THESSALONIANS 
4:6…212 
5:21…219 
5:23-24…216 
II THESSALONIANS 
1:5…212 
2:15-17…219 
I TIMOTHY 
1:19, 20…216 
4:1…216 
6:7…173 
6:11…219 
6:12…195, 219 
6:20-21…216 
6:21…219 
II TIMOTHY 
1:12…216 
2:12…219 
3:14…219 
4:7-8…219 
4:18…216 
HEBREWS 
2:1…219 
2:3-4…11 
2:14…224 
3:6…217, 219 
3:12…219 
3:14…217, 219 
4:1…218 
4:11…219 
4:14…219 
5:14…13 
6:4-6…219 
6:11…216, 219 
6:12…219 
6:13-20…215 
7:24-25…216 
8:1…184 
9:12…209 
9:14-15…209 
10:14…216 
10:19-39…234 
10:22-23…216 
10:23…219 
10:26-31…219 
10:27…12, 237 
10:35-36…219 
11:1…216 
11:27…219 
12:1-13…219 
12:4…195 
12:25…219 
12:28…212 
12:28-29…26, 68, 209 
12:29…190, 236 
13:5-6…216 
JAMES 
1:2-4…219 
1:5-6…13 
1:12…219 
1:17…184 
1:19…173 
2:19…207 
2:26…207 
3:1…237 
4:17…224 
5:10, 11…219 
I PETER 
1:5-7…219 
1:17…218 
1:3-5…216 
2:17…221 
3:17…219 
5:9…219 
5:10…216 
II PETER 
1:10, 11…219 
3:16…12 
I JOHN 
Ch 1…139 
1:8…219 
1:8, 9…189 
2:1, 2…216 
3:9…237 
3:9, 14…216 
 264 
3:15…2 
3:18-20…216 
4:12…219 
4:13…216 
4:16-18…29 
4:17…31, 219, 220 
4:18…128, 219, 220 
5:10, 11…216 
5:13…216 
5:18…216 
JUDE 
1…216 
21…219 
24…216 
REVELATION 
1:7…221 
1:17…72, 185, 221 
2:10…219 
2:17…219 
3:5…219 
3:11, 12…219 
3:21…219 
5:5…189 
11:18…221 
12:9…221 
14:7…221 
14:12…219 
15:3…221 
16:15…219 
19:5…221 
19:7…141 
19:10…221 
20:15…2 
21:1-4…141 
21:7…219 
21:8…107 
22:11…219 
22:13…214 
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